Existence of records | would prove the w. etern.
---------------------+--------------------------
Records do not exist | the w. is non-eternal
Non-existence of marks | wd. pr. w. made by chance
---------------------+----------------------------
The marks exist | w. was not made by chance
***
'If this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently of
Scripture in jest; and if he were good he would not do so in
earnest; but he does it, either in jest or earnest; therefore
he is either not wise or not good.'
As it stands this is quite circular, but it might be rendered valid by
generalisation:--
VI.
To speak irrev. of Scr. in | indicates that a man is not
jest or earnest | wise or not good
---------------------------+------------------------------
This man does it | we must infer that _he is not
| w. or not g._
***
'If virtue were a habit worth acquiring, it must ensure either power,
or wealth, or honour, or pleasure; but virtue ensures none of
these; therefore virtue is not a habit worth attaining.' Fallacy of
contrast--
I.
What ensures | is worth
-------------------+---------
V. does not ensure | _N. C._
***
'If men are not likely to be influenced in the performance of a known
duty by taking an oath to perform it, the oaths commonly administered
are superfluous; if they are likely to be so influenced, everyone
should be made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his
life; but one or other must be the case; _therefore_ either the oaths
commonly administered are superfluous, or everyone should be made to
take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life.'--This will be
more intelligible if contracted thus: If oaths fail to influence they
are superfluous; if they influence they should be obligatory; but they
either influence or do not; therefore they are either superfluous
or should be obligatory. There is no argument; the alternative
conclusions merely repeat the alternative precedents.
***
'If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary; but virtue is voluntary;
therefore so is vice.' (Arist. _Eth._ Bk. III. quoted by Whately.)
This is a circular way of saying that we believe it to be a fact that
vice is voluntary. The argumentative form is probably supposed to
give the assertion greater weight than it would have if expressed as a
perceptual judgment.
***
This is valid argument, according to Hamilton--'If man were suited to
live out of society, he would either be a god or a beast; but man is
neither a god nor a beast; therefore he is not suited to live out of
society.'--It has faults of contrast and tautology.
I.
Only gods and beasts | are suited
-------------------------+-----------
Man is neither g. nor b. | _N. C._
***
'If iron is impure, it is brittle; but this iron is impure; therefore
it is brittle.'--A valid dogmatic argument.
I.
Impure iron | is brittle
------------------+-----------------
This iron is imp. | _it must be br._
***
'If the weather is fine, we shall go into the country; now the weather
is fine, therefore we shall go into the country.'--We never get beyond
the simple judgment that our going into the country is associated with
fine weather.
***
The following is valid:--'As often as the weather is fine, my
brother has a habit of going into the country; if the weather be fine
to-morrow I infer that he will go into the country.' Here a particular
hypothetical case is illustrated by reference to a general habit.
***
'As often as the weather is fine my brother goes into the country;
if it be not fine to-morrow I conclude that he will not go into
the country.'--A fallacy of contrast: we are not informed in the
antecedents what the brother does on wet days.
***
'If there are sharpers in the company we ought not to gamble;
but there are no sharpers in the company; therefore we ought
to gamble.'
I.
Presence of sh. | forbids to gamble
----------------+------------------
Absence of sh. | _N. C._
***
'Logic as it was cultivated by the schoolmen proved a fruitless study;
therefore logic as it is cultivated at the present day must be a
fruitless study likewise.'--We must take the conclusion as valid,
until we know in what respects modern logic is superior to scholastic
logic.
***
'Few treatises of science convey important truths, without
any admixture of error, in a perspicuous and interesting form:
therefore though a treatise would deserve much attention which
should possess such excellence, it is plain that few treatises
of science do deserve much attention.'
This means no more than that treatises of a certain excellence
would deserve attention, and that there are few of them. There is no
argument.
***
'Some objects of great beauty answer no other purpose but to
gratify the sight: many flowers have great beauty; and many of
them accordingly answer no other purpose than to gratify the
sight.'
I.
Some obj. which answer | are beautiful
------------------------+--------------
Many flowers are beaut. | _N. C._
***
'None but Whites are civilised; the ancient Germans were
Whites; therefore they were civilised.'
I.
All civilised nations | are Whites
----------------------|-----------
Anc. Ger. were Wh. | _N. C._
***
'Wilkes was a favourite with the populace; he who is a
favourite with the populace must understand how to manage
them; he who understands how to manage them must be well
acquainted with their character; he who is well acquainted
with their character must hold them in contempt; therefore
Wilkes must have held the populace in contempt.'
Favourites | must kn. how to || He who kn. how | must be
| manage || to manage | acquainted
--------------+-----------------------++----------------+--------------
W. was a fav. | _he knew how to man._ || W. knew | _he was acq._
He who is acq. | must despise
---------------+---------------------
W. was acq. | _he must have desp._
***
'Something has existed from eternity. For since something now
is, it is manifest that something always was. Otherwise the
things that now are must have risen out of nothing, absolutely
and without cause. Which is a plain contradiction in terms.
For to say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no
cause at all of that production, is to say that something is
effected when it is effected by nothing, that is, at the same
time when it is not effected at all. Whatever exists has a
cause of its existence, either in the necessity of its own
nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal: or in
the will of some other being, and then that other being must,
at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed
before it.'
In this theorem we have a case--'Something is'; and a
conclusion--'Something has existed from eternity.' The reasoner
seeks a credible or conceivable precedent by which to connect that
conclusion with the case.
We are offered a choice of two theorems. The first is untenable, for
we have never had the experience that is given as precedent; it is
also tautological, as the 'something' of the case is the 'whatever' of
the precedent.
V.
Whatever exists in the necessity | has existed from eternity
of its own nature |
------------------------------------+-------------------------------
'Something' exists in the necessity | _it has existed from eternity_
of its own nature
It is not inconceivable that something should be self-existent, but we
know nothing as to its being eternal. We are not familiar enough with
self-existent things and eternal things to warrant us in asserting
dogmatically that where the first quality is, there also must be the
second.
The next theorem is that everything must be caused, and that causation
involves a _regressum ad infinitum_. On this principle there must
have been things for an eternity backwards. According to the theory of
causation given in section XXVII, a true beginning is reached when we
discover the motive, design and power that produced an effect. It is
not necessary to ask next what caused that motive, design and power.
The infinite regress is applicable only to _material sequence_, in
which there is no proper beginning or end. The author of the above
argument seems to be trying to combine the notion of causation by
_will_ with that of infinite regress. But his language is too obscure
to make it certain what he means exactly.
***
The three following theorems--in a diluted form--occur in an otherwise
excellent work on the politics and social life of the ancient Greeks.
'The Athenians who opposed the union of Greece and Macedonia were old
men, and the result was mischievous; other similar instances are
found in history; therefore the government of old men is always
mischievous.'--A fallacy of false generality. Everybody knows that
some old men have been wise governors. Cicero, from his experience,
drew the opposite conclusion--that the only safe rulers were old men.
'All old political leaders are mischievous; Gladstone is old;
therefore he is to be considered politically mischievous.'--Even were
the precedent not false the argument is superfluous, for the effect of
Gladstone's politics is now matter of fact or history.
'Gladstone is politically mischievous; he advocates Home Rule for
Ireland; therefore Irish Home Rule must be mischievous.'--A fallacy
of division: a political leader might on the whole be mischievous,
but his measures need not on that account be each and every one
mischievous.
If dialectic were taught generally and on a rational method, a
responsible author would avoid bad reasoning of this sort as carefully
as he avoids bad grammar, vulgar imagery, or faulty arithmetic.
* * * * * *
Transcriber's note:
Punctuation has been corrected without comment.
The spelling in this book is that found in the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED).