OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF SENSE.
1. Division of simple ideas.
The better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation, it may not
be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways
whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves
perceivable by us.
FIRST, then, There are some which come into our minds BY ONE SENSE
ONLY.
SECONDLY, There are others that convey themselves into the mind BY MORE
SENSES THAN ONE.
THIRDLY, Others that are had from REFLECTION ONLY.
FOURTHLY, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to
the mind BY ALL THE WAYS OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.
We shall consider them apart under these several heads.
Ideas of one Sense.
There are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense,
which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as
white, red, yellow, blue; with their several degrees or shades and
mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest, come in
only by the eyes. All kinds of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the
ears. The several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if
these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from
without to their audience in the brain,—the mind’s presence-room (as I
may so call it)—are any of them so disordered as not to perform their
functions, they have no postern to be admitted by; no other way to
bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.
The most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are heat and
cold, and solidity: all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the
sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else, more or less firm
adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious
enough.
2. Few simple Ideas have Names.
I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple
ideas belonging to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible if we would;
there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses
than we have names for. The variety of smells, which are as many
almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of
them want names. Sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these
ideas, which in effect is little more than to call them pleasing or
displeasing; though the smell of a rose and violet, both sweet, are
certainly very distinct ideas. Nor are the different tastes, that by
our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names.
Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt are almost all the epithets we
have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes, which are to be
found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the
different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be
said of colours and sounds. I shall, therefore, in the account of
simple ideas I am here giving, content myself to set down only such as
are most material to our present purpose, or are in themselves less apt
to be taken notice of though they are very frequently the ingredients
of our complex ideas; amongst which, I think, I may well account
solidity, which therefore I shall treat of in the next chapter.