Broadly speaking, election is simply choice. In a narrower sense the
term is limited to the choice of persons for political offices, or for
nomination to such offices, by the people, or by a somewhat numerous
body, as distinguished from appointment by a single person; or the
determination of other questions submitted by law to popular vote.
This paper seeks to present the general features of American laws in the
nature of election reform, in the narrower sense, with especial reference
to the decisions of the highest courts thereon.
When the thirteen original American Colonies revolted against the mother
country, their government was essentially that which had been evolved in
a thousand years of struggle and conflict in England. But in details,
there was as wide divergence as could well be imagined among people of
practically common origin, race, religion and language. With the more
permanent union under the Federal Constitution came an impulse to conform
much governmental procedure to a common standard. Especially was this
true in the matter of elections.
After 130 years of trial and change, nearly all of the States vote on the
same day, choose representatives in Congress and Presidential electors,
as well as most other officers in the same manner, and do not differ
very widely in methods of voting. The qualifications of Electors are
somewhat diverse, though probably less so than at the beginning, and
everywhere the right of suffrage has been widely extended. The period
of active assimilation to common standards lasted to the time of the
Civil War. Then the universal, extended and heated discussion of human
rights, the fury of partisanship, the passions engendered in the great
internecine conflict, the adoption of the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments,
and following all this, the expansion of the nation in wealth and power,
together with the accumulation of colossal fortunes, and the growth
of corporate importance and influence, all these led to the trial and
testing of the most fundamental and long-established rights of man, while
every new measure in law, has had to run the gantlet from the preliminary
proposal in caucus, convention, primary, or elsewhere, to the final
decision thereon in the highest judicial tribunal. There was no final
judicial inquiry into the right of suffrage until in 1857 in New York and
in 1859 in North Carolina; but such became numerous in the reconstruction
period. From questioning new rights of black men, it was a short step to
attacking old rights of white men.
How the matter of popular elections has grown in importance may in a
degree be illustrated by the court decisions. The syllabi up to September
1, 1896, in all State and Federal cases affecting elections, occupy
553 columns of a digest; for the eight and one-half years immediately
following, up to April 1, 1905, 396 columns are so filled. Seemingly
nearly four-fifths as many points relative to the elective franchise have
been passed on in less than a decade, as in the earlier 120 years of free
government. Except in the instance of Kentucky, 1889, on the Australian
ballot for the city of Louisville, no question reached a court of last
resort prior to 1890 on such matters as the Australian ballot, factional
nominations, and nomination papers, while in that year four such cases
were decided in the New York Court of Appeals alone, and others in
Montana and Missouri.
In the earlier, simpler, primitive days an important aim was the securing
to each State its rights, real or fancied; latterly more attention has
been given to the rights of the individual to an effective share in
Government from its beginning in primary election, caucus, convention, or
otherwise, within a party or without it, and continuing until his wishes
are at last crystallized in the form of laws, and to protection against
fraud, violence and intimidation while exercising the prerogatives of an
enfranchised citizen. Not unknown are instances of denying rights already
possessed and restricting privileges long exercised. There has been
tyrannical suppression of individuals and classes. But the sweep of the
years, though slow-moving, has been in consonance with the Declaration of
Independence—“to secure these rights, to life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness, governments are instituted among men deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed.”
Yet I doubt not, through the ages,
One increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of man are widened
With the process of the suns.
In the recent movement for election reforms, four lines of advance are
marked: (1)—To secure the voter, by protecting him from evil influences,
as is the object of the various “corrupt practices acts” and kindred
laws; by guarding him against fraud, intimidation and overawing, by
means of an absolutely secret ballot, as under the Australian system;
and by preventing, as with voting-machines, any manipulation of ballots
or count. (2)—To extend the franchise by reducing the qualifications
of Electors, and so making suffrage more nearly universal, as in the
15th Amendment, and the laws enabling women to vote. (3)—To increase
popular control over officials and their acts, over law-making, and over
the initial steps in making nominations, as in making offices elective
instead of appointive, in adopting the initiative, the referendum, and
the recall, and in prescribing legal forms for primary elections and
making nominations. (4)—To secure more equitable representation of
every individual, class, party or interest; to avoid the despotism of
a majority, or worse yet, a plurality; and to prevent the practical
effacement of minorities.
(1) To preserve the purity of elections, many states have “Corrupt
Practices acts” forbidding the purchase of votes, directly or indirectly,
by candidates, committees or others, with money, intoxicating liquors,
cigars, promise of office, or otherwise. Some limit the amount of
expenditures of candidates; others require detailed sworn statements of
campaign outlays to be publicly filed. President Roosevelt in at least
his last two messages urged Congress to enact stringent laws to prevent
bribery and corruption in Federal elections, and to secure publicity of
the expenses of candidates, parties and committees, and of the source of
contributions.
Voting was doubtless at first _viva voce_. In some States, particularly
in the South, elections were so conducted for many years, and in Kentucky
this was in accordance with a constitutional provision. For a number of
reasons, however, voting by ballot was adopted in all the States, either
originally, or superseding the _viva voce_ method.
The written or printed ballot was gradually perverted to such degree that
in 1857 the legislature of South Australia adopted an official secret
ballot, printed and paid for by the public, and wholly controlled and
handled by public officers. The idea was speedily carried to England,
spread over Continental Europe, and at a somewhat later date reached the
United States, where in some form, almost everywhere modified, it has
become part of the electoral machinery in every State, under the name of
Australian ballot. On first test in American courts, the system was held
to be unconstitutional, but it has later been sustained almost everywhere
as being merely regulative. The tendency of these laws has been to make
elections more formal, and less flexible. Changes on the ballot and
“scratching” are no longer possible with the ease of the old private
ballot system. But in general the voter’s choice is not restricted to
the names printed on the ballot. Constitutional guarantees of secrecy
are not impaired by those clauses which permit aid by election officers,
to the disabled or illiterate, in marking the ballot. In some States,
as Tennessee and Maryland, illiterates are indirectly or partially
disfranchised by laws which permit aid only to persons “that by reason of
blindness or other physical disability” are unable to mark their ballots.
These laws have been sustained in the highest courts. Regulations, if
not too difficult in the opinion of the court, are upheld, and likewise
provisions that require a party to have cast a certain percentage of the
vote at the last preceding election, before it may be entitled to an
official ballot. Even forcing a citizen to choose between voting under
an obnoxious party heading, or not at all, is, at least in New Jersey,
viewed as no deprivation of his rights.
In a number of States, voting machines which automatically register the
voter’s choice have been authorized, and to some extent used.
At this point mention may be made of compulsory voting, which has been
seriously discussed as advisable to bring out otherwise good citizens
who are apathetic as to their civic responsibilities. In 1898 the people
of North Dakota adopted a constitutional amendment, permitting the
Legislature to impose a penalty for failure to vote.
(2) Although the theory of the Declaration of Independence is broad,
the practice as to the “consent of the governed” was decidedly limited
at the time of the Revolution, and the ruling power in at least some
of the States was vested in so few persons as to be oligarchic rather
than popular. Property qualifications were often essential to the
right of suffrage. These no longer exist in any State. Also age, race,
sex, citizenship, residence and payment of taxes determined a person’s
eligibility either to vote, or to hold office, or both. A higher age is
set generally in Europe, but in America twenty-one years is universally
accepted as marking maturity for voting purposes. Race distinctions
were wiped out by the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Religious tests were always few, and are probably wholly
abolished—the last effort being to bar Mormons in Nevada about twenty
years ago, but held unconstitutional. Sex is no longer considered
in Wyoming, Idaho, Utah and Colorado. While only males are fully
enfranchised in the other States, suffrage has been given to females in
many matters, particularly municipal and school. Only American citizens
may vote in a large number of States, but in others aliens also, who have
declared their intentions to become citizens by naturalization, have full
rights. In an anomalous position are Porto Ricans and Filipinos, who are
neither citizens nor aliens. Residence where the elector offers to vote
is always required, usually a year or more in the State, but sometimes
less; and a shorter time in the county and voting precinct, or city and
ward.
The extreme mobility of our population, so different from conditions
in the Old World, or even earlier America, has led to a feeling that,
in some way, the good citizen should be enabled to express his choice
in National elections, though for any reason he may have moved from
one State to another shortly before election; likewise that he save
his vote for State and district officers and measures, though crossing
county lines; and on county matters, though removing from precinct to
precinct. An effort to avert this temporary disfranchisement was made
in Kansas, by a law permitting railroad employees to vote where their
occupation happens to take them on election day. The payment of taxes has
long been a pre-requisite to casting a ballot in Pennsylvania and other
Eastern States. In the South, this requirement, as well as educational
qualifications, appears to gain ground.
(3) The extension of the subjects of popular decision has been most
marked, and the drift is increasingly in that direction. A further
innovation, rapidly growing, is the expression of a wish or preference by
the electorate where such vote is merely advisory and not binding. Office
after office, once appointive, is made elective, and when so gained by
the people is never surrendered again. In 1776-1783 only Georgia, among
the Colonies elected judges. Today thirty-one States elect them. Then
scarcely a governor was chosen by the people. At first presidential
electors were named in a variety of ways. But by 1832, the right had
everywhere been yielded to the people. The very many resolutions of
amendment offered in Congress, providing for the election of United
States Senators by direct vote, the passage of such measures repeatedly
by the House, and the persistent, reiterated requests for this reform by
various Legislatures, all show a deep-seated popular desire.
Scarcely had America copied from Australia her ballot system, when,
becoming adept as Rome in absorbing from surrounding nations, she
borrowed from the Swiss the Latin terms _referendum_ and _initiative_,
although the principles thereby expressed are as long established on this
continent as English settlements. For centuries among Germanic peoples,
there has been a steady transition of power. The right to petition the
crown grew into legislation. Final power was transferred from king to
parliament, and now in turn it is passing from the legislative branch
directly to the electorate.
None of the colonial charters, except those of Pennsylvania, had any
provision for amendment, and of the original States, only Massachusetts
and New Hampshire submitted their constitutions to the people for
ratification. By 1787, provision for amendment, thitherto wholly lacking
in all State constitutions, unless Pennsylvania’s, was added to eight
of them. The custom of amending constitutions by popular vote arose,
and is now established in every State except Delaware. Thus, changing
the organic law, upon legislative initiative, has become commonplace.
The next step—to permit the people themselves to initiate the change
and finally for them to ratify or reject and even to propose important
laws,—was slower of acceptance. Switzerland began this revolution in free
government in 1830 and by 1848 had the principle embedded in its federal
constitution. About 1886 discussions of the Swiss institutions, and
especially the initiative and referendum, as seen by American students
abroad, began to appear in leading American journals and magazines.
In 1898 South Dakota amended its constitution by adopting a provision
for initiative and referendum. In 1900 Utah followed this example. In
1902 Oregon by the decisive ratio of eleven to one in the popular vote,
adopted the most clearly expressed section yet developed in our country.
In 1904 Nevada added a similar feature to the organic law.
In April, 1901, the matter of an initiative and referendum amendment
first reached a supreme court, coming up in South Dakota, regarding
acts to take immediate effect, passed under the emergency clause of
the amendment. The court held that the Legislature is sole judge as to
what laws are “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety, or support of the State government and its
existing institutions.” The fundamental principles involved were not
questioned on either side. But in December, 1903, the initiative and
referendum amendment was directly attacked in the Supreme Court of
Oregon, and unanimously sustained. The Court, per Bean, J., said: “Nor
do we think the amendment void because in conflict with Sec. 4, of Art.
4, of the Constitution of the United States, guaranteeing to every State
a republican form of government. Now the initiative and referendum
amendment does not abolish or destroy the republican form of government,
or substitute another in its place. The representative character of the
government still remains. The people have simply reserved to themselves
a larger share of legislative power, but they have not overthrown the
republican form of government, or substituted another in its place. The
Government is still divided into legislative, executive and judicial
departments, the duties of which are discharged by representatives
selected by the people. Under this amendment, it is true, the people
may exercise a legislative power, and may effect veto or defeat bills
passed and approved by the Legislature and governor but the legislative
and executive departments are not destroyed, nor are their powers or
authority materially curtailed.” Although the question of the nature of
laws initiated, or otherwise adopted by the people, upon reference to
them, was not directly before the court, it said: “Laws proposed and
enacted by the people under the initiative clause of the amendment are
subject to the same constitutional limitations as other statutes and may
be amended or repealed by the Legislature at will.”
Concerning that clause in the amendment which says: “the veto power of
the governor shall not extend to measures referred to the people,” the
court held that this applies to bills actually referred to the people,
and not to all that might be referred, and that all acts not submitted
to a referendum may be vetoed. The Utah and Nevada amendments have not
been tested in court. Indeed, that of Utah is not self-executing, and
the Legislature has not yet enacted a method of procedure to give it
effect. The South Dakota amendment specifically applies to municipalities
as well as the State. Nebraska in 1898 enacted a general initiative and
referendum statute for counties, townships, cities, villages and school
districts.
Since the time when “popular sovereignty” was a party shibboleth in the
free or slave-State controversy, so many matters are frequently, if
not habitually, submitted to a vote that such course no longer excites
comment. The charter of Greater New York was adopted upon a referendum,
which method has become the rule rather than the exception in giving
charters effect. Within the charters themselves, the Initiative and
Referendum appears with increasing frequency.
Many of the earlier acts referring matters to the people were assailed
as unconstitutional on the ground of delegating legislative power to
the people. The diverse decisions on the subject cannot be reconciled.
Beginning with Delaware in 1847 and continuing to as late date as 1902
(in Ohio), various courts have pronounced such laws invalid. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided flatly in 1853 and
again in 1854 that conditional legislation, to take effect upon popular
approval, is not unconstitutional. Then began some subtle and attenuated
“distinguishing” among decisions. Many courts came round to the position
that “while the Legislature cannot delegate its power to enact laws,
it may provide that whether or not a law enacted shall be operative,
may be made to depend upon the popular will.” An interesting fact is
that the courts in the Southern States invariably upheld reference to
the people, and that adverse decisions are very numerous in the North.
A peculiar referendum was attempted in Massachusetts, but was declared
unconstitutional. The act provided for submitting the question of
extending municipal suffrage to women, but by a special section allowed
the women to vote on the proposition of their own enfranchisement. Where
there are constitutional clauses requiring some matters to be referred to
the people, the rule of _expressio unius est exclusio alterius_ has been
invoked in opposing the submission of other laws to the people, but in
vain. The failure of the proper officers to provide for taking a vote at
the first election after the passage of a referendum law, cannot defeat
the will of the people, or deprive them of the option of acceptance or
rejection. Until accepted by popular vote, the law takes effect only
for the purpose of submission, and at a later election mandamus will
lie to require the officials to hold the election properly. In 1900 a
movement began in Australia to make it obligatory to refer the matter to
the people in case of a deadlock between the two houses on any bill or
resolution.
The latest development of the principle is the advisory referendum, and
advisory initiative. As the name indicates, these simply show to the
legislative and executive departments the will of their constituents, and
no legal obligation rests upon the officials to give form to the popular
expression. In 1901 Illinois enacted a “public opinion law.” Delaware has
pending a constitutional amendment to establish the advisory initiative
and referendum. In 1905 Texas enacted a very interesting experiment in
the way of a primary election law, which not only provides for nomination
of candidates by direct vote, but contains provision for the use of the
initiative and referendum within party lines to direct party policy, and
determine what principles shall be promulgated in the party platform.
Many city councils have voluntarily resorted to this method of learning
the people’s will. In Buffalo in the fall of 1905 three questions were to
be submitted. But the commissioner failed or refused to put the questions
upon the voting machines at the proper time. Mandamus was brought in the
Supreme Court. Thereupon Justice Krause granted the writ on one question,
that relating to public ownership of a light and power plant by the
city, but denied it on the other two, saying as to these: “They involve
questions of legislation over which the city council manifestly has no
power. Indeed, their very purpose is not to furnish information for the
guidance of the local authorities; but they are peculiarly matters for
the Legislature.”
When the Federal Constitution was submitted for ratification, many
of the conventions in the several States, dissatisfied with certain
features and more often with omissions in, the new instrument, offered
amendments. These were numerous and varied, and some were later adopted.
In New York and Rhode Island the conventions offered an amendment for
the recall of United States Senators at the will of the Legislature,
and the substitution of others. In 1803 and again in 1806, the Virginia
Legislature passed resolutions in support of such amendment for recall.
A revival and much broader application of the principle has lately been
seen. In 1903 the city of Los Angeles, California, amended its charter
by popular vote, and in addition to the initiative and referendum, it
placed in the people’s arsenal another powerful weapon—the recall. A
few words in the charter clearly define the recall. In the special
election in September 1904, the councilman whose course in voting for two
certain ordinances was not approved by his ward, was defeated by another
candidate. The incumbent then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the rest of the council and city government generally
to recognize him for the remainder of his term. Without deciding the
point, the court assumed the validity of the recall amendment, but
sustained the petitioner on the ground that the procedure in calling
the special election was not quite regular. Even on this point, Chief
Justice Beatty dissented. In an inferior court, the matter had come up in
another form, and Judge Ostler decided against the incumbent, holding
that the recall amendment is not obnoxious to either the State or Federal
constitution, that it was not necessary to make charges in the petition
for election, but simply to make statements of reasons to enlighten the
public; that the officer had no property in the office nor vested right
to hold to the end of his term; that it was no contract, but a mere
agency, terminable at any time by the principal, the sovereign people.
With the general adoption of the Australian ballot, whether pure or
modified, a certain rigidity and official formality was introduced, which
makes independent action, or the rejection of “regular” party candidates,
however unworthy they be, increasingly difficult. This put a premium
upon the control of conventions and party machinery, and the naming
of party candidates by whatever means. To secure a fair, untrammeled
expression of popular will in the initiatory step of making nominations,
a system of primary election laws has been evolved, and now exists in
almost every State. The early forms applied where parties voluntarily, in
primary elections, made nominations, sometimes of candidates by direct
vote, but more often only of delegates to conventions, all under party
management and control, subject to such public laws; the later forms are
mandatory, requiring all parties to nominate candidates, or delegates,
at an official primary election, under public control. The usual course
of evolution has been to hold primaries for naming delegates, and then
to assume the nomination of all candidates without the intervention of
delegates.
About 1879 or 1880 a primary election law was enacted in Kentucky, but
no obligation was imposed on any party or persons to nominate candidates
by primary election. In 1895, almost simultaneously, several States
adopted compulsory primary laws, limiting their operation at first to
one or several large cities, and later extending them over the State in
either a mandatory or an optional form. So widely do these enactments
differ, that it is hard to deduce general statements of their features.
Many have been upheld, and not a few overthrown. There has been a general
tendency to substitute mandatory for optional laws. After a bitter fight,
extending over a series of years, Wisconsin by a majority of over 50,000
adopted a mandatory primary election law in 1904, that provides for
nomination by direct vote, of almost all officers from the smallest up
to candidates for United States Senators, by all parties upon the same
day at the same polling places and with the same election officers, who
are publicly chosen from the two leading parties in the State. In 1900
California expressly recognized the primary election by a Constitutional
provision, and empowered the Legislature to prescribe conditions on
which voters may participate in such elections. The Constitution of
Mississippi, Section 247, declares that the Legislature shall enact laws
to secure fairness in primary elections. Where the primaries are official
and mandatory, all expenses are paid by the public; where they are
voluntary, the cost falls on the party holding them. Myriads of questions
have arisen out of these elections, and Legislatures have sought in a
variety of ways, to solve them. The proclivity of some voters to take
part in all primaries has been an ever-present problem in those States
that permit the several parties to hold their primaries at different
times and places.
Where it is entirely optional with a party, whether or not to nominate
by primaries, having decided affirmatively the party must conduct such
election strictly in accordance with the statutes. The first primary laws
made past acts the test of qualification to take part in a party primary
election. But later laws incline to accept future intentions instead,
while New Jersey, at least, requires both faith and works. Kentucky’s
court has held that the Constitutional provisions relating to elections,
do not apply to primary elections, but most courts that have considered
the subject, take the opposite view. Massachusetts holds that a primary
law is not unconstitutional in authorizing printing on the ballots, the
names of candidates presented by a certain number of voters, if blanks
are left for the insertion of the names of other candidates not so
presented. But Minnesota denies this poor boon to voter and candidate,
and says that no blanks need be left in which to write a name.
In many instances, only parties casting a certain percentage of the total
vote are privileged to avail themselves of the mandatory laws, and such
limitation has been upheld where ample provision is made for nominations
in other ways, by the minor parties. In some of the laws, the procedure
is minutely detailed; others are very brief and general. Some leave much
to the party rules and machinery already in existence, or that may be
provided, and even expressly declare that the party’s rules shall govern
in matters not provided for in the law. While the provisions of a primary
law may apply only to general elections, seemingly to the exclusion
of special elections, it is not therefore a special law, within the
Constitutional meaning of the term, and in all elections to which the act
does not apply, the old statutes will govern as before the passing of a
primary law. Nor is a law rendered special by requiring direct choice of
the candidates in a single ward or township, while for larger divisions,
delegates are selected to hold nominating conventions. A New York statute
distinguishes between municipal and other elections in determining party
affiliations, so that a man may claim party regularity, though voting
differently at will in city affairs. The inalienable right of the people
to call Cincinnatus and Putnam from their plows, when the office seeks
the man has been vindicated by the Supreme Court of Michigan.
(4) Ever since man first espoused the doctrine of majority rule in
popular Government, students have been perplexed by the problems
presented when three or more candidates for one office, or three or
more solutions of one question, have been before the people. Likewise,
the utter elimination of the minority from a voice in affairs, and its
treatment as a wholly negligible factor, has troubled philosophers and
statesmen who desire justice and truly representative government. In the
early history of this nation, five or more of the original commonwealths
chose their representatives in Congress on a general ticket; five chose
by districts, and this system gradually spread, until in 1842 it was made
mandatory. Numerous constitutional amendments were offered, especially
in the early days, to elect Presidential Electors by districts, and
Representatives by districts. In 1877 and again in 1888, Maish of
Pennsylvania presented resolutions of amendment dividing the electoral
votes of each State in proportion to the popular vote for the several
candidates. Many States provide for the distribution of election boards,
and some few other offices among political parties, usually between the
two leading parties. In 1870 Illinois adopted a constitution with a
section to secure proportional representation, or more properly, minority
representation, in the legislature. Quite a number of proportional
measures have been passed in the different States, but most of them have
been pronounced to be unconstitutional. In March 1889, the Michigan
Legislature enacted a law embodying the “cumulative” plan to represent
the minority. It was held unconstitutional. In the opinion, Chief Justice
Champlin discusses the matter philosophically and historically, and
describes the four plans known as the “restrictive” or “limited vote,”
the “Cumulative,” the “Geneva,” “free vote,” or “Gilpin” plan, and the
“Hare” or “single vote” system. To this there has since been added
perhaps as, fifth—the “Gove” plan.
The “restrictive” or “limited vote” plan has been used in American
elections more than any other method designed to assure representation
of a minority. The Pennsylvania Constitution prescribed the limited
vote for Judges of the Supreme Court, County Commissioners and some
other officers. The principle has been extended by simple statutory
enactment, in the Keystone State, and upheld there. But similar laws
in Ohio, New Jersey and Rhode Island, have been repeatedly pronounced
unconstitutional. In foreign countries, the system is much used. The
“cumulative” plan is much used in corporations, and some attempt has been
made to apply it in general elections, the Illinois selection of its
lower house, being the most prominent example. Beginning in 1874, Ohio,
too, used this method for a while in selecting Legislators. In 1889 it
was applied in Boston to choosing Aldermen. In Michigan the attempt so
to elect the lower house was held void, as has been stated. The “free
vote” has gained no foothold in our land, but is much used in Europe. The
Hare-Spence plan has been in use in some parts of Denmark since 1856,
also in Tasmania, parts of Australia and New Zealand.
The “preferential ballot,” which is a prominent feature of the
Hare-Spence method of securing proportional representation, has also been
used where single candidates are to be chosen to office, in order to
assure a majority choice among three or more candidates.
Even this simple survey of events shows strongly the steady advance of
the electorate in taking power into their own hands. If any mistrust the
people, if any have any misgivings lest the masses be incapable of using
wisely the powers they have assumed, he may find relief in the thought
that whereas the average mature American of the year 1800 had enjoyed but
82 days of schooling in his life, his descendant of today receives 1,034
days’ public instruction. The trend toward democracy may be the result of
men’s conscious deliberate design; it may be unconscious destiny.
States are not great,
Except as men may make them.
Men are not great, except they do and dare;
But States, like men,
Have destinies that take them.
That bear them on, not knowing how or where.
[Illustration: _Our Sword of Damocles_
_Warren, in Boston Herald_]
[Illustration: _Uncle Doesn’t Seem to be Going Anywhere_
_Wilder, in Chicago Record-Herald_]
[Illustration: _The Jolly Rogers_
_Cory, in N. Y. World_]
[Illustration: PIERRE, SANSCULOTTE