OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS.
1. Ideas considered in reference to their Archetypes.
Besides what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other
considerations belong to them, in reference to THINGS FROM WHENCE THEY
ARE TAKEN, or WHICH THEY MAY BE SUPPOSED TO REPRESENT; and thus, I
think, they may come under a threefold distinction, and are:—First,
either real or fantastical; Secondly, adequate or inadequate; Thirdly,
true or false.
First, by REAL IDEAS, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such
as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or
with their archetypes. FANTASTICAL or CHIMERICAL, I call such as have
no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of
being to which they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes. If we
examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned, we shall find
that,
2. Simple Ideas are all real appearances of things.
First, Our SIMPLE IDEAS are all real, all agree to the reality of
things: not that they are all of them the images or representations of
what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities
of bodies, hath been already shown. But, though whiteness and coldness
are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and
coldness, pain, &c., being in us the effects of powers in things
without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations;
they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that
are really in things themselves. For, these several appearances being
designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things
which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that
purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be
only CONSTANT EFFECTS, or else EXACT RESEMBLANCES of something in the
things themselves: the reality lying in that steady correspondence they
have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they
answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters
not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus
our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree
to those powers of things which produce them on our minds; that being
all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure.
For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to
the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea,
more than what it was received.
3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations.
Though the mind be wholly passive in respect of its simple ideas; yet,
I think, we may say it is not so in respect of its complex ideas. For
those being combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under
one general name, it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of
liberty in forming those complex ideas: how else comes it to pass that
one man’s idea of gold, or justice, is different from another’s, but
because he has put in, or left out of his, some simple idea which the
other has not? The question then is, Which of these are real, and which
barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of
things, and what not? And to this I say that,
4. Mixed Modes and Relations, made of consistent Ideas, are real.
Secondly, MIXED MODES and RELATIONS, having no other reality but what
they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this
kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there
be a possibility of existing conformable to them. These ideas
themselves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and
so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them
inconsistent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known
language assigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would
signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough;
they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name
that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a
man would give the name of justice to that idea which common use calls
liberality. But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of
speech, than reality of ideas. For a man to be undisturbed in danger,
sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it
steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may
exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one’s reason or
industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an idea as
the other. Though the first of these, having the name COURAGE given to
it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea; but the
other, whilst it has not a common received name of any known language
assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no
reference to anything but itself.
5. Complex Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the
existence of Things.
Thirdly, Our complex ideas of SUBSTANCES, being made all of them in
reference to things existing without us, and intended to be
representations of substances as they really are, are no further real
than as they are such combinations of simple ideas as are really
united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are
fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as
were really never united, never were found together in any substance:
v. g. a rational creature, consisting of a horse’s head, joined to a
body of human shape, or such as the CENTAURS are described: or, a body
yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed, but lighter than common
water: or an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of
similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it.
Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is
probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of
substances, being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know;
and consisting of such collections of ideas as no substance ever showed
us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary:
but much more are those complex ideas so, which contain in them any
inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.