Absurdities of Immaterialism,
Or,
A Reply to T. W. P. Taylder's Pamphlet,
Entitled,
"The Materialism of the Mormons or Latter-day Saints, Examined and
Exposed."
By Orson Pratt,
One of the Twelve Apostles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints.
"What is truth?" This is a question which has been asked by many. It
is a question supposed to be of difficult solution. Mr. Taylder in
his tract against materialism, says, "It is a question which all the
philosophers of the Grecian and Roman schools could not answer." He
seems to think the question was unanswerable until the introduction of
the gospel; since which time he considers that the veil is taken away,
and that "we now enjoy the full blaze of truth." He further confidently
asserts, that "with the materials afforded us in that sacred book,
(meaning the New Testament,) we are enabled satisfactorily to answer
the question, What is truth?"
What does this author mean by the foregoing assertions? Does he mean,
that no truth was understood by the Grecian and Roman schools? That
no truth was discerned by the nations, during the first four thousand
years after the creation? Or, does he mean, that the gospel truths
were not understood until they were revealed? He certainly must mean
the latter and not the former. Both the Romans and Grecians could,
without the least difficulty, answer the question. "What is truth?"
Nothing is more simple than an answer to this question. It is a truth,
_that something exists in space,_ and this truth was just as well
perceived by all nations before the book called the New Testament
existed as afterwards. It is a truth that, "the three angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles." This was not learned from that
sacred book--the Bible. We admit that the question, what is _gospel_
truth, could not be answered by any one to whom the gospel had never
been revealed. Dr. Good, in his "Book of Nature," says, "general
truth may be defined, the connexion and agreement, or repugnancy and
disagreement, of our ideas." This definition we consider erroneous;
for it makes general truth depend on the existence of ideas. Now
truth is independent of all ideas. It is a necessary truth that,
_space is boundless,_ and that _duration is endless,_ abstract from
all connexion and agreement of our ideas, or even of our existence,
or the existence of any other being. If neither the universe nor its
Creator existed, these eternal unchangeable, and necessary truths would
exist, unperceived and unknown. Truth is the relation which things bear
to each other. Knowledge is the perception of truth. Truth may exist
without knowledge, but knowledge cannot exist without truth.
The New Testament unfolds, not all the truths which exist, but some
few truths of infinite importance. The vast majority of truths of less
importance were discovered independently of that book.
"The followers of Joseph Smith," says this author, "hold the doctrine
of the materiality of all existence in common with the ancient
academics." This, sir, we admit. Our belief, however, in this doctrine,
is founded, not on any modern supernatural revelation, unfolding this
doctrine, as this author insinuates, but on reason and common sense.
The doctrine of immaterialism, in our estimation, is false, and in the
highest degree absurd, and unworthy the belief of any true Christian
philosopher.
The author of the treatise against materialism has stated his first
proposition as follows:--
"_The Philosophy of the Mormons is_ IRRATIONAL."
What the author means by this proposition is, that it is "irrational"
to believe _all substance material._ To substantiate this proposition
he sets out in quest of proof. An _immaterial substance_ is the thing
wanted. No other proof will answer. If he can prove the existence of an
immaterial substance his point is gained,--his proposition established,
and the irrationality of the material theory will be demonstrated.
As we are about to launch forth into the wide field of existence in
search of an "immaterial substance," it may be well to have the _term_
correctly defined, so as to be able to distinguish such a substance
from _matter. _It is of the utmost importance that every reasoner
should clearly define the terms he employs. Two contending parties
may use the same word in altogether different meanings; and each draw
correct conclusions from the meaning which he attaches to the same
word; hence arise endless disputes. As we have no confidence in the
immaterial theory, we shall let the immaterialist define his own terms.
We shall give,
Taylder's Definition.--"What is meant by an _immaterial substance_
is merely this, that something exists which is _not matter_ and is
evidently _distinct_ from matter, which is _not dependent_ on matter
for its existence, and which possesses properties and qualities
_entirely different_ from those possessed by matter." (Taylder's Tract
against Materialism. Page 14.)
This definition of an "immaterial substance" is ambiguous. It needs
another definition to inform us what he means. Does he mean that ALL
of "the properties and qualities" of an immaterial substance are
"entirely different from those possessed by matter;" and that it
possesses NO properties in common with matter? Or does he mean that
while it "possesses SOME properties and qualities entirely different"
from matter it inherits OTHERS in common with matter? If the latter be
his meaning, we see no reason for calling _any_ substance "immaterial."
Iron possesses SOME properties and qualities "entirely different"
from all other kinds of matter, and other properties it inherits in
common with every other kind. Shall we therefore say that iron is not
matter? Among the various kind of matter, each has its _distinct_
properties, and its _common_ properties; and notwithstanding each
possesses "entirely different" properties and qualities from all other
kinds, yet each is called matter because it possesses some properties
in common with all other kinds. Hence the term _matter_ should be
given to all substances which possess _any_ properties in common,
however wide they may differ in other respects. A substance to be
_immaterial_ must possess NO properties or qualities in common with
matter. All its qualities must be entirely _distinct_ and _different_.
It is to be regretted that our opponent has not defined an _immaterial
substance_ more clearly. As he is ambiguous in his definition, we shall
presume that he entertains the same views as the modern advocates of
immaterialism generally entertain.
That celebrated writer, Isaac Taylor, says,--"a disembodied spirit,
or we should rather say, an unembodied spirit, or sheer mind, is
NOWHERE. Place is a relation belonging to extension; and extension is
a property of matter; but that which is wholly abstracted from matter,
and in speaking of which we deny that it has _any property_ in common
therewith, can in itself be subjected to none of its conditions; and
we might as well say of a pure spirit that it is hard, heavy, or red,
or that it is a cubic foot in dimensions, as say that it is _here_
or _there._ It is only in a popular and improper sense that any such
affirmation is made concerning the Infinite Spirit, or that we speak of
God as _everywhere_ present." * * * "Using the term as we use them of
ourselves, God is not _here_ or _there_." * * * "When we talk of an
absolute immateriality," continues this author, "and wish to withdraw
mind altogether from matter, we must no longer allow ourselves to
imagine that it is, or can be, in any place, or that it has any kind of
relationship to the visible and extended universe." (Taylor's "Physical
Theory of Another Life." Chapter II.) Dr. Good says, "The metaphysical
immaterialists of modern times freely admit that the mind has NO PLACE
of existence, that it does exist NOWHERE; while at the same time they
are compelled to allow that the immaterial Creator or universal spirit
exists EVERYWHERE, substantially as well as virtually." (Good's "Book
of Nature," Series III., Lecture I.)
Dr. Abercrombie, in speaking upon _matter_ and _mind,_ says, that "in
as far as our utmost conception of them extends, we have no grounds for
believing that they have _anything_ in common." (Abercrombie on the
"Intellectual Powers." Part I. Sec. I.)
With these definitions, we shall follow our opponent in his researches
after an "immaterial substance." After taking a minute survey of man,
he believes he has found in his composition, and in connexion with his
bodily organization, something _immaterial._ He says, "the spirit is
the purely immaterial part, which is capable of separation from the
body, and can exist independently of the body."
"The _body_ is that _material_ part, 'formed out of the dust of the
ground,' and is the medium through which the mind is manifested."
(Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 8.)
That the mind or _spirit_, "is capable of separation from the body,
and can exist independently of the body," we most assuredly believe;
but that it is "immaterial" we deny; and it remains for Mr. Taylder
to _prove_ its _immateriality_. His first proof is founded on his
own assertion, that "mind is simple, not compounded." If this
assertion be admitted as true, it affords not the least evidence
for the _immateriality_ of _mind._ Every material atom is simple,
not compounded. Is it, therefore, not matter? Must each simple,
uncompounded elementary atom be _immaterial?_
Mr. Taylder next says, "Mind is not perceivable to corporeal organs,
matter is so perceivable." This assertion is altogether unfounded.
"Corporeal organs" can perceive neither _matter_ nor _mind_. The
mind alone can perceive: corporeal organs are only the instruments
of perception. Bishop Butler, in his Analogy, expressly says, that
"our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their
being perceived, in like matter as foreign matter does, without
affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive."
(Butler's Analogy. Part I. Chap. I.) The mind clearly perceives its
own existence as well as the existence of other matter. _Perception_,
then, is a quality peculiar to that kind of matter called mind. Mr.
Taylder further remarks, that "All the qualities of matter are not
comparable with the more excellent qualities of mind, such as power and
intelligence." We willing to admit that _power_ and _intelligence,_
and some other qualities of mind, are far superior to the qualities of
other matter; but we do not admit that the superiority of some of the
qualities of a substance prove its _immateriality_. The superiority
of some qualities has nothing to do with the _immateriality_ of the
_substance_. OXYGEN possesses some qualities, not only distinct from,
but superior to, those qualities possessed by BARIUM, STRONTIUM,
SILICIUM, GLUCINIUM, ZIRCONIUM, and many other metals and material
substances; yet no one from this will draw the conclusion, that
_oxygen_ is _immaterial_. Oxygen is material though it possesses some
distinct and superior qualities to other matter; so mind or spirit is
material, though it differs in the superiority of some of its qualities
from other matter.
It is strange, indeed, to see the inconsistencies of this learned
author: he remarks, "Mind thinks, matter cannot think. It is the
existence of this thinking principle which clearly proves the
immateriality of the mind or spirit." This method of reasoning may
be termed (_petitio principii_), begging the question. First, he
assumes that "matter cannot think;" and, second, draws the conclusion
that a _thinking substance_ is _immaterial._ This conclusion is a
legitimate one if the premises are granted; but the premises are
assumed, therefore the conclusion is false. Prove that _mind_ is _not_
matter before you assume that "matter cannot think." It would seem
from the assertions of this author, that the quality of "thinking" is
to be the touchstone--the infallible test--the grand distinguishing
characteristic between _material_ and _immaterial_ substances.
It matters not, in his estimation, how many qualities different
substances inherit in common, if one can be found that thinks, it must
be immaterial. There is no one substance out of the fifty or more
substances discovered by chemists, but what possesses some qualities
"entirely different" from any of the rest; therefore, each substance,
when compared with others, has equal claims with that of mind to be
placed in the _immaterial_ list. In proving that mind is immaterial, it
is not enough to prove that it has _some_ properties entirely distinct
from other substances; but it must be proved to have no properties in
common with matter. Nothing short of this will agree with the modern
notions of _immateriality._ It must be shown that mind or spirit has
no relation to _duration_ or _space_--no _locality_--that it must
exist "NOWHERE"--that it has no _extension_--that it exists not "Now"
and "Then," neither "Here" nor "There"--that it cannot be moved from
_place_ to _place_--that it has no _form_ or _figure_--no _boundaries_
or _limits_ of extension. These, according to the definitions of modern
immaterialists, are the negative conditions or qualities absolutely
necessary to the existence of all _immaterial substance_. While
the opposite of these, or the positive qualities or conditions are
absolutely necessary to the existence of all _material_ substance.
"How do you distinguish," inquires Mr. Taylder, "between any two given
substances, such as, that a block of stone is not a log of wood?" He
answers, "Because they possess different qualities." And then declares,
"So also you distinguish between mind and matter." But the "different
qualities" by which "a block of stone" is distinguished from "a log of
wood," do not prove either the stone or the wood to be _immaterial_;
neither do the different qualities by which the substance called mind
is distinguished from other substances, prove either the mind or the
other substances to be _immaterial_. So far as the different qualities
are evidences, the mind has as good a claim to materiality as the stone
or wood.
"The properties of body," continues our learned opponent, "are size,
weight, solidity, resistance, &c.; those of the mind are joy, hope,
fear, &c.; but weight is not joy, resistance is not hope, size is not
fear; therefore, as a block of stone is not a log of wood, so mind
is not matter." That a _stone_ possesses many _different qualities_
from _wood,_ and that mind possesses many different qualities from
other substances, we by no means deny; but that these _different
qualities_ prove stone, or wood, or mind, or any other substance to be
_immaterial,_ we do deny. We care not how many different properties
mind possesses over and above other substances; that is altogether
foreign from the question. But is it destitute of any or of all the
properties which other substances possess? is the question. Is it
destitute of "size, weight, solidity, resistance, &c?" If not, then the
mind possesses all the essential characteristics of matter, though its
peculiar and distinct properties should be multiplied to infinity.
This author calls "weight" one of the properties of matter. What is
_weight?_ It is nothing more nor less than force. Matter approaches
to, or presses on, other matter with _weight,_ or _force,_ or _power_.
Now matter either exerts this _force_ of itself, or else it is
impelled either directly or indirectly by other substances, possessing
intelligence, power, and other properties of mind. If matter exerts
this power of itself, then it exhibits one of the properties of mind;
but if the seat of this power is in that substance called mind, then
it is mind that exhibits the power called weight, and not other
substances. Mr. Taylder informs us that "it is mind, and _mind alone,_
which is the _seat of power_." (Taylder against Materialism. Page 12.)
If this be true, (and we feel no disposition to deny it), then _weight_
is not the property of unintelligent matter, but a property of mind.
And the same reasoning will apply to all other _powers or forces_
which are generally ascribed to unintelligent matter. They are only
the powers or forces of mind, or else other substances exhibit powers
or forces which are common to mind: in the latter case, mind could not
be _immaterial_: in the former case, unintelligent matter (if such
exist) is deprived of every force usually ascribed to it. It can have
neither gravitation, attraction, repulsion, chemical affinity, nor
any other conceivable force. Though deprived of all energy or force,
unintelligent matter would still be possessed of those inert qualities
(if, indeed, they may be called qualities) essential to its existence.
These qualities, or rather conditions necessary to its existence, are
duration, extension or place, solidity, figure, &c. An _immaterial
substance_ must have none of those conditions or qualities.
It is amusing to trace this author's process of reasoning. He first
assumes premises entirely false, argues from the same, shows the
deductions to be absurd and triumphantly exclaims, "Mind then is not
matter." We will quote the following specimen: "If the mind," says
this author, "be material and the brain nothing but a large gland,
secreting the various affections of thought, hope, joy, memory, &c,
then all these _affections_ or _qualities_ are _material,_ and must be
also little particles of matter, of different forms and dimensions, and
perhaps of various colours, Then we might, with the utmost propriety,
without the shadow of an absurdity, logically say, 'the twentieth
part of our belief, the half of a hope, the top of memory, the corner
of a fear, the north side of a doubt,' &c. Mind then is not matter."
(Taylder against Materialism. Page 15.) It will be perceived that this
logical author, in the foregoing quotation, confounds _affections_ or
_qualities_ with _mind;_ that is, he supposes "thought, hope, joy,
memory," &c. all to be material as well as the mind; he then introduces
a material brain that secretes the material affections; but what
becomes of the material mind he does not tell us; probably the material
mind is stowed away in some extremity of the body--in the foot or big
toe, so as not to interfere with its material affections, which are
secreted in the material brain at the other extremity. After imagining
up such an unheard of being, no wonder that he should discover some
absurdities in its composition. No wonder that in such a creature of
his own invention, there should be, not only "the corner of a fear,"
and "the north side of a doubt," but a cubical imagination with horns
to it. No wonder that such frightful absurdities should cause as great
a man as Taylder to exclaim with the upper part of a five-cornered
assurance, that "Mind then is not matter." It would be a logical
conclusion from his logical absurdities, founded on his _material
affections_ of a material mind.
But who does not know that "thought, hope, joy, memory," and all
other _affections_ or _qualities_ are not substances of any kind, but
merely different operations or states of the mind? A material mind,
possessing the power to think, to feel, to reason, to remember, is
not the brain, nor secretions of the brain, nor any other part of the
fleshy tabernacle; but it is the being that inhabits it, that preserves
its own identity, whether in the body or out of it, and remains
unchangeable in its substance whatever changes may happen to the body.
This material spirit or mind existed before it entered the body, exists
in the body, will exist after it leaves the body, and will be reunited
again with the body in the resurrection.
As another specimen of monstrous absurdities logically deduced from
absurd premises, we quote the following:--"Materialism" he remarks,
"is not only relatively but absolutely absurd. If mind be matter, or
matter mind, then we may have the square or cube of joy or grief, of
pain or pleasure. We may divide a great joy into a number of little
joys, or we may accumulate a great joy by heaping together the solid
parts of several little joys. We shall then have the color and shape of
a thought. It will be either white, grey, brown, crimson, purple, or it
may be a mixture of two or more colors. Then we shall have a dark grey
hope, a bright yellow sorrow, a round brown tall pain, and an octagonal
green belief; an inch of thought, a mile of joy." We do most cordially
agree with Mr. Taylder that these results would be "not only relatively
but absolutely absurd;" and only equalled by the absurdity of the
premises from which they were deduced. He has assumed that the several
STATES or CONDITIONS of the mind, such as joy, grief, pain, pleasure,
thought, &c., are material as well as the mind. With the same propriety
he might have assumed that MOTION is material as well as the matter
moved. Joy is no more a _substance_ than _motion,_ both are merely the
_states_ or _conditions_ of substance. As great absurdities could be
deduced from assuming that _motion_ is material, as there can be from
Mr. Taylder's assumption that _joy_ is material. As an illustration,
let us take this author's own words, with the exception of substituting
_iron_ for _mind, motion_ for the _affections_ of the mind; it will
then read thus:--"If" _iron_ "be matter, or matter" _iron,_ "then we
may have the square or cube of" a _solid motion._ "We may divide a
great" _solid motion_ "into a number of little" _solid motions,_ "or
we may accumulate a great" _solid motion_ "by heaping together the
solid parts of several little" _solid motions._ "We shall then have a
color and shape of a" _motion._ "It will be either white, grey, brown,
crimson, purple, or it may be a mixture of two or more colors. Then we
shall have a dark grey" _motion_ "a round, brown, tall" _motion_; "an
inch" or "a mile of" _solid motion_, &c. It is strange that Mr. Taylder
did not close his train of reasoning, by saying, "Mind, therefore,
is not matter;" and then we could have completed the parallel by
saying, _iron, therefore, is not matter._ If such reasoning proves
mind _immaterial,_ similar reasoning will prove any other substance
immaterial.
"Mr. Orson Pratt," observes our author, "calls matter into existence,
of which the world knows but little. He has not only 'intelligent
matter,' but 'all-wise,' and 'all-powerful' matter. This matter is
capable of division into parts; for all matter has length, breadth,
and thickness. Then we shall have the half of an intelligent atom of
matter, the eighth of an all-wise atom, the thousandth part of an
all-powerful atom &c. Such are the absurdities which 'the Latter-day
Saint' embraces." Here the author seems to have recovered partially
from the wild absurd notions of applying the term _material_ to the
affections, and is willing to apply it to substance where it belongs.
But he speaks of the division of atoms which does not accord with the
general notions of modern philosophy. The immortal Newton says, "It
seems probable that God, in the beginning, formed matter in _solid,
masses, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles_." This does not favor
the divisibility of atoms. Newton further observes, "That nature may
be lasting, the changes of corporeal things are to be placed only
in the _various separations,_ and _new associations,_ and _motions_
of these _permanent_ particles; compound bodies being apt to break,
not in the midst of solid particles, but where those particles are
laid together, and touch only in a few points." These are the views
entertained by philosophers generally at the present day, with the
exception of here and there an isolated individual who advocates the
theory of the infinite divisibility of matter. Perhaps our author
may be of that class; for he speaks of the division of atoms. It is
admitted that substance is capable of division and subdivision until
arriving at its ultimate atoms, after which all further separation
ceases. This division of the same kind of substance does not alter
or change the nature or properties of the respective parts; if they
possessed attraction when united, they also possess it when separated
or else attraction is the result of union and ceases with it. So in
relation to intelligent substance, without regard to its materiality
or immateriality; if it is intelligent as a whole, it is intelligent
in its respective parts after division, or else the intelligent power
is the result of the union of unintelligent parts, and ceases when the
union ceases. Therefore if the intelligent substance, called mind,
is intelligent, as a whole, it is intelligent in all its parts; and
there would be no more absurdity in speaking of the half, the eighth,
or the thousandth part of an intelligent substance, than there would
be in speaking of the half, the eighth, or the thousandth part of an
attracting substance. And yet Mr. Taylder exclaims, "Such are the
absurdities which the 'Latter-day Saint' embraces."
Perhaps our author's _immaterial mind_ or _spirit_ will not suffer him
to believe that the _whole_ spirit of man is made up or consists _of
parts._ If the spirit of man is a _substance,_ as Mr. Taylder admits,
though he denies its _materiality,_ then it must be either a simple
uncompounded being or atom, or a united collection of such beings or
atoms.
Bishop Butler supposes the spirit of man to be a single, simple,
indivisible being. He remarks, that "since consciousness is a single
and individual power, it should seem that the subject in which it
resides must be so too," "that is the conscious being." He further
says, "That we have no way of determining by experience what is the
certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet,
(continues he), till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than
the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to
think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to
think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even
though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible." (Butler's Analogy.
Part I, Chap. I.) Our author seems to be a little more positive than
Butler, and asserts apparently without any doubt, that "mind is simple
not compounded." (Taylder against Materialism. Page 14.) Here, then,
according to both Butler and Taylder, we have a simple, uncompounded,
indivisible, little atom of conscious substance, or, in other words,
an _intelligent atom._ The terms _atoms_ and _being_ are synonymous
when applied to a simple indivisible substance so small that Butler
intimates that its "bulk" has not been determined to exceed "the solid
elementary particles of matter."
If the spirit of one man is a little atom of intelligent substance
having "bulk," the spirit of every other man is a similar atom; hence
in the human bodies now living on the earth, there must exist nearly
one thousand million _of intelligent atoms,_ each conscious of its
own existence, and capable of originating motion independently of
the others. Mr. Taylder says this intelligent _atom_ or _spirit_ "is
capable of separation from the body, and can exist independently of
the body." This being admitted, then there must be many thousand
million of intelligent atoms which once inhabited bodies but now exist
independently of them. This is the legitimate result of the theory
which assumes that the spirit of a man is a little conscious being--a
substance, simple, uncompounded and indivisible, capable of existing
either in or out of a body. Where, then, Mr. Taylder, is the absurdity
in believing as the "Saints" do, in the existence of immense numbers
of intelligent atoms? It agrees most perfectly with the results of
your own theory--the only difference is in the name. You call these
little indivisible substances _immaterial,_ we call them _material._
You apply to them the same powers that we do. You believe them to be
conscious, intelligent, and thinking atoms as well as we. The name of
a substance does not alter its nature; as for instance some call one
of the constituent elements of the atmosphere "azote," others call
it "nitrogen," but all admit that it possesses the same nature and
properties. If this indivisible conscious being, or atom of substance,
possesses "bulk," as Bishop Butler intimates, then in this respect it
is like the atoms of all other substances, and therefore it must be
matter.
If some atoms can possess various degrees of intelligence, wisdom, and
power, whether in the body or out of it, then there is no absurdity
in the theory that there are other atoms which are "all-wise" and
"all-powerful." Mr. Taylder admits that there must be a God, and that
he is an all-wise and all-powerful being or substance,--that substance
must be either a simple uncompounded indivisible being or atom, or a
collection of such beings or atoms. If it be an indivisible being or
atom, it would prove the existence of one all-wise and all-powerful
being or atom: if it be a collection of such beings or atoms, then the
theory of all-wise and all-powerful atoms of substance is established.
All theistical writers admit the existence of such a substance. It is
not the _existence_ of the substance that is questioned, but it is its
_nature._ One class calls it _immaterial,_ another _material._ Mr.
Taylder has undertaken to prove that it is _immaterial,_ but as yet he
has not furnished us with even the most distant shadow of an evidence,
unless, indeed, his own assertions are evidence. Indeed, he has nowhere
attempted to prove that the spiritual substance of either man or the
Deity possesses no properties in common with other substance admitted
to be matter.
As another specimen of Taylder's logic we quote the following:--
"There is another conclusion equally absurd, if the existence of an
immaterial substance be denied, and thinking be ascribed to matter,
and that is, the mind must always think in the same way, in the
same direction." As a proof of this assumption our author refers to
the writings of Priestly, as follows:--"If man," says Dr. Priestly,
"be a material being, and the power of thinking the _result_ of a
_certain organization_ of the _brain,_ does it not follow, that all
his functions must be regulated by the laws of mechanism, and that, of
consequence, all his actions proceed from an irresistible necessity?"
"The doctrine of necessity," continues Priestly, "is the immediate
result of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the
undoubted consequence of materialism."
We are willing to admit that "an irresistible necessity" would be
the inevitable consequence of assuming that "the power of thinking
is the RESULT of a CERTAIN ORGANIZATION of the BRAIN." But this is a
most absurd assumption; for if "the power of thinking be the result
of a certain organization of the brain," then, when that organization
ceases, the power of thinking would cease also, and there could be no
separate existence for the mind or spirit.
But we believe that the power of thinking is not the RESULT of a brain
organization, but the original property of that substance called spirit
or mind, which can exist independently of a brain organization, and
entirely separate and apart from the body.
Priestly asserts that "mechanism is the undoubted consequence of
materialism." But this is a baseless assertion. Mechanism implies the
incapability of acting only according to the laws of Mechanism, as it
is acted upon: hence, "an irresistible necessity characterizes all of
its movements." But not so with an intelligent thinking substance:
it can originate its own motions, and act according to its own will,
independently of the laws of mechanism: hence a perfect freedom
characterizes all of its movements. Before Priestly or any other man
can logically assert that "mechanism is the undoubted consequence of
materialism," he must first prove that matter cannot think, and will,
and move, or, in other words, he must prove that mind is not matter.
Our author endeavours to overthrow materialism because of the
absurdities which Darwin advocated. He quotes the words of that author
as follows:--"Ideas are material things: they are contractions,
motions, or configurations of the fibres of the organs of sense."
"Here," exclaims Mr. Taylder, "is the real _perfection of materialism!
It destroys man's accountability to God!_" There is then no such
thing as praise or blame, fear or hope, reward or punishment, and,
consequently, no religion. "How," inquires our author, "can the
Mormons reconcile this conclusion with their religious fabric, built
on revelations and visions?" "If _their God_ be a material being, he
must _necessarily act mechanically_." We reply that we do not wish to
reconcile our religious fabric with Darwin's absurdities. Darwin has
assumed that "ideas, contractions, motions, or configurations," are all
_material_.
What man, disencumbered of a strait waistcoat, could ever believe in
such ridiculous nonsense! It is only equalled by Taylder's material
joys and sorrows, of which we have already had occasion to speak.
The substance of the Deity, nor no other intelligent substance, is
dependent on the "_contractions, motions, or configurations_" of
organical fibres for its actions, but it is a self-moving substance,
not subject to the law of necessity or mechanism like unintelligent
matter.
"The last consideration," says this immaterialist author, "which
it is necessary to advance for the real existence of mind, is
_consciousness_." (Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 18.)
"The real existence of mind" is not doubted by us. Mr. Taylder has
strayed entirely from the question. The question is not whether mind
has a _real existence,_ but whether it is _immaterial._
"It is generally considered," remarks this author, "that in a few years
our bodies are entirely changed. How, then, on the material scheme,
can a Mormon tell that he is the same person now that he was _twenty
years since,_ or shall be _ten years hence?_" We reply that it is only
the substance of the material body that is constantly changing, while
the material spirit which inhabits the body, remains unchangeable.
Personal identity consists, not in the identity of a changeable body,
but in the identity of an unchangeable substance called spirit, which
feels, thinks, reasons, and remembers. The Athenian galley, which
was sent every year to Delos for a thousand years, had been repaired
so often that every part of its materials had been changed more than
once, therefore it did not remain the same identical substance during
that period of time; but if a certain unchangeable diamond had been
carried within this galley for one thousand years, it would be the same
identical substance still, though the galley that carried it had been
changed ever so often; so likewise let the material body meet with an
entire change every few years, the unchangeable material spirit which
it carries within will remain the same identical substance still.
Indeed, if Bishop Butler's intimation be correct, that the spirit of
man is a small indivisible being or atom, whose bulk has not been
determined to exceed the size of small elementary particles of matter,
then it would be impossible for such a small conscious indivisible atom
to change its substance in the least degree, and therefore it must
preserve its entire identity under all possible circumstances.
Our author next inquires, "How can _spiritual_ matter occupy the same
space with the matter of which the body consists?" We answer that it
cannot occupy the same identical space with other matter, for this
is in all cases an absolute impossibility. It can only occupy its
own space in union with the matter of which the body consists. Every
particle of the body occupies a distinct space of its own, and no two
particles of the body can exist in the same space at the same time,
neither can any atom of spirit occupy the same space at the same time
with any other atom or substance. All substances are porous. It can
be proved that the component particles of all known substances are
not in absolute contact, for all bodies composed of these particles
can be compressed, and their dimensions reduced without diminishing
their mass. All organized substances are porous in a high degree, that
is their "volume consists partly of material particles and partly of
interstitial spaces, which spaces are either absolutely void and empty,
or filled by some substance of a different species from the body in
question." (Lardner's Scientific Lectures. Vol. II. Lecture 1.) The
material body being porous, there is room for the material spirit to
exist in close connexion with its component parts, and this too without
infringing upon the impenetrability of substances. If the material
spirit be as small as Bishop Butler intimates, it will not occupy much
room in the body. Many millions of millions of such spirits, if "not
larger in bulk than the elementary particles of bodies," could occupy
much less room that a cubic inch of space.
We have now examined all of Mr. Taylder's arguments (if, indeed,
they may be called arguments) which have been adduced in support of
his first proposition, which it will be recollected, was stated in
these words--"The philosophy of the Mormons is IRRATIONAL?" or, in
other words, it is irrational to believe in the materiality of all
substance. How far he has supported this proposition our readers can
judge for themselves. He has not brought forth the least shadow of
evidence to prove that such a thing as an immaterial substance exists.
He has, indeed, argued, that such a thing as mind or spirit has a
real existence--that it thinks, and feels, and is conscious. In all
these things he agrees with us, without the least variation. He argues
that the substance called mind, possesses many different and superior
qualities to all other substance; his views in this respect do not
differ in the least from ours. He has clearly exhibited the absurdities
of Priestly, Darwin, and various other writers, who have made mind the
result of the motions of the brain or of its organization. We agree
with him most perfectly in the rejection of such absurdities, but in
no place has he brought forward argument, reason, or evidence to prove
that the substance called mind possesses no properties in common with
other substances; therefore he has utterly failed in establishing his
proposition. As no immaterialist can, from experiment, reason, or any
other process whatsoever, glean the least shadow of evidence in favour
of the immateriality of any substance, therefore we shall now on our
part show--