A legal correspondent writes to us on this subject as follows:
‘It has long been felt to be a defect in the English law that if a man
deserted his wife without any cause or otherwise, she had no direct
remedy against him in respect of the expense of her maintenance and the
bringing up of the children (if any) of the marriage. In case the wife
so deserted could carry on any business, or in any other way acquire
the means of livelihood, she could obtain a protection order so early
as the year 1858, long before the passing of the first Married Women’s
Property Act. But if she were not so fortunately situated, and had
no near relatives to whom she could look for assistance, she must go
into the workhouse, and leave the poor-law officers to look after her
husband. This has often been productive of great hardship, for it is
no light thing for a woman delicately nurtured to become an inmate
of the refuge for the destitute. But by an Act passed in the recent
session, this defect has been remedied to a considerable extent in an
easy and practical way. Thus, if an innocent woman has been deserted by
her husband, she may have him summoned before any two justices of the
peace in petty sessions or any stipendiary magistrate; and thereupon,
if the justices or magistrate should be satisfied that the husband,
being able wholly or in part to maintain his wife, or his wife and
family, as the case may be, has wilfully refused or neglected so to
do, and that he has deserted his wife, they or he may order that the
husband pay to his wife such weekly sum not exceeding two pounds as
may be considered to be in accordance with his means, taking also into
account any means which the wife may have for the support of herself
and family, if any. Power is given for the alteration of the order
whenever it should appear to be necessary or just, in case of any
alteration in the circumstances of the husband or of the wife. And any
such order may be discharged on the application of the husband, if it
should appear just to do so. Writers in some of the legal journals have
expressed the opinion that this change in the law goes too far; but the
present writer has long advocated such a change, and it appears to be
altogether an improvement upon the previous state of the law in this
respect.’