Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress comes

from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his

neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century

is that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving

for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot

whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the

Gospel of Greed.

Much is to be said on both sides. I have not concealed, I could not

conceal, my own passionate predilection. Such a confession will probably

shock my scientific brethren. Yet the strong feeling is in itself, I

think, an argument of some weight in favor of the agapastic theory of

evolution,—so far as it may be presumed to bespeak the normal judgment

of the Sensible Heart. Certainly, if it were possible to believe in

agapasm without believing it warmly, that fact would be an argument

against the truth of the doctrine. At any rate, since the warmth of

feeling exists, it should on every account be candidly confessed;

especially since it creates a liability to onesidedness on my part

against which it behooves my readers and me to be severally on our

guard.

SECOND THOUGHTS. IRENICA.

Let us try to define the logical affinities of the different theories of

evolution. Natural selection, as conceived by Darwin, is a mode of

evolution in which the only positive agent of change in the whole

passage from moner to man is fortuitous variation. To secure advance in

a definite direction chance has to be seconded by some action that shall

hinder the propagation of some varieties or stimulate that of others. In

natural selection, strictly so called, it is the crowding out of the

weak. In sexual selection, it is the attraction of beauty, mainly.

The _Origin of Species_ was published toward the end of the year 1859.

The preceding years since 1846 had been one of the most productive

seasons,—or if extended so as to cover the great book we are

considering, _the_ most productive period of equal length in the entire

history of science from its beginnings until now. The idea that chance

begets order, which is one of the corner-stones of modern physics

(although Dr. Carus considers it “the weakest point in Mr. Peirce’s

system,”) was at that time put into its clearest light. Quetelet had

opened the discussion by his _Letters on the Application of

Probabilities to the Moral and Political Sciences_, a work which deeply

impressed the best minds of that day, and to which Sir John Herschel had

drawn general attention in Great Britain. In 1857, the first volume of

Buckle’s _History of Civilisation_ had created a tremendous sensation,

owing to the use he made of this same idea. Meantime, the “statistical

method” had, under that very name, been applied with brilliant success

to molecular physics. Dr. John Herapath, an English chemist, had in 1847

outlined the kinetical theory of gases in his _Mathematical Physics_;

and the interest the theory excited had been refreshed in 1856 by

notable memoirs by Clausius and Krönig. In the very summer preceding

Darwin’s publication, Maxwell had read before the British Association

the first and most important of his researches on this subject. The

consequence was that the idea that fortuitous events may result in a

physical law, and further that this is the way in which those laws which

appear to conflict with the principle of the conservation of energy are

to be explained, had taken a strong hold upon the minds of all who were

abreast of the leaders of thought. By such minds, it was inevitable that

the _Origin of Species_, whose teaching was simply the application of

the same principle to the explanation of another “non-conservative”

action, that of organic development, should be hailed and welcomed. The

sublime discovery of the conservation of energy by Helmholtz in 1847,

and that of the mechanical theory of heat by Clausius and by Rankine,

independently, in 1850, had decidedly overawed all those who might have

been inclined to sneer at physical science. Thereafter a belated poet

still harping upon “science peddling with the names of things” would

fail of his effect. Mechanism was now known to be all, or very nearly

so. All this time, utilitarianism,—that improved substitute for the

Gospel,—was in its fullest feather; and was a natural ally of an

individualistic theory. Dean Mansell’s injudicious advocacy had led to

mutiny among the bondsmen of Sir William Hamilton, and the nominalism of

Mill had profited accordingly; and although the real science that Darwin

was leading men to was sure some day to give a death-blow to the

sham-science of Mill, yet there were several elements of the Darwinian

theory which were sure to charm the followers of Mill. Another thing:

anæsthetics had been in use for thirteen years. Already, people’s

acquaintance with suffering had dropped off very much; and as a

consequence, that unlovely hardness by which our times are so contrasted

with those that immediately preceded them, had already set in, and

inclined people to relish a ruthless theory. The reader would quite

mistake the drift of what I am saying if he were to understand me as

wishing to suggest that any of those things (except perhaps Malthus)

influenced Darwin himself. What I mean is that his hypothesis, while

without dispute one of the most ingenious and pretty ever devised, and

while argued with a wealth of knowledge, a strength of logic, a charm of

rhetoric, and above all with a certain magnetic genuineness that was

almost irresistible, did not appear, at first, at all near to being

proved; and to a sober mind its case looks less hopeful now than it did

twenty years ago; but the extraordinarily favorable reception it met

with was plainly owing, in large measure, to its ideas being those

toward which the age was favorably disposed, especially, because of the

encouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy.

Diametrically opposed to evolution by chance, are those theories which

attribute all progress to an inward necessary principle, or other form

of necessity. Many naturalists have thought that if an egg is destined

to go through a certain series of embryological transformations, from

which it is perfectly certain not to deviate, and if in geological time

almost exactly the same forms appear successively, one replacing another

in the same order, the strong presumption is that this latter succession

was as predeterminate and certain to take place as the former. So,

Nägeli, for instance, conceives that it somehow follows from the first

law of motion and the peculiar, but unknown, molecular constitution of

protoplasm, that forms must complicate themselves more and more.

Kolliker makes one form generate another after a certain maturation has

been accomplished. Weismann, too, though he calls himself a Darwinian,

holds that nothing is due to chance, but that all forms are simple

mechanical resultants of the heredity from two parents.[74] It is very

noticeable that all these different sectaries seek to import into their

science a mechanical necessity to which the facts that come under their

observation do not point. Those geologists who think that the variation

of species is due to cataclysmic alterations of climate or of the

chemical constitution of the air and water are also making mechanical

necessity chief factor of evolution.

Evolution by sporting and evolution by mechanical necessity are

conceptions warring against one another. A third method, which

supersedes their strife, lies enwrapped in the theory of Lamarck.

According to his view, all that distinguishes the highest organic forms

from the most rudimentary has been brought about by little hypertrophies

or atrophies which have affected individuals early in their lives, and

have been transmitted to their offspring. Such a transmission of

acquired characters is of the general nature of habit-taking, and this

is the representative and derivative within the physiological domain of

the law of mind. Its action is essentially dissimilar to that of a

physical force; and that is the secret of the repugnance of such

necessitarians as Weismann to admitting its existence. The Lamarckians

further suppose that although some of the modifications of form so

transmitted were originally due to mechanical causes, yet the chief

factors of their first production were the straining of endeavor and the

overgrowth superinduced by exercise, together with the opposite actions.

Now, endeavor, since it is directed toward an end, is essentially

psychical, even though it be sometimes unconscious; and the growth due

to exercise, as I argued in my last paper, follows a law of a character

quite contrary to that of mechanics.

Lamarckian evolution is thus evolution by the force of habit.—That

sentence slipped off my pen while one of those neighbors whose function

in the social cosmos seems to be that of an Interrupter, was asking me a

question. Of course, it is nonsense. Habit is mere inertia, a resting on

one’s oars, not a propulsion. Now it is energetic projaculation (lucky

there is such a word, or this untried hand might have been put to

inventing one) by which in the typical instances of Lamarckian evolution

the new elements of form are first created. Habit, however, forces them

to take practical shapes, compatible with the structures they affect,

and in the form of heredity and otherwise, gradually replaces the

spontaneous energy that sustains them. Thus, habit plays a double part;

it serves to establish the new features, and also to bring them into

harmony with the general morphology and function of the animals and

plants to which they belong. But if the reader will now kindly give

himself the trouble of turning back a page or two, he will see that this

account of Lamarckian evolution coincides with the general description

of the action of love, to which, I suppose, he yielded his assent.

Remembering that all matter is really mind, remembering, too, the

continuity of mind, let us ask what aspect Lamarckian evolution takes on

within the domain of consciousness. Direct endeavor can achieve almost

nothing. It is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one’s

stature, as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the Muses by

merely straining for it, before it is ready to come. We haunt in vain

the sacred well and throne of Mnemosyne; the deeper workings of the

spirit take place in their own slow way, without our connivance. Let but

their bugle sound, and we may then make our effort, sure of an oblation

for the altar of whatsoever divinity its savor gratifies. Besides this

inward process, there is the operation of the environment, which goes to

break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render the mind

lively. Everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit

makes us lethargic, while a succession of surprises wonderfully

brightens the ideas. Where there is a motion, where history is a-making,

there is the focus of mental activity, and it has been said that the

arts and sciences reside within the temple of Janus, waking when that is

open, but slumbering when it is closed. Few psychologists have perceived

how fundamental a fact this is. A portion of mind abundantly commissured

to other portions works almost mechanically. It sinks to a condition of

a railway junction. But a portion of mind almost isolated, a spiritual

peninsula, or _cul-de-sac_, is like a railway terminus. Now mental

commissures are habits. Where they abound, originality is not needed and

is not found; but where they are in defect, spontaneity is set free.

Thus, the first step in the Lamarckian evolution of mind is the putting

of sundry thoughts into situations in which they are free to play. As to

growth by exercise, I have already shown, in discussing _Man’s Glassy

Essence_, in last October’s _Monist_, what its _modus operandi_ must be

conceived to be, at least, until a second equally definite hypothesis

shall have been offered. Namely, it consists of the flying asunder of

molecules, and the reparation of the parts by new matter. It is, thus, a

sort of reproduction. It takes place only during exercise, because the

activity of protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is

its necessary condition. Growth by exercise takes place also in the

mind. Indeed, that is what it is to _learn_. But the most perfect

illustration is the development of a philosophical idea by being put

into practice. The conception which appeared, at first, as unitary,

splits up into special cases; and into each of these new thought must

enter to make a practicable idea. This new thought, however, follows

pretty closely the model of the parent conception; and thus a

homogeneous development takes place. The parallel between this and the

course of molecular occurrences is apparent. Patient attention will be

able to trace all these elements in the transaction called learning.

Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us; evolution by

fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution

by creative love. We may term them _tychastic_ evolution, or _tychasm_,

_anancastic_ evolution, or _anancasm_, and _agapastic_ evolution, or

_agapasm_. The doctrines which represent these as severally of principal

importance, we may term _tychasticism_, _anancasticism_, and

_agapasticism_. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute

chance, mechanical necessity, and the law of love, are severally

operative in the cosmos, may receive the names of _tychism_, _anancism_,

and _agapism_.

All three modes of evolution are composed of the same general elements.

Agapasm exhibits them the most clearly. The good result is here brought

to pass, first, by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon

the offspring, and, second, by the disposition of the latter to catch

the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general

purpose. In order to express the relation that tychasm and anancasm bear

to agapasm, let me borrow a word from geometry. An ellipse crossed by a

straight line is a sort of cubic curve; for a cubic is a curve which is

cut thrice by a straight line; now a straight line might cut the ellipse

twice and its associated straight line a third time. Still the ellipse

with the straight line across it would not have the characteristics of a

cubic. It would have, for instance, no contrary flexure, which no true

cubic wants; and it would have two nodes, which no true cubic has. The

geometers say that it is a _degenerate_ cubic. Just so, tychasm and

anancasm are degenerate forms of agapasm.

Men who seek to reconcile the Darwinian idea with Christianity will

remark that tychastic evolution, like the agapastic, depends upon a

reproductive creation, the forms preserved being those that use the

spontaneity conferred upon them in such wise as to be drawn into harmony

with their original, quite after the Christian scheme. Very good! This

only shows that just as love cannot have a contrary, but must embrace

what is most opposed to it, as a degenerate case of it, so tychasm is a

kind of agapasm. Only, in the tychastic evolution progress is solely

owing to the distribution of the napkin-hidden talent of the rejected

servant among those not rejected, just as ruined gamesters leave their

money on the table to make those not yet ruined so much the richer. It

makes the felicity of the lambs just the damnation of the goats,

transposed to the other side of the equation. In genuine agapasm, on the

other hand, advance takes place by virtue of a positive sympathy among

the created springing from continuity of mind. This is the idea which

tychasticism knows not how to manage.

The anancasticist might here interpose, claiming that the mode of

evolution for which he contends agrees with agapasm at the point at

which tychasm departs from it. For it makes development go through

certain phases, having its inevitable ebbs and flows, yet tending on the

whole to a foreordained perfection. Bare existence by this its destiny

betrays an intrinsic affinity for the good. Herein, it must be admitted,

anancasm shows itself to be in a broad acception a species of agapasm.

Some forms of it might easily be mistaken for the genuine agapasm. The

Hegelian philosophy is such an anancasticism. With its revelatory

religion, with its synechism (however imperfectly set forth), with its

“reflection,” the whole idea of the theory is superb, almost sublime.

Yet, after all, living freedom is practically omitted from its method.

The whole movement is that of a vast engine, impelled by a _vis a

tergo_, with a blind and mysterious fate of arriving at a lofty goal. I

mean that such an engine it _would_ be, if it really worked; but in

point of fact, it is a Keely motor. Grant that it really acts as it

professes to act, and there is nothing to do but accept the philosophy.

But never was there seen such an example of a long chain of

reasoning,—shall I say with a flaw in every link?—no, with every link a

handful of sand, squeezed into shape in a dream. Or say, it is a

pasteboard model of a philosophy that in reality does not exist. If we

use the one precious thing it contains, the idea of it, introducing the

tychism which the arbitrariness of its every step suggests, and make

that the support of a vital freedom which is the breath of the spirit of

love, we may be able to produce that genuine agapasticism, at which

Hegel was aiming.

A THIRD ASPECT. DISCRIMINATION

In the very nature of things, the line of demarcation between the three

modes of evolution is not perfectly sharp. That does not prevent its

being quite real; perhaps it is rather a mark of its reality. There is

in the nature of things no sharp line of demarcation between the three

fundamental colors, red, green, and violet. But for all that they are

really different. The main question is whether three radically different

evolutionary elements have been operative; and the second question is

what are the most striking characteristics of whatever elements have

been operative.

I propose to devote a few pages to a very slight examination of these

questions in their relation to the historical development of human

thought. I first formulate for the reader’s convenience the briefest

possible definitions of the three conceivable modes of development of

thought, distinguishing also two varieties of anancasm and three of

agapasm. The tychastic development of thought, then, will consist in

slight departures from habitual ideas in different directions

indifferently, quite purposeless and quite unconstrained whether by

outward circumstances or by force of logic, these new departures being

followed by unforeseen results which tend to fix some of them as habits

more than others. The anancastic development of thought will consist of

new ideas adopted without foreseeing whither they tend, but having a

character determined by causes either external to the mind, such as

changed circumstances of life, or internal to the mind as logical

developments of ideas already accepted, such as generalizations. The

agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental

tendencies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly

by the mere force of circumstances or of logic, as in anancasm, but by

an immediate attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined

before the mind possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by

virtue of the continuity of mind; and this mental tendency may be of

three varieties, as follows: First, it may affect a whole people or

community in its collective personality, and be thence communicated to

such individuals as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with the

collective people, although they may be intellectually incapable of

attaining the idea by their private understandings or even perhaps of

consciously apprehending it. Second, it may affect a private person

directly, yet so that he is only enabled to apprehend the idea, or to

appreciate its attractiveness, by virtue of his sympathy with his

neighbors, under the influence of a striking experience or development

of thought. The conversion of St. Paul may be taken as an example of

what is meant. Third, it may affect an individual, independently of his

human affections, by virtue of an attraction it exercises upon his mind,

even before he has comprehended it. This is the phenomenon which has

been well called the _divination_ of genius; for it is due to the

continuity between the man’s mind and the Most High.

Let us next consider by means of what tests we can discriminate between

these different categories of evolution. No absolute criterion is

possible in the nature of things, since in the nature of things there is

no sharp line of demarcation between the different classes.

Nevertheless, quantitative symptoms may be found by which a sagacious

and sympathetic judge of human nature may be able to estimate the

approximate proportions in which the different kinds of influence are

commingled.

So far as the historical evolution of human thought has been tychastic,

it should have proceeded by insensible or minute steps; for such is the

nature of chances when so multiplied as to show phenomena of regularity.

For example, assume that of the native-born white adult males of the

United States in 1880, one-fourth part were below 5 feet 4 inches in

stature and one-fourth part above 5 feet 8 inches. Then by the

principles of probability, among the whole population, we should expect

216 under 4 feet 6 inches,

48 “ 4 ” 5 “

9 ” 4 “ 4 ”

less than 2 “ 4 ” 3 “

216 above 6 feet 6 inches,

48 “ 6 ” 7 “

9 ” 6 “ 8 ”

less than 2 “ 6 ” 9 “

I set down these figures to show how insignificantly few are the cases

in which anything very far out of the common run presents itself by

chance. Though the stature of only every second man is included within

the four inches between 5 feet 4 inches and 5 feet 8 inches, yet if this

interval be extended by thrice four inches above and below, it will

embrace all our 8 millions odd of native-born adult white males (of

1880), except only 9 taller and 9 shorter.

The test of minute variation, if _not_ satisfied, absolutely negatives

tychasm. If it is satisfied, we shall find that it negatives anancasm

but not agapasm. We want a positive test, satisfied by tychasm, only.

Now wherever we find men’s thought taking by imperceptible degrees a

turn contrary to the purposes which animate them, in spite of their

highest impulses, there, we may safely conclude, there has been a

tychastic action.

Students of the history of mind there be of an erudition to fill an

imperfect scholar like me with envy edulcorated by joyous admiration,

who maintain that ideas when just started are and can be little more

than freaks, since they cannot yet have been critically examined, and

further that everywhere and at all times progress has been so gradual

that it is difficult to make out distinctly what original step any given

man has taken. It would follow that tychasm has been the sole method of

intellectual development. I have to confess I cannot read history so; I

cannot help thinking that while tychasm has sometimes been operative, at

others great steps covering nearly the same ground and made by different

men independently, have been mistaken for a succession of small steps,

and further that students have been reluctant to admit a real entitative

“spirit” of an age or of a people, under the mistaken and unscrutinized

impression that they should thus be opening the door to wild and

unnatural hypotheses. I find, on the contrary, that, however it may be

with the education of individual minds, the historical development of

thought has seldom been of a tychastic nature, and exclusively in

backward and barbarizing movements. I desire to speak with the extreme

modesty which befits a student of logic who is required to survey so

very wide a field of human thought that he can cover it only by a

reconnaissance, to which only the greatest skill and most adroit methods

can impart any value at all; but, after all, I can only express my own

opinions and not those of anybody else; and in my humble judgment, the

largest example of tychasm is afforded by the history of Christianity,

from about its establishment by Constantine, to, say, the time of the

Irish monasteries, an era or eon of about 500 years. Undoubtedly the

external circumstance which more than all others at first inclined men

to accept Christianity in its loveliness and tenderness, was the fearful

extent to which society was broken up into units by the unmitigated

greed and hard-heartedness into which the Romans had seduced the world.

And yet it was that very same fact, more than any other external

circumstance, that fostered that bitterness against the wicked world of

which the primitive gospel of Mark contains not a single trace. At

least, I do not detect it in the remark about the blasphemy against the

Holy Ghost, where nothing is said about vengeance, nor even in that

speech where the closing lines of Isaiah are quoted, about the worm and

the fire that feed upon the “carcasses of the men that have transgressed

against me.” But little by little the bitterness increases until in the

last book of the New Testament, its poor distracted author represents

that all the time Christ was talking about having come to save the

world, the secret design was to catch the entire human race, with the

exception of a paltry 144,000, and souse them all in a brimstone lake,

and as the smoke of their torment went up forever and ever, to turn and

remark, “There is no curse any more.” Would it be an insensible smirk or

a fiendish grin that should accompany such an utterance? I wish I could

believe St. John did not write it; but it is his gospel which tells

about the “resurrection unto condemnation,”—that is of men’s being

resuscitated just for the sake of torturing them;—and, at any rate, the

Revelation is a very ancient composition. One can understand that the

early Christians were like men trying with all their might to climb a

steep declivity of smooth wet clay; the deepest and truest element of

their life, animating both heart and head, was universal love; but they

were continually, and against their wills, slipping into a party spirit,

every slip serving as a precedent, in a fashion but too familiar to

every man. This party feeling insensibily grew until by about A.D. 330

the luster of the pristine integrity that in St. Mark reflects the white

spirit of light was so far tarnished that Eusebius, (the Jared Sparks of

that day), in the preface to his History, could announce his intention

of exaggerating everything that tended to the glory of the church and of

suppressing whatever might disgrace it. His Latin contemporary

Lactantius is worse, still; and so the darkling went on increasing until

before the end of the century the great library of Alexandria was

destroyed by Theophilus,[75] until Gregory the Great, two centuries

later, burnt the great library of Rome, proclaiming that “Ignorance is

the mother of devotion,” (which is true, just as oppression and

injustice is the mother of spirituality), until a sober description of

the state of the church would be a thing our not too nice newspapers

would treat as “unfit for publication.” All this movement is shown by

the application of the test given above to have been tychastic. Another

very much like it on a small scale, only a hundred times swifter, for

the study of which there are documents by the library-full, is to be

found in the history of the French Revolution.

Anancastic evolution advances by successive strides with pauses between.

The reason is that in this process a habit of thought having been

overthrown is supplanted by the next strongest. Now this next strongest

is sure to be widely disparate from the first, and as often as not is

its direct contrary. It reminds one of our old rule of making the second

candidate vice-president. This character, therefore, clearly

distinguishes anancasm from tychasm. The character which distinguishes

it from agapasm is its purposelessness. But external and internal

anancasm have to be examined separately. Development under the pressure

of external circumstances, or cataclysmine evolution, is in most cases

unmistakable enough. It has numberless degrees of intensity, from the

brute force, the plain war, which has more than once turned the current

of the world’s thought, down to the hard fact of evidence, or what has

been taken for it, which has been known to convince men by hordes. The

only hesitation than can subsist in the presence of such a history is a

quantitative one. Never are external influences the only ones which

affect the mind, and therefore it must be a matter of judgment for which

it would scarcely be worth while to attempt to set rules, whether a

given movement is to be regarded as principally governed from without or

not. In the rise of medieval thought, I mean scholasticism and the

synchronistic art developments, undoubtedly the crusades and the

discovery of the writings of Aristotle were powerful influences. The

development of scholasticism from Roscellin to Albertus Magnus closely

follows the successive steps in the knowledge of Aristotle. Prantl

thinks that that is the whole story, and few men have thumbed more books

than Carl Prantl. He has done good solid work, notwithstanding his

slap-dash judgments. But we shall never make so much as a good beginning

of comprehending scholasticism until the whole has been systematically

explored and digested by a company of students regularly organized and

held under rule for that purpose. But as for the period we are now

specially considering, that which synchronised the Romanesque

architecture, the literature is easily mastered. It does not quite

justify Prantl’s dicta as to the slavish dependence of these authors

upon their authorities. Moreover, they kept a definite purpose steadily

before their minds, throughout all their studies. I am, therefore,

unable to offer this period of scholasticism as an example of pure

external anancasm, which seems to be the fluorine of the intellectual

elements. Perhaps the recent Japanese reception of western ideas is the

purest instance of it in history. Yet in combination with other

elements, nothing is commoner. If the development of ideas under the

influence of the study of external facts be considered as external

anancasm,—it is on the border between the external and the internal

forms,—it is, of course, the principal thing in modern learning. But

Whewell, whose masterly comprehension of the history of science critics

have been too ignorant properly to appreciate, clearly shows that it is

far from being the overwhelmingly preponderant influence, even there.

Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined

line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to

steer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel

first made the world understand this; and he seeks to make logic not

merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought, which was all it had

been ambitioning before, but to be the very main-spring of thinking, and

not merely of individual thinking but of discussion, of the history of

the development of thought, of all history, of all development. This

involves a positive, clearly demonstrable error. Let the logic in

question be of whatever kind it may, a logic of necessary inference or a

logic of probable inference (the theory might perhaps be shaped to fit

either), in any case it supposes that logic is sufficient of itself to

determine what conclusion follows from given premises; for unless it

will do so much, it will not suffice to explain why an individual train

of reasoning should take just the course it does take, to say nothing of

other kinds of development. It thus supposes that from given premises,

only one conclusion can logically be drawn, and that there is no scope

at all for free choice. That from given premises only one conclusion can

logically be drawn, is one of the false notions which have come from

logicians’ confining their attention to that Nantucket of thought, the

logic of non-relative terms. In the logic of relatives, it does not hold

good.

One remark occurs to me. If the evolution of history is in considerable

part of the nature of internal anancasm, it resembles the development of

individual men; and just as 33 years is a rough but natural unit of time

for individuals, being the average age at which man has issue, so there

should be an approximate period at the end of which one great historical

movement ought to be likely to be supplanted by another. Let us see if

we can make out anything of the kind. Take the governmental development

of Rome as being sufficiently long and set down the principal dates.

B.C. 753, Foundation of Rome.

B.C. 510, Expulsion of the Tarquins.

B.C. 27, Octavius assumes title Augustus.

A.D. 476, End of Western Empire.

A.D. 962, Holy Roman Empire.

A.D. 1453, Fall of Constantinople.

The last event was one of the most significant in history, especially

for Italy. The intervals are 243, 483, 502, 486, 491 years. All are

rather curiously near equal, except the first which is half the others.

Successive reigns of kings would not commonly be so near equal. Let us

set down a few dates in the history of thought.

B.C. 585, Eclipse of Thales. Beginning of Greek philosophy.

A.D. 30, The crucifixion.

A.D. 529, Closing of Athenian schools. End of Greek philosophy.

A.D. 1125, (Approximate) Rise of the Universities of Bologna and

Paris.

A.D. 1543, Publication of the “De Revolutionibus” of Copernicus.

Beginning of Modern Science.

The intervals are 615, 499, 596, 418, years. In the history of

metaphysics, we may take the following:

B.C. 322, Death of Aristotle.

A.D. 1274, Death of Aquinas.

A.D. 1804, Death of Kant.

The intervals are 1595 and 530 years. The former is about thrice the

latter.

From these figures, no conclusion can fairly be drawn. At the same time,

they suggest that perhaps there may be a rough natural era of about 500

years. Should there be any independent evidence of this, the intervals

noticed may gain some significance.

The agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be

distinguished by its purposive character, this purpose being the

development of an idea. We should have a direct agapic or sympathetic

comprehension and recognition of it, by virtue of the continuity of

thought. I here take it for granted that such continuity of thought has

been sufficiently proved by the arguments used in my paper on the “Law

of Mind” in _The Monist_ of last July. Even if those arguments are not

quite convincing in themselves, yet if they are reënforced by an

apparent agapasm in the history of thought, the two propositions will

lend one another mutual aid. The reader will, I trust, be too well

grounded in logic to mistake such mutual support for a vicious circle in

reasoning. If it could be shown directly that there is such an entity as

the “spirit of an age” or of a people, and that mere individual

intelligence will not account for all the phenomena, this would be proof

enough at once of agapasticism and of synechism. I must acknowledge that

I am unable to produce a cogent demonstration of this; but I am, I

believe, able to adduce such arguments as will serve to confirm those

which have been drawn from other facts. I believe that all the greatest

achievements of mind have been beyond the powers of unaided individuals;

and I find, apart from the support this opinion receives from

synechistic considerations, and from the purposive character of many

great movements, direct reason for so thinking in the sublimity of the

ideas and in their occurring simultaneously and independently to a

number of individuals of no extraordinary general powers. The pointed

Gothic architecture in several of its developments appears to me to be

of such a character. All attempts to imitate it by modern architects of

the greatest learning and genius appear flat and tame, and are felt by

their authors to be so. Yet at the time the style was living, there was

quite an abundance of men capable of producing works of this kind of

gigantic sublimity and power. In more than one case, extant documents

show that the cathedral chapters, in the selection of architects,

treated high artistic genius as a secondary consideration, as if there

were no lack of persons able to supply that; and the results justify

their confidence. Were individuals in general, then, in those ages

possessed of such lofty natures and high intellect? Such an opinion

would break down under the first examination.

How many times have men now in middle life seen great discoveries made

independently and almost simultaneously! The first instance I remember

was the prediction of a planet exterior to Uranus by Leverrier and

Adams. One hardly knows to whom the principle of the conservation of

energy ought to be attributed, although it may reasonably be considered

as the greatest discovery science has ever made. The mechanical theory

of heat was set forth by Rankine and by Clausius during the same month

of February, 1850; and there are eminent men who attribute this great

step to Thomson.[76] The kinetical theory of gases, after being started

by John Bernoulli and long buried in oblivion, was reinvented and

applied to the explanation not merely of the laws of Boyle, Charles, and

Avogadro, but also of diffusion and viscosity, by at least three modern

physicists separately. It is well known that the doctrine of natural

selection was presented by Wallace and by Darwin at the same meeting of

the British Association; and Darwin in his “Historical Sketch” prefixed

to the later editions of his book shows that both were anticipated by

obscure forerunners. The method of spectrum analysis was claimed for

Swan as well as for Kirchhoff, and there were others who perhaps had

still better claims. The authorship of the Periodical Law of the

Chemical Elements is disputed between a Russian, a German, and an

Englishman; although there is no room for doubt that the principal merit

belongs to the first. These are nearly all the greatest discoveries of

our times. It is the same with the inventions. It may not be surprising

that the telegraph should have been independently made by several

inventors, because it was an easy corollary from scientific facts well

made out before. But it was not so with the telephone and other

inventions. Ether, the first anæsthetic, was introduced independently by

three different New England physicians. Now ether had been a common

article for a century. It had been in one of the pharmacopœias three

centuries before. It is quite incredible that its anæsthetic property

should not have been known; it was known. It had probably passed from

mouth to ear as a secret from the days of Basil Valentine; but for long

it had been a secret of the Punchinello kind. In New England, for many

years, boys had used it for amusement. Why then had it not been put to

its serious use? No reason can be given, except that the motive to do so

was not strong enough. The motives to doing so could only have been

desire for gain and philanthropy. About 1846, the date of the

introduction, philanthropy was undoubtedly in an unusually active

condition. That sensibility, or sentimentalism, which had been

introduced in the previous century, had undergone a ripening process, in

consequence of which, though now less intense than it had previously

been, it was more likely to influence unreflecting people than it had

ever been. All three of the ether-claimants had probably been influenced

by the desire for gain; but nevertheless they were certainly not

insensible to the agapic influences.

I doubt if any of the great discoveries ought, properly, to be

considered as altogether individual achievements; and I think many will

share this doubt. Yet, if not, what an argument for the continuity of

mind, and for agapasticism is here! I do not wish to be very strenuous.

If thinkers will only be persuaded to lay aside their prejudices and

apply themselves to studying the evidences of this doctrine, I shall be

fully content to await the final decision.

Footnote 72:

_The Monist_, January, 1893.

Footnote 73:

How can a writer have any respect for science, as such, who is capable

of confounding with the scientific propositions of political economy,

which have nothing to say concerning what is “beneficent,” such

brummagem generalisations as this?

Footnote 74:

I am happy to find that Dr. Carus, too, ranks Weismann among the

opponents of Darwin, notwithstanding his flying that flag.

Footnote 75:

See _Draper’s History of Intellectual Development_, chap. x.

Footnote 76:

Thomson, himself, in his article _Heat_ in the _Encyclopedia

Britannica_, never once mentions the name of Clausius.

_Supplementary Essay_

THE PRAGMATISM OF PEIRCE

BY

JOHN DEWEY

The term pragmatism was introduced into literature in the opening

sentences of Professor James’s California Union address in 1898. The

sentences run as follows: “The principle of pragmatism, as we may call

it, may be expressed in a variety of ways, all of them very simple. In

the _Popular Science Monthly_ for January, 1878, Mr. Charles S. Peirce

introduces it as follows:” etc. The readers who have turned to the

volume referred to have not, however, found the word there. From other

sources we know that the name as well as the idea was furnished by Mr.

Peirce. The latter has told us that both the word and the idea were

suggested to him by a reading of Kant, the idea by the _Critique of Pure

Reason_, the term by the “Critique of Practical Reason.”[77] The article

in the _Monist_ gives such a good statement of both the idea and the

reason for selecting the term that it may be quoted _in extenso_. Peirce

sets out by saying that with men who work in laboratories, the habit of

mind is molded by experimental work much more than they are themselves

aware. “Whatever statement you may make to him, he [the experimentalist]

will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an

experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of

a given description will result, or else he will see no sense at all in

what you say.” Having himself the experimental mind and being interested

in methods of thinking, “he framed the theory that a _conception_, that

is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively

in its bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously

nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct

bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable

experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept

could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept,

and _there is absolutely nothing more in it_. For this doctrine, he

invented the name _pragmatism_.”

After saying that some of his friends wished him to call the doctrine

practicism or practicalism, he says that he had learned philosophy from

Kant, and that to one “who still thought in Kantian terms most readily,

_praktisch_ and _pragmatisch_ were as far apart as the two poles, the

former belonging to a region of thought where no mind of the

experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet,

the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose. Now quite

the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an

inseparable connection between rational cognition and human

purpose.”[78]

From this brief statement, it will be noted that Peirce confined the

significance of the term to the determination of the meaning of terms,

or better, propositions; the theory was not, of itself, a theory of the

test, or the truth, of propositions. Hence the title of his original

article: _How to Make Ideas Clear_. In his later writing, after the term

had been used as a theory of truth,—he proposed the more limited

“pragmaticism” to designate his original specific meaning.[79] But even

with respect to the meaning of propositions, there is a marked

difference between his pragmaticism and the pragmatism of, say, James.

Some of the critics (especially continental) of the latter would have

saved themselves some futile beating of the air, if they had reacted to

James’s statements instead of to their own associations with the word

“pragmatic.” Thus James says in his California address: “The effective

meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to

some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether

active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the

experience must be _particular_, than in the fact that it must be

_active_.” (Italics mine.)

Now the curious fact is that Peirce puts more emphasis upon practise (or

conduct) and less upon the particular; in fact, he transfers the

emphasis to the general. The following passage is worth quotation

because of the definiteness with which it identifies meaning with both

the future and with the general. “The rational meaning of every

proposition lies in the future. How so? The meaning of a proposition is

itself a proposition. Indeed, it is no other than the very proposition

of which it is the meaning: it is a translation of it. But of the

myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated, which is

that one which is to be called its very meaning? It is, according to the

pragmaticist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to

human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances nor when one

entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most

applicable to self-control under every situation and to every purpose.”

Hence, “it must be simply the general description of all the

experimental phenomena which the assertion of the proposition virtually

predicts.” Or, paraphrasing, pragmatism identifies meaning with

formation of a habit, or way of acting having the greatest generality

possible, or the widest range of application to particulars. Since

habits or ways of acting are just as real as particulars, it is

committed to a belief in the reality of “universals.” Hence it is not a

doctrine of phenomenalism, for while the richness of phenomena lies in

their sensuous quality, pragmatism does not intend to define these

(leaving them, as it were, to speak for themselves), but “eliminates

their sential element, and endeavors to define the rational purport, and

this it finds in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in

question.” Moreover, not only are generals real, but they are physically

efficient. The meanings “the air is stuffy” and “stuffy air is

unwholesome” may determine, for example, the opening of the window.

Accordingly on the ethical side, “the pragmaticist does not make the

_summum bonum_ to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that

process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody

those generals...; in other words, becomes, through action an embodiment

of rational purports or habits generalized as widely as possible.”[80]

The passages quoted should be compared with what Peirce has to say in

the Baldwin Dictionary article. There he says that James’s doctrine

seems to commit us to the belief “that the end of man is action—a

stoical maxim which does not commend itself as forcibly to the present

writer at the age of sixty as it did at thirty. If it be admitted, on

the contrary, that action wants an end, and that the end must be

something of a general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself

... would direct us toward something different from practical facts,

namely, to general ideas.... The only ultimate good which the practical

facts to which the maxim directs attention can subserve is to further

the development of concrete reasonableness.... Almost everybody will now

agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some

way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but

in something general or continuous. Synechism is founded on the notion

that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by

laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one

and the same process of the growth of reasonableness. This is first

shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic, and

is thence inferred to hold good metaphysically. It is not opposed to

pragmaticism ... but includes that procedure as a step.”

Here again we have the doctrine of pragmaticism as a doctrine that

meaning or rational purport resides in the setting up of habits or

generalized methods, a doctrine passing over into the metaphysics of

synechism. It will be well now to recur explicitly to Peirce’s earlier

doctrine which he seems to qualify—although, as he notes, he upheld the

doctrine of the reality of generals even at the earlier period. Peirce

sets out, in his article on the “Fixation of Belief,” with the empirical

difference of doubt and belief expressed in the facts that belief

determines a habit while doubt does not, and that belief is calm and

satisfactory while doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which

we struggle to emerge; to attain, that is, a state of belief, a struggle

which may be called inquiry. The sole object of inquiry is the fixation

of belief. The scientific method of fixation has, however, certain

rivals: one is that of “tenacity”—constant reiteration, dwelling upon

everything conducive to the belief, avoidance of everything which might

unsettle it—the will to believe. The method breaks down in practice

because of man’s social nature; we have to take account of contrary

beliefs in others, so that the real problem is to fix the belief of the

community; for otherwise our own belief is precariously exposed to

attack and doubt. Hence the resort to the method of authority. This

method breaks down in time by the fact that authority can not fix all

beliefs in all their details, and because of the conflict which arises

between organized traditions. There may then be recourse to what is

“agreeable to reason”—a method potent in formation of taste and in

esthetic productions and in the history of philosophy,—but a method

which again fails to secure permanent agreements in society, and so

leaves individual belief at the mercy of attack. Hence, finally,

recourse to science, whose fundamental hypothesis is this: “There are

real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions

about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws,

and ... by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain

by _reasoning_ how things really are, and any man if he have sufficient

experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true

conclusion.”[81]

It will be noted that the quotation employs the terms “reality” and

“truth,” while it makes them a part of the statement of the _hypothesis_

entertained in scientific procedure. Upon such a basis, what meanings

attach to the terms “reality” and “truth”? Since they are general terms,

their meanings must be determined on the basis of the effects, having

practical bearings, which the object of our conception has. Now the

effect which real things have is to cause beliefs; beliefs are then the

consequences which give the general term reality a “rational purport.”

And on the assumption of the scientific method, the _distinguishing_

character of the _real_ object must be that it tends to produce a single

universally accepted belief. “All the followers of science are fully

persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far

enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they

can be applied.” “This activity of thought by which we are carried, not

where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of

destiny.... This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and

reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all

_who investigate_, is what we mean by the truth, and the object

represented in this opinion is the real.”[82] In a subsequent essay (on

the “Probability of Induction”) Peirce expressly draws the conclusion

which follows from this statement; viz., that this conception of truth

and reality makes everything depend upon the character of the methods of

inquiry and inference by which conclusions are reached. “In the case of

synthetic inferences we know only the degree of trustworthiness of our

proceeding. As all knowledge comes from synthetic inference, we must

also infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that

the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must

generally have led to true conclusions”[83]—true conclusions, once more,

being those which command the agreement of competent inquiries.

Summing up, we may say that Peirce’s pragmaticism is a doctrine

concerning the meaning, conception, or rational purport of objects,

namely, that these consist in the “effects, which might conceivably have

practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.

Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of

the object.”[84] “Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible

effects,” and if we have any doubt as to whether we really believe the

effects to be sensible or no, we have only to ask ourselves whether or

no we should act any differently in their presence. In short, our own

responses to sensory stimuli are the ultimate, or testing, ingredients

in our conception of an object. In the literal sense of the word

pragmatist, therefore, Peirce is more of a pragmatist than James.

He is also less of a nominalist. That is to say, he emphasizes much less

the _particular_ sensible consequence, and much more the habit, the

generic attitude of response, set up in consequence of experiences with

a thing. In the passage in the Dictionary already quoted he speaks as if

in his later life he attached less importance to action, and more to

“concrete reasonableness” than in his earlier writing. It may well be

that the relative emphasis had shifted. But there is at most but a

difference of emphasis. For in his later doctrine, concrete rationality

means a change in existence brought about _through_ action, and through

action which embodies conceptions whose own specific existence consists

in habitual attitudes of response. In his earlier writing, the emphasis

upon habits, as something generic, is explicit. “What a thing means is

simply what habits it involves.”[85] More elaborately, “Induction infers

a rule. Now the belief of a rule is a habit. That a habit is a rule,

active in us, is evident. That every belief is of the nature of a habit,

in so far as it is of a general character, has been shown in the earlier

papers of this series.”[86]

The difference between Peirce and James which next strikes us is the

greater emphasis placed by the former upon the method of procedure. As

the quotations already made show, everything ultimately turned, for

Peirce, upon the trustworthiness of the procedures of inquiry. Hence his

high estimate of logic, as compared with James—at least James in his

later days. Hence also his definite rejection of the appeal to the Will

to Believe—under the form of what he calls the method of tenacity.

Closely associated with this is the fact that Peirce has a more explicit

dependence upon the social factor than has James. The appeal in Peirce

is essentially to the consensus of those who have investigated, using

methods which are capable of employment by all. It is the need for

social agreement, and the fact that in its absence “the method of

tenacity” will be exposed to disintegration from without, which finally

forces upon mankind the wider and wider utilization of the scientific

method.

Finally, both Peirce and James are realists. The reasonings of both

depend upon the assumption of real things which really have effects or

consequences. Of the two, Peirce makes clearer the fact that in

philosophy at least we are dealing with the _conception_ of reality,

with reality as a term having rational purport, and hence with something

whose meaning is itself to be determined in terms of consequences. That

“reality” means the object of those beliefs which have, after prolonged

and coöperative inquiry, becomes stable, and “truth” the quality of

these beliefs is a logical consequence of this position. Thus while “we

may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what

anybody may think them to be ... it would be a great mistake to suppose

that this definition makes the idea of reality perfectly clear.”[87] For

it is only the outcome of persistent and conjoint inquiry which enables

us to give intelligible meaning in the concrete to the expression

“characters independent of what anybody may think them to be.” (This is

the pragmatic way out of the egocentric predicament.) And while my

purpose is wholly expository I can not close without inquiring whether

recourse to Peirce would not have a most beneficial influence in

contemporary discussion. Do not a large part of our epistemological

difficulties arise from an attempt to define the “real” as something

given prior to reflective inquiry instead of as that which reflective

inquiry is forced to reach and to which when it is reached belief can

stably cling?

Footnote 77:

See article on “Pragmatism,” in _Baldwin’s Dictionary_, Vol. 2., p.

322, and the _Monist_, Vol. 15, p. 162.

Footnote 78:

Kant discriminates the laws of morality, which are _a priori_, from

rules of skill, having to do with technique or art, and counsels of

prudence, having to do with welfare. The latter he calls pragmatic;

the _a priori_ laws practical. See _Metaphysics of Morals_, Abbott’s

trans., pp. 33 and 34.

Footnote 79:

See the article in the _Monist_ already mentioned, and another one in

the same volume, p. 481, “The Issues of Pragmaticism.”

Footnote 80:

It is probably fair to see here an empirical rendering of the Kantian

generality of moral action, while the distinction and connection of

“rational purport” and “sensible particular” have also obvious Kantian

associations.

Footnote 81:

P. 26.

Footnote 82:

P. 56-57.

Footnote 83:

P. 105.

Footnote 84:

P. 45.

Footnote 85:

P. 43.

Footnote 86:

P. 151.

Footnote 87:

P. 53.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PEIRCE’S PUBLISHED WRITINGS

I. Writings of General Interest.[88]

_A._ Three papers in the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, Vol. 2

(1868).

1. “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” pp.

103-114.

2. “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” pp. 140-157.

3. “Ground of Validity of the Laws of Logic,” pp. 193-208.

These three papers, somewhat loosely connected, deal mainly with the

philosophy of discursive thought. The first deals with our power of

intuition, and holds that “every thought is a sign.” The second, one of

the most remarkable of Peirce’s writings, contains an acute criticism of

the Cartesian tradition and a noteworthy argument against the

traditional emphasis on “images” in thinking. The third contains, _inter

alia_, a refutation of Mill’s indictment of the syllogism. The same

volume of the _Journal_ contains two unsigned communications on

Nominalism and on the Meaning of Determined.

_B._ Review of Fraser’s “Berkeley,” in the _North American Review_,

Vol. 113 (1871), pp. 449-472.

This paper contains an important analysis on medieval realism, and of

Berkeley’s nominalism. (A Scotist realism continues to distinguish

Peirce’s work after this.)

_C._ “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” in _Popular Science

Monthly_, Vols. 12-13 (1877-1878). Reprinted in Pt. I of this

volume. The first and second papers were also published in the

_Revue Philosophique_, Vols. 6-7 (1879).

_D._ Ten papers in the _Monist_, Vols. 1-3 (1891-1893), and 15-16

(1905-1906). The first five are reprinted in Pt. II of this volume.

The sixth paper, “Reply to the Necessitarians,” Vol. 3, pp. 526-570, is

an answer to the criticism of the foregoing by the editor of the

_Monist_, Vol. 2, pp. 560ff.; cf. Vol. 3, pp. 68ff. and 571ff., and

McCrie, “The Issues of Synechism,” Vol. 3, pp. 380ff.

7. “What Pragmatism Is?” Vol. 15, pp. 161-181.

8. “The Issues of Pragmaticism,” Vol. 15, pp. 481-499.

9. “Mr. Peterson’s Proposed Discussion,” Vol. 16, pp. 147ff.

10. “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,” Vol. 16, pp.

492-546.

The last four papers develop Peirce’s thought by showing its agreement

and disagreement with the pragmatism of James and Schiller. The last

paper contains his Method of Existential Graphs.

_E._ “The Reality of God,” in the _Hibbert Journal_, Vol. 7 (1908),

pp. 96-112. (This article contains brief indications of many of

Peirce’s leading ideas.)

_F._ Six Papers in the _Open Court_, Vols. 6-7 (1893).

1. “Pythagorics” (on the Pythagorean brotherhood), pp. 3375-3377.

2. “Dmesis” (on charity towards criminals), pp. 3399-3402.

3. “The Critic of Arguments (I.), Exact Thinking,” pp. 3391-3394.

4. “The Critic of Arguments (II.), The Reader is Introduced to

Relatives,” pp. 3415-3419. (The last two contain a very clear

succinct account of the general character of Peirce’s logic.)

5. “What is Christian Faith?” pp. 3743-3745.

6. “The Marriage of Religion and Science,” pp. 3559-3560.

_G._ Articles in Baldwin’s “Dictionary of Philosophy”: Individual,

kind, matter and form, possibility, pragmatism, priority, reasoning,

sign, scientific method, sufficient reason, synechism, and

uniformity.

_H._ “Pearson’s Grammar of Science,” in _Popular Science Monthly_,

Vol. 58 (1901), pp. 296-306. (A critique of Pearson’s conceptualism

and of his utilitarian view as to the aim of science.)

II. Writings of Predominantly Logical Interest.

_A._ Five Papers on Logic, read before the American Academy of Arts

and Sciences. Published in the _Proceedings of the Academy_, Vol. 7

(1867).

1. “On an Improvement in Boole’s Calculus of Logic,” pp. 250-261.

(Suggests improvements in Boole’s logic, especially in the

representation of particular propositions. The association of

probability with the notion of relative frequency became a leading

idea of Peirce’s thought.)

2. “On the Natural Classification of Arguments,” pp. 261-287. (A

suggestive distinction between the leading principle and the premise

of an argument. Contains also an interesting note (pp. 283-284)

denying the positivistic maxim that, “no hypothesis is admissible

which is not capable of verification by direct observation.”)

3. “On a New List of Categories,” pp. 287-298. The categories are:

Being, Quality (Reference to a Ground), Relation (Reference to a

Correlate), Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),

Substance. “Logic has for its subject-genus all symbols and not

merely concepts.” Symbols include terms, propositions, and

arguments.

4. “Upon the Logic of Mathematics,” pp. 402-412. “There are certain

general propositions from which the truths of mathematics follow

syllogistically.”

5. “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension,” pp. 416-432.

(Interesting historical references to the use of these terms and an

attack on the supposed rule as to their inverse proportionality.)

_B._ “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relations,” in

_Memoires of the American Academy_, Vol. 9 (1870), pp. 317-378.

(Shows the relation of inclusion between classes to be more

fundamental than Boole’s use of equality. Extends the Booleian

calculus to DeMorgan’s logic of relative terms.)

_C._ “On the Algebra of Logic,” _American Journal of Mathematics_,

Vol. 3 (1880), pp. 15-57. (Referred to by Schroeder as Peirce’s

_Hauptwerk_ in “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik,” Vol. 1., p.

107.)

_D._ “On the Logic of Number,” _American Journal of Mathematics_,

Vol. 4 (1881), pp. 85-95.

_E._ “Brief Description of the Algebra of Relatives,” Reprinted from

??, pp. 1-6.

_F._ “On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of

Notation,” _American Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 7 (1884), pp.

180-202.

_G._ “A Theory of Probable Inference” and notes “On a Limited

Universe of Marks” and on the “Logic of Relatives” in “Studies in

Logic by members of the Johns Hopkins University,” Boston, 1883, pp.

126-203.

_H._ “The Regenerated Logic,” _Monist_, Vol. 7, pp. 19-40.

“The Logic of Relatives,” _Monist_, Vol. 7, pp. 161-217. (An

elaborate development of his own logic of relatives, by way of

review of Schroeder’s book.)

_I._ Miscellaneous Notes, etc.

1. Review of Venn’s “Logic of Chance,” _North American Review_,

July, 1867.

2. “On the Application of Logical Analysis to Multiple Algebra,”

_Proceedings of the American Academy_, Vol. 10 (1875), pp. 392-394.

3. “Note on Grassman’s ‘Calculus of Extension,’” _Proceedings of the

American Academy_, Vol. 13 (1878), pp. 115-116.

4. “Note on Conversion,” _Mind_, Vol. 1, p. 424.

5. Notes and Additions to Benjamin Peirce’s “Linear Associative

Algebra,” _American Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 4 (1881), pp.

92ff., especially pp. 221-229.

6. “Logical Machines,” _American Journal of Psychology_, Vol. 1

(1888).

7. “Infinitesimals,” _Science_, Vol. 11 (1900), p. 430.

8. “Some Amazing Mazes,” _Monist_, Vol. 18 (April and July, 1908),

and Vol. 19 (Jan., 1909).

9. “On Non-Aristotelian Logic” (Letter), _Monist_, Vol. 20.

_J._ A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic. 1903. Boston. Alfred

Mudge & Son (a four page brochure).

_K._ Articles in Baldwin’s “Dictionary of Philosophy” on: laws of

thought, leading principle, logic (exact and symbolic), modality,

negation, predicate and predication, probable inference, quality,

quantity, relatives, significant, simple, subject, syllogism,

theory, truth and falsity universal, universe, validity,

verification, whole and parts.

III. Researches in the Theory and Methods of Measurement.

_A._ General and Astronomic.

1. “On the Theory of Errors of Observation,” _Report of the

Superintendent of the U. S. Coast Survey_ for 1870, pp. 220-224.

2. “Note on the Theory of Economy of Research,” _Report of the U. S.

Coast Survey_ for 1876, pp. 197-201. (This paper deals with the

relation between the utility and the cost of diminishing the

probable error.)

3. “Apparatus for Recording a Mean of Observed Times,” _U. S. Coast

Survey_, 1877. Appendix No. 15 to _Report_ of 1875.

4. “Ferrero’s Metodo dei Minimi Quadrati,” _American Journal of

Mathematics_, Vol. 1 (1878), pp. 55-63.

5. “Photometric Researches,” _Annals of the Astronomical Observatory

of Harvard College_, Vol. 9 (1878), pp. 1-181.

6. “Methods and Results. Measurement of Gravity.” Washington. 1879.

7. “Methods and Results. A Catalogue of Stars for Observations of

Latitude.” Washington. 1879.

8. “On the Ghosts in Rutherford’s ‘Diffraction Spectra,’” _American

Journal of Mathematics_, Vol. 2 (1879), pp. 330-347.

9. “Note on a Comparison of a Wave-Length with a Meter,” _American

Journal of Science_, Vol. 18 (1879), p. 51.

10. “A Quincuncial Projection of the Sphere,” _American Journal of

Mathematics_, Vol. 2 (1879), pp. 394, 396.

11. “Numerical Measure of Success of Predictions,” _Science_, Vol. 4

(1884), p. 453.

12. “Proceedings Assay Commission” Washington, 1888. (Joint Reports

on Weighing.)

_B._ Geodetic Researches. The Pendulum.

1. “Measurement of Gravity at Initial Stations in America and

Europe,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_, 1876, pp. 202-237 and

410-416.

2. “De l’influence de la flexibilité du trépied sur l’oscillation du

pendule a réversion,” Conférence Geodesique Internationale (1877)

Comptes Rendus, Berlin, 1878, pp. 171-187. (This paper was

introduced by Plantamour and was followed by the notes of Appolzer.)

3. “On the Influence of Internal Friction upon the Correction of the

Length of the Second’s Pendulum,” _Proceedings of the American

Academy_, Vol. 13 (1878), pp. 396-401.

4. “On a Method of Swinging Pendulums for the Determination of

Gravity proposed by M. Faye,” _American Journal of Science_, Vol. 18

(1879), pp. 112-119.

5. “Results of Pendulum Experiments,” _American Journal of Science_,

Vol. 20 (1880).

6. “Flexure of Pendulum Supports,” _Report of the U. S. Coast

Survey_, 1881, pp. 359-441.

7. “On the Deduction of the Ellipticity of the Earth from the

Pendulum Experiment,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_, 1881, pp.

442-456.

8. “Determinations of Gravity at Stations in Pennsylvania,” _Report

of U. S. Coast Survey_, 1883, Appendix 19 and pp. 473-486.

9. “On the Use of the Noddy,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_,

1884, pp. 475-482.

10. “Effect of the Flexure of a Pendulum upon the Period of

Oscillation,” _Report of the U. S. Coast Survey_, 1884, pp. 483-485.

11. “On the Influence of a Noddy, and of Unequal Temperature upon

the Periods of a Pendulum,” _Report of the U. S. Coast and Geodetic

Survey_ for 1885, pp. 509-512.

_C._ Psychologic. “On Small Differences in Sensation” (in

cooperation with J. Jastrow), _National Academy of Sciences_, Vol. 3

(1884), pp. 1-11.

IV. Philologic.

“Shakespearian Pronunciation” (in coöperation with J. B. Noyes),

_North American Review_, Vol. 98 (April, 1864), pp. 342-369.

V. Contributions to the _Nation_.

Lazelle, Capt. H. M., One Law in Nature. _Nation_, Vol. 17, No. 419.

Newcomb, S., Popular Astronomy. Vol. 27, No. 683.

Read, C., Theory of Logic, 1878. Vol. 28, No. 718.

Rood, O. N., Modern Chromatics, 1879. Vol. 29, No. 746.

Note on the _American Journal of Mathematics_. Vol. 29, No. 756.

Jevons, W. S., Studies in Deductive Logic, 1880. Vol. 32, No. 822.

Ribot, Th., The Psychology of Attention, 1890. Vol. 50, No. 1303.

James, W., The Principles of Psychology, 1890. Vol. 53, Nos. 1357

and 1358.

Comte, A. (F. Harrison, editor), The New Calendar of Great Men,

1892. Vol. 54, No. 1386.

Lobatchewsky, N. (Translator: G. B. Halsted), Geometrical Researches

on the Theory of Parallels, 1891. Vol. 54, No. 1389.

Lombroso, C., The Man of Genius, 1891. Vol. 54, No. 1391.

Note on William James’ abridgment of his Psychology, 1892. Vol. 54,

No. 1394.

McClelland, W. J., A Treatise on the Geometry of the Circle, 1891.

Vol. 54, No. 1395.

Buckley, Arabella B., Moral Teachings of Science, 1892. Vol. 54, No.

1405.

Hale, E. E., A New England Boyhood, 1893. Vol. 57, No. 1468.

Mach, E. (Translator: T. J. McCormack), The Science of Mechanics,

1893. Vol. 57, No. 1475.

Ritchie, D. G., Darwin and Hegel, 1893. Vol. 57, No. 1482.

Huxley, T. H., Method and Results, 1893. Vol. 58, No. 1489.

Scott, Sir Walter, Familiar Letters of Sir Walter Scott. Vol. 58,

No. 1493.

Gilbert, W. (Translator: P. F. Mottelay), Magnetic Bodies. Vol. 58,

No. 1494 and No. 1495.

Forsyth, A. R., Theory of Functions of a Complex Variable, 1893; and

Harkness, J., A Treatise on the Theory of Functions, 1893; and

Picard, E., Traité d’analyse, 1893. Vol. 58, No. 1498.

A Short Sketch of Helmholtz, Sept. 13, 1894. Vol. 59, No. 1524.

Windelband, W. (Translator: J. H. Tufts), A History of Philosophy;

and Falkenberg, R. (Translator: A. C. Armstrong), History of Modern

Philosophy; and Bascom, J., An Historical Interpretation of

Philosophy; and Burt, B. C., A History of Modern Philosophy. Vol.

59, Nos. 1526 and 1527.

Spinoza (Translators: W. H. White and Amelia H. Stirling), Ethics,

1894. Vol. 59, No. 1532.

Watson, J., Comte, Mill, and Spencer, 1895. Vol. 60, No. 1554.

Jones, H., A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze, 1895; and

Eberhard, V., Die Grundbegriffe der ebenen Geometrie, 1895; and

Klein, F. (Translator: A. Ziwet), Riemann and his Significance for

the Development of Modern Mathematics, 1895; and Davis, N. K.,

Elements of Inductive Logic, 1895. Vol. 61, No. 1566.

Benjamin, P., The Intellectual Rise in Electricity, 1895. Vol. 62,

No. 1592.

Baldwin, J. M., The Story of the Mind, 1898. Vol. 67, No. 1737.

Darwin, G. H., The Tides and Kindred Phenomena in the Solar System,

1898. Vol. 67, No. 1747.

Marshall, H. R., Instinct and Reason, 1898. Vol. 68, No. 1774.

Britten, F. J., Old Clocks and Watches and their Makers, 1899. Vol.

69, No. 1778.

Renouvier, Ch., et Prat, L. La Nouvelle Monadologie, 1899. Vol. 69,

No. 1779.

Mackintosh, R., From Comte to Benjamin Kidd, 1899; and Moore, J. H.,

Better-World Philosophy, 1899. Vol. 69, No. 1784.

Ford, P. L., The Many-sided Franklin, 1899. Vol. 69, No. 1793.

Avenel, G. d’, Le Mécanisme de la vie moderne, 1900. Vol. 70, No.

1805.

Reid, W., Memoirs and Correspondence of Lyon Playfair, 1899. Vol.

70, No. 1806.

Stevenson, F. S., Robert Grosseteste, 1899. Vol. 70, No. 1816.

Thilly, F., Introduction to Ethics, 1900. Vol. 70, No. 1825.

Wallace, A. R., Studies, Scientific and Social, 1900. Vol. 72, No.

1854.

Sime, J., William Herschel and His Work, 1900. Vol. 72, No. 1856.

Rand, B. (Editor), The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical

Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, 1900; and Robertson, J. M.

(Editor), Characteristics of Men, _etc._, by Shaftesbury, 1900. Vol.

72, No. 1857.

Bacon, Rev. J. M., By Land and Sea, 1901. Vol. 72, No. 1865.

Jordan, W. L., Essays in Illustration of the Action of Astral

Gravitation in Natural Phenomena, 1900. Vol. 72, No. 1876.

Goblot, E., Le Vocabulaire Philosophique, 1901. Vol. 72, No. 1877.

Fraser, A. C. (Editor), The Works of George Berkeley, 1901. Vol. 73,

No. 1883.

Frazer, P., Bibliotics, 1901. Vol. 73, No. 1883.

Caldecott, A., The Philosophy of Religion in England and America,

1901. Vol. 73, No. 1885.

Review of four physical books. Vol. 73, No. 1887.

Maher, M., Psychology: Empirical and Rational, 1901. Vol. 73, No.

1892.

Mezes, S. E., Ethics, 1901. Vol. 73, No. 1895.

Report of the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences,

Philadelphia, 1901. Vol. 73, No. 1899.

Crozier, J. B., History of Intellectual Developments on the Lines of

Modern Evolution. Vol. III., 1901, Vol. 74, No. 1908.

Richardson, E. C., Classification, Theoretical and Practical, 1901.

Vol. 74, No. 1913.

Vallery-Radot, R. (Translator: Mrs. R. L. Devonshire), The Life of

Pasteur. Vol. 74, No. 1914.

Giddings, F. H., Inductive Sociology, 1902. Vol. 74, No. 1918.

Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences,

Washington, D. C., 1902. Vol. 74, No. 1921.

Emerson, E. R., The Story of the Vine, 1902. Vol. 74, No. 1926.

Joachim, H. H., A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, 1901. Vol. 75, No.

1932.

Review of four chemistry text-books, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1934.

Royce, J., The World and the Individual, Vol. II., 1901. Vol. 75,

No. 1935. (For a review of Vol. I., probably by Peirce, see 1900,

Vol. 70, No. 1814.)

Thorpe, T. E., Essays in Historical Chemistry, 1902. Vol. 75, No.

1938.

Paulsen, F., Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine, 1902. Vol. 75,

No. 1941.

Aikens, H. A., The Principles of Logic, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1942.

Drude, P., The Theory of Optics, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1944.

Valentine, E. S., Travels in Space, 1902; and Walker, F., Aerial

Navigation, 1902. Vol. 75, No. 1947.

Baillie, J. B., The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic, 1901.

Vol. 75, No. 1950.

Forsyth, A. R., Theory of Differential Equations, Vol. IV., 1902.

Vol. 75, No. 1952.

Ellwanger, G. W., The Pleasures of the Table, 1902. Vol. 75, No.

1955.

Earle, Alice M., Sundials and Roses of Yesterday, 1902. Vol. 75, No.

1956.

Smith, Rev. T., Euclid: His Life and System, 1902. Vol. 76, No.

1961.

Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences,

Washington, D. C., 1903. Vol. 76, No. 1974.

Hibben, J. G., Hegel’s Logic, 1902. Vol. 76, No. 1977.

Mellor, J. W., Higher Mathematics for Students of Chemistry and

Physics, 1903. Vol. 76, No. 1977.

Sturt, H. C. (Editor), Personal Idealism, 1902. Vol. 76, No. 1979.

Baldwin, J. M., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II.,

1902. Vol. 76, No. 1980.

Note on Kant’s Prolegomene edited in English by Dr. P. Carus, 1903.

Vol. 76, No. 1981.

Smith, N., Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, 1902. Vol. 77, No.

1985.

Hinds, J. I. D., Inorganic Chemistry, 1902. Vol. 77, No. 1986.

Clerke, Agnes M., Problems in Astrophysics, 1903. Vol. 77, No. 1987.

Michelson, A. A., Light Waves and their Uses, 1903; and Fleming, J.

A., Waves and Ripples in Water, 1902. Vol. 77, No. 1989.

Note on Sir Norman Lockyer. Vol. 77, No. 1794.

Note on British and American Science, 1903. Vol. 77, No. 1996.

Welby, Lady Victoria, What is Meaning? 1903; and Russell, B., The

Principles of Mathematics, 1903. Vol. 77, No. 1998.

Note on the Practical Application of the Theory of Functions, 1903.

Vol. 77, No. 1999.

Fahie, J. J., Galileo. Vol. 78, No. 2015.

Halsey, F. A., The Metric Fallacy, and Dale, S. S., The Metric

Failure in the Textile Industry. Vol. 78, No. 2020.

Newcomb, S., The Reminiscences of an Astronomer, 1903. Vol. 78, No.

2021.

Boole, Mrs. M. E., Lectures on the Logic of Arithmetic, 1903; and

Bowden, J., Elements of the Theory of Integers, 1903. Vol. 78, No.

2024.

Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences,

Washington, D. C., 1904. Vol. 78, No. 2026.

Lévy-Bruhl, L. (Translator: Kathleen de Beaumont-Klein), The

Philosophy of Auguste Comte, 1903. Vol. 78, No. 2026.

Turner, W., History of Philosophy, 1903. Vol. 79, No. 2036.

Duff, R. A., Spinoza’s Political and Ethical Philosophy. Vol. 79,

No. 2038.

Allbutt, T. C., Notes on the Composition of Scientific Papers, 1904.

Vol. 79, No. 2039.

Sylvester, J. J., The Collected Mathematical Papers of, Vol. I. Vol.

79, No. 2045.

Renouvier, Ch., Les Derniers Entretiens, 1904, and Dewey, J.,

Studies in Logical Theory, 1903. Vol. 79, No. 2046.

Royce, J., Outlines of Psychology. Vol. 79, No. 2048.

Straton, G. M., Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon

Culture. Vol. 79, No. 2055.

Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, New York,

1904. Vol. 79, No. 2057.

Boole, Mrs. M. E., The Preparation of the Child for Science, 1904.

Vol. 80, No. 2062.

Royce, J., Herbert Spencer, 1904. Vol. 80, No. 2065.

Strutt, R. J., The Becquerel Rays and the Properties of Radium,

1904. Vol. 80, No. 2066.

Schuster, A., An Introduction to the Theory of Optics, 1904. Vol.

80, No. 2071.

Findlay, A., The Phase Rule and its Application, 1904. Vol. 80, No.

2074.

Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences,

Washington, D. C., 1905. Vol. 80, No. 2078.

Flint, R., Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum, 1904; and Peirce, C.

S., A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic, 1903. Vol. 80, No. 2079.

Arnold, R. B., Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality, 1904, also

a Note on Mendeleeff’s Principles of Chemistry. Vol. 80, No. 2083.

Note on Ida Freund’s The Study of Chemical Composition. Vol. 80, No.

2086.

Carnegie, A., James Watt, 1905. Vol. 80, No. 2087.

Ross, E. A., Foundations of Sociology, 1905, and Sociological

Papers, 1905, published by the Sociological Society. Vol. 81, No.

2089.

Wundt, W. (Translator: E. B. Titchener), Principles of Physiological

Psychology, 1904. Vol. 81, No. 2090.

Roscoe, H. E., A Treatise on Chemistry, Vol. I., 1905, and de

Fleury, M., Nos Enfants au Collège, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2097.

Varigny, H. de, La Nature et la Vie, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2101.

Note on Mr. G. W. Hill’s Moon Theory. Vol. 81, 2103.

Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, New

Haven, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2108.

Gosse, E., Sir Thomas Browne, 1905. Vol. 81, No. 2111.

Rutherford, E., Radio-Activity, 1905. Vol. 82, No. 2116.

Wallace, A. R., My Life, 1905. Vol. 82, No. 2121.

Haldane, Elizabeth S., Descartes. Vol. 82, No. 2125.

Report on the Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences,

Washington, D. C., 1906. Vol. 82, No. 2130.

Rogers, H. J. (Editor), Congress of Arts and Sciences, Universal

Exposition, St. Louis, 1904. Vol. 82, No. 2136.

Loeb, J., The Dynamics of Living Matter; and Mann, G., Chemistry of

the Proteids. Vol. 83, No. 2140.

Roscoe, H. E., The Life and Experiences of Sir Henry Enfield Roscoe.

Vol. 83, No. 2141.

Marshall, T., Aristotle’s Theory of Conduct. Vol. 83, No. 2150.

Joseph, H. W. B., An Introduction to Logic. Vol. 83, No. 2156.

OTHER ARTICLES AND REVIEWS

Old Stone Mill at Newport, _Science_, 4, 1884, 512.

Criticism on “Phantasms of the Living,” _Proc. Am. Soc. Psychical

Research_, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1887).

Napoleon Intime, _The Independent_, December 21 and December 28,

1893.

Decennial Celebration of Clark University, _Science_, 11 (1900), p.

620.

Century’s Great Men of Science, _Smithsonian Institute Reports_,

1900.

Campanus _Science_, 13 (1901), p. 809.

French Academy of Science, N. Y. Evening _Post_, March 5, 1904.

Footnote 88:

The following classification is arbitrary, as some of Peirce’s most

significant reflections occur in papers under headings II. and III. It

may, however, be useful.

● Transcriber’s Notes:

○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).

Text that was in bold face is enclosed by equals signs (=bold=).

○ Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are

referenced.

○ Numbers raised to a power are denoted by the caret sign: 2^5 is 2

raised to the 5th power. Powers may be enclosed in curly brackets,

so 2^{32} is 2 raised to the 32nd power.

○ Subscripts are denoted by an underscore followed by the subscript

in curly brackets, so O_{2} means O followed by a subscript 2.