PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS OF THE SECESSIONISTS.
Arrival of Major Anderson.--Huger's Opposition to a premature
Assault on Fort Moultrie.--Anderson's Report to the Secretary of
War.--Active Preparations by the South Carolinians.--Meeting of
Congress.--Attempts at Compromise.--Secession Batteries at Mount
Pleasant.--Arrival of Major Buell with written Orders.--Vain
Efforts to Strengthen Castle Pinckney.--Northern Opinion.--Public
Meeting in Philadelphia.
It was now openly proclaimed in Charleston that declarations in favor of
the Union would no longer be tolerated; that the time for deliberation
had passed, and the time for action had come.
On the 21st our new commander arrived and assumed command. He felt as if
he had a hereditary right to be there, for his father had distinguished
himself in the Revolutionary War in defense of old Fort Moultrie against
the British, and had been confined a long time as a prisoner in
Charleston. We had long known Anderson as a gentleman; courteous,
honest, intelligent, and thoroughly versed in his profession. He had
been twice brevetted for gallantry--once for services against the
Seminole Indians in Florida, and once for the battle of Molino del Rey
in Mexico, where he was badly wounded. In politics he was a strong
pro-slavery man. Nevertheless, he was opposed to secession and Southern
extremists. He soon found himself in troubled waters, for the
approaching battle of Fort Moultrie was talked of everywhere throughout
the State, and the mob in Charleston could hardly be restrained from
making an immediate assault. They were kept back once through the
exertions of Colonel Benjamin Huger, of the Ordnance Department of the
United States Army. As he belonged to one of the most distinguished
families in Charleston, he had great influence there. It was said at the
time that he threatened if we were attacked, or rather mobbed, in this
way, he would join us, and fight by the side of his friend Anderson.[5]
Colonel Memminger, afterward the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury,
also exerted himself to prevent any irregular and unauthorized
violence.
An additional force of workmen having arrived from Baltimore, Captain
Foster retained one hundred and twenty to continue the work on Fort
Moultrie, leaving his assistant, Lieutenant Snyder, one hundred and nine
men to finish Fort Sumter.
On the 1st of December, Major Anderson made a full report to Secretary
Floyd in relation to our condition and resources. It was accompanied
with requisitions, in due form, for supplies and military material.
Colonel Gardner, before he left, had already applied for rations for the
entire command for six months.
Previous to Lincoln's election, Governor Gist had stated that in that
event the State would undoubtedly secede, and demand the forts, and that
any hesitation or delay in giving them up would lead to an immediate
assault. Active preparations were now in progress to carry out this
threat. In the first week of December we learned that cannon had been
secretly sent to the northern extremity of the island, to guard the
channel and oppose the passage of any vessels bringing us
re-enforcements by that entrance. We learned, too, that lines of
countervallation had been quietly marked out at night, with a view to
attack the fort by regular approaches in case the first assault failed.
Also, that two thousand of the best riflemen in the State were engaged
to occupy an adjacent sand-hill and the roofs of the adjoining houses,
all of which overlooked the parapet, the intention being to shoot us
down the moment we attempted to man our guns. Yet the Administration
made no arrangements to withdraw us, and no effort to re-enforce us,
because to do the former would excite great indignation in the North,
and the latter might be treated as coercion by the South. So we were
left to our own scanty resources, with every probability that the affair
would end in a massacre. Under these circumstances the appropriating of
$150,000 to repair Fort Moultrie and $80,000 to finish Fort Sumter by
the mere order of the Secretary of War, without the authority of
Congress, was simply an expenditure of public money for the benefit of
the Secessionists, and I have no doubt it was so intended. Forts
constructed in an enemy's country, and left unguarded, are built for the
enemy.
Congress met on the 3d of December, but took no action in relation to
our peculiar position. As usual, their whole idea was to settle the
matter by some new compromise. The old experiment was to be tried over
again: St. Michael and the Dragon were to lie down in peace, and become
boon companions once more.
The office-holders in the South, who saw in Lincoln's election an end to
their pay and emoluments, were Secessionists to a man, and did their
best to keep up the excitement. They tried to make the poor whites
believe that through the re-opening of the African slave-trade negroes
would be for sale, in a short time, at thirty dollars a head; and that
every laboring man would soon become a rich slave-owner and
cotton-planter. To the timid, they said there would be no coercion. To
the ambitious, they spoke of military glory, and the formation of a vast
slave empire, to include Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies.
The merchants were assured that Charleston would be a free port,
rivaling New York in its trade and opulence.
They painted the future in glowing colors, but the present looked dreary
enough. All business was at an end. The expenses of the State had become
enormous, and financial ruin was rapidly approaching. The heavy
property-owners began to fear they might have to bear the brunt of all
these military preparations in the way of forced loans.[6] For a time a
strong reaction set in against the Rhett faction, but intimidation and
threats prevented any open retrograde movement.
Among those who were reported to be most clamorous to have an immediate
attack made upon us, was a certain captain of the United States
Dragoons, named Lucius B. Northrup; afterward made Paymaster-general of
South Carolina, and subsequently, through the personal friendship of
Jeff. Davis, promoted to be Commissary-general of the rebel army. He had
resided for several years in Charleston on sick-leave, on full pay.
Before urging an assault he should have had the grace to resign his
commission, for his oath of office bound him to be a friend to his
comrades in the army, and not an enemy. I am tempted, in this
connection, to show how differently the rebel general Magruder acted,
under similar circumstances, when he was a captain and brevet colonel in
our service. He said to his officers, the evening before he rode over
the Long Bridge, at Washington, to join the Confederates, "If the
rebels come to-night, we'll give them hell; but to-morrow I shall send
in my resignation, and become a rebel myself."
Amidst all this turmoil, our little band of regulars kept their spirits
up, and determined to fight it out to the last against any force that
might be brought against them. The brick-layers, however, at work in
Fort Sumter were considerably frightened. They held a meeting, and
resolved to defend themselves, if attacked by the Charleston roughs, but
not to resist any organized force.
On the 11th of December we had the good fortune to get our provisions
from town without exciting observation. They had been lying there
several days. It was afterward stated in the papers that the captain of
the schooner was threatened severely for having brought them. On the
same day the enemy began to build batteries at Mount Pleasant, and at
the upper end of Sullivan's Island, guns having already been sent there.
We also heard that ladders had been provided for parties to escalade our
walls. Indeed, the proposed attack was no longer a secret. Gentlemen
from the city said to us, "We appreciate your position. It is a point of
honor with you to hold the fort, but a political necessity obliges us
to take it."
My wife, becoming indignant at these preparations, and the utter apathy
of the Government in regard to our affairs, wrote a stirring letter to
my brother, in New York, stating some of the facts I have mentioned. By
some means it found its way into the columns of the _Evening Post_, and
did much to call attention to the subject, and awaken the Northern
people to a true sense of the situation. She was quite distressed to
find her hasty expressions in print, and freely commented on both by
friends and enemies. I may say, in passing, that the distinguished
editor of that paper, William Cullen Bryant, proved to be one of the
best friends we had at the North. George W. Curtis, who aided us freely
with his pen and influence, was another. They exerted themselves to
benefit us in every way, and were among the first to invoke the
patriotism of the nation to extricate us from our difficulties, and save
the union of the States. When we returned to New York, they and their
friends gave us a cordial and heartfelt welcome.
To resume the thread of my narrative. The fort by this time had been
considerably strengthened. The crevices were filled up, and the walls
were made sixteen feet high, by digging down to the foundations and
throwing up the surplus earth as a glacis. Each of the officers had a
certain portion given him to defend. I caused a sloping picket fence,
technically called _a fraise_, to be projected over the parapet on my
side of the work, as an obstacle against an escalading party. I
understood that this puzzled the military men and newspapers in
Charleston exceedingly. They could not imagine what object I could have
in view. One of the editors said, in reference to it, "Make ready your
sharpened stakes, but you will not intimidate freemen."
There was one good reason why our opponents did not desire to commence
immediate hostilities. The delay was manifestly to their advantage, for
the engineers were putting Fort Sumter in good condition at the expense
of the United States. They (the rebels) intended to occupy it as soon as
the work approached completion. In the mean time, to prevent our
anticipating them, they kept two steamers on guard, to patrol the
harbor, and keep us from crossing. These boats contained one hundred and
twenty soldiers, and were under the command of Ex-lieutenant James
Hamilton, who had recently resigned from the United States Navy.
The threatening movements against Fort Moultrie required incessant
vigilance on our part, and we were frequently worn out with watching and
fatigue. On one of these occasions Mrs. Seymour and Mrs. Doubleday
volunteered to take the places of Captain Seymour and myself, and they
took turns in walking the parapet, two hours at a time, in readiness to
notify the guard in case the minute-men became more than usually
demonstrative.
In December the secretary sent another officer of the
Inspector-general's Department, Major Don Carlos Buell, to examine and
report upon our condition. Buell bore written orders, which were
presented on the 11th, directing Major Anderson not to provoke
hostilities, but in case of immediate danger to defend himself to the
last extremity, and take any steps that he might think necessary for
that purpose. There would appear to be some mystery connected with this
subject, for Anderson afterward stated to Seymour, as a reason for not
firing when the rebels attempted to sink the _Star of the West_, that
his instructions tied his hands, and obliged him to remain quiescent.
Now, as there are no orders of this character on record in the War
Department, they must have been of a verbal and confidential nature. In
my opinion, Floyd was fully capable of supplementing written orders to
resist, by verbal orders to surrender without resistance. If he did so,
I can conceive of nothing more treacherous, for his object must have
been to make Anderson the scape-goat of whatever might occur. Buell,
however, is not the man to be the bearer of any treacherous
communication. Still, he did not appear to sympathize much with us, for
he expressed his disapproval of our defensive preparations; referring
particularly to some loop-holes near the guard-house, which he said
would have a tendency to irritate the people. I thought the remark a
strange one, under the circumstances, as "the people" were preparing to
attack us. I had no doubt, at the time, in spite of the warlike message
he had brought, that Buell's expressions reflected the wishes of his
superiors. I have ascertained recently that Floyd did have one or more
confidential agents in Charleston, who were secretly intermeddling in
this matter, without the sanction of the President or the open authority
of the War Office. It appears from the records that another assistant
adjutant-general, Captain Withers, who joined the rebels at the outbreak
of the rebellion, and became a rebel general, was also sent by Floyd to
confer with Anderson. It is not at all improbable, therefore, that some
one of the messengers who actually joined the enemy may have been the
bearer of a treasonable communication. It appears from Anderson's own
statement that his hands were tied, and no one that knew him would ever
doubt his veracity. Yet, if he really desired to retain possession of
Charleston harbor for the Government, and Floyd's orders stood in his
way, why did he not, after the latter fled to the South, make a plain
statement to the new secretary, Judge Holt, whose patriotism was
undoubted, and ask for fresh instructions? It looks to me very much as
if he accepted the orders without question because he preferred the
policy of non-resistance.
I shall have occasion to refer to this subject again in the course of my
narrative.
We had frequently regretted the absence of a garrison in Castle
Pinckney, as that post, being within a mile of Charleston, could easily
control the city by means of its mortars and heavy guns. We were too
short-handed ourselves to spare a single soldier. The brave
ordnance-sergeant, Skillen, who was in charge there, begged hard that we
would send him a few artillerists. He could not bear the thought of
surrendering the work to the enemies of the Government without a
struggle, and would have made a determined resistance if he could have
found any one to stand by him. We talked the matter over, and Captain
Foster thought he could re-enforce Skillen by selecting a few reliable
men from his masons to assist in defending the place. He accordingly
sent a body of picked workmen there, under his assistant, Lieutenant
R.K. Meade, with orders to make certain repairs. The moment, however,
Meade attempted to teach these men the drill at the heavy guns, they
drew back in great alarm, and it was soon seen that no dependence could
be placed upon them. So Castle Pinckney was left to its fate.
As the General Government seemed quietly to have deserted us, we watched
the public sentiment at the North with much interest. There was but
little to encourage us there. The Northern cities, however, were
beginning to appreciate the gravity of the crisis. At the call of the
Mayor of Philadelphia, a great public meeting was held in Independence
Square. For one, I was thoroughly dispirited and disgusted at the
resolutions that were passed. They were evidently prompted by the
almighty dollar, and the fear of losing the Southern trade. They urged
that the North should be more than ever subservient to the South, more
active in catching fugitive slaves, and more careful not to speak
against the institution of slavery. As a pendant to these resolutions,
an official attempt was made, a few days afterward, to prevent the
eloquent Republican orator, George W. Curtis, from advocating the
Northern side of the question.