The only possible argument which the immaterialist pretends to bring
forward in support of the _inextension_ and _indivisibility_ of a
thinking substance, and consequently of its immateriality--is founded
on the self-consciousness of such substance.
A thinking substance is conscious of its own individual unity: it
is conscious that itself is not _many_ beings, but one. Mankind
universally feel their own individual unity when each contemplates
himself. Each one is certain that it is the same being that rejoiced
yesterday who remembers to-day--that all past and present affections
are the affections of _one_ being, and not of many. The absolute
_oneness_ of a thinking being is supposed to be inconsistent with
a _plurality_ of parts. To avoid this supposed inconsistency the
immaterialist assumes that such a substance is without parts.
Dr. Brown says "that the very notion _of plurality_ and division is as
inconsistent with the notion of self as the notions of existence and
nonexistence." (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.)
That by the term "_plurality_," he means the plurality of parts, as
well as a plurality of atoms,--is very evident from the whole tenor of
his reasoning. If the materialist, as Dr. Brown again says, "assert
thought to be the affection of a single particle, a monade; he must
remember that if what he chooses to term a single particle, be a
particle or matter, it too must still admit of division; it must have a
top and bottom, a right side and a left; it must, as it is demonstrable
in geometry, admit of being cut in different points, by an infinite
number of straight lines; and all the difficulty of the composition of
thought, therefore, remains precisely as before." "If it be supposed,"
continues he, "so completely divested of all the qualities of matter,
as not to be _extended,_ nor consequently divisible, it is then mind
which is asserted under another name, and every thing which is at all
important in the controversy is conceded." (Brown's Philosophy of the
Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.)
A unity of substance, consisting of parts, is supposed by Dr. Brown and
other immaterialists to be, not only relatively, but absolutely absurd.
But this supposed absurdity is only imaginary, and is founded wholly
on supposition and false reasoning, and not on our self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness teaches us the _unity_ of self, but it does not
teach us that a unity of self is inconsistent with a plurality of
parts, and consequently inextended.
The absolute _oneness_ or _unity_ of a thinking being can, by no means,
be denied. Every man in all the world,--the savage as well as the
philosopher,--is conscious that what he calls himself is not _many_
but _one_; but no man is conscious that the thinking substance called
self does not consist of a plurality of parts--no one is conscious that
self is inextended. Indeed, in the very notion of unity is involved the
notion of a plurality of parts. In abstract numbers themselves a unit
consists of an unlimited number of fractional parts. A unit of time is
composed of innumerable parts called moments. A unit of space embraces
a countless number of fractional spaces. A unit of substance is
composed of an immense number of fractional parts. Without a plurality
of parts we can form no notion whatsoever of unity. If consciousness,
therefore, teaches us of the unity of self, it must teach us of a unity
consisting of parts; otherwise it teaches us nothing. The unity of the
thinking being, then, proves to a demonstration that it consists of
parts, and consequently must be extended.
The term _unity_ when applied to time, space, or substance, is entirely
indefinite as to quantity. Any quantity, either great or small, may be
assumed as a unit. In a multitude of human beings a man; in a bodily
organ a molecule of any compounded substance which enters into its
composition; and, in a molecule, an atom may be assumed as the unit.
In an atom there is an indefinite number of parts, either of which may
be chosen as a unit. But when we descend the scale still farther, and
speak of that which has no parts, we can form no possible conception
of a unit of inextension. The term nothing, instead of unity, is the
only applicable term for that which is inextended. To think of unity in
reference to external things, we think of something that has parts; so
likewise to feel the unity of the mind is to feel that it has parts.
If the unity or oneness of the mind is any evidence in favor of its
being inextended and without parts, the unity or oneness of all other
substances is equal evidence of their inextension. All the atoms of
every substance in the immensity of space, when considered separately
and apart, are units, that is each atom is not _many_ substances, but
one. Therefore, if the unity of substance necessarily implies the
inextension of substance, every atom in the universe must be inextended
and without parts, and consequently immaterial.
If it be said that the universe contains no substances that can be
called _units,_ but that each atom is a _plurality_ of substances,
this would not obviate the difficulty in the least; it would only be
adding absurdity to absurdity; for a _plurality_ to exist without
the possibility of a _unity's_ existing, is inconceivable nonsense.
A plural number, without a singular, or many substances to co-exist
without the possibility of the existence of any single one, is as
grossly absurd as immaterialism itself. Hence _unity_ implies parts
as much as _plurality._ Therefore, wherever a unity or plurality
of substance exists, there matter exists, with all its essential
characteristics.
No doubt but that the immaterialist absurdity was invented principally
to combat the gross errors which have been embraced by some
materialists, both of ancient and modern times. The great majority
of materialists have contended that thought and feeling are the
_results_ of organization, beginning and ceasing with it. Hobbes,
Spinosa, Priestley, Darwin, and numerous other individuals, have
strenuously advocated this inconsistency. They have asserted that
particles of matter have no susceptibilities of thought and feeling
when unorganized, but as soon as they were brought together into a
certain system, the result of such union is thought and feeling. Dr.
Brown, in combating this vague conjecture, has clearly shown that a
system of particles can have no properties as a whole which it does not
possess in its individual parts; and, consequently, that a thought, or
a joy, or a fear, or any other affections of the mind, cannot possibly
be the affections resulting from a plurality, but in all cases must
be the affections or feelings of every part of a substance. We most
cordially believe with Dr. Brown, that a system of particles cannot
possibly possess a property which the individuals composing the system
do not possess. Had this great philosopher and metaphysician stopped
here, his reasoning would have been amply sufficient to have overthrown
the errors of Priestly, Darwin, and others who have supposed thought
to begin and end with organization. But by supposing an individual
unity to be inconsistent with extension and parts, he has advocated an
absurdity still more glaring than the one which a part of his reasoning
has so successfully overthrown.
There is another gross error of a very different nature from the one
advocated by Priestley and his followers, which Dr. Brown also very
clearly exposes. This error consists in assuming thought, hope, fear,
joy, sorrow, desire, and all other affections to be little particles of
matter. We are not aware, however, that there was ever a human being
so void of common sense as to advocate this palpable inconsistency. It
is very evident that this error is not necessarily incorporated with
that absurd notion which supposes thought and other affections to be
a _property_ of an organized system of particles, but not a property
of each individual particle. The two errors are widely different: the
one supposes a thought or feeling to be a _property,_ not of a single
particle, but of a collection of particles; the other supposes a
thought or feeling to be a little particle of matter itself, and not a
_property_ of either a particle or collection of particles. The former
error has had numerous advocates in such men as Priestley, Darwin,
&c.; but the latter, so far as we are aware, has had no advocates. Dr.
Brown, however, has attacked not only the former, but the latter error,
as though it really had an existence in some popular theory.
If thought be little particles of matter, Dr. Brown justly argues,
"that it will be not more absurd to talk of the twentieth part of an
affirmation, or the quarter of a hope, of the top of a remembrance, and
the north and east corners of a comparison, than of the twentieth part
of a pound, or of the different points of the compass in reference to
any part of the globe of which we may be speaking." We agree with him
most perfectly in saying, "that with every effort of attention which
we can give to our mental analysis, we are as incapable of forming any
conception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half of
a belief, as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a
central point, or of a square without a single angle."
Dr. Brown also endeavours to bring this mode of reasoning to bear
against the absurdity which supposes thought to be a _quality_ of a
collection of particles arranged in the form of an organ, but not a
quality of single particles. But it is evident that the arguments which
entirely demolish one error, leave the other entirely untouched. The
weakness of Dr. Brown's argument, when wrongfully applied against the
last-named error, will more fully appear by reference to his own words
which read as follows:--
"Even though it were admitted, however, in opposition to one of the
clearest truths in science, that an organ is something more than a mere
name for the separate and independent bodies which it denotes, and
that our various feelings are states of the sensorial organ, it must
still be allowed that, if two hundred particles existing in a certain
state form a doubt, the division of these into two equal aggregates
of the particles, as they exist in this state at the moment of that
particular feeling, would form halves of a doubt; that all the truths
of arithmetic would be predicable of each separate thought, if it were
a state of a number of particles."
By a little reflection it will be seen that Dr. Brown's inference is
entirely unfounded. "If two hundred particles existing in a certain
state form a doubt," it does not necessarily follow that "the division
of these into two equal aggregates of the particles," would form
halves of a doubt. If two hundred pounds weight attached to a certain
machine will produce a result called _motion,_ it does not necessarily
follow that one hundred pounds will produce a result called _half of
a motion._ If exactly two hundred particles organized in a certain
form, were requisite to produce a certain thought, then it is evident
that to alter in the least either the number or organization would
be a complete destruction of that particular thought, instead of
forming fractions of it. This is what Priestley and his followers
assert. They say that thought begins and ends with the organization,
and that the single individuals entering into the system, form no
thought nor fractions of a thought. This absurdity, therefore, remains
untouched by this argument of Dr. Brown. It is effectually demolished,
however, by another species of argument, used by him to which we have
already referred. He has proved Priestley's theory to be false, not
by supposing that the fractions of a doubt could be made to result
from it, but by clearly showing that an organ is only a name for a
collection of many substances, which cannot possibly possess any
property as a whole, which the individuals do not possess when existing
singly. He has also proved the theory which asserts that a thought
or a feeling is a little particle of matter, to be false, because it
involves the absurdity of fractional thoughts, hopes, fears, &c.
But there is one more theory which we venture to propose, that we
believe to be impregnable, which no philosopher or metaphysician ever
has or ever can refute. This theory may be stated as follows:--
A thought, hope, fear, joy, or any other feeling is not a little
particle of matter, nor the result or quality of a collection of
particles, called an organ or a system or organs, but it is the state
or affection of a single individual substance, having extension and
parts, and all the essential characteristics belonging to all other
matter.
There is no absurdity in speaking of the half, or of a quarter, or of
any other fractional part of this substance, but there would be a great
absurdity in speaking of the fractional parts of its mere _states_ or
_affections._ The half or a thousandth part of a thinking substance
is as reasonable as the half or a thousandth part of an attracting
substance; but the top or bottom of a thought would be as absurd as
the top or bottom of attraction. The north or east side of a substance
which remembers, is just as correct as the north or east corners of a
substance which possesses a chemical affinity; but the north side of a
remembrance would be as inconsistent as the north side of a chemical
affinity. Hence, none of the arguments which are so successfully
brought to bear against the other two theories, will in the least
affect this. It is invulnerable in every point at which it may be
assailed.
Every conceivable part of this substance, however minute, possesses
the same property as the whole. A thought, or any other state of
feeling is, therefore, perceived by every possible part of which a
whole consists. A unity of substance, as we have already had occasion
to remark, consists of an immense number of fractional parts. These,
in order to constitute _unity,_ must be so closely connected with, and
related to each other, that whatever state or affection one may happen
to be in, all the rest must immediately be notified of the same. If one
part be affected with pain, every other part most be conscious of it.
If one part rejoices, hopes, or fears, the whole must, by sympathy,
rejoice, hope, or fear in the same manner. But if one part could
suffer, while another part was unconscious of such suffering; or if
the affection of one part had no tendency to affect another, then the
individual unity would be destroyed, and the substance would be as many
distinct, thinking, feeling beings as there were parts unconscious of
the affections of the others.
It is not necessary that a thinking substance should be limited to
magnitudes or quantities that are exceedingly minute in order to
constitute a unity. Large amounts of substance are as consistent with
unity as small ones. But in all cases, whether the quantity be large
or small, it is necessary that the parts should bear that relation to
each other, that when one is affected every other should be affected
also; otherwise, it could not be a unity. The feeling or thinking
substance of an elephant or whale is as much an individual unity as
the feeling substance or spirit of a gnat or animalculæ, though the
magnitude of the former far exceeds that of the latter. It is the
peculiar organization or relation of parts in such a manner as to be
all conscious of each other's affection which constitutes the unity,
without any regard to the size or amount of substance organized.
When the several parts are so organized as to think, remember, hate,
love, and feel alike, under the different circumstances to which the
organization may be exposed, the whole is one individual unity or being.
If the mind or spirit be of the same magnitude as the body, then the
impressions received through the various organs of a human body would
only have to be transferred to the distance of about five feet, in
order that every part of the mind might be alike conscious of such
impressions. Let the velocity be ever so rapid, time would be an
essential ingredient to the transfer of these communications from part
to part. If they were communicated with the velocity of sound, those
parts of the mind the most distant from the one first affected, would
receive the impression in the two hundredth part of a second. If the
transfer were as rapid as light, the impression would be conveyed to
the most distant extremities of the mind in the two hundred millionth
part of a second. These inconceivably minute portions of time would be
altogether imperceptible to the mind. Hence, whenever any part of the
mind is affected through its sensorial organs, every other part seems
to be affected in the same instant, whereas, in reality, the affection
is conveyed successively from part to part, the same as sound or light
is conveyed from a sounding or a luminous body.
The conveyance of internal thoughts or emotions of any kind form one
part of the mind to the other, is probably equal in velocity to the
transfer of the various notions gained by sensation. Therefore, in
consequence of the inconceivable velocity with which all thoughts and
sensations are conveyed from one extremity of the mind to another, it
is impossible for one part of the mind to have a thought, sensation, or
feeling of any kind which the other parts of the mind can, during any
term of time that is appreciable, be ignorant of. It is for this reason
that the _whole_ of the mind thinks,--the whole of the mind loves,--the
_whole_ of the mind hates,--the _whole_ of the mind wills, &c.
If the term of time were of any appreciable length in which thoughts
and feelings are conveyed from one part of the perceptive mind to the
other, then, while one part of the mind was hating an object, another
part of the same mind might be loving it because of newly discovered
qualities; and while a part of the mind in one foot was suffering
intense pain, caused by treading upon hot iron, another part of the
mind in the other foot, not having had time to receive the information,
would venture also into the same danger.
Were it possible for the different parts of the mind to feel and think
without being able to communicate their respective feelings to each
other, then every part that thus thought and felt, would be a distinct
individual, as much so as if it were separated for miles from all
the rest, or, as if it were a separate organization. In this case,
the whole being or mind which we before termed I, would cease its
individual unity; and each part which thought and felt independently,
could appropriate to itself the term I, and with the greatest propriety
could apply the term YOU to every other part which thought and felt
distinctly and differently from itself.
It is, therefore, because all parts of the mind seem to be affected in
the same way, and apparently at the same time, that it is felt to be
a single individual mind. It is this, and this only, that constitutes
the unity of a thinking being, and not, as the immaterialist asserts, a
something "without parts," which from its very nature could constitute
neither a unity, nor a plurality, nor any thing else, but nothing.
If the human spirit be nearly the same form and magnitude as the
fleshly tabernacle in which it dwells, it must be composed of an
immense number of particles, each of which is susceptible of almost an
infinite variety of thoughts, emotions, and feelings. Whence originated
these susceptibilities? Are they the results of organization? Did each
particle obtain its susceptibilities by being united with others? This
would be impossible; for if a particle were entirely destitute of the
capacity of thinking and feeling, no possible organization could impart
to it that power. The power to think and feel, is not, nor can not be
derived from any arrangement of particles. If they have not this power
before organization, they can never have it afterwards. It follows
then, that if ever there were a time when the particles of the human
spirit existed in a disorganized state, each particle so existing,
must have had all the susceptibilities of feeling and thought that it
now has; and, consequently, each particle must have been a separate
independent being of itself. Therefore, under such circumstances, one
particle would have been no more affected with the state or condition
of others, than one man is affected with the pleasures or pains of
others with whom he is not associated.
How, then, it may be asked, can these separate independent beings,
be so united as to form but one being, possessing the same
susceptibilities as each of the individuals of which it is composed?
The answer to this question may be more clearly understood by the
following illustration. Let a certain number of iron filings exist
in a scattered condition, widely separated from each other. It is
evident that each possesses the susceptibility of magnetism. Such
as are brought within the influence of a loadstone or magnet, under
favourable circumstances, will exhibit all the magnetic phenomena,
while others unconnected and at a distance, will remain entirely
unaffected. But let all these filings be firmly united together into
one bar of iron, and be exposed to the influence of a magnet or
loadstone, and they will then be affected alike. Those which were
before the union distinct individual particles, exhibiting at the
same time different susceptibilities and qualities, according to the
different circumstances in which they were placed,--are, by their
union, consolidated into one mass. In this condition, if one part
be magnetized, the whole will be magnetized; if one part be moved,
the whole will be moved. Therefore the particles in this bar, though
distinct parts of the same substance, can no longer be considered
distinct individuals, because they are no longer affected differently,
but alike. So it is with the human spirit: its particles previous to
the organization, are, as above stated, separate and distinct beings,
and the affections of each are entirely independent of the state of
the others. But when organized into a person, all particles must from
henceforth be subject to the same influences; and though they are
distinct parts of the same substance, yet they are one in all their
thoughts and feelings; and it is this which constitutes individuality
in all intelligent organizations.
If a bar of iron, weighing one pound, had the power of expressing its
different qualities, it could with the greatest propriety say, I am
heavy--I am magnetized--I move. The term I would represent the whole
bar, consisting of an infinite number of parts,--all affected precisely
in the same moment and in the same manner. Now no one would for a
moment suppose the pound of iron to be immaterial and without parts,
because the term I was representative of a single individual bar. So
likewise in the expressions, I think,--I feel,--I remember; the term
I is a representative of the whole being, every part of which thinks,
feels, and remembers in the same moment and in the same manner.
The arguments which Dr. Brown has used (Brown's Philosophy of the
Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.) against the materiality of the mind, would
apply with the same force against the materiality of iron or any other
substance; for if thought or feeling prove the unity and inextension of
mind,--weight, magnetism, or motion will, with as much reason, prove
the unity and inextension of iron.
Mr. Taylder has asserted that "The Materialism of the Mormons is not
only unscriptural, but anti-scriptural." (Taylder against Materialism,
page 21.)
1.--He undertakes to show that it is unscriptural, by asserting that
it is "in opposition to the _spirituality_ of the Divinity." (Taylder
against Materialism, page 22.)
We readily admit that any system which is "in opposition to the
_spirituality_ of the Divinity," is not only unscriptural but
dangerously false. That the Spirits of the Father and the Son, as well
as the Holy Spirit, consist of a substance purely spiritual, can by
no means be denied by any believer in the sacred scriptures. It is a
doctrine firmly believed by us and all the Latter-day Saints. It is a
doctrine most definitely expressed and advocated in our pamphlet on the
Kingdom of God, and that, too, on the very page from which Mr. Taylder
makes copious extracts. It is there that we have definitely spoken of
"_the_ SPIRITS _of the Father and Son_:" it is there that we speak of
the Holy SPIRIT: it there that we have expressly said that "_God is a
SPIRIT_." And yet in the face of all these declarations Mr. Taylder
has had the hardihood to say that our theory is "in opposition to the
spirituality of the Divinity." Instead of this, it is the material
theory alone that establishes the very existence, of Spirit. Take
away the _materiality_ of Spirit, and you at once destroy its very
existence, as we have abundantly shown in the foregoing pages.
The immaterialists have aimed a deadly blow at the foundation of
all spiritual existence, by denying it extension and parts. We, in
opposition to this unphilosophic, unscriptural, and atheistical
doctrine, have most clearly expressed our belief in a real tangible
substance called Spirit, which has extension and parts, like all other
matter.
"In the case of the angels' visit to Abraham, and of their partaking
of food, who," inquiries Mr. Taylder, "would conclude they must have
fleshy bodies?" (Taylder against Materialism, page 24.) We answer
that a "_fleshly body_" and a _spiritual body_ are entirely different
things. One is a body of material flesh; the other is a body of
material spirit--they are entirely different kinds of matter, as much
so as iron and oxygen. Jesus says, "God is a Spirit;" and again he
says, "a Spirit hath not flesh and bones." From these sayings of Jesus,
we can see that spiritual matter and fleshy or bony matter are distinct
substances. These passages are sometimes quoted as a supposed proof of
immateriality. But everyone knows that there are millions of substances
that are not flesh and bones. A house, a stone, or a tree, "hath not
flesh and bones," any more than a spirit; shall we therefore say that
all these substances are _immaterial_? If a spirit must be _immaterial_
because it hath not flesh and bones, then every substance in the
universe, except flesh and bones, must be immaterial.
Mr. Taylder supposes that the persons who appeared to Abraham, and
ate, and walked, and conversed with him, were only "_bodily forms_,"
"_assumed_ in _mercy_ to man." But, we ask, how does our author know
but what these bodily forms were the real, true, substantial forms of
these beings, instead of assumed ones? He seems to think that "it might
be assumed, with equal propriety, that the Divine Being is 'a rock,' 'a
fortress,' 'a tower,' 'a shield,' 'a buckler,' because he is so styled
in the bible." But did he ever appear in the form of a "rock," or "a
fortress," to any person anciently? Did he ever appear to Abraham,
to Jacob, to Moses, to the Seventy Elders of Israel, to Micaiah, to
Isaiah, or to the Jewish nation, when he walked among them, in the
flesh, as a tower, a shield, or a buckler? No: he appeared to them all
as a person. If the three persons whom Abraham saw had appeared like a
shield, or any other inanimate thing, they would not have been called
men. It was because they resembled the human species that they were
thus called.
Mr. Taylder says, "this scheme contradicts itself; for if Christ were
possessed of a body of flesh and blood, how could he become incarnate?
The Mormons believe," continues he, "in the incarnation, but this
contradicts it. Their doctrine implies that he had a _body before_ he
was incarnate, or he had a body before he had a body, or he had a body
and had not a body at the same time." (Taylder's Tract, page 26.)
This author must be very ignorant of our doctrine if he supposes
that we think that Christ had "a body of flesh and blood" before his
incarnation. Christ, before his incarnation, was a spiritual body, and
not a body of flesh and bones. It was the body of his spirit and not
a fleshly body that was with the Father in the beginning, when God
said, "let us make man in our likeness and in our image." Whenever he
appeared before he dwelt in flesh, it was the pure spiritual matter
only that was seen. The spiritual body of Christ has hands, face, feet,
and all other members, the same as his body of flesh and bones. The
spiritual bodies of all men were in the likeness of the spiritual body
of Christ when they were first created.
That spiritual bodies are capable of condensation, is evident from
the fact of their occupying the small bodies of infants. The spirits
of just men, who have departed from the fleshly tabernacle, have been
seen by the inspired writers; and from their description of them, we
should not only judge them to be of the same _form_, but likewise of
about the same size as man in this life. These departed spirits, then,
which are about the same magnitude as men in the flesh, once occupied
infant bodies. There are only two methods by which to account for their
increase in magnitude; one is by an additional quantity of spiritual
matter, being gradually and continually incorporated in the spiritual
body, by which its magnitude is increased in the same way and in the
same proportion as the fleshly body is increased. And the other is by
its elasticity or expansive properties by which it increases in size,
as the tabernacle of flesh and bones increases, until it attains to
its natural magnitude, or until its expansive and cohesive properties
balance each other, or are in a state of equilibrium.
The latter method seems to be in accordance with scripture. The
spiritual body of Christ, when seen previous to his incarnation, is not
represented as an infant in stature, but as a man, and consequently his
spirit must have been of the size of a man. Therefore, when he came and
dwelt in the infant tabernacle of flesh, born of a virgin, his spirit
must have been greatly condensed; and did not completely regain its
former magnitude until the fleshly tabernacle had attained its full
growth.
As a further evidence of the condensation of spiritual matter, we read
of seven devils beings cast out of Mary Magdalene, and of a legion of
others inhabiting one man, and which, after being cast out, entered a
large herd of swine. Now these devils were once angels who kept not
their first estate. Those angels who kept their first estate, that have
been seen, appear about the size and of the form of men, insomuch that
they are frequently called men in the scriptures: and it is reasonable
to suppose that those angels who fell did not, to any great extent,
alter their size and form. Therefore, they must have been very much
condensed and crowded when a legion of them entered one body.
That the different particles of a spirit are not all in actual contact
is very evident from the fact that a spiritual body can alter its
dimensions by condensation or expansion. It is also evident from
the fact of its entering into union with flesh and bones, and also
withdrawing itself at death. If the particles were in contact, and
inseparably connected, there would be no possibility of getting in
and out of a fleshly body, unless by entirely dissolving its parts.
But, as it is, each refined particle of the spirit can, like heat or
electricity, pass between the fleshly particles; and thus the whole
body of spiritual particles can liberate themselves; and by their own
self-moving powers and free will, can still preserve and maintain their
own organization. Here is manifested the great superiority of spiritual
matter to all other matter; each particle has the power of self-motion.
The whole mass of particles have power to preserve themselves in an
organized form as long as they please. Should they, by any contingency,
be disarranged, as in passing in or out of a body, they can with the
greatest ease, resume their former position, and maintain their bodily
organization either in or out of a fleshly tabernacle.
Mr. Taylder, in speaking of the seven devils which possessed Mary
Magdalene, says, if they were material they must have "_condensed_
themselves into a very small space." He then remarks, "No doubt the
reader questions the possibility of any sane person, first embracing
and then calmly propagating such errors. (Taylder's Tract, page 28.)
But we calmly ask Mr. Taylder, which would be the most reasonable
and philosophic,--to believe that seven substances could all occupy
the same space at the same time, or to believe, as we do, in the
_condensation_ of substance? The former is an admitted absurdity, but
the latter is something that is constantly taking place in a great
variety of substances. None could believe the former, unless his mental
vision was obscured and his eyes blinded by the absurd insane notions
of priestcraft and false tradition; but any man of sound sense, who
dares think for himself, could believe the latter, because it does not
involve an absurdity.
"The Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove" upon the
Saviour, and like "as cloven tongues of fire" on the apostles.
"How can a dove," inquires Mr. Taylder, "extend through all space
and intermingle with all the matter?" "It is (he asserts) a clear
impossibility." We readily admit that a dove or a cloven tongue of
fire cannot be omnipresent. It is, as Mr. Taylder says, "_a clear
impossibility_." And it is likewise just as impossible for a _person_
to be everywhere present, as it is for a dove. Why should our author
suppose it possible for a person to be everywhere present, when he
admits that a dove could not be in such a condition? The "_cloven
tongues of fire_" that appeared unto the disciples on the day of
pentecost, were only parts of that all-wise substance which extends
through space. The cloven tongue of fire which rested upon one man,
was not the same that rested upon all the others; hence there was a
_plurality_ of them that appeared. The prophet Joel informs us, that
in the last days the Spirit shall be poured out upon _all flesh._ No
two persons can receive the same identical particles of this Spirit at
the same instant; a part therefore of the Holy Spirit will rest upon
one man, and another part will rest upon another. If the Spirit rests
upon all flesh at the same time, then there will be as many parts of
the Spirit as there are distinct individuals in whom it dwells. No one
of these parts of the Spirit can be everywhere present any more than a
dove. Each part can occupy only one place at a time. If the whole be
infinite in quantity, it can extend through infinite space; if it be
finite in quantity, it can only occupy finite space.
That different parts of this spirit can assume different shapes, is
evident from its appearing as a dove at one time, and as cloven tongues
of fire at another. It is also evident from the fact of the Saviour's
speaking of the Holy Spirit as a personage. "Howbeit, when _he_ the
Spirit of truth, is come, HE will guide you into all truth; for HE
shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever HE shall hear, that shall HE
speak: and HE will shew you things to come." (John, xvi., 13.) There is
no more inconsistency in one part of the Holy Spirit existing in the
form of a person, than there is in another part existing in the form of
a dove, and several other parts existing in the form of cloven tongues
of fire.
That the all-powerful matter called the Holy Spirit is very widely
diffused, is evident from the fact that the time will come when it will
be poured out upon all flesh. It is very certain that the Psalmist
had some idea of the immense quantities of this substance, and of its
extensive diffusion, when he exclaims, "Whither shall I go from thy
Spirit?" &c. The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the deep, and by
his Spirit the heavens were garnished. When we speak of the Spirit of
God, extending through all space, we do not mean that it absolutely
fills every minute portion of space, for if this were the case, there
would be no room for any other matter. A substance, to absolutely fill
all space, would be an infinite solid, without pores and immovable
in all its parts; therefore, the Spirit exists in different parts
of space in greater or less degrees of density, like heat, light,
or electricity. It is this glorious and all-powerful substance that
governs and controls all other substances by its actual presence,
producing all the phenomena ascribed to the laws of nature; in it we
exist, we live, we move, and by it we receive wisdom and knowledge, and
are guided into truth in proportion as we permit it to dwell within us
and receive its heavenly teachings.
2.--"The next consideration," says our author, "is their denial of the
infinity, perfection, and omnipresence of the Godhead." (Taylder's
Tract, page 31.) Under this head he quotes many passages of scripture
to show that the presence of God fills heaven and earth, and that
the heaven of heavens cannot contain him. All these things we freely
admit. The Holy Spirit is called God in the scriptures, as well as the
Father and Son. This, we presume, Mr. Taylder will admit. It is God,
the Holy Spirit, then, that is everywhere, substantially and virtually.
The Holy Spirit is infinitely perfect and wise, one in substance, but
one in wisdom, power, glory, and goodness. Jesus prayed that all his
disciples might be made one, as he and his Father are one. If Jesus
and the Father are one person, then all the disciples must, according
to the prayer of Jesus, lose their individual identity and become one
person: this would be perfect nonsense. Therefore, Jesus and the Father
are two persons or two substances, the same in kind but not the same in
identity--in the same sense that his disciples are different persons:
and, consequently, distinct substances. His disciples are to be made
one with him, and with each other, the same as Jesus and the Father are
one; that is, they are to be one in wisdom, power, and glory, but not
in person and substance. The substance of the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost are three distinct substances, as much as the substance of three
men are distinct.
These three substances act in concert in the same way that all the
innumerable millions of his disciples, after they are glorified,
will act in concert. The disciples will then be like him. Their
glorified bodies will be similar to that of Christ's but not the same
as Christ's: they will all maintain their separate individualities,
like the Father and Son. The one-ness of the Godhead may be in some
measure illustrated by two gallons of pure water, existing in separate
vessels, representing the Father and Son, and an ocean of pure water,
representing the Holy Spirit. No one would say of these three portions
of water that they were identically the same. Every portion would be a
separate substance of itself, but yet the separate portions would be
one in kind--one in quality, but three in separate distinct identities.
So it is with the Godhead so far as the spiritual matter is concerned.
There is the same power, wisdom, glory, and goodness in every part, and
yet every part has its own work to perform, which accords in the most
perfect harmony with the mind and will of every other part.
Each atom of the Holy Spirit is intelligent, and like all other matter
has solidity, form, and size. It is because each acts in the most
perfect unison with all the rest that the whole is considered one Holy
Spirit. All these innumerable atoms are considered one Holy Spirit in
the same sense that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are considered
one God. The immense number of atoms, though each is all-wise and
all-powerful, is, by virtue of their perfect concord and agreement,
but one Holy Spirit, the same as the intelligent particles of a man's
spirit are, by their peculiar union, but one human spirit. Their unity
or oneness does not consist in that inexplicable, incomprehensible,
imaginary something without extension or parts, as taught in the first
of the "Thirty-nine Articles," but it consists in a unity or oneness of
wisdom, power, and glory, each part performing its own splendid works
and operations in union with the mind and will of every other part.
No one part can perform any work but what is the mind of the whole.
Therefore, in this sense it is the same mind--the same will--the same
wisdom that pervades the whole.
Mr. Taylder, in order to establish his views of a god without parts,
quotes from the theological works of a very celebrated writer on the
omnipresence of God, which reads as follows:--
"The essential presence is without any division of himself. I fill
heaven and earth, not part in heaven and part in earth: I fill one
as well as the other. One part of his essence is not in one place,
and another part of his essence in another place; he would then be
changeable, for that part of his essence which was now in this place
he might alter to another, and place that part of his essence which
were in another place to this; but he is undivided everywhere. It is
impossible that one part of his essence can be separated from another:
for he is not a body, to have one part separable from another. The
light of the sun cannot be cut into parts; it cannot be shut into any
place, and kept there; it is entire in every place: shall not God, who
gives the light that power, be much more present himself? Whatsoever
hath parts is finite, but God is infinite; therefore, hath no parts
of his essence. Besides, if there were such a division of his being,
he would not be the most simple and uncompounded being, but would be
made up of various parts; he would not be a spirit, for parts are
evidences of composition, and it could not be said that God is here or
there, but only a part of God is here and a part of God is there. But
he fills heaven and earth; he is as much a God in the earth beneath as
he is in heaven above. 'The Lord he is God in heaven above and upon
the earth beneath; there is none else.'--Deut. iv. 39. Entirely in all
places, not by scraps and fragments of his essence." (Charnock on the
"Omnipresence of God.")
Of all the absurdities ever imagined up by mortal man in relation
to God, the above caps the climax. "One part of his essence," says
Charnock, "is not in one place and another part of his essence in
another place." How does he exist? According to this theologian, the
whole of the essence of God entire must exist in every place. The whole
of his essence, not a part, must exist in every cubic inch of space.
In one cubic foot of space, according to Charnock, there would be
seventeen hundred and twenty eight cubic inches, each containing the
whole of the essence of God. As each cubic inch of space is susceptible
of being divided into an infinite number of fractional spaces, each
fractional space must contain the whole of the essence of God; hence
the whole of his essence would be repeated an infinite number of times
in every cubic inch. Therefore, if the whole of the essence of God
constitutes God, we shall have an infinite number of gods in every
cubic inch of space.
But the absurdity does not stop here. Charnock admits the omnipresence
of God; he supposes his essence to fill the infinity of space. Now the
whole of this infinitely extended essence must exist in the smallest
fractional space that can be imagined, and must be repeated an infinite
number of times in all finite spaces, in order that the whole of his
essence may be in every possible space.
"It is impossible," says Charnock, "that one part of his essence can be
separated from another." But, we ask, are not the different parts of
space separated from each other? And if he fills all space, then his
essence that is in one part of space must be separate from his essence
in another part of space. If the whole of his essence occupies a cubic
foot of space on the earth, and the whole of his essence occupies
another cubic foot of space at the distance of the sun, how is it that
these essences at this great distance are not separate from each other?
But does not every school-boy know that the whole of any essence cannot
be in two separate places at the same instant? And does not every one
know that the whole of an essence, infinitely extended, cannot possibly
exist in a finite space.
Charnock endeavours to illustrate his absurdities by referring to
the rays of light. "The light of the sun," he says, "cannot be cut
into parts,"--_it is entire in every place_." What does this great
theologian mean by this? Does he mean that the light of the sun is
without parts like his god? or that the whole light of the sun is in
every place? Does the whole light of the sun enter our eyes or only a
part of his rays? If the whole light of the sun "is entire in every
place," then the intensity of his light must be equal in all places. If
this be the case, philosophers must be entirely mistaken, for they say
that light varies in intensity inversely as the square of the distance
from the luminous body; they inform us that a body situated at twice
or three times the distance of the earth from the sun will enjoy only
one-fourth or one-ninth of the amount of light that we enjoy; but how
could this be possible, if the whole light of the sun, instead of part,
"is entire in every place?"
It takes light over eight minutes to come from the sun to the earth.
Charnock says, "The light of the sun cannot be cut into parts." This
is not true; for if an opaque body, one million of miles in diameter,
were to be placed at any given instant half way between the earth and
sun, the light of the sun would still continue to be seen for upwards
of four minutes after the intervention of this body. The rays of light
between the earth and the opaque body would be entirely cut off from
the rays on the opposite side of the body.
It matters not whether the corpuscular or the undulatory theory of
light be adopted--whether the particles of light emanate from the sun
or merely vibrate; each atom is separate from every other atom, and
each is only a part of the great whole. An infinite number of parts
enter into the vast assemblage of luminous atoms. Light radiates from
the sun in all directions, and fills the surrounding spaces by a part
being in one space and a part in another, and not, like Mr. Charnock's
god, the whole being repeated in every part of space. That part of the
essence of light which is in one place, cannot by any possibility be in
any other place at the same instant. In one sense it may be said to be
one light, or the same light, because the properties are alike. Each
particle is a distinct, separate essence from every other particle, but
the qualities of each are alike or similar. Therefore, in this sense we
may speak of the light of the sun as _one_ light, though it possesses
an infinite number of parts, the same as we speak of God being one God,
though the parts of his essence are infinite in number. Mr. Charnock
says, "Whatsoever hath parts is finite, but God is infinite, and,
therefore, hath not parts of his essence." Space likewise is infinite,
and therefore, according to this gentleman's logic, it can have no
parts. Duration is infinite, and, therefore, it also must be without
parts. What would a cubic inch of space be? Any man that was not insane
would at once say that it is a part of space. Therefore, if an infinite
space or an infinite duration can have parts, why not an infinite
essence have parts?
"The Lord he is God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath; there
is none else."--Deut. iv. 39. Such a passage when referring to the
person of God, should be understood the same as we would understand
a similar expression concerning any earthly ruler: for instance, it
can be said of her Majesty, she is queen in Great Britain and also in
Canada, and there is none else; that is, there is none else that is
queen in these two places. This would have no reference to her person
being in these two places at the same time; it only shows that she
should be the only acknowledged queen in these two places. But when God
says, "I fill heaven and earth," he has reference to his Holy Spirit,
a part of which fills heaven, and another part fills the earth. That
part which fills the earth has the same wisdom, knowledge, glory,
and power as the part that fills the heaven; hence, though distinct
and separate essences, their perfections and attributes are one. One
wisdom--one glory--one power, pervade every part of this glorious
essence. This oneness is such that the part which fills the earth will
never act contrary to the will of the part which fills the heavens.
The essence possesses a plurality of parts, but the wisdom possesses
no divisibility of parts; it is infinite wisdom in every part. Wisdom
cannot be divided into parts any more than love, hope, joy, or fear.
A truth is identically the same truth whether possessed by one or
a million of persons, and is not susceptible of being divided into
fractions. The Holy Spirit is called "_The Spirit of Truth_." Though
the essence that possesses this truth may be divided into an infinite
number of parts, occupying an infinite number of separate spaces, yet
the truth that pervades them all is ONE truth. It is the indivisibility
and unity of these perfections or qualities that constitute the oneness
of the Godhead.
3.--Mr. Taylder supposes my assertion that "there is no such thing as
moral image," to be unscriptural, and that "it denies in some respects
the moral perfections of the Godhead." (Taylder's Tract, page 33.)
We still maintain that there cannot be any such thing as moral image
independently of an essence or substance to which it belongs. And this
is the only sense which we intended to convey in our tract on the
"KINGDOM OF GOD." Indeed, it is there expressly said, that "Morality is
a property of some being or substance. A property without a substance
or being to which it appertains is inconceivable. A property can never
have figure, shape, or image of any kind." This is a truth admitted
by all philosophers. Sir Isaac Newton in the Scholium, at the end of
the "_principia_," in speaking of God says, "He is omnipresent, not by
means of his _virtue_ alone, but also by his _substance,_ for virtue
cannot subsist without substance." Virtue or morality cannot subsist
without _substance;_ hence it can have no _image_ without substance.
Substance alone can have an image. Such an image may have the property
of virtue, or of morality, and by reason of this property may be
called a virtuous image, or a moral image. It is in this sense alone
that the apostle Paul applies the term image to the new man. "Ye have
put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image
of him that created him." Col. iii. 10. "Ye have put on the new man,
which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." Eph.
iv. 24. Now what is this new man? It is the spirit of man renewed in
its properties, but not changed in its substance or essence. This
substance previously to the renewal of its qualities was immoral, after
the renewal it became moral or virtuous, possessing the same quality
in a degree as the substance or image of the Deity. The substance of
the Deity may be termed a moral substance or image, the same as the
substance of gold is called a yellow substance, or yellow image, if
it resembles a person. The yellowness of gold could not be an image
independently of the substance, neither could the morality of the Deity
be an image independently of his essence.
The spiritual substance of man was formed in the beginning after the
same image as the spiritual substance of the persons of the Father
and Son. Previously to the fall these spirits were all moral in their
nature; by the fall the spirits of men lost their morality and virtue,
but not their essence--that continued the same; by the new birth man
regains his morality and virtue, while the essence remains the same;
it now becomes a moral virtuous image, whereas the same substance was
before immoral. Paul, in speaking of the resurrection, says, "As we
have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of
the heavenly." I Cor. xv. 49.
This cannot mean a heavenly image without substance; for when man
rises from the dead, he certainly will rise with flesh and bones. The
immortal bodies of the saints when they rise from the grave "will
be fashioned," as Paul says, "like unto the glorious body of Jesus
Christ." As Jesus ascended into heaven with a body of flesh and bones,
so will his saints bear the same image, having flesh and bones after
"the image of the heavenly." That these glorious bodies of immortal
flesh and immortal bones will be moral images, in the sense above
stated, there is no doubt. But such a thing as a moral image in the
sense that the immaterialists use the term, is a clear impossibility.
Such an image, as we remarked in our treatise on the "KINGDOM OF GOD,"
never can and never will have "an existence only in the brains of
modern idolaters."
4.--Mr. Taylder falsely accuses us of denying "the _personality_ of
each person in the Trinity, making each to be only a part in the
Godhead." (Taylder's Tract, page 34.)
This author very well knows that the personalities in the godhead
are not denied by us. It will be seen on the very pages to which he
has so frequently referred, that we believe the Father and Son to be
two separate distinct personages, as much so as fathers and sons of
the human race; it will there be seen that we also believe the Holy
spirit to be a separate distinct substance from the two substances of
the Father and Son. That all may see that this author has wrongfully
accused us of denying "the personality of each person in the Trinity,"
we make the following extract from our treatise on the "KINGDOM OF GOD."
"The Godhead consists of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The
Father is a material being. The substance of which he is composed is
wholly material. It is a substance widely different in some respects
from the various substances with which we are more immediately
acquainted. In other respects it is precisely like all other materials.
The substance of his person occupies space the same as other matter.
It has solidity, length, breadth, and thickness, like all other
matter. The elementary materials of his body are not susceptible of
occupying, at the same time, the same identical space with other
matter. The substance of his person, like other matter, cannot be in
two places at the same instant. It also requires _time_ for him to
transport himself from place to place. It matters not how great the
velocity of his movements, _time_ is an essential ingredient to all
motion, whether rapid or slow. It differs from other matter in the
superiority of its powers, being intelligent, all-wise, and possessing
the power of self-motion to a far greater extent than the coarser
materials of nature. "God is a _spirit_." But that does not make him
an immaterial being--a being that has no properties in common with
matter. The expression, "_an immaterial being_," is a contradiction
in terms. Immateriality is only another name for nothing. It is the
negative of all existence. A "_spirit_" is as much _matter_ as oxygen
or hydrogen. It has many properties in common with all other matter.
Chemists have discovered between fifty and sixty kinds of matter; and
each kind has some properties in common with all other matter, and some
properties peculiar to itself which the others do not inherit. Now,
no chemist in classifying his substances would presume to say, this
substance is material, but that one is immaterial, because it differs
in some respects from the first. He would call them all material,
though they in some respects differed widely. So the substance called
spirit is material, though it differs in a remarkable degree from
other substances. It is only the addition of another element of a more
powerful nature than any yet discovered. He is not a being "without
_parts_," as modern idolators teach; for every whole is made up of
parts. The whole person of the Father consists of innumerable parts;
and each part is so situated as to bear certain relations of distance
to every other part. There must also be, to a certain degree, a freedom
of motion among these parts, which is an essential condition to the
movements of his limbs, without which he could only move as a whole.
"All the foregoing statements in relation to the person of the Father,
are equally applicable to the person of the Son.
"The Holy Spirit being one part of the Godhead, is also a material
substance, of the same nature and properties in many respects, as
the spirits of the Father and Son. It exists in vast immeasurable
quantities, in connexion with all material worlds. This is called
God in the Scriptures, as well as the Father and Son. God the Father
and God the Son cannot be everywhere present; indeed they cannot be
even in two places at the same instant: but God the Holy Spirit is
omnipresent--it extends through all space, intermingling with all other
matter, yet no one atom of the Holy Spirit can be in two places at
the same instant, which in all cases is an absolute impossibility. It
must exist in inexhaustible quantities, which is the only possible way
for any substance to be omnipresent. All the innumerable phenomena of
universal nature are produced in their origin by the actual presence
of this intelligent all-wise and all-powerful material substance
called the Holy Spirit. It is the most active matter in the universe,
producing all its operations according to fixed and definite laws
enacted by itself, in conjuction with the Father and the Son. What are
called the laws of nature are nothing more nor less than the fixed
method by which this spiritual matter operates. Each atom of the Holy
Spirit is intelligent, and like other matter has solidity, form, and
size, and occupies space. Two atoms of this spirit cannot occupy the
same space at the same time. In all these respects it does not differ
in the least from all other matter. Its distinguishing characteristics
from other matter are its almighty powers and infinite wisdom, and
many other glorious attributes which other materials do not possess.
If several of the atoms of this Spirit should exist united together
in the form of a person, then this person of the Holy Spirit would be
subject to the same necessity as the other two persons of the Godhead,
that is, it could not be everywhere present. No finite number of atoms
can be omnipresent. An infinite number of atoms is requisite to be
_everywhere_ in infinite space. Two persons receiving the gift of the
Holy spirit, do not each receive at the same time the same identical
particles, though they each receive a substance exactly similar in
kind. It would be as impossible for each to receive the same identical
atoms at the same instant, as it would be for two men at the same time
to drink the same identical pint of water." (Kingdom of God. Part I,
page 4.)
From this extract it will be perceived that the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, are believed by us to be three distinct material substances,
the same in kind, but not the same in identity. The person of the
Father is a body of Spirit, consisting of parts. Mr. Taylder enquires,
"What does the author mean by 'the _elementary_ materials of his
body?' Is his body a compounded substance, capable of being reduced to
original and simple elements?" We answer that the _elements_ of his
body are the different parts of which it consists. The _whole,_ being
"_compounded_" of "_elementary_" parts.
The Godhead may be further illustrated by a council, consisting of
three men--all possessing equal wisdom, knowledge, and truth, together
with equal qualifications in every other respect. Each person would be
a separate distinct person or substance from the other two, and yet the
three would form but ONE council. Each alone possesses, by supposition,
the same wisdom and truth that the three united or the ONE council
possesses. The union of the three men in one council would not increase
the knowledge or wisdom of either. Each man would be _one part_ of the
council when reference is made to his person; but the wisdom and truth
of each man would be the _whole_ wisdom and truth of the council, and
not a part. If it were possible to divide truth, and other qualities
of a similar nature into fractions, so that the Father should have
the third part of truth, the third part of wisdom, the third part of
knowledge, the third part of love, while the Son and the Holy Spirit
possessed the other two-thirds of these qualities or affections, then
neither of these persons could make "_one_ God," "but only a _part_
of a God." But because the divisibility of wisdom, truth, or love is
impossible, the _whole_ of these qualities dwell in the Father--the
_whole_ dwells in the Son--the _whole_ is possessed by the Holy Spirit.
"The Holy Spirit is _one part_ of the Godhead" in essence; the _whole_
of God in wisdom, truth, and other similar qualities. If a truth
could become three truths, distinct from each other, by dwelling in
three persons or substances, then there would be _three_ Gods instead
of _one_. But as it is, the Trinity is _three_ in essence but _one_
in truth and other similar principles. The oneness of the Godhead,
as described in the Scriptures, never was intended to apply to the
essence, but only to the perfections and other attributes.
If the Father possess infinite wisdom and knowledge, why, some may ask,
can he not get along with his work without the assistance of the Son
and Holy Spirit? We answer, the Son is necessary to reconcile fallen
man to the Father: the Holy Spirit is necessary to sanctify and purify
the affections of men, and also to dwell in them as a teacher of truth.
Immense quantities of this substance are also necessary in order to be
present in connexion with all other substances, to control and govern
them according to fixed and definite laws that good order and harmony
may obtain in every department of the universe. The Father and Son
govern the immensity of creation, not by their own actual presence, but
by the actual presence of the Spirit. The union of the three does not
give any additional wisdom and knowledge to either, but by the union,
they are able to carry on certain works which could not be carried on
by one singly. One singly, as for instance the Father, could have power
to do all things not inconsistent with his perfections and attributes,
that is, he could act where he was present, but without the assistance
of the Holy Spirit or some other being, he being a person, could not
act where he is not present. By the union of the three, each is able to
act in all places through the assistance of the others. The persons of
the Father and Son can be in heaven, and yet, through the agency of the
spirit, act upon the earth. An omnipresent person is impossible, but an
omnipresent substance, diffused through space, is not only consistent,
but reasonable. Persons through the medium of such an all-wise and
all-powerful substance, can exercise Almighty power, at the same time
in the most distant departments of creation. Without such a substance
with which they were in union, they could not carry on the grand and
powerful operations of universal nature; for no substance can act where
it is not present.
Perhaps the objector may refer to matter attracting matter as a proof
that it can act where it is not present. But we are bold to affirm that
such a thing as attraction cannot possibly exist. For matter to draw
distant matter towards itself, and consequently act where it is not
present, would be as utterly impossible as it would be for a person
to be in two or more places at the same time. All the phenomena of
universal gravitation can be accounted for upon principles infinitely
more simple and consistent, than to ascribe to matter the impossible
power of acting where it is not present. The author may, at some future
time, give his views with regard to the powers of nature, and the
laws by which it is governed. But to enter in this work into a full
development of our theory in relation to those intricate though sublime
subjects, would be a digression foreign to the objects we have in view
in this treatise.
No doubt many apparent objections to our views of the Godhead will
arise in the minds of many who nave been traditionated in the absurd
doctrines of immaterialism. Not long since a series of questions were
propounded to the Latter-day Saints by the Rev. F. Austin, a Roman
Catholic minister, a few of which, relating to the nature of God, we
insert here together with our answers. (The whole series of questions,
together with the answers, will be published in the "Millenial Star.")
Question.--"If the God of the Mormonites be like a man in figure,
we must suppose the organs of the senses to have the same uses, and
to be dependent on the same sources for information; his ears, in
consequence, for hearing must be dependent on the transmission of
sound. How, then, can he hear his people praying to him in Europe when
he is in America?"
Answer.--Because the _figure_ of two substances are alike, that is no
evidence that the _qualities_ of the two substances are alike. A wax
figure may be in the shape of a man, and yet, we all know, that it
has not the qualities of a man. A wise man may have the figure of a
foolish man, and yet be far superior to him in the qualities of wisdom,
knowledge and understanding. God may have the figure of a man, and yet
have many qualities and susceptibilities which man has not got. The
resemblance of figure, then, has nothing to do, as to whether other
qualities shall be alike or unlike. The spiritual body of the Deity is
altogether a different kind of substance from the fleshly body of man,
yet they may resemble each other in figure. The substances are entirely
different, therefore, though the figures should resemble each other,
this is no evidence that all the qualities must be alike. The ear of
the fleshly body may be affected by the vibrations of our atmosphere;
the ear of a spiritual body may be affected in an entirely different
manner, and yet their figures may resemble each other. The ear of
the fleshly body may be affected by the vibrations of many elastic
substances besides the atmosphere. Sound is conveyed through various
mediums with different degrees of velocity. The ear of the spiritual
body may be affected, not only by the atmosphere and other elastic
mediums which affect the ear of flesh, but it also may be affected
by a vast number of other more subtle and refined mediums, which may
transfer sound with a velocity immensely superior to any motion with
which we are acquainted. A refined medium which would convey sound with
no greater velocity than that of light, would carry information from
Europe to America in less than the sixtieth part of a second. But if
God foreknows all things, he must have foreknown all about our prayers
millions of ages before we were born, and must also have foreknown the
precise time when we would pray, and the kind of spirit or feeling, and
the degree of faith that would accompany each prayer; and if he knew
all these things before they come to pass, he must certainly know them
the moment they do come to pass; and, therefore, with a foreknowledge
of all things, there would be no necessity for his receiving
information of our prayers by the transmission of sound; he would know
and understand our prayers the moment they were offered up, the same
as he knew them and understood them in ages before they were offered
up. "He that formed the ear shall he not hear." Because God knows the
nature of music, that is no reason why he may not rejoice in hearing
music. One use, then, of the ears of his spiritual body is, no doubt,
to hear and rejoice in delightful music, not that it increases his
knowledge, but it is joyful to his ear. The ear of man serves a double
purpose; it is not only a medium of information, but a medium of sounds
that are delightful to the mind. The ear of the Lord may be delighted
with sounds, though he receive no additional knowledge by those sounds.
Question--"If he be like man, his legs must be the organs of motion; if
not, what purpose do they serve? If they are, are they good for walking
through the air as well as on land? Or has he wings, or how? or some
organ of motion we have not got? And if we have not sot this organ, how
can we be created to his image and likeness, supposing the resemblance
in every thing?"
Answer.--The resemblance between man and God has reference, as we
have already observed, to the shape or figure; other qualities may or
may not resemble each other. Man has legs, so has God, as is evident
from his appearance to Abraham. Man walks with his legs, so does God
sometimes, as is evident from his going with Abraham towards Sodom. God
can not only walk, but he can move up or down through the air without
using his legs as in the process of walking. (See Gen. xvii. 22; also
xi. 5; also xxxv. 13.)--"A man wrestled with Jacob until the breaking
of day;" after which, Jacob says--"I have seen God face to face, and my
life is preserved."--Gen. xxxii. 24-30. That this person had legs is
evident from his wrestling with Jacob. His image and likeness was so
much like man's, that Jacob at first supposed him to be a man.--(See
24th verse.) God, though in the figure of a man, has many powers that
man has not got. He can go upwards through the air. He can waft himself
from world to world by his own self-moving powers. These are powers not
possessed by man only through faith, as in the instances of Enoch and
Elijah. Therefore, though in the figure of a man, he has powers far
superior to man.
Question--"When God appears surrounded with glory, is this glory
essential to him or not? If essential, how can he lay it aside, as he
seems to have done when he appeared to Abraham? If his appearing so
does not prove it essential, how does his appearance in the form of a
man prove that form essential to him?"
Answer--The glory of God is essential to him under all circumstances,
whether his person is visible or invisible--whether man is permitted
to behold that glory or not. He never lays aside his glory, though he
may not always render it visible to mortals. "The God of glory," says
the martyr Stephen, "appeared unto our father Abraham when he was in
Mesopotamia, before he dwelt in Charran"--Acts, vii. 2. But because he
showed Abraham his person, it did not necessarily follow that he must
also show him his glory. The person of God is one thing, and his glory
is another; they are inseparably connected. He cannot divest his person
of his glory, nor lay it aside, but he can hide his glory from the
gaze of man, or he can reveal it and his person also, or he can reveal
his person and not his glory. The visibility or the invisibility of
the glory of God does not render it non-essential to him. The glory is
just as essential as his image and likeness, and his image or likeness,
resembling that of man's, is as essential as his glory--neither can be
laid aside, though one or both may be rendered visible or invisible.
Question.--"If his presence do not extend beyond his size, that is,
the size of a man, how could he divide the waters of the sea--how could
he hold them up? If they were a solid mass, it might be conceived;
but all the strength in the world won't hold up water; and it must be
remembered that a person must be present where he acts."
Answer.--He could divide the waters of the sea, and hold them up by the
actual presence of his Holy Spirit which not only moves upon the face
of the waters, but is likewise in and through the waters, governing
them and controlling all the elements according to the mind of God. It
is the actual presence of this Spirit that produces all the phenomena
ascribed to the laws of nature, as well as many of the deviations from
those laws, commonly called miracles; it extends, like the golden rays
of the bright luminary of heaven, through all extent; it spreads life
and happiness through all the varied species of animated beings, and
gilds the starry firmament with a magnificent splendor, celestial,
immortal, and eternal.
_15, Wilton Street, Liverpool, July 31st, 1849_.
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R. James, Printer, 39, South Castle Street, Liverpool.