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[Illustration: FORT SUMTER.]
REMINISCENCES
OF
FORTS SUMTER AND MOULTRIE
IN 1860-'61
BY ABNER DOUBLEDAY
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL U.S.A.
[Illustration]
NEW YORK
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
FRANKLIN SQUARE
1876
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, by
HARPER & BROTHERS,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
INTRODUCTION.
Now that the prejudices and bitter partisan feeling of the past are
subsiding, it seems a fitting time to record the facts and incidents
connected with the first conflict of the Rebellion. Of the eleven
officers who took part in the events herein narrated, but four now
survive. Before the hastening years shall have partially obliterated
many circumstances from my memory, and while there is still an
opportunity for conference and friendly criticism, I desire to make,
from letters, memoranda, and documents in my possession, a statement
which will embody my own recollections of the turbulent days of 1860 and
1861.
I am aware that later and more absorbing events have caused the earlier
struggles of the war to recede in the distance; but those who were in
active life at that time will not soon forget the thrill of emotion and
sympathy which followed the movements of Anderson's little band, when it
became its duty to unfold the flag of the Union against a united South
in arms.
I know how difficult it is to write contemporaneous history, or even to
give a bare detail of facts, without wounding the susceptibilities of
others; but whenever I have felt called upon to give my own opinion, I
have endeavored to do so in the spirit of Lincoln's immortal
sentiment--"With malice toward none; with charity for all."
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
FORT MOULTRIE IN 1860.
The Garrison of Fort Moultrie.--Early Indications of
Secession.--Situation of the Fort.--Edmund Ruffin and Robert Barnwell
Rhett.--The Secretary of War.--Arms sent to the South.--Colonel
Gardner.--Captain Foster ordered to Charleston Harbor.--The Officers at
Fort Moultrie.--Communications with Northern Men by
Cipher.--Proscription of Antislavery Men in Charleston.--Position of
Charleston Merchants.--The Secession Leaders only prepared to resist
Coercion.--The Mob proves Unmanageable.--General Scott's Letter to the
President, October 29th.--The Situation in November.--No Instructions
from Washington.--Colonel Gardner's Report to General Wool. _Page_ 13
CHAPTER II.
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE.
Defeat of Captain Seymour's Expedition on the Ashley.--Mayor Macbeth's
Explanation.--Captain Foster's Work on Fort Moultrie.--Governor Gist
convenes the South Carolina Legislature.--Creation of a Standing
Army.--Arrival of Masons from Baltimore.--Situation of Fort Sumter.--A
Dramatic Incident.--Secretary Floyd's Action.--Horace Greeley's Advocacy
of the Right of Secession.--The Situation November 18th. 30
CHAPTER III.
PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS OF THE SECESSIONISTS.
Arrival of Major Anderson.--Huger's Opposition to a Premature Assault on
Fort Moultrie.--Anderson's Report to the Secretary of War.--Active
Preparations by the South Carolinians.--Meeting of Congress.--Attempts
at Compromise.--Secession Batteries at Mount Pleasant.--Arrival of Major
Buell with Written Orders.--Vain Efforts to Strengthen Castle
Pinckney.--Northern Opinion.--Public Meeting in Philadelphia. 41
CHAPTER IV.
THE REMOVAL TO FORT SUMTER.
Passage of the Secession Ordinance.--Governor Pickens's
Proclamation.--Judge Petigru's Visit to Fort Moultrie.--Floyd's
Treachery.--Yancey's Lectures in the North.--The Removal to Sumter. 55
CHAPTER V.
THE FIRST OVERT ACT.
The New Quarters.--Seizure of Castle Pinckney by Charleston
Troops.--Raising the Flag at Fort Sumter.--The Sergeant's
Daughter.--Major Anderson's Position.--The Charleston Troops take Fort
Moultrie.--A Military Problem.--Condition of Fort Sumter.--Governor
Pickens's Commission.--A New Outrage. 68
CHAPTER VI.
EFFECT OF ANDERSON'S MOVEMENT.
President Buchanan Aroused.--Excitement in Charleston.--The Situation at
the Beginning of 1861.--Governor Pickens's War Measures.--"My heart was
never in this War". 82
CHAPTER VII.
THE "STAR OF THE WEST."
Promise of Succor.--Fatal Delay.--A Contumacious Chaplain.--Visit from
our Ladies.--Governor Pickens's Cabinet.--Appearance of the Star of the
West.--The Vessel fired upon from Morris Island and Fort
Moultrie.--Major Anderson's Protest.--Governor Pickens's Reply. 92
CHAPTER VIII.
A RESORT TO DIPLOMACY.
Major Anderson's Proposed Diplomatic Negotiations.--Defensive
Preparations.--Changes in the Cabinet.--Meade's Defection.--Anecdote of
Governor Pickens.--Battery at Cummings Point.--Soldiers' Families
Removed.--A Threatening Letter.--Confederate Visitors to the
Fort.--Organization of the Confederate Government. 107
CHAPTER IX.
THE CRISIS AT HAND.
South Carolina's Grievances.--Inauguration of President
Lincoln.--Determination to Re-enforce Sumter.--An Audacious
Proposal.--The Shannon.--New Rebel Batteries Unmasked.--Formal Notice of
Bombardment. 123
CHAPTER X.
THE BOMBARDMENT.
The First Shot.--Defective Guns.--John Carmody's Exploit.--Destructive
Effects of the Bombardment.--Burning of the Officers'
Quarters.--Terrific Conflagration. 143
CHAPTER XI.
THE EVACUATION.
Senator Wigfall's Volunteer Mission.--Terms of Evacuation Settled.--The
Question of Casualties on the Other Side.--Salute to the
Flag.--Occupation of the Fort by Southern Troops.--Embarkation.--Welcome
in New York.--Conclusion. 161
APPENDIX. 179
[Illustration: MAP OF CHARLESTON HARBOR.]
REMINISCENCES OF FORTS SUMTER AND MOULTRIE IN 1860-'61.
CHAPTER I.
FORT MOULTRIE IN 1860.
The Garrison of Fort Moultrie.--Early Indications of
Secession.--Situation of the Fort.--Edmund Ruffin and Robert
Barnwell Rhett.--The Secretary of War.--Arms sent to the
South.--Colonel Gardner.--Captain Foster ordered to Charleston
Harbor.--The Officers at Fort Moultrie.--Communications with
Northern Men by Cipher.--Proscription of Antislavery Men in
Charleston.--Position of Charleston Merchants.--The Secession
Leaders only prepared to resist Coercion.--The Mob proves
unmanageable.--General Scott's Letter to the President, October
29.--The Situation in November.--No Instructions from
Washington.--Colonel Gardner's Report to General Wool.
The summer of 1860 found me stationed at the head-quarters of the First
United States Artillery at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina. I was captain
of Company E, and second in command to Brevet Colonel John L. Gardner,
who was lieutenant-colonel of the regiment. The regimental band and
Captain Truman Seymour's company (H) also formed part of the garrison.
The other forts were unoccupied, except by the ordnance-sergeants in
charge.
Charleston, at this period, was far from being a pleasant place for a
loyal man. Almost every public assemblage was tinctured with treasonable
sentiments, and toasts against the flag were always warmly applauded. As
early as July there was much talk of secession, accompanied with
constant drilling, and threats of taking the forts as soon as a
separation should occur.
To the South Carolinians Fort Moultrie was almost a sacred spot,
endeared by many precious historical associations; for the ancestors of
most of the principal families had fought there in the Revolutionary War
behind their hastily improvised ramparts of palmetto logs, and had
gained a glorious victory over the British fleet in its first attempt to
enter the harbor and capture the city.
The modern fort had been built nearly on the site of the ancient one.
Its walls were but twelve feet high. They were old, weak, and so full of
cracks that it was quite common to see soldiers climb to the top by
means of the support these crevices afforded to their hands and feet.
The constant action of the sea-breeze had drifted one immense heap of
sand against the shore-front of the work, and another in the immediate
vicinity. These sand-hills dominated the parapet, and made the fort
untenable. Indeed, it was originally built by the engineers as a mere
sea-battery, with just sufficient strength to prevent it from being
taken by a _coup de main_. As an overpowering force of militia could
always be summoned for its defense, it was supposed that no foreign army
would ever attempt to besiege it. The contingency that the people of
Charleston themselves might attack a fort intended for their own
protection had never been anticipated.
Our force was pitifully small, even for a time of peace and for mere
police purposes. It consisted of sixty-one enlisted men and seven
officers, together with thirteen musicians of the regimental band;
whereas the work called for a war garrison of three hundred men.
The first indication of actual danger came from Richmond, Virginia, in
the shape of urgent inquiries as to the strength of our defenses, and
the number of available troops in the harbor. These questions were put
by a resident of that city named Edmund Ruffin; an old man, whose later
years had been devoted to the formation of disunion lodges, and who
became subsequently noted for firing the first gun at Fort Sumter. His
love of slavery amounted to fanaticism. When the cause of the Rebellion
became hopeless, he refused to survive it, and committed suicide.
In the beginning of July, Robert Barnwell Rhett, and other ultra men in
Charleston, made violent speeches to the mob, urging them to drive every
United States official out of the State; but as many influential
Secessionists were enjoying the sweets of Federal patronage under
Buchanan, we did not anticipate any immediate disturbance. To influence
his hearers still more, Rhett did not hesitate to state that Hamlin was
a mulatto, and he asked if they intended to submit to a negro
vice-president.[1]
It is an interesting question to know how far at this period the
Secretary of War himself was loyal. Mr. Dawson, the able editor of the
_Historical Magazine_, is of opinion, after a careful investigation of
the facts, that Floyd at this time was true to the Union, and that he
remained so until December 24th, when it was discovered that he had been
advancing large sums of money from the Treasury to contractors, to pay
for work which had never been commenced. To make the loss good, nearly a
million of dollars was taken from the Indian Trust Fund.
Finding he would be dismissed from the Cabinet for his complicity in
these transactions, and would also be indicted by the Grand Jury of the
District of Columbia, he made a furious Secession speech, sent in his
resignation, and suddenly left for the South.[2] Mr. Dawson founds his
opinion in this case upon the statement of Fitz John Porter, who was a
major on duty in the War Department at the time, and therefore
apparently well qualified to judge. Floyd's actions toward us, however,
were not those of a true man, and I am of opinion that his loyalty was
merely assumed for the occasion. He sent seventeen thousand muskets to
South Carolina, when he knew that Charleston was a hot-bed of sedition,
and that in all probability the arms would be used against the United
States. Greeley says, in his "American Conflict," that during these
turbulent times Floyd disarmed the Government by forwarding one hundred
and fifteen thousand muskets, in all, to the Southern Confederacy.[3] In
addition to this, he sold large quantities of arms to S.B. Lamar, of
Savannah, and other Secessionists in the South, on the plea that the
muskets thus disposed of did not conform to the latest army model. Just
before his resignation, he continued the same policy by directing that
one hundred and twenty-four heavy guns should be shipped from Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania, to Ship Island, Mississippi, where there was no garrison,
and to Galveston, Texas. Yet this was the official upon whom we were to
rely for advice and protection. This was the wolf who was to guard the
fold.
Our commander, Colonel Gardner, had done good service in the War of 1812
and in Mexico; but now, owing to his advanced age, was ill fitted to
weather the storm that was about to burst upon us. In politics he was
quite Southern, frequently asserting that the South had been treated
outrageously in the question of the Territories, and defrauded of her
just rights in other respects. He acquiesced, however, in the necessity
of defending the fort should it be attacked; but as he lived with his
family outside of the walls, he could not take a very active part
himself. Indeed, on one occasion, when a Secession meeting was held in
our immediate vicinity, accompanied with many threats and noisy
demonstrations, he sent word to me to assume command at once in his
place.
He now found himself in a peculiar position. The populace were becoming
excited, and there was every probability that a collision, accidental or
otherwise, might occur at any moment between the troops and the mob
outside, if not between the troops and the State militia. The dilemma
which confronted him was either to make a disgraceful surrender of his
command, or take the other alternative, and fight South Carolina
single-handed, without the aid or co-operation of the General
Government. He thought the difficulty might perhaps be solved by
removing the garrison to Smithville, North Carolina, having received
permission to do so, in case the yellow fever, which had proved so
disastrous the previous year, should break out again. Strange to say,
some of the most ultra papers in the Southern interest in New York and
Charleston ridiculed the proposed movement. They probably feared that
our absence might deprive the conspirators of the prestige of an easy
victory.
By the middle of August the country people began to be quite violent in
their language, and made many threats of what they would do in case of
Lincoln's election.
While the rebellion was thus drifting onward, the North remained
quiescent, utterly refusing to believe in the existence of any real
danger. Yet it was publicly known that, although the Southern States had
refused to commit themselves to Secession, they were pledged not to
allow South Carolina to be coerced, and this practically amounted to a
powerful league against the Union, since it was a combination to prevent
the enforcement of the laws which bound the States together.
As we were liable to be attacked at any moment, we desired to get rid of
the sand-hills which dominated our walls. To this end we applied to the
Quartermaster-general (General Joseph E. Johnston) for authority to hire
citizen laborers; but he declined to accede to the request, on the
ground that the work did not properly appertain to his department. He
was a nephew of Floyd, and soon went over to the enemy. With the
exception of Robert E. Lee, he subsequently became the most noted of all
the rebel generals.
We were gratified, about the 1st of September, at seeing some signs of
life in the Secretary of War, which seemed to show that he appreciated
our dangers and difficulties. He ordered First Lieutenant and Brevet
Captain John G. Foster, of the engineers, to repair to Fort Moultrie,
and put that and the other defenses of Charleston harbor in perfect
order. The reason privately assigned for this was that we were drifting
into complications with England and France with reference to Mexico. For
one, I gave the honorable secretary very little credit for this
proceeding, inasmuch as he had just previous to this forwarded to South
Carolina the means of arming and equipping seventeen thousand men
against the United States. I, therefore, came to the conclusion that the
forts were to be made ready for active service, in order that they might
be turned over in that condition to the Southern League.
Two young lieutenants of engineers, G.W. Snyder and R.K. Meade, were
soon after sent to Foster as assistants.
And here it may be well to speak of the officers of our command, as they
were at that period. The record of their services afterward, during the
rebellion, would constitute a volume in itself.
Colonel John L. Gardner was wounded in the war with Great Britain in
1812. He had also been engaged in the war against the Florida Indians,
and the war with Mexico, receiving two brevets for the battles of Cerro
Gordo and Contreras.
Seymour, Foster, and myself had also served in Mexico as second
lieutenants on our first entrance into the army, and Davis as a
non-commissioned officer of an Indiana regiment.
John G. Foster, severely wounded at Molino del Rey, and brevetted
captain, was one of the most fearless and reliable men in the service.
Captain Truman Seymour, twice brevetted for gallantry at Cerro Gordo and
Chernbusco, was an excellent artillery officer, full of invention and
resource, a lover of poetry, and an adept at music and painting.
First Lieutenant Jefferson C. Davis, brave, generous, and impetuous--the
boy-sergeant of Buena Vista--won his first commission in the regular
army by his gallantry in that action.
First Lieutenant Theodore Talbot, when very young, had shared the
dangers, privations, and sufferings of Fremont's party in their
explorations to open a pathway across the continent. He was a cultivated
man, and a representative of the chivalry of Kentucky, equally ready to
meet his friend at the festive board, or his enemy at ten paces.
Doctor S. Wiley Crawford, our assistant surgeon, entered the service
after the Mexican war. He was a genial companion, studious, and full of
varied information. His ambition to win a name as a soldier soon induced
him to quit the ranks of the medical profession.
Hall, Snyder, and Meade were recent graduates of the Academy, who had
never seen active service in the field. They were full of zeal,
intelligence, and energy.
In one respect we were quite fortunate: the habits of the officers were
good, and there was no dissipation or drunkenness in the garrison. The
majority of the men, too, were old soldiers, who could be thoroughly
relied upon under all circumstances.
There was, also, one civilian with us, Mr. Edward Moale, who was clerk
and brother-in-law to Captain Foster. His services were subsequently
very valuable in many ways.
Fearing that in the course of events our correspondence might be
tampered with, I invented a cipher which afterward proved to be very
useful. It enabled me to communicate, through my brother in New York,
much valuable information to Mr. Lincoln at Springfield, Preston King,
Roscoe Conkling, and other leaders of public opinion, in relation to our
strength and resources.[4]
Situated as we were, we naturally desired to know how far Mr. Buchanan's
Cabinet was willing to sustain us. William H. Trescott, of South
Carolina, was Assistant Secretary of State at this time, and frequently
corresponded with his brother, Doctor Trescott, in Charleston. We,
therefore, naturally thought the views of the latter might indirectly
reflect those of the Administration. The doctor was of opinion there
would be no attempt at coercion in case South Carolina seceded, but that
all postal and telegraphic communication would cease, and a man-of-war
be placed outside to collect the revenue. This arrangement would leave
our little force isolated and deserted, to bear the brunt of whatever
might occur.
In October the disunionists became more bitter, but they were not
disposed to be aggressive, as they thought Buchanan could be relied upon
not to take any decisive action against them.
Colonel Gardner would not at this time mount the guns, or take any
precautions whatever. He alleged, with reason, that the work was all
torn to pieces by the engineers; that it was full of debris, and that,
under the circumstances, he was not responsible for any thing that might
happen. We had been promised a considerable number of recruits, but they
were kept back; and we now ascertained that none would be sent until
late in December, after the crisis was over.
In the latter part of the month I became quite unpopular in Charleston;
partly on account of my anti-slavery sentiments, but more especially
because some very offensive articles, written from that city, had
appeared in the Northern papers, and were attributed to me. It seems
that at this very time an abolition correspondent of the _New York
Tribune_ was employed in the office of Rhett's paper, the _Charleston
Mercury_. This man professed to be the most loud-mouthed secessionist of
them all. In conversation with me afterward, he claimed to be the author
of the articles referred to.
In truth, these were days of extraordinary proscription for opinion's
sake. I heard with profound indignation of the case of a poor seamstress
from New York, who had been sent to jail in Charleston simply for
stating that she did not believe in the institution of slavery. On
appealing to the then mayor of New York, Fernando Wood, he replied that
he was rejoiced she was in prison, and hoped she would be kept there.
Toward the close of the month, the South Carolina leaders began to fear
that the other Southern States would not join them, and were engaged in
discussing the subject of a French protectorate.
The negroes overheard a great deal that was said by their masters, and
in consequence became excited and troublesome, for the news flew like
wild-fire among them that "Massa Linkum" was coming to set them all
free.
The enthusiasm of the moneyed men in Charleston began to cool when they
reflected upon the enormous expenses involved in keeping up a standing
army in an agricultural State like South Carolina. At the request of
some Union men, Captain Seymour made a startling exhibit, showing the
large amount required to maintain even a moderate force. It had a good
effect upon the merchants, and, indeed, if the other Southern States had
not promptly sustained South Carolina, the movement must have soon
collapsed from its inherent weakness.
Although the secession leaders were preparing to meet coercion, if it
should come, I will do them the justice to say that they determined to
commit no overt act against the Union so long as the State formed an
integral part of it. They soon found, however, that the mob did not
recognize these fine distinctions. It was easy to raise the storm, but,
once under full headway, it was difficult to govern it. Independent
companies and minute-men were everywhere forming, in opposition to their
wishes; for these organizations, from their very nature, were quite
unmanageable. The military commanders much preferred the State militia,
because they could control it by law. A gentleman from the country, who
had joined the minute-men, came in one day to the Charleston Hotel, with
a huge cockade on his hat, expecting to be received with great
applause; but, to his astonishment, he was greeted with laughter and
ridicule.
On the 29th of October, General Scott wrote his celebrated letter to the
President, recommending that strong garrisons be placed at once in all
the Southern forts. Undoubtedly this was good advice; but as our army
was widely scattered all over the West to protect the frontier
settlements from the Indians, only five small companies were available
for the purpose. The suggestion, therefore, had but little practical
value.
November had arrived. The muttering of the storm was heard all around
us, and yet not one word of counsel or encouragement came from
Washington. Colonel Gardner began to feel uneasy at this studied
silence, and determined to place the responsibility of any disaster that
might occur where it properly belonged. On the 1st of the month he made
a full report to his next superior officer, General Wool, at Troy, New
York, to be forwarded to the Secretary of War, in relation to the
dangers that threatened us, and our imperfect means of defense. He
notified them that our provisions would be exhausted by the 20th of the
month, and that we were very deficient in ammunition and military
supplies generally. The secretary, in his answer to this communication,
simply expressed his regret that he had not been informed of all this
before. This sympathy was no doubt very gratifying; but, being of an
entirely passive nature, did not benefit us in the least. Colonel
Gardner, at our solicitation, directed that the guns which had been
dismounted to enable the engineers to make their repairs be remounted at
once, and Seymour's company and mine soon placed them in position. It
was of little use, however, to have our armament in readiness, unless
the approaches to the fort could be carefully watched. This it was
impossible to do by the ordinary system of guard duty; but I suggested a
plan which enabled us to have an ample number of sentinels, without
exhausting the men. It was done by placing each man on guard for a
single hour, between tattoo and reveille, allowing him to sleep for the
remainder of the night.