It has long been held that the laws of the Israelites, as revealed by
God to Moses, by him embodied in the books of the Pentateuch and since
preserved by the zealous care of the Jewish people, are incomparable.
Accordingly they have been adopted professedly by most Christian nations
and were early accepted by our own king Alfred[1] as the basis of the
law system of this our land.
We live in an age of devotion to comparative methods, when it is an
article of faith to hold that the most fruitful means to attain a clear
understanding of the exact nature of anything is to compare it with its
like. This comparative method forms a large part of modern scientific
research and, with proper safeguards and reserves, has become a
favourite weapon of literary research into the history of human
institutions.
Long ago, as it seems to us, SIR HENRY MAINE used it[2] when he wrote
his _History of Early Law_. As a consequence of his investigations and
those of many who have followed in his footsteps, the Science of
Comparative Law has grown up. All the great law systems of the world
have been classified and compared, and comparative lawyers felt
qualified to assign to any new-found fragment of ancient law its true
position in their schemes. The results had rather confirmed than
traversed ancient claims for the supremacy of Mosaic Laws. Men had
settled down to the belief that we might compare, and that to its great
advantage, the Legislation of Moses with the Roman Laws of the XII
Tables, with the Indian Laws of Manu or the Greek Code of Gortyna. We
had recognized the broad outlines of a process of evolution and begun to
understand the way in which, as a people advanced along the path of
progress in the elements of civilization, similar human needs called
forth similar solutions of the questions of right and wrong.
Nevertheless much remained obscure in many ancient legislations. It was
the opinion of JHERING,[3] the great authority on Roman Law, that for
the ultimate solution of the puzzles of Roman Law we should have to go
back to Babylon. In his days comparatively little was known about the
laws of Babylonia, and that little was badly attested. Men were still of
opinion that the Mosaic Law was the oldest of which we had any
trustworthy account and that Babylonian laws, if there ever were any
worthy of the name, must have been more barbarous and unformed.
Then there came, in the early days of this century, a great surprise,
calling at once for much revision of our neatly arranged systems of
knowledge. A Code of Laws was discovered, certainly the oldest known, by
far the most complete and best attested, and at the same time the most
advanced of all but the most modern.
Fragments of it were already known from late copies, had been recognized
as probably parts of a Babylonian Code of Law, were even conjecturally
styled the Code of Hammurabi by PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH,[4] but
very little could be concluded from them. Then suddenly at Susa in Elam
was discovered practically the whole text of it. Ever since it has been
the subject of profound study from all points of view.
The comparison of this Code of Hammurabi with the Laws of Moses was
bound to be made. Many reasons would suggest the likelihood that much
similarity would be observed between two early legislations both Semitic
in complexion. Comparisons with other ancient codes were equally sure to
be made and the differences naturally to be expected would be carefully
weighed and considered. But while most surprising results came out of
these comparisons, especially in the realm of Roman Law, a much keener
interest has attached to the comparison with Hebrew Law, not only
because of the sacred nature of the Old Testament, but even more because
this had been the special study of the Higher Critics. These scholars
had almost decided what their view of the composition of the Pentateuch
should be, what were the ultimate sources implied, what dates should be
assigned to the constituent documents, and the arguments to be
considered valid in such discussions. Those who rejected the Higher
Critical conclusions flew at once to the new-found Code for arguments to
refute Higher Criticism; while Higher Critics found confirmations in
many directions.
It may be hoped that this side issue has lost its interest, and that a
hearing may now be obtained for a simple attempt to use the two
legislations for mutual understanding. When on the appearance of the
Code in its first edition I lectured upon it at Queens’ College,
Cambridge, it was solely as a new document of human history. When a
month or two later I was privileged to point out its ‘significance for
comparison with the Hebrew legislation’ in a paper read before the
Cambridge Theological Society,[5] of which an abstract appeared in the
_Journal of Theological Studies_ (Jan. 1903), it is probable enough
that the contrasts to the Mosaic Law were more apparent than the
likenesses. In the next few months there was ready for press an
extensive work on the Code, illustrating its meaning from the
innumerable legal documents, most of them contemporary, which had been
my study for years. As bearing on this comparison I soon found that a
baldly literal translation of the Code gave a most Biblical turn to its
phraseology which the easy, lucid, but peraphrastic renderings given by
others perpetually disguised. The general likenesses, Semitic
characteristics, and apparent cases of adaptation were separately
classed and those most suggestive of dependence insisted upon. The index
of subjects compiled from the Code and contemporary legal documents
appeared to constitute a substantial advance in the knowledge of ancient
law.
Of all this work, prepared in 1904, it was not possible to publish more
than the translation, under the title _The Oldest Code of Laws in the
World_ (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh), with a selection from the index. The
other results were freely communicated to various scholars, but it was
not without some pangs that I saw most of them attained in time
independently. Later an article on the _Code of Hammurabi_ in the
Supplementary Volume of Hastings’s _Bible Dictionary_ and one on
_Babylonian Law_ in the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_ afforded me the
chance of setting out some results of my research upon the Code in its
relation to the ancient civilization of Babylonia, with a rapid glance
at its relations to Israelite Law. When writing a work for the American
public on _Assyrian and Babylonian Laws, Contracts, and Letters_, I
expanded some parts of this treatment.
I trust that I may be pardoned for thus simply stating why, when the
British Academy conferred upon me the great honour of inviting me to
deliver the Schweich Lectures for 1912, I selected the subject of
_Babylonian Law in its relation to the Laws of Moses_. It was a subject
in which I had taken an interest for some years, and I was anxious to
seize an opportunity of making public the work done in 1903-4.
A very large amount of work has been done by others on various aspects
of the Code of Hammurabi, especially on the Continent, where the
facilities for publication appear to be greatly superior to those in
England. What is done here is, however, of excellent quality; and MR. S.
A. COOK undertook a detailed comparison with the laws of Hammurabi and
other codes which[6] leaves very little to be desired. MR. ST. CHAD
BOSCAWEN in his _First of Empires_ stated some interesting opinions, and
MR. CHILPERIC EDWARDS has given a fresh translation. PROFESSOR R. F.
HARPER gave a useful handbook of the text with new translation, index,
vocabulary, sign-list, &c., which makes the study simple to those who
can read cuneiform.
Reference may be made to the Bibliographies given in these and other
books listed in the Bibliography printed on pp. 65 ff.
With such a volume of literature already published, it may seem
superfluous to add a further contribution. Indeed, when the present
writer read an account of the Code to the Cambridge Theological Society
in October 1902, he was quite content to call his paper _The Code of
Hammurabi, fresh material for comparison with the Mosaic Code_. He would
have been well content to leave it as such, being rather concerned to
furnish material for study than to make direct contributions to the
application of it to subjects beyond his competence. Much that has been
published on this comparison, however, seems to him really inadequate or
so ill-considered that it appears to be a duty to submit a different
view. He is fully conscious that it is only one view and may prove to be
wrong. Yet it seems to him that it is a view which takes account of more
facts than any other, and, while not admitting of formal proof, is both
reasonable and probable.
Briefly stated, the view thus taken is that the Code of Hammurabi
belongs to the same group of ancient legislations as the Hebrew, and
that both are compromises between two distinct types of law.
One type is that which is perhaps best seen in the customs of the Arabs,
as still surviving among the modern Bedawin, and known to us from the
ancient Arabic writers. This has been called primitive Semitic custom.
The Israelites, before their entrance into Canaan, as a nomad pastoral
people, would be governed by such law, if it can be called law. The
dynasty to which Hammurabi belonged was foreign to Babylonia. It owed
its rise to an incursion of a Semitic people. That Semites were in
Babylonia long before is true, but this was a fresh invasion by a
probably nomad pastoral race. They had previously obeyed the same
primitive laws as it is assumed the Israelites did before their
settlement in Canaan. Forming as they did the ruling race in Babylonia,
they yet clung with Oriental conservatism to their ancient customs. Even
such a powerful ruler as Hammurabi could not, or at any rate did not see
fit to, entirely change those customs. In the period when the Laws of
Moses were instituted, the Israelites were similarly the ruling race in
Canaan. Their earlier laws, as known to us, show the same conservation
of primitive custom, and that of the same type.
The other type of law is that due to a settled community. In Babylonia
it may have been evolved through long ages. It may have been, and
probably was, largely due to a non-Semitic people, usually called
Sumerians, whose racial affinities are not yet well made out. These were
conquered by the Semites of Hammurabi’s race. In Canaan too the invading
Israelites found a long-settled people in possession. They were governed
by very similar laws to those of the settled Babylonians. That these
laws had been imported from Babylonia is open to question. Much that is
common to the laws of the two settled communities may have arisen
independently. There is as yet no evidence that the Canaanites were of
the Sumerian stock.[7] But Babylonian influence on the Canaanite law is
quite conceivable, and is supported by historical evidence of
long-continued intercourse between Babylonia and the West. As the
Israelites became a settled population many of their nomad customs must
have become inappropriate. They might have evolved new laws. They might
have taken over the laws of the Canaanites, so far as these were
innocent, or not too obnoxious to Hebrew prejudices. Exactly which
course they followed in each case is a matter of history. The historical
evidence may be inconclusive. We must make the best of it.
When, therefore, the Code of Hammurabi is compared with the Laws of
Moses, the common material may be due to one of two common sources,
primitive Semitic law (otherwise nomad law) and the law of settled
communities. For the latter we may hesitate to fix on a racial name. But
it is not necessarily that of any and every settled community. Inasmuch
as we find it in its most developed form in the Code of Hammurabi, we
may call it Babylonian. On the other hand, as the oldest known witness
to the primitive type is the same Code, we may call that Babylonian
also. In this modified sense we shall be able to speak of the Laws of
Moses as being primitive Semitic law modified by Babylonian influence.
That, however, would be a description easily misunderstood if divorced
from its context.
It is better to say that both legislations are compromises between the
two types of law, that they show different degrees of preponderance of
one or the other type, and that the Laws of Moses manifest an
independent development strongly influenced by the Code of Hammurabi.
We may still claim an independent development of the Laws of Moses.
For during the whole time that the Israelites were in Canaan they were,
as usually supposed, independent of Babylonian rule. If they adopted
laws which were already prevalent in Babylonia, we may be sure it was
not solely because they were Babylonian. This may be disputed. For there
were times when, if we may believe their own tradition, they did receive
embassies from Babylonia, or even adopt Assyrian cults. This kind of
influence might conceivably lead to the adoption of Babylonian or
Assyrian law, which latter was always practically the Code of Hammurabi.
The Israelites may never have adopted Canaanite law consciously, but
always supposed themselves to be creators of their own laws. But they
could hardly avoid knowing the Canaanite law. When a man does as his
neighbours do, he may be perfectly independent in his choice so to do,
as some men count independence. But it is usual to regard him as
influenced by their conduct. Even when he decides to do the very
opposite to what they do we may contend that he was influenced by his
knowledge of their conduct. Reaction may be claimed as a sign of
independence, but it is also a sign of influence. The truth always is
that every action exhibits both independence and influence. We may hold
to the explanation that a man’s circumstances determine him, but we must
then give a wide meaning to circumstance.
Now one of Israel’s circumstances was Canaan. The Canaanites had settled
laws, and to some extent those laws must have embodied the results of
experience of what was suitable in Canaan. Israel might have arrived at
the same results, by the same way. It is, however, surely difficult to
deny that they availed themselves of Canaanite experience and adopted
Canaanite laws. If they did so at all, it is mere quibbling to deny
Canaanite influence. Even if they had so framed their laws as to avoid a
likeness to Canaanite laws altogether, that would still show Canaanite
influence. That they did neither, but achieved a totally distinct type
of law, can alone show complete independence. That they did not adopt
all Canaanite customs, but made a selection, shows the best sort of
independence. That there was always a strong tendency to adopt too much
that was Canaanite, is the lament of their best teachers. These also
protested against much that was Israelite custom. But it is not certain
that these protests were always against what had been Canaanite. It may
sometimes have been more primitive custom, properly more Israelite. For,
at any rate, regarded from the point of civilization, we must admit that
the Canaanites were more advanced.
It might now be supposed that the differences of opinion which have been
called forth by comparisons of the Hebrew and Babylonian legislations
resolve themselves into this: that one opinion emphasizes the
independence, the other dwells upon the influence. That is partly true,
but does not cover all the divergence. For when similarities are
accounted for by a common Semitic origin, or an _Urgesetz_, or as the
natural outcome of human intellect acting similarly in similar
circumstances, not all the factors of the problem are taken into
account. These might be adequate solutions if Israel had been separated
from all other Semitic races and entered an empty Canaan. They might
even account for the similarities, such as they are, between the laws of
the Babylonians and the Aztecs. Men everywhere do reach the invention of
pottery, but man anywhere will use the pot he finds ready made.
What these contentions leave out of account is the existence of
ready-made laws. This cannot be denied. The Canaanites were there, by
all admitted. They must have had laws and customs. No one surely denies
that. What proof could ever be produced that Israel did not adopt such
as were convenient? In the selections and rejections which the
Israelites made they showed whatever independence we may give them
credit for. That they could have invented the same themselves, or
obtained them elsewhere, is perfectly irrelevant. To assert that they
did invent them, not adopt them, is to describe the same fact in
different words. It looks very like perversity. We may pretend to have
invented something exactly like what some one else has done before, but
the Patent Laws usually prevent our getting much profit out of it. Even
when we introduce judicious little variations there is sometimes
astonishing reluctance to credit us with the inventiveness which we feel
to be our own.
Some writers have boldly gone to the root of the matter and minimized
the extent to which Canaan was influenced by Babylonia. This is
perfectly legitimate. We cannot be too cautious how we use the facts of
history. Eastern lands show to-day that the tide of conquest may roll
over them and leave little trace behind. Egypt was influential in
Palestine once, but there is not much trace of its influence in Canaan.
This, however, is not entirely absent. Explorations in Palestine do
exhibit considerable traces of Egyptian influence in some directions.
What traces of Israelite influence are there to compare with it? Here,
however, the question is being taken into a totally irrelevant field.
The Canaanites adopted exactly what suited them, they submitted to what
was imposed, just so long as they were obliged. That they adopted all
the Babylonian laws is absurd to suppose. Just as absurd as to suppose
that under Israelite rule, they adopted all Israelite law or custom. If
they had, there would then be nothing left for Israel to select or
reject. Let us give them credit for some independence even when
conquered. Their law was a Canaanite version of Babylonian or Israelite
law, in any case. If they had it written down in cuneiform even, it was
probably translated into Canaanite. Some would maintain that that was
Hebrew. At any rate, what we know of it is very similar. But that they
could have escaped Babylonian influence on their laws is almost
inconceivable. What we know of the Laws of Moses either proves that they
were, in some cases, practically the same as Babylonian, or else shows
direct Babylonian influence. We may turn this evidence the other way and
say that the Code of Hammurabi shows Canaanite influence, from what we
can see in it to be like the Laws of Moses. There are not lacking some
to call the dynasty of Hammurabi ‘Canaanite’. But the evidence rather
goes to show that what Hammurabi’s race contributed to his Code was more
like what Israel contributed to the Laws of Moses and not at all like
what a settled folk, such as the Canaanites, would contribute. We may
perhaps concede that the Canaanites were Semitic and of the same race as
those who conquered Babylon and founded Hammurabi’s Dynasty. At that
time they may have been nomads, as the Israelites were later when they
came into Canaan. But if, in Canaan, they retained a primitive type of
law and evolved a settled law or adopted it from some previous
inhabitants, so that their law also, like the Code of Hammurabi and the
Laws of Moses, was a blend of the two types; then we have no longer the
means to separate their particular blend from the other two.
It is of great importance to discern what was Canaanite law, and we
shall find some traces of it. But on the whole, we can only infer it by
separating from Israelite law what they are likely to have contributed
to it. It is not a very safe method, but we have no other yet. Some
contributions are made by the Tell-el-Amarna tablets. More may be
expected from fresh discoveries. There is another indirect method. The
laws of Phoenicia and Carthage may give some help. Even the Roman Laws
of the XII Tables may be of use. They do show surprising likenesses to
the Code of Hammurabi. How these laws could find their way from
Babylonia to Rome is not easy to imagine. Phoenicia may be thought of as
an intermediary. If this be tolerated as a solution, then we may assume
that where Babylon agrees with Rome, especially if Phoenicia can be
shown to agree also, it is probable that Canaan was also very similar.
If then Israel is the same as well we can hardly doubt whence the
original motive came.
There are possibly some indications that the Laws of Moses mark an
advance on the customs which ruled in the days of the Patriarchs. In
view of modern critical contentions that these stories of the Patriarchs
are a sort of reflection back into the past of what the later writers
felt would be appropriate to the time in which they set the eponymous
heroes of the old days, we may hesitate to regard such attributed
customs as trustworthy for a comparison. Nor is it beyond question
whether the Israelites ever obeyed the laws of Bedouin Arabs. But
assuming that on their entrance into Canaan the Israelites acquired
fresh customs, we may make some important reflections. Supposing there
was a change in law, can we detect it? If we can, what exactly does it
establish? Have we merely a change due to a change of habitat, or have
other factors to be taken into account?
Now we may question whether this change of law was due to the change in
habits from a nomadic life to a settled state, simply and solely. The
Israelites when they invaded Canaan found there an already settled
people, if we may believe their own account. There were cities and
houses and crops already there. From secular sources, such as the
Tell-el-Amarna tablets, we know that some time before the conquest there
was an advanced state of civilization in Canaan. We even know the names
of many kings and cities. What became of this settled population? It is
contrary to all analogy and to the Israelite tradition itself to suppose
that they were all exterminated. They were obviously possessed of a
higher civilization than their invaders, already, what the Israelites in
time became, a settled people. Can it be thought that they exerted no
influence on their conquerors? We cannot but expect that as the
Israelites became settled they would adopt the customs of the settled
population. We have it on record that their own teachers charged them
with doing this. Some of these customs must have been innocent enough,
and such as would be equally appropriate for Israelites when settled.
Others would be obnoxious to the racial prejudices, religious or social,
of the more conservative Israelites. There would naturally be conflict
in some cases between conflicting views of right. In some cases one view
would prevail, in others a different result would follow. Even
compromises are not inconceivable. To insist that all laws in Israel
were the product of the national genius, even if dignified by the name
of revelation, is to make a heavy demand on our credulity.
It seems then to be a reasonable working hypothesis that the Israelites
did at first succeed in impressing a primitive type of law on the land,
especially in those matters which were not entirely unsuited to both
peoples. This seems to be supported by the character of what is regarded
as the earliest law code in Israel. We at any rate may say that they
themselves regarded such as their laws. It would require strong proof
before we could admit that the surviving conquered people obeyed them
too. As the Israelites became a settled people they may have invented
fresh laws. It does require proof, however, that these were invented,
and not already the laws of the conquered race. Provided that they were
not too repugnant to the Hebrew genius it would be a step towards
unification to adopt existing laws. Proof must be overwhelming that they
were not adopted before we can think otherwise. The selective power to
adopt or reject, to modify and concede, completely guards independence.
On the other hand, unless we can prove that there was no adoption at
all, we admit influence. Here the controversialists seem to have
confounded the issue. They either deny all influence in order to
maintain independence, or they destroy all independence by hardening
influence into origination. On either assumption Moses does not get
credit for much initiative.
Hitherto we have not considered the question whether the settled
Canaanites were governed by the Code of Hammurabi before the Israelites
came. Some have tried to make the whole controversy turn on this point.
It is difficult to see how an answer can be given to that question,
except by the discovery of a copy of the Code itself in a
pre-Israelitish city. If, on the other hand, we admit that the
civilization of Canaan was essentially Babylonian before the conquest,
we may suppose that it was governed by Babylonian laws, at any rate, to
a large extent. It is to be expected that there would be local
variations. Can we test such an hypothesis? We do now know what
Babylonian law was in the time of Hammurabi some five hundred years
before the conquest of Canaan. We do know that in Babylonia that law
remained practically unchanged for a thousand years longer. We must then
admit that if Babylonian law had sway in Canaan at all, it must have
been that of the Code to all intents and purposes. We thus have a linked
chain of hypotheses. If Canaanite civilization was once an offshoot of
Babylonian, and gradually asserted its influence over Hebrew
legislation, then we ought to find more and more likeness to the Code of
Hammurabi in Israelite law as time goes on. For that purpose we may
concede as much as the critics wish to claim for their arrangement of
successive codes in the Books of Moses before the Code was discovered.
The later the law is, according to them, the more likely will it be on
our hypothesis to resemble the Code. We assume that the Canaanite
element in the nation held on to their old law, while submitting to the
innovations introduced by the invaders. If the other proposition holds
true, either this was the fact, or the particular law, instead of being
late, must be redated before Canaanite conservatism was overcome.
We may now state the broad principle to be tested. The more primitive
laws in the Mosaic Codes are properly Israelite, and an inheritance from
old nomadic custom. The more advanced laws are due to gradually
assimilated Canaanite sources. These should show, if not identity, at
least affinity with the Code of Hammurabi. If they do not, we have
several alternative views to weigh. Either the law of Hammurabi did not
continue to bear sway in Canaan, or it never did on that point, or the
law is a new creation. The mere fact that a given, late, non-primitive
law in Israel is not found in the Code of Hammurabi proves nothing as to
the origin of any unconnected law. We have to do with a long chain, of
which we can only compare the two ends. What happened between we do not
know.
We may do well to clear out of the way some obstacles that might at
least distract attention. An apparently strong point has been made
against any connexion between the legislations on the score of
philology. It is said that while the names of the things dealt with are
the same, the technical terms are different. Thus, while the words for
silver and gold, sheep and oxen, fields and houses are the same, those
for rulers, for laws and customs are different. This is partly an
argument from silence, partly an ignoration of facts. It is true that
‘to marry’, in Babylonian, is _aḫâzu_, and in Hebrew
_lāḳāh_; but in Assyrian it is _laḳû_. Now we may reply that
the Assyrian shows that it was once _laḳû_ in Babylonian also. The
connexion for which we contend does not demand transliteration, but
translation. What would be thought of any student of mediaeval history
who denied the influence of Roman law on English because Latin words
were not used? If this be the test, the Tell-el-Amarna tablets show much
stronger Babylonian influence than we contend for. Practically the whole
of their vocabulary is Babylonian. They also show that the writers had
words of their own, Semitic, if not Hebrew, which they glossed by
Babylonian. Some think the Israelites learnt their Hebrew in Canaan. If
the Canaanites were speaking Hebrew and had Babylonian laws, the
translating into Hebrew was done before the conquest. The fact is that
the whole philological argument breaks down unless we can show that the
words compared are the only words in use with the same meaning. The
lexicons do not on the whole afford a sufficient source for the
comparison. They embody little of the vocabulary of the legal documents
or contracts.
Of much more cogency than the agreement of separate items would be a
similarity of order in the arrangement of the common matter. PROFESSOR
D. H. MÜLLER has found some interesting examples of this in comparing
the Code with the Twelve Tables. This leads him and others to suspect
an Oriental influence on early Roman Law. That must remain little more
than a suspicion unless we can indicate the route by which such
influence could come in. In the case of Israel the problem is to show
how it could be kept out.
A comparison of the Code with the Laws of Moses from this point of view
is greatly hampered by the fact that the latter are not in any
particular order. If we follow the critical division of the material we
find that we are left with a variety of legislations of very different
dates and qualities well shown in _The Hexateuch_, or in articles in
_Dict. Bible_. It will hardly be claimed for any one of these that we
have it still in a completely preserved form. If so, then the intention
must have been to leave a great deal to the action of the well-known
customary law.
This solution, however, is not to be rejected off-hand. For the Code of
Hammurabi does not deal expressly with all cases: it omits murder. Hence
we must not insist that any Israelite code either, when first
promulgated, covered all cases of crime and misdemeanour. There is,
however, good ground for saying that each Israelite legislation included
some things which are now omitted from the Books of Moses. If this be
denied, then we must account for the very incomplete nature of these
codes. We may do so thus. It was only to be expected that a new
legislation would deal chiefly with cases that had not hitherto been
decided, or on which old law had grown obsolete, or where conflicting
views of right had come to be held. If, then, we can regard any
Israelite code, as now known to us, as being on the whole preserved in
its original order, even though other portions have been suppressed or
abrogated, we may compare the order of its clauses with those of the
Code of Hammurabi. We need not take account of the suspicions which will
now be thrown on that order by critics, unless they were expressed
before the Code of Hammurabi was known. And on the whole case we may
plead with respect to any Israelite code, that either it once covered
much more than it does, as we know it now, or that its incompleteness is
due to the existence of well-established custom on the omitted points,
and that it simply enacted changes.
As a result of the intensive work done on the Code of Hammurabi itself
by the many scholars who have devoted their study to it, we now
understand it far better than before. It would be invidious to attempt
to assign each step to its own author, and I expressly disclaim any
originality for views that I may have held long before some one else
published them, but it may add to the confidence with which my readers
follow me, if they remember that nearly everything has been
independently reached by two students at least. My chief desire,
however, is to make my views clear, and to state my reasons as
intelligibly as may be.
I propose to deal first with the external features of the Code of
Hammurabi, dwelling chiefly on those that are useful for a comparison
with the Israelite legislation. Then, secondly, I will point out briefly
the types of likeness between the Babylonian and Hebrew laws, and the
associated contrasts. Then I will venture to discuss in my way and
attempt to estimate the extent of dependence, if any. But I cannot claim
to have said the last word on any point raised here. We are still at the
mercy of future discovery. Let us hope it will be merciful to some
theories, at any rate.
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LAWS OF BABYLONIA AND THE LAWS OF THE HEBREW
PEOPLES