It has been already mentioned that Solon forbade the sale of daughters

or sisters into slavery by fathers or brothers; a prohibition which

shows how much females had before been looked upon as articles of

property. And it would seem that before his time the violation of a free

woman must have been punished at the discretion of the magistrates; for

we are told that he was the first who enacted a penalty of one hundred

drachmas against the offender, and twenty drachmas against the seducer

of a free woman. Moreover, it is said that he forbade a bride when given

in marriage to carry with her any personal ornaments and appurtenances,

except to the extent of three robes and certain matters of furniture not

very valuable. Solon further imposed upon women several restraints in

regard to proceeding at the obsequies of deceased relatives. He forbade

profuse demonstrations of sorrow, singing of composed dirges, and

costly sacrifices and contributions. He limited strictly the quantity of

meat and drink admissible for the funeral banquet, and prohibited

nocturnal exit, except in a car and with a light. It appears that both

in Greece and Rome, the feelings of duty and affection on the part of

surviving relatives prompted them to ruinous expense in a funeral, as

well as to unmeasured effusions both of grief and conviviality; and the

general necessity experienced for legal restriction is attested by the

remark of Plutarch, that similar prohibitions to those enacted by Solon

were likewise in force at his native town of Chæronea.

Other penal enactments of Solon are yet to be mentioned. He forbade

absolutely evil speaking with respect to the dead. He forbade it

likewise with respect to the living, either in a temple or before judges

or archons, or at any public festival--on pain of a forfeit of three

drachmas to the person aggrieved, and two more to the public treasury.

How mild the general character of his punishments was, may be judged by

this law against foul language, not less than by the law before

mentioned against rape. Both the one and the other of these offences

were much more severely dealt with under the subsequent law of

democratical Athens. The peremptory edict against speaking ill of a

deceased person, though doubtless springing in a great degree from

disinterested repugnance, is traceable also in part to that fear of the

wrath of the departed which strongly possessed the early Greek mind.

It seems generally that Solon determined by law the outlay for the

public sacrifices, though we do not know what were his particular

directions. We are told that he reckoned a sheep and a medimnus (of

wheat or barley?) as equivalent, either of them, to a drachma, and that

he also prescribed the prices to be paid for first-rate oxen intended

for solemn occasions. But it astonishes us to see the large recompense

which he awarded out of the public treasury to a victor at the Olympic

or Isthmian games: to the former, five hundred drachmas, equal to one

year's income of the highest of the four classes on the census; to the

latter one hundred drachmas. The magnitude of these rewards strikes us

the more when we compare them with the fines on rape and evil speaking.

We cannot be surprised that the philosopher Xenophanes noticed, with

some degree of severity, the extravagant estimate of this species of

excellence, current among the Grecian cities. At the same time, we must

remember both that these Pan-Hellenic games presented the chief visible

evidence of peace and sympathy among the numerous communities of Greece,

and that in the time of Solon, factitious reward was still needful to

encourage them. In respect to land and agriculture Solon proclaimed a

public reward of five drachmas for every wolf brought in, and one

drachma for every wolf's cub; the extent of wild land has at all times

been considerable in Attica. He also provided rules respecting the use

of wells between neighbors, and respecting the planting in conterminous

olive grounds. Whether any of these regulations continued in operation

during the better-known period of Athenian history cannot be safely

affirmed.

In respect to theft, we find it stated that Solon repealed the

punishment of death which Draco had annexed to that crime, and enacted,

as a penalty, compensation to an amount double the value of the property

stolen. The simplicity of this law perhaps affords ground for presuming

that it really does belong to Solon. But the law which prevailed during

the time of the orators respecting theft must have been introduced at

some later period, since it enters into distinctions and mentions both

places and forms of procedure, which we cannot reasonably refer to the

forty-sixth Olympiad. The public dinners at the Prytaneum, of which the

archons and a select few partook in common, were also either first

established, or perhaps only more strictly regulated, by Solon. He

ordered barley cakes for their ordinary meals, and wheaten loaves for

festival days, prescribing how often each person should dine at the

table. The honor of dining at the table of the Prytaneum was maintained

throughout as a valuable reward at the disposal of the government.

Among the various laws of Solon, there are few which have attracted more

notice than that which pronounces the man who in a sedition stood aloof,

and took part with neither side, to be dishonored and disfranchised.

Strictly speaking, this seems more in the nature of an emphatic moral

denunciation, or a religious curse, than a legal sanction capable of

being formally applied in an individual case and after judicial

trial,--though the sentence of _atimy_, under the more elaborated Attic

procedure, was both definite in its penal consequences and also

judicially delivered. We may, however, follow the course of ideas under

which Solon was induced to write this sentence on his tables, and we may

trace the influence of similar ideas in later Attic institutions. It is

obvious that his denunciation is confined to that special case in which

a sedition has already broken out: we must suppose that Cylon has seized

the Acropolis, or that Pisistratus, Megacles, and Lycurgus are in arms

at the head of their partisans. Assuming these leaders to be wealthy and

powerful men, which would in all probability be the fact, the

constituted authority--such as Solon saw before him in Attica, even

after his own organic amendments--was not strong enough to maintain the

peace; it became, in fact, itself one of the contending parties. Under

such given circumstances, the sooner every citizen publicly declared his

adherence to some of them, the earlier this suspension of legal

authority was likely to terminate. Nothing was so mischievous as the

indifference of the mass, or their disposition to let the combatants

fight out the matter among themselves, and then to submit to the victor.

Nothing was more likely to encourage aggression on the part of an

ambitious malcontent, than the conviction that if he could once

overpower the small amount of physical force which surrounded the

archons, and exhibit himself in armed possession of the Prytaneum or the

Acropolis, he might immediately count upon passive submission on the

part of all the freemen without. Under the state of feeling which Solon

inculcates, the insurgent leader would have to calculate that every man

who was not actively in his favor would be actively against him, and

this would render his enterprise much more dangerous. Indeed, he could

then never hope to succeed, except on the double supposition of

extraordinary popularity in his own person and widespread detestation of

the existing government. He would thus be placed under the influence of

powerful deterring motives; so that ambition would be less likely to

seduce him into a course which threatened nothing but ruin, unless under

such encouragements from the preëxisting public opinion as to make his

success a result desirable for the community. Among the small political

societies of Greece--especially in the age of Solon, when the number of

despots in other parts of Greece seems to have been at its

maximum--every government, whatever might be its form, was sufficiently

weak to make its overthrow a matter of comparative facility. Unless upon

the supposition of a band of foreign mercenaries--which would render the

government a system of naked force, and which the Athenian lawgiver

would of course never contemplate--there was no other stay for it except

a positive and pronounced feeling of attachment on the part of the mass

of citizens. Indifference on their part would render them a prey to

every daring man of wealth who chose to become a conspirator. That they

should be ready to come forward, not only with voice but with arms--and

that they should be known beforehand to be so--was essential to the

maintenance of every good Grecian government. It was salutary in

preventing mere personal attempts at revolution; and pacific in its

tendency, even where the revolution had actually broken out, because in

the greater number of cases the proportion of partisans would probably

be very unequal, and the inferior party would be compelled to renounce

their hopes.

It will be observed that, in this enactment of Solon, the existing

government is ranked merely as one of the contending parties. The

virtuous citizen is enjoined, not to come forward in its support, but to

come forward at all events, either for it or against it. Positive and

early action is all which is prescribed to him as matter of duty. In the

age of Solon there was no political idea or system yet current which

could be assumed as an unquestionable datum--no conspicuous standard to

which the citizens could be pledged under all circumstances to attach

themselves. The option lay only between a mitigated oligarchy in

possession, and a despot in possibility; a contest wherein the

affections of the people could rarely be counted upon in favor of the

established government. But this neutrality in respect to the

constitution was at an end after the revolution of Clisthenes, when the

idea of the sovereign people and the democratical institutions became

both familiar and precious to every individual citizen. We shall

hereafter find the Athenians binding themselves by the most sincere and

solemn oaths to uphold their democracy against all attempts to subvert

it; we shall discover in them a sentiment not less positive and

uncompromising in its direction, than energetic in its inspirations. But

while we notice this very important change in their character, we shall

at the same time perceive that the wise precautionary recommendation of

Solon, to obviate sedition by an early declaration of the impartial

public between two contending leaders, was not lost upon them. Such, in

point of fact, was the purpose of that salutary and protective

institution which is called the _Ostracism_. When two party leaders, in

the early stages of the Athenian democracy, each powerful in adherents

and influence, had become passionately embarked in bitter and prolonged

opposition to each other, such opposition was likely to conduct one or

other to violent measures. Over and above the hopes of party triumph,

each might well fear that, if he himself continued within the bounds of

legality, he might fall a victim to aggressive proceedings on the part

of his antagonists. To ward off this formidable danger, a public vote

was called for, to determine which of the two should go into temporary

banishment, retaining his property and unvisited by any disgrace. A

number of citizens, not less than six thousand, voting secretly, and

therefore independently, were required to take part, pronouncing upon

one or other of these eminent rivals a sentence of exile for ten years.

The one who remained became, of course, more powerful, yet less in a

situation to be driven into anti-constitutional courses than he was

before. Tragedy and comedy were now beginning to be grafted on the lyric

and choric song. First, one actor was provided to relieve the chorus;

next, two actors were introduced to sustain fictitious characters and

carry on a dialogue in such manner that the songs of the chorus and the

interlocution of the actors formed a continuous piece. Solon, after

having heard Thespis acting (as all the early composers did, both tragic

and comic) in his own comedy, asked him afterward if he was not ashamed

to pronounce such falsehoods before so large an audience. And when

Thespis answered that there was no harm in saying and doing such things

merely for amusement, Solon indignantly exclaimed, striking the ground

with his stick, "If once we come to praise and esteem such amusement as

this, we shall quickly find the effects of it in our daily

transactions." For the authenticity of this anecdote it would be rash to

vouch, but we may at least treat it as the protest of some early

philosopher against the deceptions of the drama: and it is interesting

as marking the incipient struggles of that literature in which Athens

afterward attained such unrivaled excellence.

It would appear that all the laws of Solon were proclaimed, inscribed,

and accepted without either discussion or resistance. He is said to have

described them, not as the best laws which he could himself have

imagined, but as the best which he could have induced the people to

accept. He gave them validity for the space of ten years, during which

period both the senate collectively and the archons individually swore

to observe them with fidelity; under penalty, in case of non-observance,

of a golden statue as large as life to be erected at Delphi. But though

the acceptance of the laws was accomplished without difficulty, it was

not found so easy either for the people to understand and obey, or for

the framer to explain them. Every day persons came to Solon either with

praise, or criticism, or suggestions of various improvements, or

questions as to the construction of particular enactments; until at last

he became tired of this endless process of reply and vindication, which

was seldom successful either in removing obscurity or in satisfying

complainants. Foreseeing that if he remained he would be compelled to

make changes, he obtained leave of absence from his countrymen for ten

years, trusting that before the expiration of that period they would

have become accustomed to his laws. He quitted his native city in the

full certainty that his laws would remain unrepealed until his return;

for (says Herodotus) "the Athenians _could not_ repeal them, since they

were bound by solemn oaths to observe them for ten years." The

unqualified manner in which the historian here speaks of an oath, as if

it created a sort of physical necessity and shut out all possibility of

a contrary result, deserves notice as illustrating Grecian sentiment.

On departing from Athens, Solon first visited Egypt, where he

communicated largely with Psenophis of Heliopolis and Sonchis of Sais,

Egyptian priests who had much to tell respecting their ancient history,

and from whom he learned matters, real or pretended, far transcending in

alleged antiquity the oldest Grecian genealogies--especially the history

of the vast submerged island of Atlantis, and the war which the

ancestors of the Athenians had successfully carried on against it, nine

thousand years before. Solon is said to have commenced an epic poem upon

this subject, but he did not live to finish it, and nothing of it now

remains. From Egypt he went to Cyprus, where he visited the small town

of Æpia, said to have been originally founded by Demophon, son of

Theseus, and ruled at this period by the prince Philocyprus--each town

in Cyprus having its own petty prince. It was situated near the river

Clarius in a position precipitous and secure, but inconvenient and

ill-supplied, Solon persuaded Philocyprus to quit the old site and

establish a new town down in the fertile plain beneath. He himself

stayed and became _æcist_ of the new establishment, making all the

regulations requisite for its safe and prosperous march, which was

indeed so decisively manifested that many new settlers flocked into the

new plantation, called by Philocyprus _Soli_, in honor of Solon. To our

deep regret, we are not permitted to know what these regulations were;

but the general fact is attested by the poems of Solon himself, and the

lines in which he bade farewell to Philocyprus on quitting the island

are yet before us. On the dispositions of this prince his poem bestowed

unqualified commendation.

Besides his visit to Egypt and Cyprus, a story was also current of his

having conversed with the Lydian king Croesus at Sardis. The

communication said to have taken place between them has been woven by

Herodotus into a sort of moral tale which forms one of the most

beautiful episodes in his whole history. Though this tale has been told

and retold as if it were genuine history, yet as it now stands it is

irreconcilable with chronology--although very possibly Solon may at some

time or other have visited Sardis, and seen Croesus as hereditary

prince.

But even if no chronological objections existed, the moral purpose of

the tale is so prominent, and pervades it so systematically from

beginning to end, that these internal grounds are of themselves

sufficiently strong to impeach its credibility as a matter of fact,

unless such doubts happen to be out-weighed--which in this case they are

not--by good contemporary testimony. The narrative of Solon and Croesus

can be taken for nothing else but an illustrative fiction, borrowed by

Herodotus from some philosopher, and clothed in his own peculiar beauty

of expression, which on this occasion is more decidedly poetical than is

habitual with him. I cannot transcribe, and I hardly dare to abridge it.

The vainglorious Croesus, at the summit of his conquests and his riches,

endeavors to win from his visitor Solon an opinion that he is the

happiest of mankind. The latter, after having twice preferred to him

modest and meritorious Grecian citizens, at length reminds him that his

vast wealth and power are of a tenure too precarious to serve as an

evidence of happiness; that the gods are jealous and meddlesome, and

often make the show of happiness a mere prelude to extreme disaster; and

that no man's life can be called happy until the whole of it has been

played out, so that it may be seen to be out of the reach of reverses.

Croesus treats this opinion as absurd, but "a great judgment from God

fell upon him, after Solon was departed--probably (observes Herodotus)

because he fancied himself the happiest of all men." First he lost his

favorite son Atys, a brave and intelligent youth (his only other son

being dumb). For the Mysians of Olympus being ruined by a destructive

and formidable wild boar, which they were unable to subdue, applied for

aid to Croesus, who sent to the spot a chosen hunting force, and

permitted--though with great reluctance, in consequence of an alarming

dream--that his favorite son should accompany them. The young prince was

unintentionally slain by the Phrygian exile Adrastus, whom Croesus had

sheltered and protected, Hardly had the latter recovered from the

anguish of this misfortune, when the rapid growth of Cyrus and the

Persian power induced him to go to war with them, against the advice of

his wisest counsellors. After a struggle of about three years he was

completely defeated, his capital Sardis taken by storm, and himself made

prisoner. Cyrus ordered a large pile to be prepared, and placed upon it

Croesus in fetters, together with fourteen young Lydians, in the

intention of burning them alive either as a religious offering, or in

fulfilment of a vow, "or perhaps (says Herodotus) to see whether some of

the gods would not interfere to rescue a man so preëmiently pious as the

king of Lydia." In this sad extremity, Croesus bethought him of the

warning which he had before despised, and thrice pronounced, with a deep

groan, the name of Solon. Cyrus desired the interpreters to inquire whom

he was invoking, and learnt in reply the anecdote of the Athenian

lawgiver, together with the solemn memento which he had offered to

Croesus during more prosperous days, attesting the frail tenure of all

human greatness. The remark sunk deep into the Persian monarch as a

token of what might happen to himself: he repented of his purpose, and

directed that the pile, which had already been kindled, should be

immediately extinguished. But the orders came too late. In spite of the

most zealous efforts of the bystanders, the flame was found

unquenchable, and Croesus would still have been burned, had he not

implored with prayers and tears the succor of Apollo, to whose Delphian

and Theban temples he had given such munificent presents. His prayers

were heard, the fair sky was immediately overcast and a profuse rain

descended, sufficient to extinguish the flames. The life of Croesus was

thus saved, and he became afterward the confidential friend and adviser

of his conqueror.

Such is the brief outline of a narrative which Herodotus has given with

full development and with impressive effect. It would have served as a

show-lecture to the youth of Athens not less admirably than the

well-known fable of the Choice of Heracles, which the philosopher

Prodicus, a junior contemporary of Herodotus, delivered with so much

popularity. It illustrates forcibly the religious and ethical ideas of

antiquity; the deep sense of the jealousy of the gods, who would not

endure pride in any one except themselves; the impossibility, for any

man, of realizing to himself more than a very moderate share of

happiness; the danger from a reactionary Nemesis, if at anytime he had

overpassed such limit; and the necessity of calculations taking in the

whole of life, as a basis for rational comparison of different

individuals. And it embodies, as a practical consequence from these

feelings, the often-repeated protest of moralists against vehement

impulses and unrestrained aspirations. The more valuable this narrative

appears, in its illustrative character, the less can we presume to treat

it as a history.

It is much to be regretted that we have no information respecting events

in Attica immediately after the Solonian laws and constitution, which

were promulgated in B.C. 594, so as to understand better the practical

effect of these changes. What we next hear respecting Solon in Attica

refers to a period immediately preceding the first usurpation of

Pisistratus in B.C. 560, and after the return of Solon from his long

absence. We are here again introduced to the same oligarchical

dissensions as are reported to have prevailed before the Solonian

legislation: the Pediis, or opulent proprietors of the plain round

Athens, under Lycurgus; the Parali of the south of Attica, under

Megacles; and the Diacrii or mountaineers of the eastern cantons, the

poorest of the three classes, under Pisistratus, are in a state of

violent intestine dispute. The account of Plutarch represents Solon as

returning to Athens during the height of this sedition. He was treated

with respect by all parties, but his recommendations were no longer

obeyed, and he was disqualified by age from acting with effect in

public. He employed his best efforts to mitigate party animosities, and

applied himself particularly to restrain the ambition of Pisistratus,

whose ulterior projects he quickly detected.

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