OF RELATION.
1. Relation, what.
BESIDES the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of
things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their
comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of
anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry any idea
as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it
stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one
thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and
carries its view from one to the other—this is, as the words import,
RELATION and RESPECT; and the denominations given to positive things,
intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts
beyond the subject itself denominated, to something distinct from it,
are what we call RELATIVES; and the things so brought together,
RELATED. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being,
it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; v.g.
when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex
idea of the species, man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man,
I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white
colour. But when I give Caius the name HUSBAND, I intimate some other
person; and when I give him the name WHITER, I intimate some other
thing: in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and
there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea,
whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings
two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once,
though still considered as distinct: therefore any of our ideas may be
the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the
contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the
denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion
why he is said to be whiter than free-stone.
2. Ideas of relations without correlative Terms, not easily
apprehended.
These and the like relations, expressed by relative terms that have
others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and son,
bigger and less, cause and effect, are very obvious to every one, and
everybody at first sight perceives the relation. For father and son,
husband and wife, and such other correlative terms, seem so nearly to
belong one to another, and, through custom, do so readily chime and
answer one another in people’s memories, that, upon the naming of
either of them, the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so
named; and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is so
plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative
names, there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of.
CONCUBINE is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife: but in
languages where this and the like words have not a correlative term,
there people are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that
evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to
explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence
it is, that many of those names, which, duly considered, do include
evident relations, have been called EXTERNAL DENOMINATIONS. But all
names that are more than empty sounds must signify some idea, which is
either in the thing to which the name is applied, and then it is
positive, and is looked on as united to and existing in the thing to
which the denomination is given; or else it arises from the respect the
mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers
it, and then it includes a relation.
3. Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations.
Another sort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be
either relative, or so much as external denominations: which yet, under
the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the
subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable, relation. Such are
the seemingly positive terms of OLD, GREAT, IMPERFECT, &c., whereof I
shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.
4. Relation different from the Things related.
This further may be observed, That the ideas of relations may be the
same in men who have far different ideas of the things that are
related, or that are thus compared: v. g. those who have far different
ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father; which is a
notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act
of that thing called man whereby he contributed to the generation of
one of his own kind, let man be what it will.
5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in the things related.
The nature therefore of relation consists in the referring or comparing
two things one to another; from which comparison one or both comes to
be denominated. And if either of those things be removed, or cease to
be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though
the other receive in itself no alteration at all; v.g. Caius, whom I
consider to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow, only by the
death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely
by the mind’s changing the object to which it compares anything, the
same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same
time: v.g. Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be
older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.
6. Relation only betwixt two things.
Whatsoever doth or can exist, or be considered as one thing is
positive: and so not only simple ideas and substances, but modes also,
are positive beings: though the parts of which they consist are very
often relative one to another: but the whole together considered as one
thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is
in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and
under one name, it is a positive or absolute thing, or idea. Thus a
triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative,
yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea. The same may be
said of a family, a tune, &c.; for there can be no relation but betwixt
two things considered as two things. There must always be in relation
two ideas or things, either in themselves really separate, or
considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their
comparison.
7. All Things capable of Relation.
Concerning relation in general, these things may be considered:
First, That there is no one thing, whether simple idea, substance,
mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of
almost an infinite number of considerations in reference to other
things: and therefore this makes no small part of men’s thoughts and
words: v.g. one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all
these following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, son,
grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend,
enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European,
Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superior,
inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike,
&c., to an almost infinite number: he being capable of as many
relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things,
in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever. For,
as I said, relation is a way of comparing or considering two things
[*dropped line] from that comparison; and sometimes giving even the
relation itself a name.
8. Our Ideas of Relations often clearer than of the Subjects related.
Secondly, This further may be considered concerning relation, that
though it be not contained in the real existence of things, but
something extraneous and superinduced, yet the ideas which relative
words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than of those
substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father or
brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of
a man; or, if you will, PATERNITY is a thing whereof it is easier to
have a clear idea, than of HUMANITY; and I can much easier conceive
what a friend is, than what God; because the knowledge of one action,
or one simple idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a
relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate
collection of sundry ideas is necessary. A man, if he compares two
things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein
he compares them: so that when he compares any things together, he
cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. THE IDEAS, THEN, OF
RELATIONS, ARE CAPABLE AT LEAST OF BEING MORE PERFECT AND DISTINCT IN
OUR MINDS THAN THOSE OF SUBSTANCES. Because it is commonly hard to know
all the simple ideas which are really in any substance, but for the
most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any
relation I think on, or have a name for: v.g. comparing two men in
reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the ideas of
brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For significant
relative words, as well as others, standing only for ideas; and those
being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the
knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear
conception of that which is the foundation of the relation; which may
be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is
attributed to. Thus, having the notion that one laid the egg out of
which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of DAM
and CHICK between the two cassiowaries in St. James’s Park; though
perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds
themselves.
9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.
Thirdly, Though there be a great number of considerations wherein
things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of
relations, yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about those
simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be
the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall show
it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of; and
in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection: which
yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it past
doubt that the notions we have of them are but certain simple ideas,
and so originally derived from sense or reflection.
10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are
relative.
Fourthly, That relation being the considering of one thing with another
which is extrinsical to it, it is evident that all words that
necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are supposed really
to exist in that thing to which the words are applied are relative
words: v.g.a MAN, BLACK, MERRY, THOUGHTFUL, THIRSTY, ANGRY, EXTENDED;
these and the like are all absolute, because they neither signify nor
intimate anything but what does or is supposed really to exist in the
man thus denominated; but FATHER, BROTHER, KING, HUSBAND, BLACKER,
MERRIER, &c., are words which, together with the thing they denominate,
imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of
that thing.
11. All relatives made up of simple ideas.
Having laid down these premises concerning relation in general, I shall
now proceed to show, in some instances, how all the ideas we have of
relation are made up, as the others are, only of simple ideas; and that
they all, how refined or remote from sense soever they seem, terminate
at last in simple ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive
relation, wherein all things that do, or can exist, are concerned, and
that is the relation of CAUSE and EFFECT: the idea whereof, how derived
from the two fountains of all our knowledge, sensation and reflection,
I shall in the next place consider.