Nominalists deny the existence of general ideas as distinct from
particular ideas. Most of them affirm that we employ general or common
words to signify the common properties of similar things, but that we
are incapable of thinking of these common properties apart from the
other properties that accompany them.
Why we should wish to use signs of things we cannot think about,
or how a word can be a 'sign' when we are incapable of attaching a
definite meaning to it, are points not satisfactorily cleared up by
nominalists.
Considering how well Berkeley's principle, combined with the plasmic
theory, accounts for generalisation, and how inevitable it is that
there should be general ideas distinguishable from particular ideas
by superior brilliancy and endurance, it is surprising to find in
Berkeley one of the most convinced and eloquent of nominalists. His
views on the subject have so much weight with philosophers that I must
examine them at length.
'It is agreed on all hands,' he writes in the Introduction to
his _Principles_, 'that the qualities or modes of things do
never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated
from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended
together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the
mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted
from those other qualities with which it is united, does by
that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there
is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved:
this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple
constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of
the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour,
and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to
exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame
to itself by _abstraction_ the idea of colour exclusive
of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and
extension.'
Abstract ideas do not form a fourth class of ideas but are fractions
of particular, general, or imaginary ideas, and may (as Berkeley,
reporting the metaphysical doctrine, says) be single or partial
properties mentally detached from the collective properties forming an
object. In this case they are abstracted properties, not ideas. Since
general ideas are less complete than the particular ideas from which
they were drawn, they are abstract ideas in so far as they are partial
ideas; but all abstract ideas are not general ideas. Berkeley's
nominalism is based on the supposed impossibility of forming any sort
of partial idea, and he now proceeds to reproduce the metaphysical
account of the general abstract idea.
'And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities
or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental
separation, attain abstract ideas [general ideas] of the more
compounded beings which include several co-existent qualities.
For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and
John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape
and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded
idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man,
that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common
to all, and so makes an abstract [general] idea wherein all
the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from and
cutting off those circumstances and differences which might
determine it to any particular existence. And after this
manner it is said we come by the abstract [general] idea of
man, or, if you please, humanity or human nature; wherein it
is true there is included colour, because there is no man but
has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black,
nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular
colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included
stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature,
nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all
these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great
variety of other creatures that partake of some parts, but not
all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those
parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only
which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea
of _animal_, which abstracts not only from all particular
men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes and insects. The
constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body,
life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By _body_ is meant body
without any particular shape or figure, there being no one
shape or figure common to all animals, without covering either
of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair,
feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing
properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out
of the _abstract_ [general] _idea_. Upon the same account the
spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor
creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is
it is not easy to conceive.'
This is a fair paraphrase of the accounts given by metaphysicians of
the manner of forming general ideas. It is also in itself a perfectly
correct account of the process, considered simply as a manifestation
of consciousness or a succession of states of consciousness, that is,
apart from the substantial plasmic operation of which it is merely the
symptom. Berkeley however denies that it is a true statement of what
takes place in the mind of consciousness.
'Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting
their ideas, they best can tell; for myself, I find indeed
I have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself, the
ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of
variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man
with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body
of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose each by
itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body.
But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some
particular shape or colour. Likewise the idea of man that I
frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or
a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a
middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive
the abstract idea above described. And it is equally
impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct
from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow,
curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all
other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own
myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider
some particular parts or qualities separated from others,
and which, though they are united in some object, yet it is
possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that
I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those
qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated;
or that I can form a general notion, by abstracting from
particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two
proper acceptations of _abstraction_. And there is ground to
think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case.
The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never
pretend to _abstract notions_ [general ideas]. It is said they
are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study;
we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be,
they are confined only to the learned.'
It is quite true that 'the simple and illiterate never _pretend_ to
abstract notions,' for the sufficient reason that they do not know
the names of their mental operations, even if they are capable of
discriminating them. For the same reason they do not pretend to talk
prose or to be realists.
The practice of every profession and craft, even the humblest,
involves abstraction and generalisation. The objective properties
associated with a given utility have to be abstracted from those which
are indifferent, and this is what enables men of experience in
any branch of industry or art to form a speedy judgment on matters
touching their special affairs. It is in part what distinguishes the
'professional' from the 'amateur.'
Berkeley's disclaimer of any power in himself to form general ideas
is no doubt sincere, and he is justified in reasoning from himself to
others. But the point at issue is, whether Berkeley in this instance
correctly analysed his own mental processes. The fact that he was
correct in some points of great importance does not preclude us from
surmising that he may have been wrong in others of less importance.
In comparison with his discovery of the substantiality of mind, his
oversight on the subject of abstraction is a bagatelle.
He explains the existence of general words on the theory that they are
names of particular ideas which we use to represent all similar ideas.
'... an idea which, considered in itself, is particular,
becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all
other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by
an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method
of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance,
a black line of one inch in length: this, which in itself is
a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its
signification general, since, as it is there used, it
represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is
demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other
words, of a line in general. And, as _that particular line_
becomes general by being made a sign, so the _name_ "line,"
which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made
general. And as the former owes its generality not to its
being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all
particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter
must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause,
namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently
denotes.'
These extracts will suffice to show what was Berkeley's doctrine on
the subject of general ideas.
With respect to the analogy supposed to exist between the generality
of a name and the generality of a general idea, it has to be observed
that a name owes its generality solely to its being the sign of a
general idea. It is an imputed or conventional generality,--in its
proper character a general name is concrete and individual. Also it
does not resemble the thing it signifies (the general idea), nor the
concrete things from which that has been derived.
The generality of a general idea, on the other hand, depends
altogether on its _resemblance_ to many particular things. It is
independent of convention. Hence there is no real analogy between the
two generalities.
Considering that Berkeley professes himself unable to imagine abstract
properties, it is surprising how easily and naturally he writes about
geometrical lines--which are abstract properties. Probably he means
concrete _strokes_.
What sort of representation can subsist between one concrete stroke
and every other concrete stroke? If it is straight it will not
correctly represent a curve; if it is curved it will not represent
a straight stroke. A stroke an inch long cannot stand for a stroke a
hundred miles long; a black stroke does not properly represent a red
stroke. So it is incorrect to say that 'what is demonstrated of _it_
is demonstrated of all strokes, or, in other words, of a stroke
in general.' A particular object can stand only for itself, and
if general words stand for many things it is not by direct
representation, but because they first suggest general ideas, which
are the true substitutes of many particular things.
A reference to geometrical objects, themselves so abstract, is a
doubtful mode of showing how well one concrete thing can represent
others. Had Berkeley taken a more complex object as his general
representative he would have seen the weakness of his argument.
Suppose a biologist has to discourse on a province of animal life
comprising many species, and takes an individual of one species as a
representative of the whole. His sample is perhaps a hare, but he
has to treat of birds and fishes. What is to prevent his hearers from
concluding that birds are furred animals and fishes quadrupeds? Are
they to be expected to see in the hare only the properties common to
all the animals reviewed? If so they have the power denied them
by nominalists of forming a pure general idea, and the hare is
superfluous. The common properties could have been defined and
imagined without a concrete specimen, with irrelevant attributes,
being brought into the discourse.
All nominalists insist that if we think long on a general idea it
becomes particular, and from this they argue that it is not, and never
has been, a general idea[11].
The experiments of this sort proposed by logicians are misleading,
because we are without the ordinary motives for thinking generally.
In practical thought we have some sufficient reason for attending to
a fraction of consciousness and excluding the rest, and the irrelevant
qualities are distinctly less charged with attention than the
principal quality.
The power of abstracting thought is a matter of education. It is that
ruling of the spirit which is more difficult than the capture of a
city. We have to master the restless energic Self and fix it down on a
particular plasmic figure, or a mere point or edge of one, preventing
the energy from spreading to adjacent images. That is irksome and
fatiguing, but it is only a high degree of the faculty everyone
possesses of distinguishing particular objects from each other. Some
minds are so flaccid that you cannot hold them to one subject, even
the most particular and obvious, for five minutes at a time. Training
enables us to bring into the focus of attention just what we wish to
observe or think about, and leave the rest in the background, however
closely it may be connected with the matter that immediately interests
us. But for this power much of our energy would be expended to no
purpose. Abstraction is simply attention of a minute and concentrated
kind--a bringing of our energy of observation or recollection to a
fine point.
When abstraction need not be prolonged--when we are free to pass
rapidly from one general or abstract idea to another--there is no
difficulty in partial thinking. We skim over the plasmic imprints,
lightly brushing the surface of each where it is most prominent and
therefore most general, but not pausing to recollect particulars. It
is this rapid delicate touch we oftenest use in actual thought; but
when for purposes of experiment we come down heavily on an imprint,
then the Self overflows to adjacent channels and particular memories
are stirred up, in spite of every effort to limit our attention.
So common and easy is rapid general thought that it is constantly
used as a substitute for concrete thought, when a sketchy treatment of
things is all that is wanted.
'A bird has alighted on the fence.' The speaker saw a particular
concrete bird, and might have tried to describe it in the concrete.
But the attributes that rendered it concrete are supposed not to be
of present importance, and the hearer is consequently invited to think
only of bird in general. Would a nominalist affirm that in such a case
the words are meaningless unless the idea is concreted--unless the
general sketch is filled out in detail?
Take another example. 'The man sat by the window overlooking the river
that flowed towards the city.'
Here all the nouns are general, but the picture is individual and
concrete. It is also quite intelligible, as a sketch. We can think of
a man without assigning to him any particular type of face, or colour
of hair, or stature, or age, or clothing. Our idea is the general idea
_man_ used as a sketch of a particular man. He is in a house because
he is looking through a window, but we do not stay to imagine the
house as cottage, inn, or mansion. We call up the general idea
_house_, which is definite enough for our purpose, and we cannot doubt
for a moment that we have such a general idea. The river may be wide
or narrow, straight or crooked, navigable or not, but we think only
of the general idea _river_, which is water flowing between banks. And
surely we can imagine a general _city_ without giving it any definite
size, or form, or nationality, or number of inhabitants!
These considerations clearly demonstrate that we have general ideas,
which are not merely concrete ideas used as examples, and if we can
employ them in the manner just indicated, where a light superficial
recollection is all that is necessary, we can equally well use them
in their more legitimate character, as signs of certain general
utilities.