If we turn to the map of the Old World, to test the comparative

territorial resources of the two states whose armies were now about to

come into conflict, the immense preponderance of the material power of

the Persian king over that of the Athenian republic is more striking

than any similar contrast which history can supply. It has been truly

remarked that, in estimating mere areas Attica, containing on its whole

surface only seven hundred square miles, shrinks into insignificance if

compared with many a baronial fief of the Middle Ages, or many a

colonial allotment of modern times. Its antagonist, the Persian, empire,

comprised the whole of modern Asiatic and much of modern European

Turkey, the modern kingdom of Persia and the countries of modern

Georgia, Armenia, Balkh, the Punjaub, Afghanistan, Beloochistan, Egypt

and Tripoli.

Nor could a European, in the beginning of the fifth century before our

era, look upon this huge accumulation of power beneath the sceptre of a

single Asiatic ruler with the indifference with which we now observe on

the map the extensive dominions of modern Oriental sovereigns; for, as

has been already remarked, before Marathon was fought, the prestige of

success and of supposed superiority of race was on the side of the

Asiatic against the European. Asia was the original seat of human

societies, and long before any trace can be found of the inhabitants of

the rest of the world having emerged from the rudest barbarism, we can

perceive that mighty and brilliant empires flourished in the Asiatic

continent. They appear before us through the twilight of primeval

history, dim and indistinct, but massive and majestic, like mountains in

the early dawn.

Instead, however, of the infinite variety and restless change which has

characterized the institutions and fortunes of European states ever

since the commencement of the civilization of our continent, a

monotonous uniformity pervades the histories of nearly all Oriental

empires, from the most ancient down to the most recent times. They are

characterized by the rapidity of their early conquests, by the immense

extent of the dominions comprised in them, by the establishment of a

satrap or pashaw system of governing the provinces, by an invariable and

speedy degeneracy in the princes of the royal house, the effeminate

nurslings of the seraglio succeeding to the warrior sovereigns reared in

the camp, and by the internal anarchy and insurrections which indicate

and accelerate the decline and fall of these unwieldy and ill-organized

fabrics of power.

It is also a striking fact that the governments of all the great Asiatic

empires have in all ages been absolute despotisms. And Heeren is right

in connecting this with another great fact, which is important from its

influence both on the political and the social life of Asiatics. "Among

all the considerable nations of Inner Asia, the paternal government of

every household was corrupted by polygamy: where that custom exists, a

good political constitution is impossible. Fathers, being converted into

domestic despots, are ready to pay the same abject obedience to their

sovereign which they exact from their family and dependents in their

domestic economy."

We should bear in mind, also, the inseparable connection between the

state religion and all legislation which has always prevailed in the

East, and the constant existence of a powerful sacerdotal body,

exercising some check, though precarious and irregular, over the throne

itself, grasping at all civil administration, claiming the supreme

control of education, stereotyping the lines in which literature and

science must move, and limiting the extent to which it shall be lawful

for the human mind to prosecute its inquiries.

With these general characteristics rightly felt and understood it

becomes a comparatively easy task to investigate and appreciate the

origin, progress and principles of Oriental empires in general, as well

as of the Persian monarchy in particular. And we are thus better enabled

to appreciate the repulse which Greece gave to the arms of the East, and

to judge of the probable consequences to human civilization, if the

Persians had succeeded in bringing Europe under their yoke, as they had

already subjugated the fairest portions of the rest of the then known

world.

The Greeks, from their geographical position, formed the natural

van-guard of European liberty against Persian ambition; and they

preëminently displayed the salient points of distinctive national

character which have rendered European civilization so far superior to

Asiatic. The nations that dwelt in ancient times around and near the

northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea were the first in our continent

to receive from the East the rudiments of art and literature, and the

germs of social and political organizations. Of these nations the

Greeks, through their vicinity to Asia Minor, Phoenicia, and Egypt, were

among the very foremost in acquiring the principles and habits of

civilized life; and they also at once imparted a new and wholly original

stamp on all which they received. Thus, in their religion, they received

from foreign settlers the names of all their deities and many of their

rites, but they discarded the loathsome monstrosities of the Nile, the

Orontes, and the Ganges; they nationalized their creed, and their own

poets created their beautiful mythology. No sacerdotal caste ever

existed in Greece.

So, in their governments, they lived long under hereditary kings, but

never endured the permanent establishment of absolute monarchy. Their

early kings were constitutional rulers, governing with defined

prerogatives. And long before the Persian invasion, the kingly form of

government had given way in almost all the Greek states to republican

institutions, presenting infinite varieties of the blending or the

alternate predominance of the oligarchical and democratical principles.

In literature and science the Greek intellect followed no beaten track,

and acknowledged no limitary rules. The Greeks thought their subjects

boldly out; and the novelty of a speculation invested it in their minds

with interest, and not with criminality.

Versatile, restless, enterprising, and self-confident, the Greeks

presented the most striking contrast to the habitual quietude and

submissiveness of the Orientals; and, of all the Greeks, the Athenians

exhibited these national characteristics in the strongest degree. This

spirit of activity and daring, joined to a generous sympathy for the

fate of their fellow-Greeks in Asia, had led them to join in the last

Ionian war, and now mingling with their abhorrence of the usurping

family of their own citizens, which for a period had forcibly seized on

and exercised despotic power at Athens, nerved them to defy the wrath of

King Darius, and to refuse to receive back at his bidding the tyrant

whom they had some years before driven out.

The enterprise and genius of an Englishman have lately confirmed by

fresh evidence, and invested with fresh interest, the might of the

Persian monarch who sent his troops to combat at Marathon. Inscriptions

in a character termed the Arrow-headed, or Cuneiform, had long been

known to exist on the marble monuments at Persepolis, near the site of

the ancient Susa, and on the faces of rocks in other places formerly

ruled over by the early Persian kings. But for thousands of years they

had been mere unintelligible enigmas to the curious but baffled

beholder; and they were often referred to as instances of the folly of

human pride, which could indeed write its own praises in the solid rock,

but only for the rock to outlive the language as well as the memory of

the vainglorious inscribers.

The elder Niebuhr, Grotefend, and Lassen, had made some guesses at the

meaning of the cuneiform letters; but Major Rawlinson of the East India

Company's service, after years of labor, has at last accomplished the

glorious achievement of fully revealing the alphabet and the grammar of

this long unknown tongue. He has, in particular, fully deciphered and

expounded the inscription on the sacred rock of Behistun, on the western

frontiers of Media. These records of the Achæmenidæ have at length found

their interpreter; and Darius himself speaks to us from the consecrated

mountain, and tells us the names of the nations that obeyed him, the

revolts that he suppressed, his victories, his piety, and his glory.

Kings who thus seek the admiration of posterity are little likely to dim

the record of their successes by the mention of their occasional

defeats; and it throws no suspicion on the narrative of the Greek

historians that we find these inscriptions silent respecting the

overthrow of Datis and Artaphernes, as well as respecting the reverses

which Darius sustained in person during his Scythian campaigns. But

these indisputable monuments of Persian fame confirm, and even increase

the opinion with which Herodotus inspires us of the vast power which

Cyrus founded and Cambyses increased; which Darius augmented by Indian

and Arabian conquests, and seemed likely, when he directed his arms

against Europe, to make the predominant monarchy of the world.

With the exception of the Chinese empire, in which, throughout all ages

down to the last few years, one-third of the human race has dwelt almost

unconnected with the other portions, all the great kingdoms, which we

know to have existed in ancient Asia, were, in Darius' time, blended

into the Persian. The northern Indians, the Assyrians, the Syrians, the

Babylonians, the Chaldees, the Phoenicians, the nations of Palestine,

the Armenians, the Bactrians, the Lydians, the Phrygians, the Parthians,

and the Medes, all obeyed the sceptre of the Great King: the Medes

standing next to the native Persians in honor, and the empire being

frequently spoken of as that of the Medes, or as that of the Medes and

Persians. Egypt and Cyrene were Persian provinces; the Greek colonists

in Asia Minor and the islands of the Ægean were Darius' subjects; and

their gallant but unsuccessful attempts to throw off the Persian yoke

had only served to rivet it more strongly, and to increase the general

belief that the Greeks could not stand before the Persians in a field

of battle. Darius' Scythian war, though unsuccessful in its immediate

object, had brought about the subjugation of Thrace and the submission

of Macedonia. From the Indus to the Peneus, all was his.

We may imagine the wrath with which the lord of so many nations must

have heard, nine years before the battle of Marathon, that a strange

nation toward the setting sun, called the Athenians, had dared to help

his rebels in Ionia against him, and that they had plundered and burned

the capital of one of his provinces. Before the burning of Sardis,

Darius seems never to have heard of the existence of Athens; but his

satraps in Asia Minor had for some time seen Athenian refugees at their

provincial courts imploring assistance against their fellow-countrymen.

When Hippias was driven away from Athens, and the tyrannic dynasty of

the Pisistratidæ finally overthrown in B.C. 510, the banished tyrant and

his adherents, after vainly seeking to be restored by Spartan

intervention, had betaken themselves to Sardis, the capital city of the

satrapy of Artaphernes. There Hippias--in the expressive words of

Herodotus--began every kind of agitation, slandering the Athenians

before Artaphernes, and doing all he could to induce the satrap to place

Athens in subjection to him, as the tributary vassal of King Darius.

When the Athenians heard of his practices, they sent envoys to Sardis to

remonstrate with the Persians against taking up the quarrel of the

Athenian refugees.

But Artaphernes gave them in reply a menacing command to receive Hippias

back again if they looked for safety. The Athenians were resolved not to

purchase safety at such a price, and after rejecting the satrap's terms,

they considered that they and the Persians were declared enemies. At

this very crisis the Ionian Greeks implored the assistance of their

European brethren, to enable them to recover their independence from

Persia. Athens, and the city of Eretria in Euboea, alone consented.

Twenty Athenian galleys, and five Eretrian, crossed the Ægean Sea, and

by a bold and sudden march upon Sardis, the Athenians and their allies

succeeded in capturing the capital city of the haughty satrap who had

recently menaced them with servitude or destruction. They were pursued,

and defeated on their return to the coast, and Athens took no further

part in the Ionian war; but the insult that she had put upon the Persian

power was speedily made known throughout that empire, and was never to

be forgiven or forgotten.

In the emphatic simplicity of the narrative of Herodotus, the wrath of

the Great King is thus described: "Now when it was told to King Darius

that Sardis had been taken and burned by the Athenians and Ionians, he

took small heed of the Ionians, well knowing who they were, and that

their revolt would soon be put down; but he asked who, and what manner

of men, the Athenians were. And when he had been told, he called for his

bow; and, having taken it, and placed an arrow on the string, he let the

arrow fly toward heaven; and as he shot it into the air, he said, 'Oh!

supreme God, grant me that I may avenge myself on the Athenians,' And

when he had said this, he appointed one of his servants to say to him

every day as he sat at meat, 'Sire, remember the Athenians.'"

Some years were occupied in the complete reduction of Ionia. But when

this was effected, Darius ordered his victorious forces to proceed to

punish Athens and Eretria, and to conquer European Greece, The first

armament sent for this purpose was shattered by shipwreck, and nearly

destroyed off Mount Athos. But the purpose of King Darius was not easily

shaken, A larger army was ordered to be collected in Cilicia, and

requisitions were sent to all the maritime cities of the Persian empire

for ships of war, and for transports of sufficient size for carrying

cavalry as well as infantry across the Ægean. While these preparations

were being made, Darius sent heralds round to the Grecian cities

demanding their submission to Persia. It was proclaimed in the

market-place of each little Hellenic state--some with territories not

larger than the Isle of Wight--that King Darius, the lord of all men,

from the rising to the setting sun,[44] required earth and water to be

delivered to his heralds, as a symbolical acknowledgment that he was

head and master of the country. Terror-stricken at the power of Persia

and at the severe punishment that had recently been inflicted on the

refractory Ionians, many of the continental Greeks and nearly all the

islanders submitted, and gave the required tokens of vassalage. At

Sparta and Athens an indignant refusal was returned--a refusal which was

disgraced by outrage and violence against the persons of the Asiatic

heralds.

[Footnote 44: Æschines.]

Fresh fuel was thus added to the anger of Darius against Athens, and the

Persian preparations went on with renewed vigor. In the summer of B.C.

490, the army destined for the invasion was assembled in the Aleian

plain of Cilicia, near the sea. A fleet of six hundred galleys and

numerous transports was collected on the coast for the embarkation of

troops, horse as well as foot. A Median general named Datis, and

Artaphernes, the son of the satrap of Sardis, and who was also nephew of

Darius, were placed in titular joint-command of the expedition. The real

supreme authority was probably given to Datis alone, from the way in

which the Greek writers speak of him.

We know no details of the previous career of this officer; but there is

every reason to believe that his abilities and bravery had been proved

by experience, or his Median birth would have prevented his being placed

in high command by Darius. He appears to have been the first Mede who

was thus trusted by the Persian kings after the overthrow of the

conspiracy of the Median magi against the Persians immediately before

Darius obtained the throne. Datis received instructions to complete the

subjugation of Greece, and especial orders were given him with regard to

Eretria and Athens. He was to take these two cities, and he was to lead

the inhabitants away captive, and bring them as slaves into the presence

of the Great King.

Datis embarked his forces in the fleet that awaited them, and coasting

along the shores of Asia Minor till he was off Samos, he thence sailed

due westward through the Ægean Sea for Greece, taking the islands in his

way. The Naxians had, ten years before, successfully stood a siege

against a Persian armament, but they now were too terrified to offer any

resistance, and fled to the mountain tops, while the enemy burned their

town and laid waste their lands. Thence Datis, compelling the Greek

islanders to join him with their ships and men, sailed onward to the

coast of Euboea. The little town of Carystus essayed resistance, but

was quickly overpowered.

He next attacked Eretria. The Athenians sent four thousand men to its

aid; but treachery was at work among the Eretrians; and the Athenian

force received timely warning from one of the leading men of the city to

retire to aid in saving their own country, instead of remaining to share

in the inevitable destruction of Eretria. Left to themselves, the

Eretrians repulsed the assaults of the Persians against their walls for

six days; on the seventh they were betrayed by two of their chiefs, and

the Persians occupied the city. The temples were burned in revenge for

the firing of Sardis, and the inhabitants were bound, and placed as

prisoners in the neighboring islet of Ægilia, to wait there till Datis

should bring the Athenians to join them in captivity, when both

populations were to be led into Upper Asia, there to learn their doom

from the lips of King Darius himself.

Flushed with success, and with half his mission thus accomplished, Datis

reëmbarked his troops, and, crossing the little channel that separates

Euboea from the mainland, he encamped his troops on the Attic coast at

Marathon, drawing up his galleys on the shelving beach, as was the

custom with the navies of antiquity. The conquered islands behind him

served as places of deposit for his provisions and military stores. His

position at Marathon seemed to him in every respect advantageous, and

the level nature of the ground on which he camped was favorable for the

employment of his cavalry, if the Athenians should venture to engage

him. Hippias, who accompanied him, and acted as the guide of the

invaders, had pointed out Marathon as the best place for a landing, for

this very reason. Probably Hippias was also influenced by the

recollection that forty-seven years previously, he, with his father

Pisistratus, had crossed with an army from Eretria to Marathon, and had

won an easy victory over their Athenian enemies on that very plain,

which had restored them to tyrannic power. The omen seemed cheering. The

place was the same, but Hippias soon learned to his cost how great a

change had come over the spirit of the Athenians.

But though "the fierce democracy" of Athens was zealous and true

against foreign invader and domestic tyrant, a faction existed in

Athens, as at Eretria, who were willing to purchase a party triumph over

their fellow-citizens at the price of their country's ruin.

Communications were opened between these men and the Persian camp, which

would have led to a catastrophe like that of Eretria, if Miltiades had

not resolved and persuaded his colleagues to resolve on fighting at all

hazards.

When Miltiades arrayed his men for action, he staked on the arbitrament

of one battle not only the fate of Athens, but that of all Greece; for

if Athens had fallen, no other Greek state, except Lacedæmon, would have

had the courage to resist; and the Lacedæmonians, though they would

probably have died in their ranks to the last man, never could have

successfully resisted the victorious Persians and the numerous Greek

troops which would have soon marched under the Persian satraps, had they

prevailed over Athens.

Nor was there any power to the westward of Greece that could have

offered an effectual opposition to Persia, had she once conquered

Greece, and made that country a basis for future military operations.

Rome was at this time in her season of utmost weakness. Her dynasty of

powerful Etruscan kings had been driven out; and her infant commonwealth

was reeling under the attacks of the Etruscans and Volscians from

without, and the fierce dissensions between the patricians and plebeians

within. Etruria, with her _lucumos_ and serfs, was no match for Persia.

Samnium had not grown into the might which she afterward put forth; nor

could the Greek colonies in South Italy and Sicily hope to conquer when

their parent states had perished. Carthage had escaped the Persian yoke

in the time of Cambyses, through the reluctance of the Phoenician

mariners to serve against their kinsmen.

But such forbearance could not long have been relied on, and the future

rival of Rome would have become as submissive a minister of the Persian

power as were the Phoenician cities themselves. If we turn to Spain; or

if we pass the great mountain chain, which, prolonged through the

Pyrenees, the Cevennes, the Alps, and the Balkan, divides Northern from

Southern Europe, we shall find nothing at that period but mere savage

Finns, Celts, Slavs, and Teutons. Had Persia beaten Athens at Marathon,

she could have found no obstacle to prevent Darius, the chosen servant

of Ormuzd, from advancing his sway over all the known Western races of

mankind. The infant energies of Europe would have been trodden out

beneath universal conquest, and the history of the world, like the

history of Asia, have become a mere record of the rise and fall of

despotic dynasties, of the incursions of barbarous hordes, and of the

mental and political prostration of millions beneath the diadem, the

tiara, and the sword.

Great as the preponderance of the Persian over the Athenian power at

that crisis seems to have been, it would be unjust to impute wild

rashness to the policy of Miltiades and those who voted with him in the

Athenian council of war, or to look on the after-current of events as

the mere fortunate result of successful folly. As before has been

remarked, Miltiades, while prince of the Chersonese, had seen service in

the Persian armies; and he knew by personal observation how many

elements of weakness lurked beneath their imposing aspect of strength.

He knew that the bulk of their troops no longer consisted of the hardy

shepherds and mountaineers from Persia proper and Kurdistan, who won

Cyrus's battles; but that unwilling contingents from conquered nations

now filled up the Persian muster-rolls, fighting more from compulsion

than from any zeal in the cause of their masters. He had also the

sagacity and the spirit to appreciate the superiority of the Greek armor

and organization over the Asiatic, notwithstanding former reverses.

Above all, he felt and worthily trusted the enthusiasm of those whom he

led.

The Athenians whom he led had proved by their newborn valor in recent

wars against the neighboring states that "liberty and equality of civic

rights are brave spirit-stirring things, and they, who, while under the

yoke of a despot, had been no better men of war than any of their

neighbors, as soon as they were free, became the foremost men of all;

for each felt that in fighting for a free commonwealth, he fought for

himself, and whatever he took in hand, he was zealous to do the work

thoroughly," So the nearly contemporaneous historian describes the

change of spirit that was seen in the Athenians after their tyrants were

expelled; and Miltiades knew that in leading them against the invading

army, where they had Hippias, the foe they most hated, before them, he

was bringing into battle no ordinary men, and could calculate on no

ordinary heroism.

The Great Events by Famous Historians, Volume 01 · 第 33 / 37 段