But though everything betokened war, there were forces that worked

slowly but surely for a pacific settlement. However threatening was the

attitude of Russia, her rulers really desired peace. The war had shown

once again the weakness of that Power for offence. Her strength lies in

her boundless plains, in the devotion of her millions of peasants to the

Czar, and in the patient, stubborn strength which is the outcome of long

centuries of struggle with the yearly tyrant, winter. Her weakness lies

in the selfishness, frivolity, corruption, and narrowness of outlook of

her governing class--in short, in their incapacity for organisation.

Against the steady resisting power of her peasants the great Napoleon

had hurled his legions in vain. That campaign of 1812 exhibited the

strength of Russia for defence. But when, in fallacious trust in that

precedent, she has undertaken great wars far from her base, failure has

nearly always been the result. The pathetic devotion of her peasantry

has not made up for the mental and moral defects of her governing

classes. This fact had fixed itself on every competent observer in 1877.

The Emperor Alexander knew it only too well. Now, early in 1878, it was

fairly certain that his army would succumb under the frontal attacks of

Turks and British, and the onset of the Austrians on their rear.

Therefore when, on Feb. 4, the Hapsburg State proposed to refer the

terms of peace to a Conference of the Powers at Vienna, the consent of

Russia was almost certain, provided that the prestige of the Czar

remained unimpaired. Three days later the place of meeting was changed

to Berlin, the Conference also becoming a Congress, that is, a meeting

where the chief Ministers of the Powers, not merely their Ambassadors,

would take part. The United Kingdom, France, and Italy at once signified

their assent to this proposal. As for Bismarck, he promised in a speech

to the Reichstag (Feb. 19) that he would act as an "honest broker"

between the parties most nearly concerned. There is little doubt that

Russia took this in a sense favourable to her claims, and she, too,

consented.

Nevertheless, she sought to tie the hands of the Congress by binding

Turkey to a preliminary treaty signed on March 3 at San Stefano, a

village near to Constantinople. The terms comprised those stated above

(p. 225), but they also stipulated the cession of frontier districts to

Servia and Montenegro, while Russia was to acquire the Roumanian

districts east of the River Pruth, Roumania receiving the Dobrudscha as

an equivalent. Most serious of all was the erection of Bulgaria into an

almost independent Principality, extending nearly as far south as Midia

(on the Black Sea), Adrianople, Salonica, and beyond Ochrida in Albania.

As will be seen by reference to the map (p. 239), this Principality

would then have comprised more than half of the Balkan Peninsula,

besides including districts on the Ægean Sea and around the town of

Monastir, for which the Greeks have never ceased to cherish hopes. A

Russian Commissioner was to supervise the formation of the government

for two years; all the fortresses on the Danube were to be razed, and

none others constructed; Turkish forces were required entirely to

evacuate the Principality, which was to be occupied by Russian troops

for a space of time not exceeding two years.

On her side, Turkey undertook to grant reforms to the Armenians, and

protect them from Kurds and Circassians, Russia further claimed

1,410,000,000 roubles as war indemnity, but consented to take the

Dobrudscha district (offered to Roumania, as stated above), and in Asia

the territories of Batoum, Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazid, in lieu of

1,100,000,000 roubles. The Porte afterwards declared that it signed this

treaty under persistent pressure from the Grand Duke Nicholas and

General Ignatieff, who again and again declared that otherwise the

Russians would advance on the capital[162].

[Footnote 162: For the text of the treaty see Parl. Papers, Turkey, No.

22 (1878); also _The European Concert in the Eastern Question_ by T.E.

Holland, pp. 335-348.]

At once, from all parts of the Balkan Peninsula, there arose a chorus of

protests against the Treaty of San Stefano. The Mohammedans of the

proposed State of Bulgaria protested against subjection to their former

helots. The Greeks saw in the treaty the death-blow to their hopes of

gaining the northern coasts of the Aegean and a large part of Central

Macedonia. They fulminated against the Bulgarians as ignorant peasants,

whose cause had been taken up recently by Russia for her own

aggrandisement[163]. The Servians were equally indignant. They claimed,

and with justice, that their efforts against the Turks should be

rewarded by an increase of territory which would unite to them their

kinsfolk in Macedonia and part of Bosnia, and place them on an equality

with the upstart State of Bulgaria. Whereas the treaty assigned to these

protégés of Russia districts inhabited solely by Servians, thereby

barring the way to any extension of that Principality.

[Footnote 163: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 31 (1878), Nos. 6-17, and

enclosures; _L'Hellénisme et la Macédonie_, by N. Kasasis (Paris, 1904);

L. Sergeant, _op. cit._ ch. xii.]

Still more urgent was the protest of the Roumanian Government. In return

for the priceless services rendered by his troops at Plevna, Prince

Charles and his Ministers were kept in the dark as to the terms arranged

between Russia and Turkey. The Czar sent General Ignatieff to prepare

the Prince for the news, and sought to mollify him by the hint that he

might become also Prince of Bulgaria--a suggestion which was scornfully

waved aside. The Government at Bukharest first learnt the full truth as

to the Bessarabia-Dobrudscha exchange from the columns of the _Journal

du St. Pétersbourg_, which proved that the much-prized Bessarabian

territory was to be bargained away by the Power which had solemnly

undertaken to uphold the integrity of the Principality. The Prince, the

Cabinet, and the people unanimously inveighed against this proposal. On

Feb. 4 the Roumanian Chamber of Deputies declared that Roumania would

defend its territory to the last, by armed force if necessary; but it

soon appeared that none of the Powers took any interest in the matter,

and, thanks to the prudence of Prince Charles, the proud little nation

gradually schooled itself to accept the inevitable[164].

[Footnote 164: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 30 (1878); also _Reminiscences

of the King of Roumania_, chs. x. xi.]

The peace of Europe now turned on the question whether the Treaty of

San Stefano would be submitted as a whole to the Congress of the Powers

at Berlin; England claimed that it must be so submitted. This

contention, in its extreme form, found no support from any of the

Powers, not even from Austria, and it met with firm opposition from

Russia. She, however, assured the Viennese Court that the Congress would

decide which of the San Stefano terms affected the interests of Europe

and would pronounce on them. The Beaconsfield Cabinet later on affirmed

that "every article in the treaty between Russia and Turkey will be

placed before the Congress--not necessarily for acceptance, but in order

that it may be considered what articles require acceptance or

concurrence by the several Powers and what do not[165]."

[Footnote 165: Lord Derby to Sir H. Elliot, March 13, 1878. Turkey, No.

xxiv. (1878), No 9, p. 5.]

When this much was conceded, there remained no irreconcilable

difference, unless the treaty contained secret articles which Russia

claimed to keep back from the Congress. As far as we know, there were

none. But the fact is that the dispute, small as it now appears to us,

was intensified by the suspicions and resentment prevalent on both

sides. The final decision of the St. Petersburg Government was couched

in somewhat curt and threatening terms: "It leaves to the other Powers

the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they may think

it fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting, or

not accepting, the discussion of these questions[166]."

[Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 15, p. 7.]

This haughty reply, received at Downing Street on March 27, again

brought the two States to the verge of war. Lord Beaconsfield, and all

his colleagues but one, determined to make immediate preparations for

the outbreak of hostilities; while Lord Derby, clinging to the belief

that peace would best be preserved by ordinary negotiations, resigned

the portfolio for foreign affairs (March 28); two days later he was

succeeded by the Marquis of Salisbury[167]. On April 1 the Prime

Minister gave notice of motion that the reserves of the army and militia

should be called out; and on the morrow Lord Salisbury published a note

for despatch to foreign courts summarising the grounds of British

opposition to the Treaty of San Stefano, and to Russia's contentions

respecting the Congress.

[Footnote 167: See p. 243 for Lord Derby's further reason for

resigning.]

Events took a still more threatening turn fifteen days later, when the

Government ordered eight Indian regiments, along with two batteries of

artillery, to proceed at once to Malta. The measure aroused strong

differences of opinion, some seeing in it a masterly stroke which

revealed the greatness of Britain's resources, while the more nervous of

the Liberal watch-dogs bayed forth their fears that it was the beginning

of a Strafford-like plot for undermining the liberties of England.

So sharp were the differences of opinion in England, that Russia would

perhaps have disregarded the threats of the Beaconsfield Ministry had

she not been face to face with a hostile Austria. The great aim of the

Czar's government was to win over the Dual Monarchy by offering a share

of the spoils of Turkey. Accordingly, General Ignatieff went on a

mission to the continental courts, especially to that of Vienna, and

there is little doubt that he offered Bosnia to the Hapsburg Power. That

was the least which Francis Joseph and Count Andrassy had the right to

expect, for the secret compact made before the war promised them as

much. In view of the enormous strides contemplated by Russia, they now

asked for certain rights in connection with Servia and Montenegro, and

commercial privileges that would open a way to Salonica[168]. But

Russia's aims, as expressed at San Stefano, clearly were to dominate the

Greater Bulgaria there foreshadowed, which would probably shut out

Austria from political and commercial influence over the regions north

of Salonica. Ignatieff's effort to gain over Austria therefore failed;

and it was doubtless Lord Beaconsfield's confidence in the certainty of

Hapsburg support in case of war that prompted his defiance alike of

Russia and of the Liberal party at home.

[Footnote 168: Débidour, _Hist. diplomatique de l'Europe_, vol. ii. p.

515.]

The Czar's Government also was well aware of the peril of arousing a

European war. Nihilism lifted its head threateningly at home; and the

Russian troops before Constantinople were dying like flies in autumn.

The outrages committed by them and the Bulgarians on the Moslems of

Roumelia had, as we have seen, led to a revolt in the district of Mount

Rhodope; and there was talk in some quarters of making a desperate

effort to cut off the invaders from the Danube[169]. The discontent of

the Roumanians might have been worked upon so as still further to

endanger the Russian communications. Probably the knowledge of these

plans and of the warlike preparations of Great Britain induced the

Russian Government to moderate its tone. On April 9 it expressed a wish

that Lord Salisbury would formulate a definite policy.

[Footnote 169: For these outrages, see Parl. Papers, Turkey (1878), Nos.

42 and 45, with numerous enclosures. The larger plans of the Rhodope

insurgents and their abettors at Constantinople are not fully known. An

Englishman, Sinclair, and some other free-lances were concerned in the

affair. The Rhodope district long retained a kind of independence, see

_Les Événements politiques en Bulgarie_, by A.G. Drandar, Appendix.]

The new Foreign Minister speedily availed himself of this offer; and the

cause of peace was greatly furthered by secret negotiations which he

carried on with Count Shuvaloff. The Russian ambassador in London had

throughout bent his great abilities to a pacific solution of the

dispute, and, on finding out the real nature of the British objections

to the San Stefano Treaty, he proceeded to St. Petersburg to persuade

the Emperor to accept certain changes. In this he succeeded, and on his

return to London was able to come to an agreement with Lord Salisbury

(May 30), the chief terms of which clearly foreshadowed those finally

adopted at Berlin.

In effect they were as follows: The Beaconsfield Cabinet strongly

objected to the proposed wide extension of Bulgaria at the expense of

other nationalities, and suggested that the districts south of the

Balkans, which were peopled almost wholly by Bulgarians, should not be

wholly withdrawn from Turkish control, but "should receive a large

measure of administrative self-government . . . with a Christian

governor." To these proposals the Russian Government gave a conditional

assent. Lord Salisbury further claimed that the Sultan should have the

right "to canton troops on the frontiers of southern Bulgaria"; and that

the militia of that province should be commanded by officers appointed

by the Sultan with the consent of Europe. England also undertook to see

that the cause of the Greeks in Thessaly and Epirus received the

attention of all the Powers, in place of the intervention of Russia

alone on their behalf, as specified in the San Stefano Treaty.

Respecting the cession of Roumanian Bessarabia to Russia, on which the

Emperor Alexander had throughout insisted (see page 205), England

expressed "profound regret" at that demand, but undertook not to dispute

it at the Congress. On his side the Emperor Alexander consented to

restore Bayazid in Asia Minor to the Turks, but insisted on the

retention of Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan. Great Britain acceded to this,

but hinted that the defence of Turkey in Asia would thenceforth rest

especially upon her--a hint to prepare Russia for the Cyprus Convention.

For at this same time the Beaconsfield Cabinet had been treating

secretly with the Sublime Porte. When Lord Salisbury found out that

Russia would not abate her demands for Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars, he

sought to safeguard British interests in the Levant by acquiring

complete control over the island of Cyprus. His final instructions to

Mr. Layard to that effect were telegraphed on May 30, that is, on the

very day on which peace with Russia was practically assured[170]. The

Porte, unaware of the fact that there was little fear of the renewal of

hostilities, agreed to the secret Cyprus Convention on June 4; while

Russia, knowing little or nothing as to Britain's arrangement with the

Porte, acceded to the final arrangements for the discussion of Turkish

affairs at Berlin. It is not surprising that this manner of doing

business aroused great irritation both at St. Petersburg and

Constantinople. Count Shuvaloff's behaviour at the Berlin Congress when

the news came out proclaimed to the world that he considered himself

tricked by Lord Beaconsfield; while that statesman disdainfully sipped

nectar of delight that rarely comes to the lips even of the gods of

diplomacy.

[Footnote 170: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 36 (1878). See, too, _ibid_.

No. 43.]

The terms of the Cyprus Convention were to the effect that, if Russia

retained the three districts in Asia Minor named above, or any of them

(as it was perfectly certain that she would); or if she sought to take

possession of any further Turkish territory in Asia Minor, Great Britain

would help the Sultan by force of arms. He, on his side assigned to

Great Britain the island of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by

her. He further promised "to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed

upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the

protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these

territories." On July I Britain also covenanted to pay to the Porte the

surplus of revenue over expenditure in Cyprus, calculated upon the

average of the last five years, and to restore Cyprus to Turkey if

Russia gave up Kars and her other acquisitions[171].

[Footnote 171: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 36 (1878); Hertslet, vol. iv.

pp. 2722-2725; Holland, _op. cit._, pp. 354-356.]

Fortified by the secret understanding with Russia, and by the equally

secret compact with Turkey, the British Government could enter the

Congress of the Powers at Berlin with complete equanimity. It is true

that news as to the agreement with Russia came out in a London newspaper

which at once published a general description of the Anglo-Russian

agreement of May 30; and when the correctness of the news was stoutly

denied by Ministers, the original deed was given to the world by the

same newspaper on June 14; but again vigorous disclaimers and denials

were given from the ministerial bench in Parliament[172]. Thus, when

Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury proceeded to Berlin for the opening of

the Congress (June 13), they were believed to hold the destinies of the

British Empire in their hands, and the world waited with bated breath

for the scraps of news that came from that centre of diplomacy.

[Footnote 172: Mr. Charles Marvin, a clerk in the Foreign Office, was

charged with this offence, but the prosecution failed (July 16) owing to

lack of sufficient evidence.]

On various details there arose sharp differences which the tactful

humour of the German Chancellor could scarcely set at rest. The fate of

nations seemed to waver in the balance when Prince Gortchakoff gathered

up his maps and threatened to hurry from the room, or when Lord

Beaconsfield gave pressing orders for a special train to take him back

to Calais; but there seemed good grounds for regarding these incidents

rather as illustrative of character, or of the electioneering needs of a

sensational age, than as throes in the birth of nationalities. The

"Peace with honour," which the Prime Minister on his return announced at

Charing Cross to an admiring crowd, had virtually been secured at

Downing Street before the end of May respecting all the great points in

dispute between England and Russia.

We know little about the inner history of the Congress of Berlin, which

is very different from the official Protocols that half reveal and half

conceal its debates. One fact and one incident claim attention as

serving to throw curious sidelights on policy and character

respectively. The Emperor William had been shot at and severely wounded

by a socialist fanatic, Dr. Nobiling, on June 2, 1878, and during the

whole time of the Congress the Crown Prince Frederick acted as regent of

the Empire. Limited as his powers were by law, etiquette, and Bismarck,

he is said to have used them on behalf of Austria and England. The old

Emperor thought so; for in a moment of confiding indiscretion he hinted

to the Princess Radziwill (a Russian by birth) that Russian interests

would have fared better at Berlin had he then been steering the ship of

State[173]. Possibly this explains why Bismarck always maintained that

he had done what he could for his Eastern neighbour, and that he really

deserved a Russian decoration for his services during the Congress.

[Footnote 173: Princess Radziwill, _My Recollections_ (Eng. ed. 1900),

p. 91.]

The incident, which flashes a search-light into character and discloses

the _recherché_ joys of statecraft, is also described in the sprightly

Memoirs of Princess Radziwill. She was present at a brilliant reception

held on the evening of the day when the Cyprus Convention had come to

light. Diplomatists and generals were buzzing eagerly and angrily when

the Earl of Beaconsfield appeared. A slight hush came over the wasp-like

clusters as he made his way among them, noting everything with his

restless, inscrutable eyes. At last he came near the Princess, once a

bitter enemy, but now captivated and captured by his powers of polite

irony. "What are you thinking of," she asked. "I am not thinking at

all," he replied, "I am enjoying myself[174]." After that one can

understand why Jew-baiting became a favourite sport in Russia throughout

the next two decades.

[Footnote 174: _Ibid_. p. 149.]

We turn now to note the terms of the Treaty of Berlin (July 13,

1878)[175]. The importance of this compact will be seen if its

provisions are compared with those of the Treaty of San Stefano, which

it replaced. Instead of the greater Bulgaria subjected for two years to

Russian control, the Congress ordained that Bulgaria proper should not

extend beyond the main chain of the Balkans, thus reducing its extent

from 163,000 square kilometres to 64,000, and its population from four

millions to a million and a half. The period of military occupation and

supervision of the new administration by Russia was reduced to nine

months. At the end of that time, and on the completion of the "organic

law," a Prince was to be elected "freely" by the population of the

Principality. The new State remained under the suzerainty of Turkey, the

Sultan confirming the election of the new Prince of Bulgaria, "with the

assent of the Powers."

[Footnote 175: For the Protocols, see Parl. Papers, Turkey (1878), No.

39. For the Treaty see _ibid_. No. 44; also _The European Concert in the

Eastern Question_, by T.E. Holland, pp. 277-307.]

Another important departure from the San Stefano terms was the creation

of the Province of Eastern Roumelia, with boundaries shown in the

accompanying map. While having a Christian governor, and enjoying the

rights of local self-government, it was to remain under "the direct

political and military authority of the Sultan, under conditions of

administrative autonomy." The Sultan retained the right of keeping

garrisons there, though a local militia was to preserve internal order.

As will be shown in the next chapter, this anomalous state of things

passed away in 1885, when the province threw off Turkish control and

joined Bulgaria.

The other Christian States of the Balkans underwent changes of the

highest importance. Montenegro lost half of her expected gains, but

secured access to the sea at Antivari. The acquisitions of Servia were

now effected at the expense of Bulgaria. These decisions were greatly in

favour of Austria. To that Power the occupation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina was now entrusted for an indefinite period in the interest

of the peace of Europe, and she proceeded forthwith to drive a wedge

between the Serbs of Servia and Montenegro. It is needless to say that,

in spite of the armed opposition of the Mohammedan people of those

provinces--which led to severe fighting in July to September of that

year--Austria's occupation has been permanent, though nominally they

still form part of the Turkish Empire.

[Illustration: MAP OF THE TREATIES OF BERLIN AND SAN STEFANO.]

Roumania and Servia gained complete independence and ceased to pay

tribute to the Sultan, but both States complained of the lack of support

accorded to them by Russia, considering the magnitude of their efforts

for the Slavonic cause. Roumania certainly fared very badly at the hands

of the Power for which it had done yeoman service in the war. The

pride of the Roumanian people brooked no thought of accepting the

Dobrudscha, a district in great part marshy and thinly populated, as an

exchange for a fertile district peopled by their kith and kin. They let

the world know that Russia appropriated their Bessarabian district by

force, and that they accepted the Dobrudscha as a war indemnity. By dint

of pressure exerted at the Congress their envoys secured a southern

extension of its borders at the expense of Bulgaria, a proceeding which

aroused the resentment of Russia.

The conduct of the Czar's Government in this whole matter was most

impolitic. It embittered the relations between the two States and drove

the Government of Prince Charles to rely on Austria and the Triple

Alliance. That is to say, Russia herself closed the door which had been

so readily opened for her into the heart of the Sultan's dominions in

1828, 1854, and 1877[176]. We may here remark that, on the motion of the

French plenipotentiaries at the Congress, that body insisted that Jews

must be admitted to the franchise in Roumania. This behest of the Powers

aroused violent opposition in that State, but was finally, though by no

means fully, carried out.

[Footnote 176: Frederick, Crown Prince of Germany, expressed the general

opinion in a letter written to Prince Charles after the Berlin Congress:

"Russia's conduct, after the manful service you did for that colossal

Empire, meets with censure on all sides." (_Reminiscences of the King of

Roumania_, p. 325).]

Another Christian State of the Peninsula received scant consideration at

the Congress. Greece, as we have seen, had recalled her troops from

Thessaly on the understanding that her claims should be duly considered

at the general peace. She now pressed those claims; but, apart from

initial encouragement given by Lord Salisbury, she received little or no

support. On the motion of the French plenipotentiary, M. Waddington, her

desire to control the northern shores of the Aegean and the island of

Crete was speedily set aside; but he sought to win for her practically

the whole of Thessaly and Epirus. This, however, was firmly opposed by

Lord Beaconsfield, who objected to the cession to her of the southern

and purely Greek districts of Thessaly and Epirus. He protested against

the notion that the plenipotentiaries had come to Berlin in order to

partition "a worn-out State" (Turkey). They were there to "strengthen an

ancient Empire--essential to the maintenance of peace."

"As for Greece," he said, "States, like individuals, which have a future

are in a position to be able to wait." True, he ended by expressing "the

hope and even the conviction" that the Sultan would accept an equitable

solution of the question of the Thessalian frontier; but the Congress

acted on the other sage dictum and proceeded to subject the Hellenes to

the educative influences of hope deferred. Protocol 13 had recorded the

opinion of the Powers that the northern frontier of Greece should follow

the courses of the Rivers Salammaria and Kalamas; but they finally

decided to offer their mediation to the disputants only in case no

agreement could be framed. The Sublime Porte, as we shall see, improved

on the procrastinating methods of the Nestors of European

diplomacy[177].

[Footnote 177: See Mr. L. Sergeant's _Greece in the Nineteenth Century_

(1897), ch. xii., for the speeches of the Greek envoys at the Congress;

also that of Sir Charles Dilke in the House of Commons in the debate of

July 29-August 2, 1878, as to England's desertion of the Greek cause

after the ninth session (June 29) of the Berlin Congress.]

As regards matters that directly concerned Turkey and Russia, we may

note that the latter finally agreed to forego the acquisition of the

Bayazid district and the lands adjoining the caravan route from the

Shah's dominions to Erzeroum. The Czar's Government also promised that

Batoum should be a free port, and left unchanged the regulations

respecting the navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosporus. By a

subsequent treaty with Turkey of February 1879 the Porte agreed to pay

to Russia a war indemnity of about £32,000,000.

More important from our standpoint are the clauses relating to the good

government of the Christians of Turkey. By article 61 of the Treaty of

Berlin the Porte bound itself to carry out "the improvements and

reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the

Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and

Kurds." It even added the promise "periodically" to "make known the

steps taken to this effect to the Powers who will superintend their

application." In the next article Turkey promised to "maintain" the

principle of religious liberty and to give it the widest application.

Differences of religion were to be no bar to employment in any public

capacity, and all persons were to "be admitted, without distinction of

religion, to give evidence before the tribunals."

Such was the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878). Viewed in its broad

outlines, it aimed at piecing together again the Turkish districts which

had been severed at San Stefano; the Bulgars and Serbs who there gained

the hope of effecting a real union of those races were now sundered once

more, the former in three divisions; while the Serbs of Servia, Bosnia,

and Montenegro were wedged apart by the intrusion of the Hapsburg Power.

Yet, imperfect though it was in several points, that treaty promised

substantial gains for the Christians of Turkey. The collapse of the

Sultan's power had been so complete, so notorious, that few persons

believed he would ever dare to disregard the mandate of the Great Powers

and his own solemn promises stated above. But no one could then foresee

the exhibition of weakness and cynicism in the policy of those Powers

towards Turkey, which disgraced the polity of Europe in the last decades

of the century. The causes that brought about that state of mental

torpor in the face of hideous massacres, and of moral weakness displayed

by sovereigns and statesmen in the midst of their millions of armed men,

will be to some extent set forth in the following chapters.

As regards the welfare of the Christians in Asia Minor, the Treaty of

Berlin assigned equal responsibilities to all the signatory Powers. But

the British Government had already laid itself under a special charge on

their behalf by the terms of the Cyprus Convention quoted above. Five

days before that treaty was signed the world heard with a gasp of

surprise that England had become practically mistress of Cyprus and

assumed some measure of responsibility for the good government of the

Christians of Asiatic Turkey. No limit of time was assigned for the

duration of the Convention, and apparently it still holds good so far as

relates to the material advantages accruing from the possession of

that island.

It is needless to say that the Cypriotes have benefited greatly by the

British administration; the value of the imports and exports nearly

doubled between 1878 and 1888. But this fact does not and cannot dispose

of the larger questions opened up as to the methods of acquisition and

of the moral responsibilities which it entailed. These at once aroused

sharp differences of opinion. Admiration at the skill and daring which

had gained for Britain a point of vantage in the Levant and set back

Russia's prestige in that quarter was chequered by protests against the

methods of secrecy, sensationalism, and self-seeking that latterly had

characterised British diplomacy.

One more surprise was still forthcoming. Lord Derby, speaking in the

House of Lords on July 18, gave point to these protests by divulging a

State secret of no small importance, namely, that one of the causes of

his retirement at the end of March was a secret proposal of the Ministry

to send an expedition from India to seize Cyprus and one of the Syrian

ports with a view to operations against Russia, and that, too, with _or

without_ the consent of the Sultan. Whether the Cabinet arrived at

anything like a decision in this question is very doubtful. Lord

Salisbury stoutly denied the correctness of his predecessor's statement.

The papers of Sir Stafford Northcote also show that the scheme at that

time came up for discussion, but was "laid aside[178]." Lord Derby,

however, stated that he had kept private notes of the discussion; and it

is improbable that he would have resigned on a question that was merely

mooted and entirely dismissed. The mystery in which the deliberations

of the Cabinet are involved, and very rightly involved, broods over this

as over so many topics in which Lord Beaconsfield was concerned.

[Footnote 178: _Sir Stafford Northcote_, vol. ii. p. 108.]

On another and far weightier point no difference of opinion is possible.

Viewed by the light of the Cyprus Convention, Britain's responsibility

for assuring a minimum of good government for the Christians of Asiatic

Turkey is undeniable. Unfortunately it admits of no denial that the

duties which that responsibility involves have not been discharged. The

story of the misgovernment and massacre of the Armenian Christians is

one that will ever redound to the disgrace of all the signatories of the

Treaty of Berlin; it is doubly disgraceful to the Power which framed the

Cyprus Convention.

A praiseworthy effort was made by the Beaconsfield Government to

strengthen British influence and the cause of reform by sending a

considerable number of well-educated men as Consuls to Asia Minor, under

the supervision of the Consul-General, Sir Charles Wilson. In the first

two years they effected much good, securing the dismissal of several of

the worst Turkish officials, and implanting hope in the oppressed Greeks

and Armenians. Had they been well supported from London, they might have

wrought a permanent change. Such, at least, is the belief of Professor

Ramsay after several years' experience in Asia Minor.

Unfortunately, the Gladstone Government, which came into power in the

spring of 1880, desired to limit its responsibilities on all sides,

especially in the Levant. The British Consuls ceased to be supported,

and after the arrival of Mr. (now Lord) Goschen at Constantinople in May

1880, as Ambassador Extraordinary, British influence began to suffer a

decline everywhere through Turkey, partly owing to the events soon to be

described. The outbreak of war in Egypt in 1882 was made a pretext by

the British Government for the transference of the Consuls to Egypt; and

thereafter matters in Asia Minor slid back into the old ruts. The

progress of the Greeks and Armenians, the traders of that land, suffered

a check; and the remarkable Moslem revival which the Sultan inaugurated

in that year (the year 1300 of the Mohammedan calendar) gradually led up

to the troubles and massacres which culminated in the years 1896 and

1897. We may finally note that when the Gladstone Ministry left the

field open in Asia Minor, the German Government promptly took

possession; and since 1883 the influence of Berlin has more and more

penetrated into the Sultan's lands in Europe and Asia[179].

[Footnote 179: See _Impressions of Turkey_, by Professor W.M. Ramsay

(1897), chap. vi.]

The collapse of British influence at Constantinople was hastened on by

the efforts made by the Cabinet of London, after Mr. Gladstone's

accession to office, on behalf of Greece. It soon appeared that Abdul

Hamid and his Ministers would pay no heed to the recommendations of the

Great Powers on this head, for on July 20, 1878, they informed Sir Henry

Layard of their "final" decision that no Thessalian districts would be

given up to Greece. Owing to pressure exerted by the Dufaure-Waddington

Ministry in France, the Powers decided that a European Commission should

be appointed to consider the whole question. To this the Beaconsfield

Government gave a not very willing assent.

The Porte bettered the example. It took care to name as the first place

of meeting of the Commissioners a village to the north of the Gulf of

Arta which was not discoverable on any map. When at last this mistake

was rectified, and the Greek envoys on two occasions sought to steam

into the gulf, they were fired on from the Turkish forts. After these

amenities, the Commission finally met at Prevesa, only to have its

report shelved by the Porte (January-March 1879). Next, in answer to a

French demand for European intervention, the Turks opposed various

devices taken from the inexhaustible stock of oriental subterfuges. So

the time wore on until, in the spring of 1880, the fall of the

Beaconsfield Ministry brought about a new political situation.

The new Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, was known as the statesman who

had given the Ionian Isles to Greece, and who advocated the expulsion

of the Turks, "bag and baggage," from Europe. At once the despatches

from Downing Street took on a different complexion, and the substitution

of Mr. Goschen for Sir Henry Layard at Constantinople enabled the Porte

to hear the voice of the British people, undimmed by official checks. A

Conference of the Powers met at Berlin to discuss the carrying out of

their recommendations on the Greek Question, and of the terms of the

late treaty respecting Montenegro.

On this latter affair the Powers finally found it needful to make a

joint naval demonstration against the troops of the Albanian League who

sought to prevent the handing over of the seaport of Dulcigno to

Montenegro, as prescribed by the Treaty of Berlin. But, as happened

during the Concert of the Powers in the spring of 1876, a single

discordant note sufficed to impair the effect of the collective voice.

Then it was England which refused to employ any coercive measures; now

it was Austria and Germany, and finally (after the resignation of the

Waddington Ministry) France. When the Sultan heard of this discord in

the European Concert, his Moslem scruples resumed their wonted sway, and

the Albanians persisted in defying Europe.

The warships of the Powers might have continued to threaten the Albanian

coast with unshotted cannon to this day, had not the Gladstone Cabinet

proposed drastic means for bringing the Sultan to reason. The plan was

that the united fleet should steam straightway to Smyrna and land

marines for the sequestration of the customs' dues of that important

trading centre. Here again the Powers were not of one mind. The three

dissentients again hung back; but they so far concealed their refusal,

or reluctance, as to leave on Abdul Hamid's mind the impression that a

united Christendom was about to seize Smyrna[180]. This was enough. He

could now (October 10, 1880) bow his head resignedly before superior

force without sinning against the Moslem's unwritten but inviolable

creed of never giving way before Christians save under absolute

necessity. At once he ordered his troops to carry out the behests of the

Powers; and after some fighting, Dervish Pasha drove the Albanians out

of Dulcigno, and surrendered it to the Montenegrins (Nov.-Dec. 1880).

Such is the official account; but, seeing that the Porte knows how to

turn to account the fanaticism and turbulence of the Albanians[181], it

may be that their resistance all along was but a device of that

resourceful Government to thwart the will of Europe.

[Footnote 180: _Life of Gladstone_, by J. Morley, vol. iii. p. 9.]

[Footnote 181: See _Turkey in Europe_, by "Odysseus," p. 434.]

The same threat as to the seizure of the Turkish customs-house at Smyrna

sufficed to help on the solution of the Greek Question. The delays and

insults of the Turks had driven the Greeks to desperation, and only the

urgent remonstrances of the Powers availed to hold back the Cabinet of

Athens from a declaration of war. This danger by degrees passed away;

but, as usually happens where passions are excited on both sides, every

compromise pressed on the litigants by the arbiters presented great

difficulty. The Congress of Berlin had recommended the extension of

Greek rule over the purely Hellenic districts of Thessaly, assigning as

the new boundaries the course of the Rivers Salammaria and Kalamas, the

latter of which flows into the sea opposite the Island of Corfu.

Another Conference of the Powers (it was the third) met to decide the

details of that proposal; but owing to the change of Government in

France, along with other causes, the whole question proved to be very

intricate. In the end, the Powers induced the Sultan to sign the

Convention of May 24, 1881, whereby the course of the River Arta was

substituted for that of the Kalamas.

As a set-off to this proposal, which involved the loss of Jannina and

Prevesa for Greece, they awarded to the Hellenes some districts north of

the Salammaria which helped partially to screen the town of Larissa from

the danger of Turkish inroads[182]. To this arrangement Moslems and

Christians sullenly assented. On the whole the Greeks gained 13,200

square kilometres in territory and about 150,000 inhabitants, but their

failure to gain several Hellenic districts of Epirus rankled deep in the

popular consciousness and prepared the way for the events of 1885

and 1897.

[Footnote 182: _The European Concert in the Eastern Question_, by T.E.

Holland, pp. 60-69.]

These later developments can receive here only the briefest reference.

In the former year, when the two Bulgarias framed their union, the

Greeks threatened Turkey with war, but were speedily brought to another

frame of mind by a "pacific" blockade by the Powers. Embittered by this

treatment, the Hellenes sought to push on their cause in Macedonia and

Crete through a powerful Society, the "Ethnike Hetairia." The chronic

discontent of the Cretans at Turkish misrule and the outrages of the

Moslem troops led to grave complications in 1897. At the beginning of

that year the Powers intervened with a proposal for the appointment of a

foreign gendarmerie (January 1897). In order to defeat this plan the

Sultan stirred up Moslem fanaticism in the island, until the resulting

atrocities brought Greece into the field both in Thessaly and Crete.

During the ensuing strifes in Crete the Powers demeaned themselves by

siding against the Christian insurgents, and some Greek troops sent from

Athens to their aid. Few events in our age have caused a more painful

sensation than the bombardment of Cretan villages by British and French

warships. The Powers also proclaimed a "pacific" blockade of Crete

(March-May 1897). The inner reasons that prompted these actions are not

fully known. It may safely be said that they will need far fuller

justification than that which was given in the explanations of Ministers

at Westminster.

Meanwhile the passionate resentment felt by the Greeks had dragged the

Government of King George into war with Turkey (April 18, 1897). The

little kingdom was speedily overpowered by Turks and Albanians; and

despite the recall of their troops from Crete, the Hellenes were unable

to hold Phersala and other positions in the middle of Thessaly. The

Powers, however, intervened on May 12, and proceeded to pare down the

exorbitant terms of the Porte, allowing it to gain only small strips in

the north of Thessaly, as a "strategic rectification" of the frontier.

The Turkish demand of £T10,000,000 was reduced to T4,000,000

(September 18).

[Illustration: MAP OF THESSALY.]

This successful war against Greece raised the prestige of Turkey and

added fuel to the flames of Mohammedan bigotry. These, as we have seen,

had been assiduously fanned by Abdul Hamid II. ever since the year 1882,

when a Pan-Islam movement began. The results of this revival were

far-reaching, being felt even among the hill tribes on the Afghan-Punjab

border (see Chapter XIV.). Throughout the Ottoman Empire the Mohammedans

began to assert their superiority over Christians; and, as Professor

Ramsay has observed, "the means whereby Turkish power is restored is

always the same--massacre[183]."

[Footnote 183: _Impressions of Turkey_, by W.M. Ramsay, p. 139.]

It would be premature to inquire which of the European Powers must be

held chiefly responsible for the toleration of the hideous massacres of

the Armenians in 1896-97, and the atrocious misgovernment of Macedonia,

by the Turks. All the Great Powers who signed the Berlin Treaty are

guilty; and, as has been stated above, the State which framed the Cyprus

Convention is doubly guilty, so far as concerns the events in Armenia. A

grave share of responsibility also rests with those who succeeded in

handing back a large part of Macedonia to the Turks. But the writer who

in the future undertakes to tell the story of the decline of European

morality at the close of the nineteenth century, and the growth of

cynicism and selfishness, will probably pass still severer censures on

the Emperors of Germany and Russia, who, with the unequalled influence

which they wielded over the Porte, might have intervened with effect to

screen their co-religionists from unutterable wrongs, and yet, as far as

is known, raised not a finger on their behalf. The Treaty of Berlin,

which might have inaugurated an era of good government throughout the

whole of Turkey if the Powers had been true to their trust, will be

cited as damning evidence in the account of the greatest betrayal of a

trust which Modern History records.

* * * * *

NOTE.--For the efforts made by the British Government on behalf of the

Armenians, the reader should consult the last chapter of Mr. James

Bryce's book, _Transcaucasia and Mount Ararat_ (new edition, 1896).

Further information may be expected in the _Life of Earl Granville_,

soon to appear, from the pen of Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice.

CHAPTER X

THE MAKING OF BULGARIA

"If you can help to build up these peoples into a bulwark of

independent States and thus screen the 'sick man' from the

fury of the northern blast, for God's sake do it."--SIR R.

MORIER to SIR W. WHITE, _December 27, 1885_.

The failure which attended the forward Hellenic movement during the

years 1896-97 stands in sharp relief with the fortunes of the

Bulgarians. To the rise of this youngest, and not the least promising,

of European States, we must devote a whole chapter; for during a decade

the future of the Balkan Peninsula and the policy of the Great Powers

turned very largely on the emancipation of this interesting race from

the effective control of the Sultan and the Czar.

The rise of this enigmatical people affords a striking example of the

power of national feeling to uplift the downtrodden. Until the year

1876, the very name Bulgarian was scarcely known except as a

geographical term. Kinglake, in his charming work, _Eothen_, does not

mention the Bulgarians, though he travelled on horseback from Belgrade

to Sofia and thence to Adrianople. And yet in 1828, the conquering march

of the Russians to Adrianople had awakened that people to a passing

thrill of national consciousness. Other travellers,--for instance,

Cyprien Robert in the "thirties,"--noted their sturdy patience in toil,

their slowness to act, but their great perseverance and will-power, when

the resolve was formed.

These qualities may perhaps be ascribed to their Tatar (Tartar) origin.

Ethnically, they are closely akin to the Magyars and Turks, but, having

been long settled on the banks of the Volga (hence their name, Bulgarian

= Volgarian), they adopted the speech and religion of the Slavs. They

have lived this new life for about a thousand years[184]; and in this

time have been completely changed. Though their flat lips and noses

bespeak an Asiatic origin, they are practically Slavs, save that their

temperament is less nervous, and their persistence greater than that of

their co-religionists[185]. Their determined adhesion to Slav ideals and

rejection of Turkish ways should serve as a reminder to anthropologists

that peoples are not mainly to be judged and divided off by

craniological peculiarities. Measurement of skulls may tell us something

concerning the basal characteristics of tribes: it leaves untouched the

boundless fund of beliefs, thoughts, aspirations, and customs which

mould the lives of nations. The peoples of to-day are what their creeds,

customs, and hopes have made them; as regards their political life, they

have little more likeness to their tribal forefathers than the average

man has to the chimpanzee.

[Footnote 184: _The Peasant State: Bulgaria in 1894_, by E. Dicey, C.B.

(1904), p. 11.]

[Footnote 185: _Turkey in Europe_, by "Odysseus," pp. 28, 356, 367.]

The first outstanding event in the recent rise of the Bulgarian race was

the acquisition of spiritual independence in 1869-70. Hitherto they, in

common with nearly all the Slavs, had belonged to the Greek Church, and

had recognised the supremacy of its Patriarch at Constantinople, but, as

the national idea progressed, the Bulgarians sought to have their own

Church. It was in vain that the Greeks protested against this schismatic

attempt. The Western Powers and Russia favoured it; the Porte also was

not loth to see the Christians further divided. Early in the year 1870,

the Bulgarian Church came into existence, with an Exarch of its own at

Constantinople who has survived the numerous attempts of the Greeks to

ban him as a schismatic from the "Universal Church." The Bulgarians

therefore took rank with the other peoples of the Peninsula as a

religious entity., the Roumanian and Servian Churches having been

constituted early in the century. In fact, the Porte recognises the

Bulgarians, even in Macedonia, as an independent religious community, a

right which it does not accord to the Servians; the latter, in

Macedonia, are counted only as "Greeks[186]."

[Footnote 186: _Turkey in Europe_, by "Odysseus," pp. 280-283, 297; _The

Peasant State_, by E. Dicey, pp. 75-77.]

The Treaty of San Stefano promised to make the Bulgarians the

predominant race of the Balkan Peninsula for the benefit of Russia; but,

as we have seen, the efforts of Great Britain and Austria, backed by the

jealousies of Greeks and Servians, led to a radical change in those

arrangements. The Treaty of Berlin divided that people into three

unequal parts. The larger mass, dwelling in Bulgaria Proper, gained

entire independence of the Sultan, save in the matter of suzerainty; the

Bulgarians on the southern slopes of the Balkans acquired autonomy only

in local affairs, and remained under the control of the Porte in

military affairs and in matters of high policy; while the Bulgarians who

dwelt in Macedonia, about 1,120,000 in number, were led to hope

something from articles 61 and 62 of the Treaty of Berlin, but remained

otherwise at the mercy of the Sultan[187].

[Footnote 187: Récius, Kiepert, Ritter, and other geographers and

ethnologists, admit that the majority in Macedonia is Bulgarian.]

This unsatisfactory state of things promised to range the Principality

of Bulgaria entirely on the side of Russia, and at the outset the hope

of all Bulgarians was for a close friendship with the great Power that

had effected their liberation. These sentiments, however, speedily

cooled. The officers appointed by the Czar to organise the Principality

carried out their task in a high-handed way that soon irritated the

newly enfranchised people. Gratitude is a feeling that soon vanishes,

especially in political life. There, far more than in private life, it

is a great mistake for the party that has conferred a boon to remind

the recipient of what he owes, especially if that recipient be young and

aspiring. Yet that was the mistake committed everywhere throughout

Bulgaria. The army, the public service--everything--was modelled on

Russian lines during the time of the occupation, until the overbearing

ways of the officials succeeded in dulling the memory of the services

rendered in the war. The fact of the liberation was forgotten amidst the

irritation aroused by the constant reminders of it.

The Russians succeeded in alienating even the young German prince who

came, with the full favour of the Czar Alexander II., to take up the

reins of Government. A scion of the House of Hesse Darmstadt by a

morganatic marriage, Prince Alexander of Battenberg had been sounded by

the Russian authorities, with a view to his acceptance of the Bulgarian

crown. By the vote of the Bulgarian Chamber, it was offered to him on

April 29, 1879. He accepted it, knowing full well that it would be a

thorny honour for a youth of twenty-two years of age. His tall

commanding frame, handsome features, ability and prowess as a soldier,

and, above all, his winsome address, seemed to mark him out as a natural

leader of men; and he received a warm welcome from the Bulgarians in the

month of July.

His difficulties began at once. The chief Russian administrator,

Dondukoff Korsakoff, had thrust his countrymen into all the important

and lucrative posts, thereby leaving out in the cold the many

Bulgarians, who, after working hard for the liberation of their land,

now saw it transferred from the slovenly overlordship of the Turk to the

masterful grip of the Muscovite. The Principality heaved with

discontent, and these feelings finally communicated themselves to the

sympathetic nature of the Prince. But duty and policy alike forbade him

casting off the Russian influence. No position could be more trying for

a young man of chivalrous and ambitious nature, endowed with a strain of

sensitiveness which he probably derived from his Polish mother. He early

set forth his feelings in a private letter to Prince Charles of

Roumania:--

Devoted with my whole heart to the Czar Alexander, I am anxious to do

nothing that can be called anti-Russian. Unfortunately the Russian

officials have acted with the utmost want of tact; confusion prevails in

every office, and peculation, thanks to Dondukoff's decrees, is all but

sanctioned. I am daily confronted with the painful alternative of having

to decide either to assent to the Russian demands or to be accused in

Russia of ingratitude and of "injuring the most sacred feelings of the

Bulgarians." My position is truly terrible.

The friction with Russia increased with time. Early in the year 1880,

Prince Alexander determined to go to St. Petersburg to appeal to the

Czar in the hope of allaying the violence of the Panslavonic intriguers.

Matters improved for a time, but only because the Prince accepted the

guidance of the Czar. Thereafter he retained most of his pro-Russian

Ministers, even though the second Legislative Assembly, elected in the

spring of that year, was strongly Liberal and anti-Russian. In April

1881 he acted on the advice of one of his Ministers, a Russian general

named Ehrenroth, and carried matters with a high hand: he dissolved the

Assembly, suspended the constitution, encouraged his officials to

browbeat the voters, and thereby gained a docile Chamber, which carried

out his behests by decreeing a Septennate, or autocratic rule for seven

years. In order to prop up his miniature czardom, he now asked the new

Emperor, Alexander III., to send him two Russian Generals. His request

was granted in the persons of Generals Soboleff and Kaulbars, who became

Ministers of the Interior and for War; a third, General Tioharoff, being

also added as Minister of Justice.

The triumph of Muscovite influence now seemed to be complete, until the

trio just named usurped the functions of the Bulgarian Ministers and

informed the Prince that they took their orders from the Czar, not from

him. Chafing at these self-imposed Russian bonds, the Prince now leant

more on the moderate Liberals, headed by Karaveloff; and on the

Muscovites intriguing in the same quarter, and with the troops, with a

view to his deposition, they met with a complete repulse. An able and

vigorous young Bulgarian, Stambuloff, was now fast rising in importance

among the more resolute nationalists. The son of an innkeeper of

Tirnova, he was sent away to be educated at Odessa; there he early

became imbued with Nihilist ideas, and on returning to the Danubian

lands, framed many plots for the expulsion of the Turks from Bulgaria.

His thick-set frame, his force of will, his eloquent, passionate speech,

and, above all, his burning patriotism, soon brought him to the front as

the leader of the national party; and he now strove with all his might

to prevent his land falling to the position of a mere satrapy of the

liberators. Better the puny autocracy of Prince Alexander than the very

real despotism of the nominees of the Emperor Alexander III.

The character of the new Czar will engage our attention in the following

chapter; here we need only say that the more his narrow, hard, and

overbearing nature asserted itself, the greater appeared the danger to

the liberties of the Principality. At last, when the situation became

unbearable, the Prince resolved to restore the Bulgarian constitution;

and he took this momentous step, on September 18, 1883, without

consulting the three Russian Ministers, who thereupon resigned[188].

[Footnote 188: For the scenes which then occurred, see _Le Prince

Alexandre de Battenberg en Bulgarie_, by A.G. Drandar, pp. 169 _et

seq_.; also A. Koch, _Fürst Alexander von Bulgarien_, pp. 144-147.

For the secret aims of Russia, see _Documents secrets de la Politique

russe en Orient_, by R. Leonoff (Berlin, 1893), pp. 49-65. General

Soboleff, _Der erste Fürst von Bulgarian_ (Leipzig, 1896), has given a

highly coloured Russian account of all these incidents.]

At once the Prince summoned Karaveloff, and said to him: "My dear

Karaveloff--For the second time I swear to thee that I will be entirely

submissive to the will of the people, and that I will govern in full

accordance with the constitution of Tirnova. Let us forget what passed

during the _coup d'état_ [of 1881], and work together for the

prosperity of the country." He embraced him; and that embrace was the

pledge of a close union of hearts between him and his people[189].

[Footnote 189: See Laveleye's _The Balkan Peninsula_, pp. 259-262, for

an account of Karaveloff.]

The Czar forthwith showed his anger at this act of independence, and,

counting it a sign of defiance, allowed or encouraged his agents in

Bulgaria to undermine the power of the Prince, and procure his

deposition. For two years they struggled in vain. An attempt by the

Russian Generals Soboleff and Kaulbars to kidnap the Prince by night

failed, owing to the loyalty of Lieutenant Martinoff, then on duty at

his palace; the two ministerial plotters forthwith left Bulgaria[190].

[Footnote 190: J.G.C. Minchin, _The Growth of Freedom in the Balkan

Peninsula_ (1886) p. 237. The author, Consul-General for Servia in

London, had earlier contributed many articles to the _Times_ and

_Morning Advertiser_ on Balkan affairs.]

Even now the scales did not fall from the eyes of the Emperor Alexander

III. Bismarck was once questioned by the faithful Busch as to the

character of that potentate. The German Boswell remarked that he had

heard Alexander III. described as "stupid, exceedingly stupid";

whereupon the Chancellor replied: "In a general way that is saying too

much[191]." Leaving to posterity the task of deciding that question, we

may here point out that Muscovite policy in the years 1878-85 achieved a

truly remarkable feat in uniting all the liberated races of the Balkan

Peninsula against their liberators. By the terms of the Treaty of San

Stefano, Russia had alienated the Roumanians, Servians, and Greeks; so

that when the Princes of those two Slav Principalities decided to take

the kingly title (as they did in the spring of 1881 and 1882

respectively), it was after visits to Berlin and Vienna, whereby they

tacitly signified their friendliness to the Central Powers.

[Footnote 191: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, by Dr. M.

Busch (Note of January 5, 1886), vol. iii. p. 150 (English edition).]

In the case of Servia this went to the length of alliance. On June 25,

1881, the Foreign Minister, M. Mijatovich, concluded with

Austria-Hungary a secret convention, whereby Servia agreed to

discourage any movement among the Slavs of Bosnia, while the Dual

Monarchy promised to refrain from any action detrimental to Servian

hopes for what is known as old Servia. The agreement was for eight

years; but it was not renewed in 1889[192]. The fact, however, that such

a compact could be framed within three years of the Berlin Congress,

shows how keen was the resentment of the Servian Government at the

neglect of its interests by Russia, both there and at San Stefano.

[Footnote 192: The treaty has not been published; for this general

description of it I am indebted to the kindness of M. Mijatovich

himself.]

The gulf between Bulgaria and Russia widened more slowly, but with the

striking sequel that will be seen. The Dondukoffs, Soboleffs, and

Kaulbars first awakened and then estranged the formerly passive and

docile race for whose aggrandisement Russia had incurred the resentment

of the neighbouring peoples. Under Muscovite tutelage the "ignorant

Bulgarian peasants" were developing a strong civic and political

instinct. Further, the Czar's attacks, now on the Prince, and then on

the popular party, served to bind these formerly discordant elements

into an alliance. Stambuloff, the very embodiment of young Bulgaria in

tenacity of purpose and love of freedom, was now the President of the

Sobranje, or National Assembly, and he warmly supported Prince Alexander

so long as he withstood Russian pretensions. At the outset the strifes

at Sofia had resembled a triangular duel, and the Russian agents could

readily have disposed of the third combatant had they sided either with

the Prince or with the Liberals. By browbeating both they simplified the

situation to the benefit both of the Prince and of the nascent liberties

of Bulgaria.

Alexander III. and his Chancellor, de Giers, had also tied their hands

in Balkan affairs by a treaty which they framed with Austria and

Germany, and signed and ratified at the meeting of the three Emperors at

Skiernewice (September 1884--see Chapter XII.). The most important of

its provisions from our present standpoint was that by which, in the

event of two of the three Empires disagreeing on Balkan questions, the

casting vote rested with the third Power. This gave to Bismarck the same

role of arbiter which he had played at the Berlin Congress.

But in the years 1885 and 1886, the Czar and his agents committed a

series of blunders, by the side of which their earlier actions seemed

statesmanlike. The welfare of the Bulgarian people demanded an early

reversal of the policy decided on at the Congress of Berlin (1878),

whereby the southern Bulgarians were divided from their northern

brethren in order that the Sultan might have the right to hold the

Balkan passes in time of war. That is to say, the Powers, especially

Great Britain and Austria, set aside the claims of a strong racial

instinct for purely military reasons. The breakdown of this artificial

arrangement was confidently predicted at the time; and Russian agents at

first took the lead in preparing for the future union. Skobeleff,

Katkoff, and the Panslavonic societies of Russia encouraged the

formation of "gymnastic societies" in Eastern Roumelia, and the youth of

that province enrolled themselves with such ardour that by the year 1885

more than 40,000 were trained to the use of arms. As for the protests of

the Sultan and those of his delegates at Philippopolis, they were

stilled by hints from St. Petersburg, or by demands for the prompt

payment of Turkey's war debt to Russia. All the world knew that, thanks

to Russian patronage, Eastern Roumelia had slipped entirely from the

control of Abdul Hamid.

By the summer of 1885, the unionist movement had acquired great

strength. But now, at the critical time, when Russia should have led

that movement, she let it drift, or even, we may say, cast off the

tow-rope. Probably the Czar and his Ministers looked on the Bulgarians

as too weak or too stupid to act for themselves. It was a complete

miscalculation; for now Stambuloff and Karaveloff had made that aim

their own, and brought to its accomplishment all the skill and zeal

which they had learned in a long career of resistance to Turkish and

Russian masters. There is reason to think that they and their

coadjutors at Philippopolis pressed on events in the month of September

1885, because the Czar was then known to disapprove any

immediate action.

In order to understand the reason for this strange reversal of Russia's

policy, we must scrutinise events more closely. The secret workings of

that policy have been laid bare in a series of State documents, the

genuineness of which is not altogether established. They are said to

have been betrayed to the Bulgarian patriots by a Russian agent, and

they certainly bear signs of authenticity. If we accept them (and up to

the present they have been accepted by well-informed men) the truth is

as follows:--

Russia would have worked hard for the union of Eastern Roumelia to

Bulgaria, provided that the Prince abdicated and his people submitted

completely to Russian control. Quite early in his reign Alexander III.

discovered in them an independence which his masterful nature ill

brooked. He therefore postponed that scheme until the Prince should

abdicate or be driven out. As one of the Muscovite agents phrased it in

the spring of 1881, the union must not be brought about until a Russian

protectorate should be founded in the Principality; for if they made

Bulgaria too strong, it would become "a second Roumania," that is, as

"ungrateful" to Russia as Roumania had shown herself after the seizure

of her Bessarabian lands. In fact, the Bulgarians could gain the wish of

their hearts only on one condition--that of proclaiming the Emperor

Alexander Grand Duke of the greater State of the future[193].

[Footnote 193: _Documents secrets de la Politique russe en Orient,_ ed.

by R. Leonoff (Berlin, 1893), pp. 8, 48. This work is named by M. Malet

in his _Bibliographie_ on the Eastern Question on p. 448, vol. ix., of

the _Histoire Générale of _MM. Lavisse and Rambaud. I have been assured

of its genuineness by a gentleman well versed in the politics of the

Balkan States.]

The chief obstacles in the way of Russia's aggrandisement were the

susceptibilities of "the Battenberger," as her agents impertinently

named him, and the will of Stambuloff. When the Czar, by his malevolent

obstinacy, finally brought these two men to accord, it was deemed

needful to adopt various devices in order to shatter the forces which

Russian diplomacy had succeeded in piling up in its own path. But here

again we are reminded of the Horatian precept--

Vis consili expers mole ruit sua.

To the hectorings of Russian agents the "peasant State" offered an ever

firmer resistance, and by the summer of 1885 it was clear that bribery

and bullying were equally futile.

Of course the Emperor of all the Russias had it in his power to harry

the Prince in many ways. Thus in the summer of 1885, when a marriage was

being arranged between him and the Princess Victoria, daughter of the

Crown Princess of Germany, the Czar's influence at Berlin availed to

veto an engagement which is believed to have been the heartfelt wish of

both the persons most nearly concerned. In this matter Bismarck, true to

his policy of softening the Czar's annoyance at the Austro-German

alliance by complaisance in all other matters, made himself Russia's

henchman, and urged his press-trumpet, Busch, to write newspaper

articles abusing Queen Victoria as having instigated this match solely

with a view to the substitution of British for Russian influence in

Bulgaria[194]. The more servile part of the German Press improved on

these suggestions, and stigmatised the Bulgarian Revolution of the

ensuing autumn as an affair trumped up at London. So far is it possible

for minds of a certain type to read their own pettiness into events.

[Footnote 194: For Bismarck's action and that of the Emperor William I.

in 1885, see _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, by M. Busch,

vol. iii. pp. 171, 180, 292, also p. 335. Russian agents came to

Stambuloff in the summer of 1885 to say that "Prince Alexander must be

got rid of before he can ally himself with the German family regnant."

Stambuloff informed the Prince of this. See _Stambuloff_, by A.H.

Beaman, p. 52.]

Meanwhile, if we may credit the despatches above referred to, the

Russian Government was seeking to drag Bulgaria into fratricidal strife

with Roumania over some trifling disputes about the new border near

Silistria. That quarrel, if well managed, promised to be materially

advantageous to Russia and mentally soothing to her ruler. It would

weaken the Danubian States and help to bring them back to the heel of

their former protector. Further, seeing that the behaviour of King

Charles to his Russian benefactors was no less "ungrateful" than that of

Prince Alexander, it would be a fit Nemesis for these _ingrats_ to be

set by the ears. Accordingly, in the month of August 1885, orders were

issued to Russian agents to fan the border dispute; and on August 12/30

the Director of the Asiatic Department at St. Petersburg wrote the

following instructions to the Russian Consul-General at Rustchuk:--

You remember that the union [of the two Bulgarias] must not

take place until after the abdication of Prince Alexander.

However, the ill-advised and hostile attitude of King Charles

of Roumania [to Russia] obliges the imperial government to

postpone for some time the projected union of Eastern

Roumelia to the Principality, as well as the abdication and

expulsion of the Prince of Bulgaria. In the session of the

Council of [Russian] Ministers held yesterday it was decided

to beg the Emperor to call Prince Alexander to Copenhagen or

to St. Petersburg in order to inform him that, according to

the will of His Majesty, Bulgaria must defend by armed force

her rights over the points hereinbefore mentioned[195].

[Footnote 195: R. Leonoff, _op. cit._ pp. 81-84.]

The despatch then states that Russia will keep Turkey quiet and will

eventually make war on Roumania; also, that if Bulgaria triumphs over

Roumania, the latter will pay her in territory or money, or in both.

Possibly, however, the whole scheme may have been devised to serve as a

decoy to bring Prince Alexander within the power of his imperial

patrons, who, in that case, would probably have detained and

dethroned him.

Further light was thrown on the tortuous course of Russian diplomacy by

a speech of Count Eugen Zichy to the Hungarian Delegations about a year

later. He made the startling declaration that in the summer of 1885

Russia concluded a treaty with Montenegro with the aim of dethroning

King Milan and Prince Alexander, and the division of the Balkan States

between Prince Nicholas of Montenegro and the Karageorgevich Pretender

who has since made his way to the throne at Belgrade. The details of

these schemes are not known, but the searchlight thrown upon them from

Buda-Pesth revealed the shifts of the policy of those "friends of

peace," the Czar Alexander III. and his Chancellor, de Giers.

Prince Alexander may not have been aware of these schemes in their full

extent, but he and his friends certainly felt the meshes closing around

them. There were only two courses open, either completely to submit to

the Czar (which, for the Prince, implied abdication) or to rely on the

Bulgarian people. The Prince took the course which would have been taken

by every man worthy of the name. It is, however, almost certain that he

did not foresee the events at Philippopolis. He gave his word to a

German officer, Major von Huhn, that he had not in the least degree

expected the unionist movement to take so speedy and decisive a step

forward as it did in the middle of September. The Prince, in fact, had

been on a tour throughout Europe, and expressed the same opinion to the

Russian Chancellor, de Giers, at Franzensbad.

But by this time everything was ready at Philippopolis. As the men of

Eastern Roumelia were all of one mind in this matter, it was the easiest

of tasks to surprise the Sultan's representative, Gavril Pasha, to

surround his office with soldiers, and to request him to leave the

province (September 18). A carriage was ready to conduct him towards

Sofia. In it sat a gaily dressed peasant girl holding a drawn sword.

Gavril turned red with rage at this insult, but he mounted the vehicle,

and was driven through the town and thence towards the Balkans.

Such was the departure of the last official of the Sultan from the land

which the Turks had often drenched with blood; such was the revenge of

the southern Bulgarians for the atrocities of 1876. Not a drop of blood

was shed; and Major von Huhn, who soon arrived at Philippopolis, found

Greeks and Turks living contentedly under the new government. The word

"revolution" is in such cases a misnomer. South Bulgaria merely returned

to its natural state[196]. But nothing will convince diplomatists that

events can happen without the pulling of wires by themselves or their

rivals. In this instance they found that Prince Alexander had made the

revolution.

[Footnote 196: _The Struggle of the Bulgarians for National

Independence_, by Major A. von Huhn, chap. ii. See, too, Parl. Papers,

Turkey, No. 1 (1886), p. 83.]

At first, however, the Prince doubted whether he should accept the crown

of a Greater Bulgaria which the men of Philippopolis now

enthusiastically offered to him. Stambuloff strongly urged him to

accept, even if he thereby still further enraged the Czar: "Sire," he

said, "two roads lie before you: the one to Philippopolis and as far

beyond as God may lead; the other to Sistova and Darmstadt. I counsel

you to take the crown the nation offers you." On the 20th the Prince

announced his acceptance of the crown of a united Bulgaria. As he said

to the British Consul at Philippopolis, he would have been a "sharper"

(_filou_) not to side with his people[197].

[Footnote 197: _Stambuloff_, by A.H. Beaman, chap. iii.; Parl. Papers,

_ibid_. p. 81.]

Few persons were prepared for the outburst of wrath of the Czar at

hearing this news. Early in his reign he had concentrated into a single

phrase--"silly Pole"--the spleen of an essentially narrow nature at

seeing a kinsman and a dependant dare to think and act for himself[198].

But on this occasion, as we can now see, the Prince had marred Russia's

plans in the most serious way. Stambuloff and he had deprived her of her

unionist trump card. The Czar found his project of becoming Grand Duke

of a Greater Bulgaria blocked by the action of this same hated kinsman.

Is it surprising that his usual stolidity gave way to one of those fits

of bull-like fury which aroused the fear of all who beheld them?

Thenceforth between the Emperor Alexander and Prince Alexander the

relations might be characterised by the curt phrase which Palafox hurled

at the French from the weak walls of Saragossa--"War to the knife." Like

Palafox, the Prince now had no hope but in the bravery of his people.

[Footnote 198: _Bismarck: Reflections and Reminiscences_, vol. ii. p.

116 (Eng. ed.).]

In the ciphered telegrams of September 19 and 20, which the Director of

the Asiatic Department at St. Petersburg sent to the Russian

Consul-General at Rustchuk, the note of resentment and revenge was

clearly sounded. The events in Eastern Roumelia had changed "all our

intentions." The agent was therefore directed to summon the chief

Russian officers in Bulgaria and ask them whether the "young" Bulgarian

officers could really command brigades and regiments, and organise the

artillery; also whether that army could alone meet the army of "a

neighbouring State." The replies of the officers being decidedly in the

negative, they were ordered to leave Bulgaria[199]. Nelidoff, the

Russian ambassador at Constantinople, also worked furiously to spur on

the Sultan to revenge the insult inflicted on him by Prince Alexander.

[Footnote 199: R. Leonoff, _op. cit._ Nos. 75, 77.]

Sir William White believed that the _volte face_ in Russian policy was

due solely to Nelidoff's desire to thwart the peaceful policy of the

Russian Chancellor, de Giers, who at that time chanced to be absent in

Tyrol, while the Czar also was away at Copenhagen[200]. But it now

appears that the Russian Foreign Office took Nelidoff's view, and bade

him press Turkey to restore the "legal order" of things in Eastern

Roumelia. Further, the Ministers of the Czar found that Servia, Greece,

and perhaps also Roumania, intended to oppose the aggrandisement of

Bulgaria; and it therefore seemed easy to chastise "the Battenberger"

for his wanton disturbance of the peace of Europe.

[Footnote 200: _Sir William White: Memoirs and Correspondence_, by H.

Sutherland Edwards, pp. 231-232.]

Possibly Russia would herself have struck at Bulgaria but for the

difficulties of the general situation. How great these were will be

realised by a perusal of the following chapters, which deal with the

spread of Nihilism in Russia, the formation of the Austro-German

alliance, and the favour soon shown to it by Italy, the estrangement of

England and the Porte owing to the action taken by the former in Egypt,

and the sharp collision of interests between Russia and England at

Panjdeh on the Afghan frontier. When it is further remembered that

France fretted at the untoward results of M. Ferry's forward policy in

Tonquin; that Germany was deeply engaged in colonial efforts; and that

the United Kingdom was distracted by those efforts, by the failure of

the expedition to Khartum, and by the Parnellite agitation in

Ireland--the complexity of the European situation will be sufficiently

evident. Assuredly the events of the year 1885 were among the most

distracting ever recorded in the history of Europe.

This clash of interests among nations wearied by war, and alarmed at the

apparition of the red spectre of revolution in their midst, told by no

means unfavourably on the fortunes of the Balkan States. The dominant

facts of the situation were, firstly, that Russia no longer had a free

hand in the Balkan Peninsula in face of the compact between the three

Emperors ratified at Skiernewice in the previous autumn (see Chapter

XII.); and, secondly, that the traditional friendship between England

and the Porte had been replaced by something like hostility. Seeing that

the Sultan had estranged the British Government by his very suspicious

action during the revolts of Arabi Pasha and of the Mahdi, even those

who had loudly proclaimed the need of propping up his authority as

essential to the stability of our Eastern Empire now began to revise

their prejudices.

Thus, when Lord Salisbury came to office, if not precisely to power, in

June 1885, he found affairs in the East rapidly ripening for a change of

British policy--a change which is known to have corresponded with his

own convictions. Finally, the marriage of Princess Beatrice to Prince

Henry of Battenberg, on July 23, 1885, added that touch of personal

interest which enabled Court circles to break with the traditions of the

past and to face the new situation with equanimity. Accordingly the

power of Britain, which in 1876-78 had been used to thwart the growth of

freedom in the Balkan Peninsula, was now put forth to safeguard the

union of Bulgaria. During these critical months Sir William White acted

as ambassador at Constantinople, and used his great knowledge of the

Balkan peoples with telling effect for this salutary purpose.

Lord Salisbury advised the Sultan not to send troops into Southern

Bulgaria; and the warning chimed in with the note of timorous cunning

which formed the undertone of that monarch's thought and policy.

Distracted by the news of the warlike preparations of Servia and Greece,

Abdul Hamid looked on Russia's advice in a contrary sense as a piece of

Muscovite treachery. About the same time, too, there were rumours of

palace plots at Constantinople; and the capricious recluse of Yildiz

finally decided to keep his best troops near at hand. It appears, then,

that Nihilism in Russia and the spectre of conspiracy always haunting

the brain of Abdul Hamid played their part in assuring the liberties

of Bulgaria.

Meanwhile the Powers directed their ambassadors at Constantinople to

hold a preliminary Conference at which Turkey would be represented. The

result was a declaration expressing formal disapproval of the violation

of the Treaty of Berlin, and a hope that all parties concerned would

keep the peace. This mild protest very inadequately reflected the

character of the discussions which had been going on between the several

Courts. Russia, it is known, wished to fasten the blame for the

revolution on Prince Alexander; but all public censure was vetoed

by England.

Probably her action was as effective in still weightier matters. A

formal Conference of the ambassadors of the Powers met at Constantinople

on November 5; and there again Sir William White, acting on instructions

from Lord Salisbury, defended the Bulgarian cause, and sought to bring

about a friendly understanding between the Porte and "a people occupying

so important a position in the Sultan's dominions." Lord Salisbury also

warned the Turkish ambassador in London that if Turkey sought to expel

Prince Alexander from Eastern Roumelia, she would "be making herself the

instrument of those who desired the fall of the Ottoman Empire[201]."

[Footnote 201: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (1886), pp. 214-215. See,

too, _ibid_. pp. 197 _et seq_. for Lord Salisbury's instructions to Sir

William White for the Conference. In view of them it is needless to

waste space in refuting the arguments of the Russophil A.G. Drandar,

_op. cit._ p. 147, that England sought to make war between the

Balkan States.]

This reference to the insidious means used by Russia for bringing the

Turks to a state of tutelage, as a preliminary to partition, was an

effective reminder of the humiliations which they had undergone at the

hands of Russia by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833). France also

showed no disposition to join the Russian and Austrian demand that the

Sultan should at once re-establish the _status quo_; and by degrees the

more intelligent Turks came to see that a strong Bulgaria, independent

of Russian control, might be an additional safeguard against the

Colossus of the North. Russia's insistence on the exact fulfilment of

the Treaty of Berlin helped to open their eyes, and lent force to Sir

William White's arguments as to the need of strengthening that treaty by

"introducing into it a timely improvement[202]."

[Footnote 202: _Ibid_. pp. 273-274, 288, for Russia's policy; p. 284 for

Sir W. White's argument.]

Owing to the opposition offered by Great Britain, and to some extent by

France, to the proposed restoration of the old order of things in

Eastern Roumelia, the Conference came to an end at the close of

November, the three Imperial Powers blaming Sir William White for his

obstructive tactics. The charges will not bear examination, but they

show the irritation of those Governments at England's championship of

the Bulgarian cause[203]. The Bulgarians always remember the names of

Lord Salisbury and Sir William White as those of friends in need.

[Footnote 203: _Ibid_. pp. 370-372.]

In the main, however, the consolidation of Bulgaria was achieved by her

own stalwart sons. While the Imperial Powers were proposing to put back

the hands of the clock, an alarum sounded forth, proclaiming the advent

of a new era in the history of the Balkan peoples. The action which

brought about this change was startling alike in its inception, in the

accompanying incidents, and still more in its results.

Where Abdul Hamid forebore to enter, even as the mandatory of the

Continental Courts, there Milan of Servia rushed in. As an excuse for

his aggression, the Kinglet of Belgrade alleged the harm done to Servian

trade by a recent revision of the Bulgarian tariff. But the Powers

assessed this complaint and others at their due value, and saw in his

action merely the desire to seize a part of Western Bulgaria as a

set-off to the recent growth of that Principality. On all sides his

action in declaring war against Prince Alexander (November 14) met with

reprobation, even on the part of his guide and friend, Austria. A recent

report of the Hungarian Committee on Foreign Affairs contained a

recommendation which implied that he ought to receive compensation; and

this seemed to show the wish of the more active part of the Dual

Monarchy peacefully but effectively to champion his cause[204].

[Footnote 204: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (1886), p. 250.]

Nevertheless, the King decided to carve out his fortunes by his own

sword. He had some grounds for confidence. If a Bulgarian _fait

accompli_ could win tacit recognition from the Powers, why should not a

Servian triumph over Bulgaria force their hands once more? Prince

Alexander was unsafe on his throne; thanks to the action of Russia his

troops had very few experienced officers; and in view of the Sultan's

resentment his southern border could not be denuded of troops. Never did

a case seem more desperate than that of the "Peasant State," deserted

and flouted by Russia, disliked by the Sultan, on bad terms with

Roumania, and publicly lectured by the Continental Powers for her

irregular conduct. Servia's triumph seemed assured.

But now there came forth one more proof of the vitalising force of the

national principle. In seven years the downtrodden peasants of Bulgaria

had become men, and now astonished the world by their prowess. The

withdrawal of the Russian officers left half of the captaincies vacant;

but they were promptly filled up by enthusiastic young lieutenants.

Owing to the blowing up of the line from Philippopolis to Adrianople,

only five locomotives were available for carrying back northwards the

troops which had hitherto been massed on the southern border; and these

five were already overstrained. Yet the engineers now worked them still

harder and they did not break down[205]. The hardy peasants tramped

impossibly long distances in their longing to meet the Servians. The

arrangements were carried through with a success which seems miraculous

in an inexperienced race. The explanation was afterwards rightly

discerned by an English visitor to Bulgaria. "This is the secret of

Bulgarian independence--everybody is in grim earnest. The Bulgarians do

not care about amusements[206]." In that remark there is food for

thought. Inefficiency has no place among a people that looks to the

welfare of the State as all in all. Breakdowns occur when men think more

about "sport" and pleasure than about doing their utmost for

their country.

[Footnote 205: A. von Huhn, _op. cit._ p. 105.]

[Footnote 206: E.A.B. Hodgetts, _Round about Armenia_, p. 7.]

The results of this grim earnestness were to astonish the world. The

Servians at first gained some successes in front of Widdin and

Slivnitza; but the defenders of the latter place (an all-important

position north-west of Sofia) hurried up all possible forces. Two

Bulgarian regiments are said to have marched 123 kilometres in thirty

hours in order to defend that military outwork of their capital; while

others, worn out with marching, rode forward on horseback, two men to

each horse, and then threw themselves into the fight. The Bulgarian

artillery was well served, and proved to be very superior to that of

the Servians.

Thus, on the first two days of conflict at Slivnitza, the defenders beat

back the Servians with some loss. On the third day (November 19), after

receiving reinforcements, they took the offensive, with surprising

vigour. A talented young officer, Bendereff, led their right wing, with

bands playing and colours flying, to storm the hillsides that dominated

the Servian position. The hardy peasants scaled the hills and delivered

the final bayonet charge so furiously that there and on all sides the

invaders fled in wild panic, and scarcely halted until they reached

their own frontier.

Thenceforth King Milan had hard work to keep his men together. Many of

them were raw troops; their ammunition was nearly exhausted; and their

_morale_ had vanished utterly. Prince Alexander had little difficulty in

thrusting them forth from Pirot, and seemed to have before him a clear

road to Belgrade, when suddenly he was brought to a halt by a menace

from the north[207].

[Footnote 207: Drandar, _Événements politiques en Bulgarie_, pp. 89-116;

von Huhn, _op. cit._ chaps. x. xi.]

A special envoy sent by the Hapsburgs, Count Khevenhüller, came in haste

to the headquarters of the Prince on November 28, and in imperious terms

bade him grant an armistice to Servia, otherwise Austrian troops would

forthwith cross the frontier to her assistance. Before this threat

Alexander gave way, and was blamed by some of his people for this act of

complaisance. But assuredly he could not well have acted otherwise. The

three Emperors, of late acting in accord in Balkan questions, had it in

their power to crush him by launching the Turks against Philippopolis,

or their own troops against Sofia. He had satisfied the claims of

honour; he had punished Servia for her peevish and unsisterly jealousy.

Under his lead the Bulgarians had covered themselves with glory, and had

leaped at a bound from political youth to manhood. Why should he risk

their new-found unity merely in order to abase Servia? The Prince never

acted more prudently than when he decided not to bring into the field

the Power which, as he believed, had pushed on Servia to war[208].

[Footnote 208: Drandar, _op. cit._ chap. iii.; Kuhn, _op. cit._ chap.

xviii.]

Had he known that the Russian Chancellor, de Giers, on hearing of

Austria's threat to Bulgaria, informed the Court of Vienna of the Czar's

condign displeasure if that threat were carried into effect, perhaps he

would have played a grand game, advancing on Belgrade, dethroning the

already unpopular King Milan, and offering to the Czar the headship of a

united Servo-Bulgarian State. He might thus have appeased that

sovereign, but at the cost of a European war. Whether from lack of

information, or from a sense of prudence and humanity, the Prince held

back and decided for peace with Servia. Despite many difficulties thrown

in the way by King Milan, this was the upshot of the ensuing

negotiations. The two States finally came to terms by the Treaty of

Bukharest, where, thanks to the good sense of the negotiators and the

efforts of Turkey to compose these strifes, peace was assured on the

basis of the _status quo ante bellum_ (March 3, 1886).

Already the Porte had manifested its good-will towards Bulgaria in the

most signal manner. This complete reversal of policy may be assigned to

several causes. Firstly, Prince Alexander, on marching against the

Servians, had very tactfully proclaimed that he did so on behalf of the

existing order of things, which they were bent on overthrowing. His

actions having corresponded to his words, the Porte gradually came to

see in him a potent defender against Russia. This change in the attitude

of the Sultan was undoubtedly helped on by the arguments of Lord

Salisbury to the Turkish ambassador at London. He summarised the whole

case for a recognition of the union of the two Bulgarias in the

following remarks (December 23, 1885):--

Every week's experience showed that the Porte had little to

dread from the subserviency of Bulgaria to foreign influence,

if only Bulgaria were allowed enjoyment of her unanimous

desires, and the Porte did not gratuitously place itself in

opposition to the general feeling of the people. A Bulgaria,

friendly to the Porte, and jealous of foreign influence,

would be a far surer bulwark against foreign aggression than

two Bulgarias, severed in administration, but united in

considering the Porte as the only obstacle to their national

development[209].

[Footnote 209: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 1 (1886), p. 424.]

Events served to reveal the soundness of this statesmanlike

pronouncement. At the close of the year Prince Alexander returned from

the front to Sofia and received an overwhelming ovation as the champion

of Bulgarian liberties. Further, he now found no difficulty in coming to

an understanding with the Turkish Commissioners sent to investigate the

state of opinion in Southern Bulgaria. Most significant of all was the

wrath of the Czar at the sight of his popularity, and the utter collapse

of the Russian party at Sofia.

Meanwhile the Powers found themselves obliged little by little to

abandon their pedantic resolve to restore the Treaty of Berlin. Sir

Robert Morier, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, in a letter of

December 27, 1885, to Sir William White, thus commented on the causes

that assured success to the Bulgarian cause:

The very great prudence shown by Lord Salisbury, and the

consummate ability with which you played your part, have made

it a successful game; but the one crowning good fortune,

which we mainly owe to the incalculable folly of the Servian

attack, has been that Prince Alexander's generalship and the

fighting capacities of his soldiers have placed our rival

action [his own and that of Sir W. White] in perfect harmony

with the crushing logic of fact. The rivalry is thus

completely swamped in the bit of cosmic work so successfully

accomplished. A State has been evolved out of the protoplasm

of Balkan chaos.

Sir Robert Morier finally stated that if Sir William White succeeded in

building up an independent Bulgaria friendly to Roumania, he would have

achieved the greatest feat of diplomacy since Sir James Hudson's

statesmanlike moves at Turin in the critical months of 1859-60 gained

for England a more influential position in Italy than France had secured

by her aid in the campaign of Solferino. The praise is overstrained,

inasmuch as it leaves out of count the statecraft of Bismarck in the

years 1863-64 and 1869-70; but certainly among the _peaceful_ triumphs

of recent years that of Sir William White must rank very high.

If, however, we examine the inner cause of the success of the diplomacy

of Hudson and White we must assign it in part to the mistakes of the

liberating Powers, France and Russia. Napoleon III., by requiring the

cession of Savoy and Nice, and by revealing his design to Gallicise the

Italian Peninsula, speedily succeeded in alienating the Italians. The

action of Russia, in compelling Bulgaria to give up the Dobrudscha as an

equivalent to the part of Bessarabia which she took from Roumania, also

strained the sense of gratitude of those peoples; and the conduct of

Muscovite agents in Bulgaria provoked in that Principality feelings

bitterer than those which the Italians felt at the loss of Savoy and

Nice. So true is it that in public as in private life the manner in

which a wrong is inflicted counts for more than the wrong itself. It was

on this sense of resentment (misnamed "ingratitude" by the "liberators")

that British diplomacy worked with telling effect in both cases. It

conferred on the "liberated" substantial benefits; but their worth was

doubled by the contrast which they offered to the losses or the

irritation consequent on the actions of Napoleon III. and of

Alexander III.

To the present writer it seems that the great achievements of Sir

William White were, first, that he kept the Sultan quiet (a course, be

it remarked, from which that nervous recluse was never averse) when

Nelidoff sought to hound him on against Bulgaria; and, still more, that

he helped to bring about a good understanding between Constantinople and

Sofia. In view of the hatred which Abdul Hamid bore to England after

her intervention in Egypt in 1882, this was certainly a great diplomatic

achievement; but possibly Abdul Hamid hoped to reap advantages on the

Nile from his complaisance to British policy in the Balkans.

The outcome of it all was the framing of a Turco-Bulgarian Convention

(February 1, 1886) whereby the Porte recognised Prince Alexander as

Governor of Eastern Roumelia for a term of five years; a few border

districts in Rhodope, inhabited by Moslems, were ceded to the Sultan,

and (wonder of wonders!) Turkey and Bulgaria concluded an offensive and

defensive alliance. In case of foreign aggression on Bulgaria, Turkish

troops would be sent thither to be commanded by the Prince; if Turkey

were invaded, Bulgarian troops would form part of the Sultan's army

repelling the invader. In other respects the provisions of the Treaty of

Berlin remained in force for Southern Bulgaria[210].

[Footnote 210: Parl. Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1886).]

On that same day, as it chanced, the Salisbury Cabinet resigned office,

and Mr. Gladstone became Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery taking the

portfolio for Foreign Affairs. This event produced little variation in

Britain's Eastern policy, and that statement will serve to emphasise the

importance of the change of attitude of the Conservative party towards

those affairs in the years 1878-85--a change undoubtedly due in the main

to the Marquis of Salisbury.

In the official notes of the Earl of Rosebery there is manifest somewhat

more complaisance to Russia, as when on February 12 he instructed Sir

William White to advise the Porte to modify its convention with Bulgaria

by abandoning the stipulation as to mutual military aid. Doubtless this

advice was sound. It coincided with the known opinions of the Court of

Vienna; and at the same time Russia formally declared that she could

never accept that condition[211]. As Germany took the same view the

Porte agreed to expunge the obnoxious clause. The Government of the Czar

also objected to the naming of Prince Alexander in the Convention. This

unlooked-for slight naturally aroused the indignation of the Prince;

but as the British Government deferred to Russian views on this matter,

the Convention was finally signed at Constantinople on April 5, 1886.

The Powers, including Turkey, thereby recognised "the Prince of

Bulgaria" (not named) as Governor of Eastern Roumelia for a term of five

years, and referred the "Organic Statute" of that province to revision

by a joint Conference.

[Footnote 211: _Ibid_. pp. 96-98.]

The Prince submitted to this arrangement, provisional and humiliating

though it was. But the insults inflicted by Russia bound him the more

closely to his people; and at the united Parliament, where 182 members

out of the total 300 supported his Ministers, he advocated measures that

would cement the union. Bulgarian soon became the official language

throughout South Bulgaria, to the annoyance of the Greek and Turkish

minorities. But the chief cause of unrest continued to be the intrigues

of Russian agents.

The anger of the Czar at the success of his hated kinsman showed itself

in various ways. Not content with inflicting every possible slight and

disturbing the peace of Bulgaria through his agents, he even menaced

Europe with war over that question. At Sevastopol on May 19, he declared

that circumstances might compel him "to defend by force of arms the

dignity of the Empire"--a threat probably aimed at Bulgaria and Turkey.

On his return to Moscow he received an enthusiastic welcome from the

fervid Slavophils of the old Russian capital, the Mayor expressing in

his address the hope that "the cross of Christ will soon shine on St.

Sofia" at Constantinople. At the end of June the Russian Government

repudiated the clause of the Treaty of Berlin constituting Batoum a free

port[212]. Despite a vigorous protest by Lord Rosebery against this

infraction of treaty engagements, the Czar and M. de Giers held to their

resolve, evidently by way of retort to the help given from London to the

union of the two Bulgarias.

[Footnote 212: Parl. Papers, Russia (1886), p. 828.]

The Dual Monarchy, especially Hungary, also felt the weight of Russia's

displeasure in return for the sympathy manifested for the Prince at

Pesth and Vienna; and but for the strength which the friendship of

Germany afforded, that Power would almost certainly have encountered war

from the irate potentate of the North.

Turkey, having no champion, was in still greater danger; her conduct in

condoning the irregularities of Prince Alexander was as odious to

Alexander III. as the atrocities of her Bashi-bazouks ten years before

had been to his more chivalrous sire. It is an open secret that during

the summer of 1886 the Czar was preparing to deal a heavy blow. The

Sultan evaded it by adroitly shifting his ground and posing as a

well-wisher of the Czar, whereupon M. Nelidoff, the Russian ambassador

at Constantinople, proposed an offensive and defensive alliance, and

went to the length of suggesting that they should wage war against

Austria and England in order to restore the Sultan's authority over

Bosnia and Egypt at the expense of those intrusive Powers. How far

negotiations went on this matter and why they failed is not known. The

ordinary explanation, that the Czar forbore to draw the sword because of

his love of peace, hardly tallies with what is now known of his

character and his diplomacy. It is more likely that he was appeased by

the events now to be described, and thereafter attached less importance

to a direct intervention in Balkan affairs.

No greater surprise has happened in this generation than the kidnapping

of Prince Alexander by officers of the army which he had lately led to

victory. Yet the affair admits of explanation. Certain of their number

nourished resentment against him for his imperfect recognition of their

services during the Servian War, and for the introduction of German

military instructors at its close. Among the malcontents was Bendereff,

the hero of Slivnitza, who, having been guilty of discourtesy to the

Prince, was left unrewarded. On this discontented knot of men Russian

intriguers fastened themselves profitably, with the result that one

regiment at least began to waver in its allegiance.

A military plot was held in reserve as a last resort. In the first

place, a Russian subject, Captain Nabokoff, sought to simplify the

situation by hiring some Montenegrin desperadoes, and by seeking to

murder or carry off the Prince as he drew near to Bourgas during a tour

in Eastern Bulgaria. This plan came to light through the fidelity of a

Bulgarian peasant, whereupon Nabokoff and a Montenegrin priest were

arrested (May 18). At once the Russian Consul at that seaport appeared,

demanded the release of the conspirators, and, when this was refused,

threatened the Bulgarian authorities if justice took its course. It is

not without significance that the Czar's warlike speech at Sevastopol

startled the world on the day after the arrest of the conspirators at

Bourgas. Apparently the arrest of Nabokoff impelled the Czar of all the

Russias to uphold the dignity of his Empire by hurling threats against a

State which protected itself from conspiracy. The champion of order in

Russia thereby figured as the abettor of plotters in the Balkans.

The menaces of the Northern Power availed to defer the trial of the

conspirators, and the affair was still undecided when the conspirators

at Sofia played their last card. Bendereff was at that time acting as

Minister of War, and found means to spread broadcast a rumour that

Servia was arming as if for war. Sending northwards some faithful troops

to guard against this baseless danger, he left the capital at the mercy

of the real enemy.

On August 21, when all was ready, the Struma Regiment hastily marched

back by night to Sofia, disarmed the few faithful troops there in

garrison, surrounded the palace of the Prince, while the ringleaders

burst into his bedchamber. He succeeded in fleeing through a corridor

which led to the garden, only to be met with levelled bayonets and cries

of hatred. The leaders thrust him into a corner, tore a sheet out of the

visitors' book which lay on a table close by, and on it hastily scrawled

words implying abdication; the Prince added his signature, along with

the prayer, "God save Bulgaria." At dawn the mutineers forced him into a

carriage, Bendereff and his accomplices crowding round to dismiss him

with jeers and screen him from the sight of the public. Thence he was

driven at the utmost speed through byways towards the Danube. There the

conspirators had in readiness his own yacht, which they had seized, and

carried him down the stream towards Russian territory.

The outburst of indignation with which the civilised world heard of this

foul deed had its counterpart in Bulgaria. So general and so keen was

the reprobation (save in the Russian and Bismarckian Press) that the

Russian Government took some steps to dissociate itself from the plot,

while profiting by its results. On August 24, when the Prince was put on

shore at Reni, the Russian authorities kept him under guard, and that,

too, despite an order of the Czar empowering him to "continue his

journey exactly as he might please." Far from this, he was detained for

some little time, and then was suffered to depart by train only in a

northerly direction. He ultimately entered Austrian territory by way of

Lemberg in Galicia, on August 27. The aim of the St. Petersburg

Government evidently was to give full time for the conspirators at Sofia

to consolidate their power[213].

[Footnote 213: A. von Huhn, _op. cit._ chap. iv.]

Meanwhile, by military display, the distribution of money, and a _Te

Deum_ at the Cathedral for "liberation from Prince Battenberg," the

mutineers sought to persuade the men of Sofia that peace and prosperity

would infallibly result from the returning favour of the Czar. The

populace accepted the first tokens of his good-will and awaited

developments. These were not promising for the mutineers. The British

Consul at Philippopolis, Captain Jones, on hearing of the affair,

hurried to the commander of the garrison, General Mutkuroff, and

besought him to crush the plotters[214]. The General speedily enlisted

his own troops and those in garrison elsewhere on the side of the

Prince, with the result that a large part of the army refused to take

the oath of allegiance to the new Russophil Ministry, composed of

trimmers like Bishop Clement and Zankoff. Karaveloff also cast in his

influence against them.

[Footnote 214: See Mr. Minchin's account in the _Morning Advertiser_ for

September 23, 1886.]

Above all, Stambuloff worked furiously for the Prince; and when a mitred

Vicar of Bray held the seals of office and enjoyed the official counsels

of traitors and place-hunters, not all the prayers of the Greek Church

and the gold of Russian agents could long avail to support the

Government against the attacks of that strong-willed, clean-handed

patriot. Shame at the disgrace thus brought on his people doubled his

powers; and, with the aid of all that was best in the public life of

Bulgaria, he succeeded in sweeping Clement and his Comus rout back to

their mummeries and their underground plots. So speedy was the reverse

of fortune that the new Provisional Government succeeded in thwarting

the despatch of a Russian special Commissioner, General Dolgorukoff,

through whom Alexander III. sought to bestow the promised blessings on

that "much-tried" Principality.

The voice of Bulgaria now made itself heard. There was but one cry--for

the return of Prince Alexander. At once he consented to fulfil his

people's desire; and, travelling by railway through Bukharest, he

reached the banks of the Danube and set foot on his yacht, not now a

prisoner, but the hero of the German, Magyar, and Balkan peoples. At

Rustchuk officers and deputies bore him ashore shoulder-high to the

enthusiastic people. He received a welcome even from the Consul-General

for Russia--a fact which led him to take a false step. Later in the day,

when Stambuloff was not present, he had an interview with this agent,

and then sent a telegram to the Czar, announcing his return, his thanks

for his friendly reception by Russia's chief agent, and his readiness to

accept the advice of General Dolgorukoff. The telegram ended thus:--

I should be happy to be able to give to Your Majesty the

definitive proof of the devotion with which I am animated

towards Your august person. The monarchical principle forces

me to re-establish the reign of law (_la légalité_) in

Bulgaria and Roumelia. Russia having given me my crown, I am

ready to give it back into the hands of its Sovereign.

To this the Czar sent the following telegraphic reply, and allowed it to

appear at once in the official paper at St. Petersburg:--

I have received Your Highness's telegram. I cannot approve

your return to Bulgaria, as I foresee the sinister

consequences that it may bring on Bulgaria, already so much

tried. The mission of General Dolgorukoff is now inopportune.

I shall abstain from it in the sad state of things to which

Bulgaria is reduced so long as you remain there. Your

Highness will understand what you have to do. I reserve my

judgment as to what is commanded me by the venerated memory

of my father, the interests of Russia, and the peace of the

Orient[215].

[Footnote 215: A. von Huhn, _The Kidnapping of Prince Alexander_, chap.

xi. (London, 1887). Article III. of the Treaty of Berlin ran thus: "The

Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and

confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers." Russia

had no right to _choose_ the Prince, and her _assent_ to his election

was only that of _one_ among the six Great Powers. The mistake of Prince

Alexander is therefore inexplicable.]

What led the Prince to use the extraordinary words contained in the last

sentence of his telegram can only be conjectured. The substance of his

conversation with the Russian Consul-General is not known; and until the

words of that official are fully explained he must be held open to the

suspicion of having played on the Prince a diplomatic version of the

confidence trick. Another version, that of M. Élie de Cyon, is that he

acted on instructions from the Russian Chancellor, de Giers, who

believed that the Czar would relent. On the contrary, he broke loose,

and sent the answer given above[216].

[Footnote 216: _Histoire de l'Entente franco-russe_, by Élie de Cyon, p.

158.]

It is not surprising that, after receiving the Czar's retort, the Prince

seemed gloomy and depressed where all around him were full of joy. At

Tirnova and Philippopolis he had the same reception; but an attempt to

derail his train on the journey to Sofia showed that the malice of his

foes was still unsated. The absence of the Russian and German Consuls

from the State reception accorded to the Prince at the capital on

September 3 showed that he had to reckon with the hostility or

disapprobation of those Governments; and there was the ominous fact that

the Russian agent at Sofia had recently intervened to prevent the

punishment of the mutineers and Bishop Clement. Few, however, were

prepared for what followed. On entering his palace, the Prince called

his officers about him and announced that, despairing of overcoming the

antipathy of the Czar to him, he must abdicate. Many of them burst into

tears, and one of them cried, "Without your Highness there is no

Bulgaria."

This action, when the Prince seemed at the height of popularity, caused

intense astonishment. The following are the reasons that probably

dictated it. Firstly, he may have felt impelled to redeem the pledges

which he too trustfully made to the Czar in his Rustchuk telegram, and

of which that potentate took so unchivalrous an advantage. Secondly, the

intervention of Russia to protect the mutineers from their just

punishment betokened her intention to foment further plots. In this

intervention, strange to say, she had the support of the German

Government, Bismarck using his influence at Berlin persistently against

the Prince, in order to avert the danger of war, which once or twice

seemed to be imminent between Russia and Germany.

Further, we may note that Austria and the other States had no desire to

court an attack from the Eastern Power, on account of a personal affair

between the two Alexanders. Great Britain also was at that time too

hampered by domestic and colonial difficulties to be able to do more

than offer good wishes.

Thus the weakness or the weariness of the States friendly to Bulgaria

left the Czar a free hand in the personal feud on which he set such

store. Accordingly, on September 7, the Prince left Bulgaria amidst the

lamentations of that usually stolid people and the sympathy of manly

hearts throughout the world. At Buda-Pesth and London there were

ominous signs that the Czar must not push his triumph further. Herr

Tisza at the end of the month assured the Hungarian deputies that, if

the Sultan did not choose to restore the old order of things in Southern

Bulgaria, no other Power had the right to intervene there by force of

arms. Lord Salisbury, also, at the Lord Mayor's banquet, on November 9,

inveighed with startling frankness against the "officers debauched by

foreign gold," who had betrayed their Prince. He further stated that all

interest in foreign affairs centred in Bulgaria, and expressed the

belief that the freedom of that State would be assured.

These speeches were certainly intended as a warning to Russia and a

protest against her action in Bulgaria. After the departure of Prince

Alexander, the Czar hit upon the device of restoring order to that

"much-tried" country through the instrumentality of General Kaulbars, a

brother of the General who had sought to kidnap Prince Alexander three

years before. It is known that the despatch of the younger Kaulbars was

distasteful to the more pacific and Germanophil chancellor, de Giers,

who is said to have worked against the success of his mission. Such at

least is the version given by his private enemies, Katkoff and de

Cyon[217]. Kaulbars soon succeeded in adding to the reputation of his

family. On reaching Sofia, on September 25, he ordered the liberation of

the military plotters still under arrest, and the adjournment of the

forthcoming elections for the Sobranje; otherwise Russia would not

regard them as legal. The Bulgarian Regents, Stambuloff at their head,

stoutly opposed these demands and fixed the elections for October the

10th; whereupon Kaulbars treated the men of Sofia, and thereafter of all

the chief towns, to displays of bullying rhetoric, which succeeded in

blotting out all memories of Russian exploits of nine years before[218].

[Footnote 217: Élie de Cyon, _Histoire de l'Entente franco-russe_, pp.

177-178.]

[Footnote 218: The Russophil Drandar (_op. cit._ p. 214) calls these

demands "remarqueblement modérées et sages"! For further details of

Kaulbars' electioneering devices see Minchin, _op. cit._ pp. 327-330.]