PART III.--CONTINUED.

LETTERS WRITTEN AFTER HIS RETURN TO THE U. S. DOWN TO THE TIME OF HIS

DEATH.

1790-1826.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

PHILADELPHIA, June 28, 1793.

DEAR SIR,--I should have taken time ere this to have considered the

observations of Mr. Young, could I at this place have done it in such

a way as would satisfy either him or myself. When I wrote the notes of

the last year, I had never before thought of calculating what were the

profits of a capital invested in Virginia agriculture. Yet that appeared

to be what Mr. Young most desired. Lest therefore no other of those,

whom you consulted for him, should attempt such a calculation, I did

it; but being at such a distance from the country of which I wrote, and

having been absent from that and from the subject in consideration many

years, I could only, for my facts, recur to my own recollection, weakened

by time and very different applications, and I had no means here of

correcting my facts. I therefore hazarded the calculation rather as an

essay of the mode of calculating the profits of a Virginia estate, than

as an operation which was to be ultimately relied on. When I went last

to Virginia I put the press-copy of those notes into the hands of the

most skilful and successful farmer in the part of the country of which

I wrote. He omitted to return them to me, which adds another impediment

to my resuming the subject here; but indeed if I had them, I could only

present the same facts, with some corrections and some justifications of

the principles of calculation. This would not and ought not to satisfy Mr.

Young. When I return home I shall have time and opportunity of answering

Mr. Young's enquiries fully. I will first establish the facts as adapted

to the present times, and not to those to which I was obliged to recur by

recollection, and I will make the calculation on rigorous principles. The

delay necessary for this will I hope be compensated by giving something

which no endeavors on my part shall be wanting to make it worthy of

confidence. In the meantime Mr. Young must not pronounce too hastily on

the impossibility of an annual production of £750 worth of wheat coupled

with a cattle product of £125. My object was to state the produce of

a _good_ farm, under _good_ husbandry as practised in my part of the

country. Manure does not enter into this, because we can buy an acre of

new land cheaper than we can manure an old acre. Good husbandry with us

consists in abandoning Indian corn and tobacco, tending small grain, some

red clover, following, and endeavoring to have, while the lands are at

rest, a spontaneous cover of white clover. I do not present this as a

culture judicious in itself, but as _good_ in comparison with what most

people there pursue. Mr. Young has never had an opportunity of seeing how

slowly the fertility of the _original soil_ is exhausted. With moderate

management of it, I can affirm that the James river lowgrounds with the

cultivation of small grain, will never be exhausted: because we know that

under that cultivation we must now and then take them down with Indian

corn, or they become, as they were originally, too rich to bring wheat.

The highlands, where I live, have been cultivated about sixty years. The

culture was tobacco and Indian corn as long as they would bring enough

to pay the labor. Then they were turned out. After four or five years

rest they would bring good corn again, and in double that time perhaps

good tobacco. Then they would be exhausted by a second series of tobacco

and corn. Latterly we have begun to cultivate small grain; and excluding

Indian corn, and following, such of them as were originally good, soon

rise up to fifteen or twenty bushels the acre. We allow that every laborer

will manage ten acres of wheat, except at harvest. I have no doubt but

the coupling cattle and sheep with this would prodigiously improve the

produce. This improvement Mr. Young will be better able to calculate than

anybody else. I am so well satisfied of it myself, that having engaged a

good farmer from the head of Elk, (the style of farming there you know

well,) I mean in a farm of about 500 acres of cleared land and with a

dozen laborers to try the plan of wheat, rye, potatoes, clover, with a

mixture of some Indian corn with the potatoes, and to push the number

of sheep. This last hint I have taken from Mr. Young's letters which you

have been so kind as to communicate to me. I have never before considered

with due attention the profit from that animal. I shall not be able to put

the farm into that form exactly the ensuing autumn, but against another

I hope I shall, and I shall attend with precision to the measures of the

ground and of the product, which may perhaps give you something hereafter

to communicate to Mr. Young which may gratify him, but I will furnish the

ensuing winter what was desired in Mr. Young's letter of Jan. 17, 1793. I

have the honor to be, with great and sincere esteem, dear Sir, your most

obedient humble servant.

TO DR. GILMER.

PHILADELPHIA, June 25, 1793.

DEAR DOCTOR,--* * * * * Dumourier was known to be a scoundrel in grain.

I mentioned this from the beginning of his being placed at the head

of the armies; but his victories at length silenced me. His apostasy

has now proved that an unprincipled man, let his other fitnesses be

what they will, ought never to be employed. It has proved too that the

French army, as well as nation, cannot be shaken in their republicanism.

Dumourier's popularity put it to as severe a proof as could be offered.

Their steadiness to their principles insures the issue of their revolution

against every effort but by the way of famine. Should that take place the

effect would be incalculable; because our machine, unsupported by food, is

no longer under the control of reason. This crisis, however, is now nearly

over, as their harvest is by this time beginning. As far as the last

accounts come down, they were retiring to within their own limits; where

their assignats would do for money, (except at Mentz,) England too is

issuing her paper, not founded like the assignats, on land, but on pawns

of thread, ribbons, &c. They will soon learn the science of depreciation,

and their whole paper system vanish into nothing, on which it is bottomed.

My affectionate respects to Mrs. Gilmer, and am, dear Doctor, yours,

sincerely.

TO COLONEL MONROE.

PHILADELPHIA, June 28, 1793.

DEAR SIR,--I have to acknowledge your favor of May 28. I believe that

through all America there has been but a single sentiment on the subject

of peace and war, which was in favor of the former. The Executive here

has cherished it with equal and unanimous desire. We have differed

perhaps as to the conduct exactly adapted to the securing it. We have as

yet no indirections of the intentions or even the wishes of the British

government. I rather believe they mean to hold themselves up, and be led

by events. In the meanwhile Spain is so evidently _picking a quarrel_

with us, that we see a war absolutely inevitable with her. We are making

a last effort to avoid it, but our cabinet is without any decision

in their expectations of the result. This may not be known before the

last of October, earlier than which I think you will meet. You should

therefore calculate your domestic measures on this change of position.

If France collected within her own limits shall maintain her ground there

steadily, as I think she will, (barring the effect of famine which no one

can calculate,) and if the bankruptcies of England proceed to the length

of an universal crush of their paper, which I also think they will, she

will leave Spain the bag to hold; she is emitting assignats also, that

is to say exchequer bills, to the amount of five millions English, or

one hundred and twenty-five millions French; and these are not founded

on land as the French assignats are, but on pins, thread, buckles, hops,

and whatever else you will pawn in the exchequer of double the estimated

value. But we all know that five millions of such stuff forced for sale

on the market of London, where there will be neither cash nor credit, will

not pay storage. This paper must rest then ultimately on the credit of the

nation as the rest of their public paper does, and will sink with that.

If either this takes place, or the confederacy is unsuccessful, we may be

clear of war with England. With respect to the increase of our shipping,

our merchants have no need, you know, of a permission to buy up foreign

bottoms. There is no law prohibiting it, and when bought they are American

property, and as such entitled to pass freely by our treaties with some

nations, and by the law of nations with all. Such accordingly, by a

determination of the Executive, will receive American passports. They will

not be entitled indeed to import goods on the low duties of _home-built_

vessels, the laws having confined that privilege to these only. We have

taken every possible method to guard against fraudulent conveyances,

which, if we can augment our shipping to the extent of our own carriage,

it would not be our interest to cover. I enclose you a note from Freneau,

explaining the interruption of your papers. I do not augur well of the

mode of conduct of the new French minister; I fear he will enlarge the

evils of those disaffected to his country. I am doing everything in my

power to moderate the impetuosity of his movements, and to destroy the

dangerous opinions which has been excited in him, that the people of the

United States will disavow the acts of their government, and that he has

an appeal from the Executive to Congress, and from both to the people.

Affairs with the Creeks seem to present war there as inevitable, but

that will await for you. We have no news from the northern commissioners,

but of the delay likely to be attempted by the Indians; but as we never

expected peace from the negotiation, I think no delay will be admitted

which may defeat our preparations for a campaign. Crops here are likely

to be good, though the beginning of the harvest has been a little wet. I

forgot whether I informed you that I had chosen a house for you, and was

determined in the choice by the southern aspect of the back buildings, the

only circumstance of difference between the two presented to my choice.

Give my best love to Mrs. Monroe, and be assured of the affectionate

esteem of, dear Sir, your friend and servant.

TO J. MADISON.

June 29, 1793.

SIR,--I wrote you on the 23d, and yesterday I received yours of the 17th,

which was the more welcome as it acknowledged mine of the 9th, about the

safety of which I was anxious. I now risk some other papers, the sequel of

those conveyed in that. The result I know not. We are sending a courier to

Madrid to make a last effort for the preservation of honorable peace. The

affairs of France are recovering their solidity, and from the steadiness

of the people on the defection of so popular and capital a commander as

Dumourier, we have a proof that nothing can shake this republicanism.

Hunger is to be expected; but the silence of the late papers on that

head, and the near approach of harvest, makes us hope they will weather

that rock. I do not find that there has been serious insurrection but in

Brittany, and where the noblesse having been as numerous as the people,

and indeed being almost the people, the counter-revolutionary spirit has

been known always to have existed since the night in which titles were

suppressed. The English are trying to stop the torrent of bankruptcies

by an emission of five millions of exchequer bills, loaned on the

pawn-broking plan, consequently much inferior to the assignats in value.

But that paper will sink to an immediate level with their other public

paper, and consequently can only complete the ruin of those who take it

from government at par, and on a pledge of pins, buckles, &c., of little

value, which will not sell so as to pay storage in a country where there

is no specie, and we may say no paper of confidence. Every letter which

comes expresses a firm belief that the whole paper system will now vanish

into that nothing on which it is bottomed. For even the public faith is

nothing as the mass of paper bottomed on it is known to be beyond its

possible redemption. I hope this will be a wholesome lesson to our future

Legislature. The war between France and England has brought forward the

Republicans and Monocrats in every State, so that their relative numbers

are perfectably visible.

TO MESSRS. CARMICHAEL AND SHORT.

PHILADELPHIA, June 30, 1793.

GENTLEMEN,--I have received from Messrs. Viar and Jaudenes the

representatives of Spain at this place, a letter, which, whether

considered in itself, or as the sequel of several others, conveys to us

very disagreeable prospects of the temper and views of their court towards

us. If this letter is a faithful expression of that temper, we presume

it to be the effect of egregious misrepresentations by their agents in

America. Revising our own dispositions and proceedings towards that power,

we can find in them nothing but those of peace and friendship for them;

and conscious that this will be apparent from a true statement of facts,

I shall proceed to give you such a one, to be communicated to the court

of Madrid. If they find it very different from that conveyed to them by

others, they may think it prudent to doubt, and to take and to give time

for mutual inquiry and explanation. I shall proceed to give you this

statement, beginning it from an early period.

At the commencement of the late war, the United States laid it down

as a rule of their conduct, to engage the Indian tribes within their

neighborhood to remain strictly neutral. They accordingly strongly

pressed it on them, urging that it was a family quarrel with which they

had nothing to do, and in which we wished them to take no part; and we

strengthened these recommendations by doing them every act of friendship

and good neighborhood, which circumstances left in our power. With some,

these solicitations prevailed; but the greater part of them suffered

themselves to be drawn into the war against us. They waged it in their

usual cruel manner, murdering and scalping men, women and children,

indiscriminately, burning their houses, and desolating the country. They

put us to vast expense, as well by the constant force we were obliged to

keep up in that quarter, as by the expeditions of considerable magnitude

which we were under the necessity of sending into their country from time

to time.

Peace being at length concluded with England, we had it also to conclude

with them. They had made war on us without the least provocation or

pretence of injury. They had added greatly to the cost of that war. They

had insulted our feelings by their savage cruelties. They were by our

arms completely subdued and humbled. Under all these circumstances, we

had a right to demand substantial satisfaction and indemnification. We

used that right, however, with real moderation. Their limits with us under

the former government were generally ill defined, questionable, and the

frequent cause of war. Sincerely desirous of living in their peace, of

cultivating it by every act of justice and friendship, and of rendering

them better neighbors by introducing among them some of the most useful

arts, it was necessary to begin by a precise definition of boundary.

Accordingly, at the treaties held with them, our mutual boundaries were

settled; and notwithstanding our just right to concessions adequate to the

circumstances of the case, we required such only as were inconsiderable;

and for even these, in order that we might place them in a state of

perfect conciliation, we paid them a valuable consideration, and granted

them annuities in money which have been regularly paid, and were equal to

the prices for which they have usually sold their lands.

Sensible, as they were, of the wrong they had done, they expected to make

some indemnification, and were, for the most part, satisfied with the mode

and measure of it. In one or two instances, where a dissatisfaction was

observed to remain as to the boundaries agreed on, or doubts entertained

of the authority of those with whom they were agreed, the United States

invited the parties to new treaties, and rectified what appeared to be

susceptible of it. This was particularly the case with the Creeks. They

complained of an inconvenient cession of lands on their part, and by

persons not duly representing their nation. They were therefore desired

to appoint a proper deputation to revise their treaty; and that there

might be no danger of any unfair practices, they were invited to come

to the seat of the General Government, and to treat with that directly.

They accordingly came. A considerable proportion of what had been ceded,

was, on the revision, yielded back to them, and nothing required in

lieu of it; and though they would have been better satisfied to have had

the whole restored, yet they had obtained enough to satisfy them well.

Their nation, too, would have been satisfied, for they were conscious

of their aggression, and of the moderation of the indemnity with which

we had been contented. But at that time came among them an adventurer

of the name of Bowles, who, acting from an impulse with which we are

unacquainted, flattered them with the hope of some foreign interference,

which should undo what had been done, and force us to consider the naked

grant of their peace as a sufficient satisfaction for their having made

war on us. Of this adventurer the Spanish government rid us; but not

of his principles, his practices, and his excitements against us. These

were more than continued by the officers commanding at New Orleans and

Pensacola, and by agents employed by them, and bearing their commission.

Their proceedings have been the subject of former letters to you, and

proofs of these proceedings have been sent to you. Those, with others now

sent, establish the facts, that they called assemblies of the southern

Indians, openly persuaded them to disavow their treaties, and the limits

therein established, promised to support them with all the powers which

depended on them, assured them of the protection of their sovereign,

gave them arms in great quantities for the avowed purpose of committing

hostilities on us, and promised them future supplies to their utmost

need. The Chickasaws, the most steady and faithful friends of these

States, have remained unshaken by these practices. So also have the

Chocktaws, for the most part. The Cherokees have been teased into some

expressions of discontent, delivered only to the Spanish Governors, or

their agents; while to us they have continued to speak the language of

peace and friendship. One part of the nation only, settled at Cuckamogga

and mixed with banditti and outcasts from the Shawanese and other

tribes, acknowledging control from none, and never in a state of peace,

have readily engaged in the hostilities against us to which they were

encouraged. But what was much more important, great numbers of the Creeks,

chiefly their young men, have yielded to these incitements, and have

now, for more than a twelvemonth, been committing murders and desolations

on our frontiers. Really desirous of living in peace with them, we have

redoubled our efforts to produce the same disposition in them. We have

borne with their aggressions, forbidden all returns of hostility against

them, tied up the hands of our people, insomuch that few instances of

retaliation have occurred even from our suffering citizens; we have

multiplied our gratifications to them, fed them when starving, from the

produce of our own fields and labor. No longer ago than the last winter,

when they had no other resource against famine, and must have perished in

great numbers, we carried into their country and distributed among them,

gratuitously, ten thousand bushels of corn; and that too, at the same

time, when their young men were daily committing murders on helpless women

and children on our frontiers. And though these depredations now involve

more considerable parts of the nation, we are still demanding punishment

of the guilty individuals, and shall be contented with it. These acts

of neighborly kindness and support on our part have not been confined

to the Creeks, though extended to them in much the greatest degree. Like

wants among the Chickasaws had induced us to send to them also, at first,

five hundred bushels of corn, and afterwards, fifteen hundred more. Our

language to all the tribes of Indians has constantly been, to live in

peace with one another, and in a most especial manner, we have used our

endeavors with those in the neighborhood of the Spanish colonies, to be

peaceable towards those colonies. I sent you on a former occasion the copy

of a letter from the Secretary of War to Mr. Seagrove, one of our agents

with the Indians in that quarter, merely to convey to you the general

tenor of the conduct marked out for those agents; and I desired you, in

placing before the eyes of the Spanish ministry the very contrary conduct

observed by their agents here, to invite them to a reciprocity of good

offices with our Indian neighbors, each for the other, and to make our

common peace the common object of both nations. I can protest that such

have hitherto been the candid and zealous endeavors of this government,

and that if its agents have in any instance acted in another way, it has

been equally unknown and unauthorized by us, and that were even probable

proofs of it produced, there would be no hesitation to mark them with

the disapprobation of the government. We expected the same friendly

condescension from the court of Spain, in furnishing you with proofs of

the practices of the Governor de Carondelet in particular practices avowed

by him, and attempted to be justified in his letter.

In this state of things, in such dispositions towards Spain and towards

the Indians, in such a course of proceedings with respect to them, and

while negotiations were instituted at Madrid for arranging these and all

other matters which might affect our friendship and good understanding, we

received from Messrs. de Viar and Jaudenes their letter of May the 25th,

which was the subject of mine of May the 31st to you; and now again we

have received that of the 18th instant, a copy of which is enclosed. This

letter charges us, and in the most disrespectful style, with

1. Exciting the Chickasaws to war on the Creeks.

2. Furnishing them with provisions and arms.

3. Aiming at the occupation of a post at the Ecores amargas.

4. Giving medals and marks of distinction to several Indians.

5. Meddling with the affairs of such as are allies of Spain.

6. Not using efficacious means to prevent these proceedings.

I shall make short observations on these charges.

1. Were the first true, it would not be unjustifiable. The Creeks have

now a second time commenced against us a wanton and unprovoked war, and

the present one in the face of a recent treaty, and of the most friendly

and charitable offices on our part. There would be nothing out of the

common course of proceeding then, for us to engage allies, if we needed

any, for their punishment. But we neither need, nor have sought them. The

fact itself is utterly false, and we defy the world to produce a single

proof of it. The declaration of war by the Chickasaws, as we are informed,

was a very sudden thing, produced by the murder of some of their people

by a party of Creeks, and produced so instantaneously as to give nobody

time to interfere, either to promote or prevent a rupture. We had, on

the contrary, most particularly exhorted that nation to preserve peace,

because in truth we have a most particular friendship for them. This will

be evident from a copy of the message of the President to them, among the

papers now enclosed.

2. The gift of provisions was but an act of that friendship to them,

when in the same distress, which had induced us to give five times as

much to the less friendly nation of the Creeks. But we have given arms

to them. We believe it is the practice of every white nation to give arms

to the neighboring Indians. The agents of Spain have done it abundantly,

and, we suppose, not out of their own pockets, and this for purposes

of avowed hostility on us; and they have been liberal in promises of

further supplies. We have given a few arms to a very friendly tribe, not

to make war on Spain, but to defend themselves from the atrocities of

a vastly more numerous and powerful people, and one which, by a series

of unprovoked and even unrepelled attacks on us, is obliging us to look

towards war as the only means left of curbing their insolence.

3. We are aiming, as is pretended, at an establishment on the Mississippi,

at the Ecores amargas. Considering the measures of this nature with which

Spain is going on, having, since the proposition to treat with us on

the subject, established posts at the Walnut hills and other places for

two hundred miles upwards, it would not have been wonderful if we had

taken countervailing measures. But the truth is, we have not done it. We

wished to give a fair chance to the negotiation going on, and thought it

but common candor to leave things in _statu quo_, to make no innovation

pending the negotiation. In this spirit we forbid, and deterred even by

military force, a large association of our citizens, under the name of

the Yazoo companies, which had formed to settle themselves at those very

Walnut hills, which Spain has since occupied. And so far are we from

meditating the particular establishment so boldly charged in this letter,

that we know not what place is meant by the Ecores amargas. This charge

then is false also.

4. Giving medals and marks of distinction to the Indian chiefs. This is

but blindly hinted at in this letter, but was more pointedly complained of

in the former. This has been an ancient custom from time immemorial. The

medals are considered as complimentary things, as marks of friendship to

those who come to see us, or who do us good offices, conciliatory of their

good will towards us, and not designed to produce a contrary disposition

towards others. They confer no power, and seem to have taken their origin

in the European practice, of giving medals or other marks of friendship to

the negotiators of treaties and other diplomatic characters, or visitors

of distinction. The British government, while it prevailed here, practised

the giving medals, gorgets, and bracelets to the savages, invariably. We

have continued it, and we did imagine, without pretending to know, that

Spain also did it.

5. We meddle with the affairs of Indians in alliance with Spain. We are

perfectly at a loss to know what this means. The Indians on our frontier

have treaties both with Spain and us. We have endeavored to cultivate

their friendship, to merit it by presents, charities, and exhortations to

peace with their neighbors, and particularly with the subjects of Spain.

We have carried on some little commerce with them, merely to supply their

wants. Spain too has made them presents, traded with them, kept agents

among them, though their country is within the limits established as ours

at the general peace. However, Spain has chosen to have it understood that

she has some claim to some parts of that country, and that it must be

one of the subjects of our present negotiations. Out of respect for her

then, we have considered her pretensions to the country, though it was

impossible to believe them serious, as coloring pretensions to a concern

with those Indians on the same ground with our own, and we were willing to

let them go on till a treaty should set things to right between us.

6. Another article of complaint is, that we have not used efficacious

means to suppress these practices. But if the charge is false, or the

practice justifiable, no suppression is necessary.

And lastly, these gentlemen say that on a view of these proceedings of the

United States with respect to Spain and the Indians, their allies, they

foresee that our peace with Spain is very problematical in future. The

principal object of the letter being _our_ supposed excitements of the

Chickasaws against the Creeks and _their_ protection of the latter, are

we to understand from this that if we arm to repulse the attacks of the

Creeks on ourselves it will disturb our peace with Spain? That if we will

not fold our arms and let them butcher us without resistance, Spain will

consider it as a cause of war? This is, indeed, so serious an intimation,

that the President has thought it could no longer be treated with

subordinate characters, but that his sentiments should be conveyed to the

government of Spain itself, through you.

We love and we value peace; we know its blessings from experience. We

abhor the follies of war, and are not untried in its distresses and

calamities. Unmeddling with the affairs of other nations, we had hoped

that our distance and our dispositions would have left us free, in the

example and indulgence of peace with all the world. We had, with sincere

and particular dispositions, courted and cultivated the friendship of

Spain. We have made to it great sacrifices of time and interest, and

were disposed to believe she would see her interests also in a perfect

coalition and good understanding with us. Cherishing still the same

sentiments, we have chosen, in the present instance, to ascribe the

intimations in this letter to the particular character of the writers,

displayed in the peculiarity of the style of their communications, and

therefore, we have removed the cause from them to their sovereign, in

whose justice and love of peace we have confidence. If we are disappointed

in this appeal, if we are to be forced into a contrary order of things,

our mind is made up. We shall meet it with firmness. The necessity of our

position will supersede all appeal to calculation now, as it has done

heretofore. We confide in our own strength, without boasting of it; we

respect that of others, without fearing it. If we cannot otherwise prevail

on the Creeks to discontinue their depredations, we will attack them in

force. If Spain chooses to consider our defence against savage butchery

as a cause of war to her, we must meet her also in war, with regret, but

without fear; and we shall be happier, to the last moment, to repair with

her to the tribunal of peace and reason.

The President charges you to communicate the contents of this letter

to the court of Madrid, with all the temperance and delicacy which the

dignity and character of that court render proper; but with all the

firmness and self-respect which befit a nation conscious of its rectitude,

and settled in its purpose.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the most perfect esteem and

respect, Gentlemen, your most obedient, and most humble servant.

TO COLONEL MONROE.

PHILADELPHIA, July 14, 1793.

DEAR SIR,--Your favor of June 27th, has been duly received. You have

most perfectly seized the _original_ idea of the proclamation. When first

proposed as a declaration of neutrality, it was opposed, first, because

the Executive had no power to declare neutrality. Second, as such a

declaration would be premature, and would lose us the benefit for which

it might be bartered. It was urged that there was a strong impression

in the minds of many that they were free to join in the hostilities on

the side of France, others were unapprised of the danger they would be

exposed to in carrying contraband goods, &c. It was therefore agreed that

a proclamation should issue, declaring that we were in a state of peace,

admonishing the people to do nothing contravening it, and putting them on

their guard as to contraband. On this ground it was accepted or acquiesced

in by all, and E. R., who drew it, brought it to me, the draught, to

let me see there was no such word as _neutrality_ in it. Circumstances

forbid other verbal criticisms. The public, however, soon took it up as

a declaration of neutrality, and it came to be considered at length as

such. The arming privateers in Charleston, with our means entirely, and

partly our citizens, was complained of in a memorial from Mr. Hammond.

In our consultation it was agreed we were by treaty _bound_ to prohibit

the enemies of France from arming in our ports, and were free to prohibit

France also, and that by the laws of neutrality we are bound to permit or

forbid the same things to both, as far as our treaties would permit. All,

therefore, were forbidden to arm within our ports, and the vessels armed

before the prohibition were on the advice of a majority ordered to leave

our ports. With respect to our citizens who had joined in hostilities

against a nation with whom we are at peace, the subject was thus viewed.

Treaties are law. By the treaty with England we are in a state of peace

with her. He who breaks that peace, if within our jurisdiction, breaks

the laws, and is punishable by them. And if he is punishable he ought to

be punished, because no citizen should be free to commit his country to

war. Some vessels were taken within our bays. There, foreigners as well

as natives are liable to punishment. Some were committed in the high

seas. There, as the sea is a common jurisdiction to all nations, and

divided _by persons_, each having a right to the jurisdiction over their

own citizens only, our citizens only were punishable by us. But they

were so, because within our jurisdiction. Had they gone into a _foreign

land_ and committed a hostility, they would have been clearly out of

our jurisdiction and unpunishable by the existing laws. As the armament

in Charleston had taken place before our citizens might have reflected

on the case, only two were prosecuted, merely to satisfy the complaint

made, and to serve as a warning to others. But others having attempted

to arm another vessel in New York after this was known, all the persons

concerned in the latter case, foreign as well as native, were directed

to be prosecuted. The Attorney General gave an official opinion that

the act was against law, and coincided with all our private opinions;

and the lawyers of this State, New York and Maryland, who were applied

to, were unanimously of the same opinion. Lately Mr. Rawle, Attorney of

the United States in this district, on a conference with the District

Judge, Peters, supposed the law more doubtful. New acts, therefore, of

the same kind, are left unprosecuted till the question is determined by

the proper court, which will be during the present week. If they declare

the act no offence against the laws, the Executive will have acquitted

itself towards the nation attacked by their citizens, by having submitted

them to the sentence of the laws of their country, and towards those

laws by an appeal to them in a case which interested the country, and

which was at least doubtful. I confess I think myself that the case is

punishable, and that, if found otherwise, Congress ought to make it so,

or we shall be made parties in every maritime war in which the piratical

spirit of the banditti in our ports can engage. I will write you what

the judicial determination is. Our prospects with Spain appear to me,

from circumstances taking place on this side the Atlantic, absolutely

desperate. Measures are taken to know if they are equally so on the other

side, and before the close of the year that question will be closed, and

your next meeting must probably prepare for the new order of things. I

fear the disgust of France is inevitable. We shall be to blame in past.

But the new minister much more so. His conduct is indefensible by the

most furious Jacobin. I only wish our countrymen may distinguish between

him and his nation, and if the case should ever be laid before them, may

not suffer their affection to the nation to be diminished. H., sensible

of the advantage they have got, is urging a full appeal by the Government

to the people. Such an explosion would manifestly endanger a dissolution

of the friendship between the two nations, and ought therefore to be

deprecated by every friend to our liberty; and none but an enemy to it

would wish to avail himself of the indiscretions of an individual to

compromit two nations esteeming each other ardently. It will prove that

the agents of the two people are either great bunglers or great rascals,

when they cannot preserve that peace which is the universal wish of both.

The situation of the St. Domingo fugitives (aristocrats as they are) calls

aloud for pity and charity. Never was so deep a tragedy presented to the

feelings of man. I deny the power of the general government to apply money

to such a purpose, but I deny it with a bleeding heart. It belongs to

the State governments. Pray urge ours to be liberal. The Executive should

hazard themselves here on such an occasion, and the Legislature when it

meets ought to approve and extend it. It will have a great effect in doing

away the impression of other disobligations towards France. I become daily

more convinced that all the West India islands will remain in the hands of

the people of color, and a total expulsion of the whites sooner or later

take place. It is high time we should pursue the bloody scenes which our

children certainly, and possibly ourselves, (south of Potomac,) have to

wade through, and try to avert them. We have no news from the continent

of Europe later than the 1st of May. My love to Mrs. Monroe. Tell her they

are paving the street before your new house. Adieu. Yours affectionately.

TO MESSRS. DE VIAR AND JAUDENES.

PHILADELPHIA, July 14, 1793.

GENTLEMEN,--I have laid before the President your letters of the 11th

and 13th instant. Your residence in the United States has given you an

opportunity of becoming acquainted with the extreme freedom of the press

in these States. Considering its great importance to the public liberty,

and the difficulty of subjecting it to very precise rules, the laws have

thought it less mischievous to give greater scope to its freedom, than to

the restraint of it. The President has therefore no authority to prevent

publications of the nature of those you complain of in your favor of

the 11th. I can only assure you that the government of the United States

has no part in them, and that all its expressions of respect towards his

Catholic Majesty, public and private, have been as uniform as their desire

to cultivate his friendship has been sincere.

With respect to the letters I have had the honor of receiving from you

for some time past, it must be candidly acknowledged that their complaints

were thought remarkable, as to the matters they brought forward as well as

the manner of expressing them. A succession of complaints, some founded

on small things taken up as great ones, some on suggestions contrary

to our knowledge of things, yet treated as if true on very inconclusive

evidence, and presented to view as rendering our peace very problematical,

indicated a determination to find cause for breaking the peace. The

President thought it was high time to come to an eclaircissement with your

government directly, and has taken the measure of sending a courier to

Madrid for this purpose. This of course transfers all explanation of the

past to another place. But the President is well pleased to hope from your

letters of the 11th and 13th, that all perhaps had not been meant which

had been understood from your former correspondence, and will be still

more pleased to find these and all other difficulties between the two

countries settled in such a way as to insure their future friendship.

I beg you to accept assurances of my particular esteem, and of the real

respect with which I have the honor to be, Gentlemen, your most obedient,

and most humble servant.

TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

PHILADELPHIA, July 18, 1793.

GENTLEMEN,--The war which has taken place among the powers of Europe,

produces frequent transactions within our ports and limits, on which

questions arise of considerable difficulty, and of greater importance to

the peace of the United States. These questions depend for their solution

on the construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations,

and on the laws of the land; and are often presented under circumstances

which do not give a cognizance of them to the tribunals of the country.

Yet their decision is so little analogous to the ordinary functions of the

executive, as to occasion much embarrassment and difficulty to them. The

President would, therefore, be much relieved, if he found himself free to

refer questions of this description to the opinions of the judges of the

Supreme Court of the United States, whose knowledge of the subject would

secure us against errors dangerous to the peace of the United States,

and their authority insure the respect of all parties. He has therefore

asked the attendance of such judges as could be collected in time for the

occasion, to know, in the first place, their opinion, whether the public

may with propriety be availed of their advice on these questions? And

if they may, to present, for their advice, the abstract questions which

have already occurred, or may soon occur, from which they will themselves

strike out such as any circumstances might, in their opinion, forbid them

to pronounce on.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of great esteem and respect,

Gentlemen, your most obedient humble servant.

TO J. MADISON.

July 21, 1792.

I wrote you on the 14th, since which I have no letter from you. It appears

that two considerable engagements took place between France and the

combined armies on the 1st and 8th of May. In the former, the French have

had rather the worst of it, as may be concluded by their loss of cannon

and loss of ground. In the latter, they have had rather the best, as is

proved by their remaining on the ground, and their throwing relief into

Conde, which had been the object of both battles. The French attacked in

both. They have sent commissioners to England to sound for peace. General

Felix Wimpfen is one. There is a strong belief that the bankruptcies and

demolitions of manufacturers through the three kingdoms, will induce

the English to accede to peace. E. R. is returned. The affair of the

loan has been kept suspended, and is now submitted to him. He brings

very flattering information of the loyalty of the people of Virginia

to the general government, and thinks the whole indisposition there is

directed against the Secretary of the Treasury _personally_, not against

his measures. On the whole he has quieted uneasiness here. I have never

been able to get a sight of Billy till yesterday. He has promised to

bring me the bill of your ploughs, which shall be paid. Adieu. Yours

affectionately.

TO MR. GENET.

PHILADELPHIA, July 24, 1793.

SIR,--Your favor of the 9th instant, covering the information of Silvat

Ducamp, Pierre Nouvel, Chouquet de Savarence, Gaston de Nogere and G.

Blustier, that being on their passage from the French West Indies to the

United States, on board merchant vessels of the United States, with slaves

and merchandise, of their property, these vessels were stopped by British

armed vessels and their property taken out as lawful prize, has been

received.

I believe it cannot be doubted, but that by the general law of nations,

the goods of a friend found in the vessel of an enemy are free, and the

goods of an enemy found in the vessel of a friend are lawful prize.

Upon this principle, I presume, the British armed vessels have taken

the property of French citizens found in our vessels, in the cases

above mentioned, and I confess I should be at a loss on what principle

to reclaim it. It is true that sundry nations, desirous of avoiding the

inconveniences of having their vessels stopped at sea, ransacked, carried

into port and detained, under pretence of having enemy goods aboard, have

in many instances introduced by their special treaties another principle

between them, that enemy bottoms shall make enemy goods, and friendly

bottoms friendly goods; a principle much less embarrassing to commerce,

and equal to all parties in point of gain and loss. But this is altogether

the effect of particular treaty, controlling in special cases the general

principle of the law of nations, and therefore taking effect between

such nations only as have so agreed to control it. England has generally

determined to adhere to the rigorous principle, having, in no instance,

as far as I recollect, agreed to the modification of letting the property

of the goods follow that of the vessel, except in the single one of her

treaty with France. We have adopted this modification in our treaties

with France, the United Netherlands and Russia; and therefore, as to

them, our vessels cover the goods of their enemies, and we lose our goods

when in the vessels of their enemies. Accordingly, you will be pleased to

recollect, that in the late case of Holland and Mackie, citizens of the

United States, who had laden a cargo of flour on board a British vessel,

which was taken by the French frigate l'Ambuscade and brought into this

port, when I reclaimed the cargo it was only on the ground that they were

ignorant of the declaration of war when it was shipped. You observed,

however, that the 14th article of our treaty had provided that ignorance

should not be pleaded beyond two months after the declaration of war,

which term had elapsed in this case by some days, and finding that to

be the truth, though their real ignorance of the declaration was equally

true, I declined the reclamation, as it never was in my view to reclaim

the cargo, nor apparently in yours, to offer to restore it, by questioning

the rule established in our treaty, that enemy bottoms make enemy goods.

With England, Spain, Portugal and Austria, we have no treaties; therefore,

we have nothing to oppose to their acting according to the general law

of nations, that enemy goods are lawful prize though found in the bottom

of a friend. Nor do I see that France can suffer on the whole; for though

she loses her goods in our vessels when found therein by England, Spain,

Portugal, or Austria, yet she gains our goods when found in the vessels

of England, Spain, Portugal, Austria, the United Netherlands, or Prussia;

and I believe I may safely affirm that we have more goods afloat in the

vessels of these six nations, than France has afloat in our vessels;

and consequently, that France is the gainer, and we the loser by the

principle of our treaty. Indeed, we are the losers in every direction of

that principle; for when it works in our favor, it is to save the goods

of our friends, when it works against us, it is to lose our own; and we

shall continue to lose while the rule is only partially established. When

we shall have established it with all nations, we shall be in a condition

neither to gain nor lose, but shall be less exposed to vexatious searches

at sea. To this condition we are endeavoring to advance; but as it depends

on the will of other nations as well as our own, we can only obtain it

when they shall be ready to concur.

I cannot, therefore, but flatter myself, that on revising the cases of

Ducamp and others, you will perceive that their losses result from the

state of war, which has permitted their enemies to take their goods,

though found in our vessels; and consequently, from circumstances over

which we have no control.

The rudeness to their persons, practised by their enemies, is certainly

not favorable to the character of the latter. We feel for it as much as

for the extension of it to our own citizens, then companions, and find in

it a motive the more for requiring measures to be taken which may prevent

repetitions of it.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your most obedient humble

servant.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

PHILADELPHIA, July 31, 1793.

DEAR SIR,--When you did me the honor of appointing me to the office I now

hold, I engaged in it without a view of continuing any length of time,

and I pretty early concluded on the close of the first four years of our

Republic as a proper period for withdrawing; which I had the honor of

communicating to you. When the period, however, arrived, circumstances had

arisen, which, in the opinion of some of my friends, rendered it proper

to postpone my purpose for awhile. These circumstances have now ceased

in such a degree as to leave me free to think again of a day on which I

may withdraw without its exciting disadvantageous opinions or conjectures

of any kind. The close of the present quarter seems to be a convenient

period, because the quarterly accounts of the domestic department are

then settled of course, and by that time, also, I may hope to receive from

abroad the materials for bringing up the foreign account to the end of its

third year. At the close, therefore, of the ensuing month of September,

I shall beg leave to retire to scenes of greater tranquility, from those

which I am every day more and more convinced that neither my talents, tone

of mind, nor time of life fit me. I have thought it my duty to mention the

matter thus early, that there may be time for the arrival of a successor,

from any part of the Union from which you may think proper to call one.

That you may find one more able to lighten the burthen of your labors,

I most sincerely wish; for no man living more sincerely wishes that your

administration could be rendered as pleasant to yourself, as it is useful

and necessary to our country, nor feels for you a more rational or cordial

attachment and respect than, dear Sir, your most obedient, and most humble

servant.

TO MR. GENET.

PHILADELPHIA, August 7, 1793.

SIR,--In a letter of June the 5th, I had the honor to inform you that the

President, after reconsidering, at your request, the case of vessels armed

within our ports to commit hostilities on nations at peace with the United

States, had finally determined that it could not be admitted, and desired

that all those which had been so armed should depart from our ports. It

being understood afterwards, that these vessels either still remained

in our ports, or had only left them to cruise on our coasts and return

again with their prizes, and that another vessel, the Little Democrat,

had been since armed at Philadelphia, it was desired, in my letter of the

12th of July, that such vessels, with their prizes, should be detained,

till a determination should be had of what was to be done under these

circumstances. In disregard, however, of this desire, the Little Democrat

went out immediately on a cruise.

I have it now in charge to inform you, that the President considers

the United States as bound, pursuant to positive assurances given in

conformity to the laws of neutrality, to effectuate the restoration of or

to make compensation for prizes, which shall have been made of any of the

parties at war with France, subsequent to the fifth day of June last, by

privateers fitted out of our ports.

That it is consequently expected, that you will cause restitution to be

made of all prizes taken and brought into our ports subsequent to the

above-mentioned day by such privateers, in defect of which, the President

considers it as incumbent upon the United States to indemnify the owners

of those prizes; the indemnification to be reimbursed by the French

nation.

That besides taking efficacious measures to prevent the future fitting out

of privateers in the ports of the United States, they will not give asylum

therein to any which shall have been at any time so fitted out, and will

cause restitution of all such prizes as shall be hereafter brought within

their ports by any of the said privateers.

It would have been but proper respect to the authority of the country,

had that been consulted before these armaments were undertaken. It would

have been satisfactory, however, if their sense of them, when declared,

had been duly acquiesced in. Reparation of the injury to which the United

States have been made so involuntarily instrumental is all which now

remains, and in this your compliance cannot but be expected.

In consequence of the information given in your letter of the 4th instant,

that certain citizens of St. Domingo, lately arrived in the United States,

were associating for the purpose of undertaking a military expedition from

the territory of the United States, against that island, the Governor of

Maryland, within which State the expedition is understood to be preparing,

is instructed to take effectual measures to prevent the same.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your most obedient, and

most humble servant.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

August 11, 1793.

Thomas Jefferson, with his respects to the President, begs leave to

express in writing more exactly what he meant to have said yesterday. A

journey home in the autumn is of a necessity which he cannot control after

the arrangements he has made, and when there, it would be his extreme wish

to remain. But if the continuance in office to the last of December, as

intimated by the President, would, by bringing the two appointments nearer

together, enable him to marshal them more beneficially to the public, and

more to his own satisfaction, either motive will suffice to induce Thomas

Jefferson to continue till that time; he submits it therefore to the

President's judgment, which he will be glad to receive when convenient, as

the arrangements he had taken may require some change.

TO ----.

August 11, 1793.

DEAR SIR,--I wrote you last on the 3d instant. Yours of July 30th,

came to hand yesterday. Besides the present which goes by post, I

write you another to-day to go by Mr. D. Randolph, who sets out the day

after to-morrow for Monticello, but whether by the direct route or via

Richmond is not yet decided. I shall desire that letter to be sent to

you by express from Monticello. I have not been able to lay my hands on

the newspaper which gave a short but true view of the intention of the

proclamation; however, having occasion to state it in a paper which I

am preparing, I have done it in the following terms, and I give you the

very words from the paper, because just as I had finished so far, 812.15.

called on me. I read it to him. He said it presented fairly his view of

the matter. He recalled to my mind that I had, at the time, opposed its

being made a declaration of neutrality on the ground that the Executive

was not the competent authority for that, and, therefore, that it was

agreed the instrument should be drawn with great care. My statement is in

these words: "On the declaration of war between France and England, the

United States being at peace with both, their situation was so new and

unexperienced by themselves, that their citizens were not, in the first

instant, sensible of the new duties resulting therefrom, and of the laws

it would impose _even on their dispositions_ towards the belligerent

powers. Some of them imagined (and chiefly their transient sea-faring

citizens) that they were free to indulge those dispositions, to take

side with either party, and enrich themselves by depredations on the

commerce of the other, and were meditating enterprises of this nature,

as was said. In this state of the public mind, and before it should

take an erroneous direction difficult to be set right, and dangerous to

themselves and their country, the President thought it expedient, by way

of Proclamation, to remind our fellow-citizens that we were in a state of

peace with all the belligerent powers; that in that state it was our duty

neither to aid nor injure any; to exhort and warn them against acts which

might contravene this duty, and particularly those of positive hostility,

for the punishment of which the laws would be appealed to, and to put

them on their guard also as to the risks they would run if they should

attempt to carry articles of contraband to any." Very soon afterwards we

learnt that he was undertaking the fitting and arming vessels in that

port, enlisting men, foreign and citizens, and giving them commissions

to cruise and commit hostilities against nations at peace with us, that

these vessels were taking and bringing prizes into our ports, that the

consuls of France were assuming to hold courts of admiralty on them, to

try, condemn and authorize their sale as legal prizes, and all this before

Mr. Genet had presented himself or his credentials to the President,

before he was received by him, without his consent or consultation, and

directly in contravention of the state of peace existing and declared to

exist in the President's proclamation, and which it was incumbent on him

to preserve till the Constitutional authority should otherwise declare.

These proceedings became immediately, as was naturally to be expected,

the subject of complaint by the representative here of that power against

whom they would chiefly operate, &c. This was the true sense of the

proclamation in the view of the draughtsman and of the two signers; but

H. had other views. The instrument was badly drawn, and made the P. go

out of his line to declare things which, though true, it was not exactly

his province to declare. The instrument was communicated to me after it

was drawn, but I was busy, and only run an eye over it to see that it was

not made a declaration of neutrality, and gave it back again, without, I

believe, changing a tittle. Pacificus has now changed his signature to

"no Jacobin." Three papers under this signature have been published in

Dunlap. I suppose they will get into Fenno. They are commentaries on the

laws of nations and on the different parts of our treaty with France. As

yet they have presented no very important heresy. Congress will not meet

till the legal day. It was referred to a meeting at my office to consider

and advice on it. I was for calling them. Kin. against it. H. said his

judgment was against it. But he would join any two who should concur so as

to make a majority either way. R. was pointedly against it. We agreed to

give our opinions separately, and though the P. was in his own judgment

for calling them, he acquiesced in the majority. I pass on to the other

letter; so adieu. Yours affectionately.

TO GOVERNEUR MORRIS.

PHILADELPHIA, August 16, 1793.

SIR,--In my letter of January the 13th, I enclosed to you copies of

several letters which had passed between Mr. Ternant, Mr. Genet and

myself, on the occurrences to which the present war had given rise within

our ports. The object of this communication was to enable you to explain

the principle on which our government was conducting itself towards

the belligerent parties; principles which might not in all cases be

satisfactory to all, but were meant to be just and impartial to all. Mr.

Genet had been then but a little time with us; and but a little more was

necessary to develop in him a character and conduct so unexpected and so

extraordinary, as to place us in the most distressing dilemma, between

our regard for his nation, which is constant and sincere, and a regard for

our laws, the authority of which must be maintained; for the peace of our

country, which the executive magistrate is charged to preserve; for its

honor, offended in the person of that magistrate; and for its character

grossly traduced, in the conversations and letters of this gentleman. In

the course of these transactions, it has been a great comfort to us to

believe, that none of them were within the intentions or expectations of

his employers. These had been too recently expressed in acts which nothing

could discolor, in the letters of the Executive Council, in the letter

and decrees of the National Assembly, and in the general demeanor of the

nation towards us, to describe to them things of so contrary a character.

Our first duty, therefore, was, to draw a strong line between their

intentions and the proceedings of their minister; our second, to lay those

proceedings faithfully before them.

On the declaration of war between France and England, the United States

being at peace with both, their situation was so new and unexperienced by

themselves, that their citizens were not, in the first instant, sensible

of the new duties resulting therefrom, and of the restraints it would

impose even _on their dispositions_ towards the belligerent powers. Some

of them imagined (and chiefly their transient sea-faring citizens) that

they were free to indulge those dispositions, to take side with either

party, and enrich themselves by depredations on the commerce of the other,

and were meditating enterprises of this nature, as there was reason to

believe. In this state of the public mind, and before it should take an

erroneous direction, difficult to be set right and dangerous to themselves

and their country, the President thought it expedient, through the channel

of a proclamation, to remind our fellow-citizens that we were in a state

of peace with all the belligerent powers, that in that state it was our

duty neither to aid nor injure any, to exhort and warn them against acts

which might contravene this duty, and particularly those of positive

hostility, for the punishment of which the laws would be appealed to; and

to put them on their guard also, as to the risks they would run, if they

should attempt to carry articles of contraband to any. This proclamation,

ordered on the 19th and signed the 22d day of April, was sent to you in my

letter of the 26th of the same month.

On the day of its publication, we received, through the channel of the

newspapers, the first intimation that Mr. Genet had arrived on the 8th

of the month at Charleston, in the character of Minister Plenipotentiary

from his nation to the United States, and soon after, that he had sent

on to Philadelphia the vessel in which he came, and would himself perform

the journey by land. His landing at one of the most distant ports of the

Union from his points both of departure and destination, was calculated

to excite attention; and very soon afterwards, we learned that he was

undertaking to authorize the fitting and arming vessels in that port,

enlisting men, foreigners and citizens, and giving them commissions to

cruise and commit hostilities on nations at peace with us; that these

vessels were taking and bringing prizes into our ports; that the consuls

of France were assuming to hold courts of admiralty on them, to try,

condemn, and authorize their sale as legal prize, and all this before Mr.

Genet had presented himself or his credentials to the President, before

he was received by him, without his consent or consultation, and directly

in contravention of the state of peace existing, and declared to exist

in the President's proclamation, and incumbent on him to preserve till

the constitutional authority should otherwise declare. These proceedings

became immediately, as was naturally to be expected, the subject of

complaint by the representative here of that power against whom they would

chiefly operate. The British minister presented several memorials thereon,

to which we gave the answer of May the 15th, heretofore enclosed to you,

corresponding in substance with a letter of the same date written to Mr.

Ternant, the minister of France then residing here, a copy of which I

send herewith. On the next day Mr. Genet reached this place, about five

or six weeks after he had arrived at Charleston, and might have been

at Philadelphia, if he had steered for it directly. He was immediately

presented to the President, and received by him as the minister of the

republic; and as the conduct before stated seemed to bespeak a design

of forcing us into the war without allowing us the exercise of any free

will in the case, nothing could be more assuaging than his assurance to

the President at his reception, which he repeated to me afterwards in

conversation, and in public to the citizens of Philadelphia in answer to

an address from them, that on account of our remote situation and other

circumstances, France did not expect that we should become a party to the

war, but wished to see us pursue our prosperity and happiness in peace.

In a conversation a few days after, Mr. Genet told me that M. de Ternant

had delivered him my letter of May the 15th. He spoke something of the

case of the Grange, and then of the armament at Charleston, explained the

circumstances which had led him to it before he had been received by the

government and had consulted its will, expressed a hope that the President

had not so absolutely decided against the measure but that he would hear

what was to be said in support of it, that he would write me a letter on

the subject, in which he thought he could justify it under our treaty; but

that if the President should finally determine otherwise, he must submit;

for that assuredly his instructions were to do what would be agreeable to

us. He accordingly wrote the letter of May the 27th. The President took

the case again into consideration, and found nothing in that letter which

could shake the grounds of his former decision. My letter of June the 5th

notifying this to him, his of June the 8th and 14th, mine of the 17th,

and his again of the 22d, will show what further passed on this subject,

and that he was far from retaining his disposition to acquiesce in the

ultimate will of the President.

It would be tedious to pursue this and our subsequent correspondence

through all their details. Referring, therefore, for these to the letters

themselves, which shall accompany this, I will present a summary view

only of all the points of difference which have arisen, and the grounds on

which they rest.

1. Mr. Genet asserts his right of arming in our ports and of enlisting

our citizens, and that we have no right to restrain him or punish them.

Examining this question under the law of nations, founded on the general

sense and usage of mankind, we have produced proofs, from the most

enlightened and approved writers on the subject, that a neutral nation

must, in all things relating to the war, observe an exact impartiality

towards the parties, that favors to one to the prejudice of the other,

would import a fraudulent neutrality, of which no nation would be the

dupe; that no succor should be given to either, unless stipulated by

treaty, in men, arms, or anything else directly serving for war; that

the right of raising troops being one of the rights of sovereignty, and

consequently appertaining exclusively to the nation itself, no foreign

power or person can levy men within its territory without its consent;

and he who does, may be rightfully and severely punished; that if the

United States have a right to refuse the permission to arm vessels and

raise men within their ports and territories, they are bound by the laws

of neutrality to exercise that right, and to prohibit such armaments and

enlistments. To these principles of the law of nations Mr. Genet answers,

by calling them "diplomatic subtleties," and "aphorisms of Vattel and

others." But something more than this is necessary to disprove them; and

till they are disproved, we hold it certain that the law of nations and

the rules of neutrality forbid our permitting either party to arm in our

ports.

But Mr. Genet says, that the twenty-second article of our treaty allows

him _expressly_ to arm in our ports. Why has he not quoted the very words

of that article _expressly_ allowing it? For that would have put an end

to all further question. The words of the article are, "it shall not be

lawful for any foreign privateers not belonging to subjects of the M.

C. King, nor citizens of the said United States, who have commissions

from any foreign Prince or State in enmity with either nation, to fit

their ships in the ports of either the one or the other of the aforesaid

parties." Translate this from the general terms in which it here

stands, into the special case produced by the present war. "Privateers

not belonging to France or the United States, and having commissions

from the enemies of one of them," are, in the present state of things,

"British, Dutch and Spanish privateers." Substituting these, then, for the

equivalent terms, it will stand thus, "it shall not be lawful for British,

Dutch or Spanish privateers to fit their ships in the ports of the United

States." Is this an _express_ permission to France to do it? Does the

negative to the enemies of France, and silence as to France herself,

imply an affirmative to France? Certainly not; it leaves the question as

to France open, and free to be decided according to circumstances. And if

the parties had meant an affirmative stipulation, they would have provided

for it expressly; they would never have left so important a point to be

inferred from mere silence or implications. Suppose they had desired to

stipulate a refusal to their enemies, but nothing to themselves; what form

of expression would they have used? Certainly the one they have used; an

express stipulation as to their enemies, and silence as to themselves.

And such an intention corresponds not only with the words, but with the

circumstances of the times. It was of value to each party to exclude

its enemies from arming in the ports of the other, and could in no case

embarrass them. They therefore stipulated so far mutually. But each might

be embarrassed by permitting the other to arm in its ports. They therefore

would not stipulate to permit that. Let us go back to the state of things

in France when this treaty was made, and we shall find several cases

wherein France could not have permitted us to arm in her ports. Suppose a

war between these States and Spain. We know, that by the treaties between

France and Spain, the former could not permit the enemies of the latter

to arm in her ports. It was honest in her, therefore, not to deceive

us by such a stipulation. Suppose a war between these States and Great

Britain. By the treaties between France and Great Britain, in force at the

signature of ours, we could not have been permitted to arm in the ports

of France. She could not then have meant in this article to give us such

a right. She has manifested the same sense of it in her subsequent treaty

with England, made eight years after the date of ours, stipulating in the

sixteenth article of it, as in our twenty-second, that foreign privateers,

_not being subjects of either crown_, should not arm against either in the

ports of the other. If this had amounted to an affirmative stipulation

that the subjects of the other crown might arm in her ports _against

us_, it would have been in direct contradiction to her twenty-second

article with us. So that to give to these negative stipulations an

affirmative effect, is to render them inconsistent with each other, and

with good faith; to give them only their negative and natural effect,

is to reconcile them to one another and to good faith, and is clearly to

adopt the sense in which France herself has expounded them. We may justly

conclude, then, that the article only obliges us to refuse this right,

in the present case, to Great Britain and the other enemies of France. It

does not go on to give it to France, either expressly or by implication.

We may then refuse it. And since we are bound by treaty to refuse it to

the one party, and are free to refuse it to that other, we are bound by

the laws of neutrality to refuse it to the other. The aiding either party

then with vessels, arms or men, being unlawful by the law of nations,

and not rendered lawful by the treaty, it is made a question whether our

citizens, joining in these unlawful enterprises, may be punished?

The United States being in a state of peace with most of the belligerent

powers by treaty, and with all of them by the laws of nature, murders

and robberies committed by our citizens within our territory, or on the

high seas, on those with whom we are so at peace, are punishable equally

as if committed on our own inhabitants. If I might venture to reason a

little formally, without being charged with running into 'subtleties and

aphorisms,' I would say that if one citizen has a right to go to war of

his own authority, every citizen has the same. If every citizen has that

right, then the nation (which is composed of all its citizens) has a right

to go to war, by the authority of its individual citizen. But this is not

true either on the general principles of society, or by our Constitution,

which gives that power to Congress alone, and not to the citizens

individually. Then the first position was not true; and no citizen has

a right to go to war of his own authority; and for what he does without

right, he ought to be punished. Indeed, nothing can be more obviously

absurd than to say, that all the citizens may be at war, and yet the

nation at peace.

It has been pretended, indeed, that the engagement of a citizen in an

enterprise of this nature, was a divestment of the character of citizen,

and a transfer of jurisdiction over him to another sovereign. Our citizens

are certainly free to divest themselves of that character by emigration

and other acts manifesting their intention, and may then become the

subjects of another power, and free to do whatever the subjects of that

power may do. But the laws do not admit that the bare commission of a

crime amounts of itself to a divestment of the character of citizen, and

withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never prescribe an

illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise

himself; nor render treason, for instance, innocent by giving it the

force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country.

Accordingly, in the case of Henfeild, a citizen of these States, charged

with having engaged in the port of Charleston, in an enterprise against

nations at peace with us, and with having joined in the actual commission

of hostilities, the Attorney General of the United States, in an official

opinion, declared that the act with which he was charged was punishable

by law. The same thing has been unanimously declared by two of the

circuit courts of the United States, as you will see in the charges of

Chief Justice Jay, delivered at Richmond, and Judge Wilson, delivered

at Philadelphia, both of which are herewith sent. Yet Mr. Genet, in the

moment he lands at Charleston, is able to tell the Governor, and continues

to affirm in his correspondence here, that no law of the United States

authorizes their government to restrain either its own citizens or the

foreigners inhabiting its territory, from warring against the enemies of

France. It is true, indeed, that in the case of Henfeild, the jury which

tried, absolved him. But it appeared on the trial, that the crime was

not knowingly and wilfully committed; that Henfeild was ignorant of the

unlawfulness of his undertaking; that in the moment he was apprised of

it he showed real contrition; that he had rendered meritorious services

during the late war, and declared he would live and die an American. The

jury, therefore, in absolving him, did no more than the constitutional

authority might have done, had they found him guilty: the Constitution

having provided for the pardon of offences in certain cases, and there

being no case where it would have been more proper than where no offence

was contemplated. Henfeild, therefore, was still an American citizen, and

Mr. Genet's reclamation of him was as unauthorized as the first enlistment

of him.

2. Another doctrine, advanced by Mr. Genet is, that our courts can take no

cognizance of questions whether vessels, _held by theirs_ as prizes, are

lawful prizes or not; that this jurisdiction belongs exclusively to their

consulates here, which have been lately erected by the National Assembly

into complete courts of admiralty.

Let us consider, first, what is the extent of jurisdiction which the

consulates of France may rightfully exercise here. Every nation has of

natural right, entirely and exclusively, all the jurisdiction which may

be rightfully exercised in the territory it occupies. If it cedes any

portion of that jurisdiction to judges appointed by another nation, the

limits of their power must depend on the instrument of cession. The United

States and France have, by their consular convention, given mutually to

their consuls jurisdiction in certain cases especially enumerated. But

that convention gives to neither the power of establishing complete courts

of admiralty within the territory of the other, nor even of deciding

the particular question of prize or not prize. The consulates of France,

then, cannot take judicial cognizance of those questions here. Of this

opinion Mr. Genet was when he wrote his letter of May the 27th, wherein

he promises to correct the error of the consul at Charleston, of whom, in

my letters of the 15th instant, I had complained, as arrogating to himself

that jurisdiction; though in his subsequent letters he has thought proper

to embark in the errors of his consuls.

But the United States, at the same time, do not pretend any right to try

the validity of captures made _on the high seas_, by France, or any other

nation, over its enemies. These questions belong, of common usage, to the

sovereign of the captor, and whenever it is necessary to determine them,

resort must be had to his courts. This is the case provided for in the

seventeenth article of the treaty, which says, that such prizes shall not

be arrested, nor cognizance taken of the validity thereof; a stipulation

much insisted on by Mr. Genet and the consuls, and which we never thought

of infringing or questioning. As the validity of captures then, made _on

the high seas_ by France over its enemies, cannot be tried within the

United States by their consuls, so neither can they by our own courts. Nor

is this the question between us, though we have been misled into it.

The real question is, whether the United States have not a right to

protect vessels within their waters and on their coasts? The Grange

was taken within the Delaware, between the shores of Jersey and of the

Delaware State, and several miles above its mouth. The seizing her was a

flagrant violation of the jurisdiction of the United States. Mr. Genet,

however, instead of apologizing, takes great merit in his letters for

giving her up. The William is said to have been taken within two miles of

the shores of the United States. When the admiralty declined cognizance of

the case, she was delivered to the French consul according to my letter of

June the 25th, to be kept till the executive of the United States should

examine into the case; and Mr. Genet was desired by my letter of June the

29th, to have them furnished with the evidence on behalf of the captors,

as to the place of capture. Yet to this day it has never been done. The

brig Fanny was alleged to be taken within five miles from our shore; the

Catharine within two miles and a half. It is an essential attribute of the

jurisdiction of every country to preserve peace, to punish acts in breach

of it, and to restore property taken by force within its limits. Were the

armed vessel of any nation to cut away one of our own from the wharves of

Philadelphia, and to chose to call it a prize, would this exclude us from

the right of redressing the wrong? Were it the vessel of another nation,

are we not equally bound to protect it, while within our limits? Were it

seized in any other of our waters, or on the shores of the United States,

the right of redressing is still the same; and humble indeed would be our

condition, were we obliged to depend for that on the will of a foreign

consul, or on negotiation with diplomatic agents. Accordingly, this

right of protection within its waters and to a reasonable distance on its

coasts, has been acknowledged by every nation, and denied to none; and if

the property seized be yet within their power, it is their right and duty

to redress the wrong themselves. France herself has asserted the right

in herself and recognized it in us, in the sixth article of our treaty,

where we mutually stipulate that we will, _by all the means in our power_

(not by negotiation), protect and defend each other's vessels and effects

in our ports or roads, or on the seas near our countries, and recover and

restore the same to the right owners. The United Netherlands, Prussia and

Sweden, have recognized it also in treaties with us; and, indeed, it is a

standing formula, inserted in almost all the treaties of all nations, and

proving the principle to be acknowledged by all nations.

How, and by what organ of the government, whether judiciary or executive,

it shall be redressed, is not yet perfectly settled with us. One of

the subordinate courts of admiralty has been of opinion, in the first

instance, in the case of the ship William, that it does not belong to the

judiciary. Another, perhaps, may be of a contrary opinion. The question is

still _sub judice_, and an appeal to the court of last resort will decide

it finally. If finally the judiciary shall declare that it does not belong

to the _civil_ authority, it then results to the executive, charged with

the direction of the _military_ force of the Union, and the conduct of

its affairs with foreign nations. But this is a mere question of internal

arrangement between the different departments of the government, depending

on the particular diction of the laws and Constitution; and it can in

nowise concern a foreign nation to which department these have delegated

it.

3. Mr. Genet, in his letter of July the 9th, requires that the ship Jane,

which he calls an English privateer, shall be immediately ordered to

depart; and to justify this, he appeals to the 22d article of our treaty,

which provides that it shall not be lawful for any foreign _privateer_ to

fit their ships in our ports, to sell _what they have taken_, or purchase

victuals, &c. The ship Jane is an English merchant vessel, which has been

many years employed in the commerce between Jamaica and these States. She

brought here a cargo of produce from that island, and was to take away

a cargo of flour. Knowing of the war when she left Jamaica, and that our

coast was lined with small French privateers, she armed for her defence,

and took one of those commissions usually called _letters of marque_. She

arrived here safely without having had any rencounter of any sort. Can

it be necessary to say that a merchant vessel is not a privateer? That

though she has arms to defend herself in time of war, in the course of her

regular commerce, this no more makes her a privateer, than a husbandman

following his plough in time of war, with a knife or pistol in his pocket,

is thereby made a soldier? The occupation of a privateer is attack and

plunder, that of a merchant vessel is commerce and self-preservation.

The article excludes the former from our ports, and from selling _what

she has taken_, that is, what she has acquired by war, to show it did not

mean the merchant vessel, and what she had acquired by commerce. Were the

merchant vessels coming for our produce forbidden to have any arms for

their defence, every adventurer who had a boat, or money enough to buy

one, would make her a privateer, our coasts would swarm with them, foreign

vessels must cease to come, our commerce must be suppressed, our produce

remain on our hands, or at least that great portion of it which we have

not vessels to carry away, our ploughs must be laid aside and agriculture

suspended. This is a sacrifice no treaty could ever contemplate, and which

we are not disposed to make out of mere complaisance to a false definition

of the term _privateer_. Finding that the Jane had purchased new carriages

to mount two or three additional guns, which she had brought in her hold,

and that she had opened additional port-holes for them, the carriages were

ordered to be re-landed, the additional port-holes stopped, and her means

of defence reduced, to be exactly the same at her departure as at her

arrival. This was done on the general principle of allowing no party to

arm within our ports.

4. The seventeenth article of our treaty leaves armed vessels free to

_conduct_, whithersoever they please, the ships and goods taken from their

enemies without paying any duty, and to depart and be conducted freely

to the places expressed in their commissions, which the captain shall be

obliged to show. It is evident, that this article does not contemplate a

freedom _to sell their prizes_ here; but on the contrary, a _departure_

to some other place, always to be expressed in their commission, where

their validity is to be finally adjudged. In such case, it would be as

unreasonable to demand duties on the goods they had taken from an enemy,

as it would be on the cargo of a merchant vessel touching in our ports for

refreshment or advices; and against this the article provides. But the

armed vessels of France have been also admitted to land and sell their

prize goods here for consumption, in which case, it is as reasonable

they should pay duties, as the goods of a merchantman landed and sold

for consumption. They have however demanded, and as a matter of right, to

sell them free of duty, a right, they say, given by this article of the

treaty, though the article does not give the right to sell at all. Where a

treaty does not give the principal right of selling, the additional one of

selling duty free cannot be given; and the laws in admitting the principal

right of selling, may withhold the additional one of selling duty free. It

must be observed, that our revenues are raised almost wholly on imported

goods. Suppose prize goods enough should be brought in to supply our

whole consumption. According to their construction we are to lose our

whole revenue. I put the extreme case to evince, more extremely, the

unreasonableness of the claim. Partial supplies would affect the revenue

but partially. They would lessen the evil, but not the error, of the

construction; and I believe we may say, with truth, that neither party had

it in contemplation, when penning this article, to abandon any part of its

revenue for the encouragement of the sea robbers of the other.

5. Another source of complaint with Mr. Genet has been, that the English

take French goods out of American vessels, which he says is against

the law of nations and ought to be prevented by us. On the contrary,

we suppose it to have been long an established principle of the law of

nations, that the goods of a friend are free in an enemy's vessel, and an

enemy's goods lawful prize in the vessel of a friend. The inconvenience

of this principle which subjects merchant vessels to be stopped at sea,

searched, ransacked, led out of their course, has induced several nations

latterly to stipulate against it by treaty, and to substitute another

in its stead, that free bottoms shall make free goods, and enemy bottoms

enemy goods; a rule equal to the other in point of loss and gain, but less

oppressive to commerce. As far as it has been introduced, it depends on

the treaties stipulating it, and forms exceptions, in special cases, to

the general operation of the law of nations. We have introduced it into

our treaties with France, Holland and Prussia; and French goods found

by the two latter nations in American bottoms are not made prize of. It

is our wish to establish it with other nations. But this requires their

consent also, is a work of time, and in the meanwhile, they have a right

to act on the general principle, without giving to us or to France cause

of complaint. Nor do I see that France can lose by it on the whole. For

though she loses _her_ goods when found in our vessels by the nations

with whom we have no treaties, yet she gains _our_ goods, when found in

the vessels of the same and all other nations; and we believe the latter

mass to be greater than the former. It is to be lamented, indeed, that

the general principle has operated so cruelly in the dreadful calamity

which has lately happened in St. Domingo. The miserable fugitives, who,

to save their lives, had taken asylum in our vessels, with such valuable

and portable things as could be gathered in the moment out of the ashes of

their houses and wrecks of their fortunes, have been plundered of these

remains by the licensed sea rovers of their enemies. This has swelled,

on this occasion, the disadvantages of the general principle, that "an

enemy's goods are free prize in the vessels of a friend." But it is one of

those deplorable and unforeseen calamities to which they expose themselves

who enter into a state of war, furnishing to us an awful lesson to avoid

it by justice and moderation, and not a cause or encouragement to expose

our own towns to the same burning and butcheries, nor of complaint because

we do not.

6. In a case like the present, where the missionary of one government

construes differently from that to which he is sent, the treaties and laws

which are to form a common rule of action for both, it would be unjust

in either to claim an exclusive right of construction. Each nation has an

equal right to expound the meaning of their common rules; and reason and

usage have established, in such cases, a convenient and well-understood

train of proceeding. It is the right and duty of the foreign missionary

to urge his own constructions, to support them with reasons which may

convince, and in terms of decency and respect which may reconcile the

government of the country to a concurrence. It is the duty of that

government to listen to his reasonings with attention and candor, and to

yield to them when just. But if it shall still appear to them that reason

and right are on their side, it follows of necessity, that exercising the

sovereign powers of the country, they have a right to proceed on their

own constructions and conclusions as to whatever is to be done within

their limits. The minister then refers the case to his own government,

asks new instructions, and, in the meantime, acquiesces in the authority

of the country. His government examines his constructions, abandons them

if wrong, insists on them if right, and the case then becomes a matter of

negotiation between the two nations. Mr. Genet, however, assumes a new

and bolder line of conduct. After deciding for himself ultimately, and

without respect to the authority of the country, he proceeds to do what

even his sovereign could not authorize, to put himself within the country

on a line with its government, to act as co-sovereign of the territory; he

arms vessels, levies men, gives commissions of war, independently of them,

and in direct opposition to their orders and efforts. When the government

forbids their citizens to arm and engage in the war, he undertakes to arm

and engage them. When they forbid vessels to be fitted in their ports

for cruising on nations with whom they are at peace, he commissions

them to fit and cruise. When they forbid an unceded jurisdiction to be

exercised within their territory by foreign agents, he undertakes to

uphold that exercise, and to avow it openly. The privateers Citoyen Genet

and Sans Culottes having been fitted out at Charleston (though without the

permission of the government, yet before it was forbidden) the President

only required they might leave our ports, and did not interfere with their

prizes. Instead, however, of their quitting our ports, the Sans Culottes

remains still, strengthening and equipping herself, and the Citoyen

Genet went out only to cruise on our coast, and to brave the authority

of the country by returning into port again with her prizes. Though in

the letter of June the 5th, the final determination of the President was

communicated, that no future armaments in our ports should be permitted,

the Vainqueur de La Bastille was afterwards equipped and commissioned in

Charleston, the Anti-George in Savannah, the Carmagnole in Delaware, a

schooner and a sloop in Boston, and the Polly or Republican was attempted

to be equipped in New York, and was the subject of reclamation by Mr.

Genet, in a style which certainly did not look like relinquishing the

practice. The Little Sarah or Little Democrat was armed, equipped and

manned, in the port of Philadelphia, under the very eye of the government,

as if meant to insult it. Having fallen down the river, and being

evidently on the point of departure for a cruise, Mr. Genet was desired

in my letter of July the 12th, on the part of the President, to detain

her till some inquiry and determination on the case should be had. Yet

within three or four days after, she was sent out by orders from Mr. Genet

himself, and is, at this time, cruising on our coasts, as appears by the

protest of the master of one of our vessels maltreated by her.

The government thus insulted and set at defiance by Mr. Genet, and

committed in its duties and engagements to others, determined still to

see in these proceedings but the character of the individual, and not to

believe, and it does not believe, that they are by instructions from his

employers. They had assured the British minister here, that the vessels

already armed to our ports should be obliged to leave them, and that no

more should be armed in them. Yet more had been armed, and those before

armed had either not gone away, or gone only to return with new prizes.

They now informed him that the order for departure should be enforced,

and the prizes made contrary to it should be restored or compensated. The

same thing was notified to Mr. Genet in my letter of August the 7th, and

that he might not conclude the promise of compensation to be of no concern

to him, and go on in his courses, he was reminded that it would be a fair

article of account against his nation.

Mr. Genet, not content with using our force, whether we will or not, in

the military line against nations with whom we are at peace, undertakes

also to direct the civil government; and particularly for the executive

and legislative bodies, to pronounce what powers may or may not be

exercised by the one or the other. Thus, in his letter of June the 8th,

he promises to respect the political opinions of the President, _till

the Representatives shall have confirmed or rejected them_; as if the

President had undertaken to decide what belonged to the decision of

Congress. In his letter of June the 4th, he says more openly, that the

President ought not to have taken on himself to decide on the subject

of the letter, but that it was of importance enough to have consulted

Congress thereon; and in that of June the 22d, he tells the President

in direct terms, that Congress ought already to have been occupied on

certain questions which he had been too hasty in deciding; thus making

himself, and not the President, the judge of the powers ascribed by the

Constitution to the executive, and dictating to him the occasion when he

should exercise the power of convening Congress at an earlier day than

their own act had prescribed.

On the following expressions, no commentary shall be made:

July 9. "Les principes philosophiques proclamées par le Président."

June 22. "Les opinions privées ou publiques de M. le President, et cette

égide ne paroissant, pas suffisante."

June 22. "Le gouvernement fédéral s'est empressé, poussé par je ne scais

quelle influence."

June 22. "Je ne puis attribuer, des démarches de cette nature qu'à des

impressions étrangéres dont le tems et la vérité triompheront."

June 25. "On poursuit avec acharnement, en vertu des instructions de M. le

Président, les armateurs Français."

June 14. "Ce réfus tend à accomplir le système infernal du roi

d'Angleterre, et des autres rois ses accomplices, pour faire périr par la

famine les Républicains Français avec la liberte."

June 8. "La lache abandon de ses amis."

July 25. "En vain le désir de conserver la paix fait-il sacrifier les

intérêts de la France à cet intérêt, du moment; en vain le soif des

richesses l'emporte-t-elle sur l'honneur dans la balance politique de

l'Amerique. Tous ces ménagemens, toute cette condescendance, toute cette

humilité n'aboutissent à rien; nos ennemis on rient, et les Français trop

confiants sont punis pour avoir cru que la nation Americaine, avoit un

pavillon, qu'elle avoit quelque égard pour ses loix, quelque conviction

de ses forces, et qu'elle tenoit au sentiment de sa dignité. Il ne m'est

pas possible de peindre toute ma sensibilité sur ce scandale qui tend à la

diminution de votre commerce, à l'oppression du notre, et à l'abaissement,

à l'avilissement des republiques. Si nos concitoyens ont été trompés, si

vous n'êtes point en état de soutenir la souveraineté de votre peuple,

parlez; nous l'avons garantié quand nous étions esclaves, nous saurons la

rendre redoubtable étant devenus libres."

We draw a veil over the sensations which these expressions excite. No

words can render them; but they will not escape the sensibility of a

friendly and magnanimous nation, who will do us justice. We see in them

neither the portrait of ourselves, nor the pencil of our friends; but

an attempt to embroil both; to add still another nation to the enemies

of his country, and to draw on both a reproach, which it is hoped will

never stain the history of either. The written proofs, of which Mr. Genet

himself was the bearer, were too unequivocal to leave a doubt that the

French nation are constant in their friendship to us. The resolves of

their National Convention, the letters of their Executive Council, attest

this truth, in terms which render it necessary to seek in some other

hypothesis the solution of Mr. Genet's machinations against our peace and

friendship.

Conscious, on our part, of the same friendly and sincere dispositions, we

can with truth affirm, both for our nation and government, that we have

never omitted a reasonable occasion of manifesting them. For I will not

consider as of that character, opportunities of sallying forth from our

ports to waylay, rob and murder defenceless merchants and others, who have

done us no injury, and who were coming to trade with us in the confidence

of our peace and amity. The violation of all the laws of order and

morality which bind mankind together, would be an unacceptable offering to

a just nation. Recurring then only to recent things, after so afflicting a

libel, we recollect with satisfaction, that in the course of two years, by

unceasing exertions, we paid up seven years' arrearages and instalments of

our debt to France, which the inefficiency of our first form of government

had suffered to be accumulating; that pressing on still to the entire

fulfilment of our engagements, we have facilitated to Mr. Genet the effect

of the instalments of the present year, to enable him to send relief to

his fellow citizens in France, threatened with famine; that in the first

moment of the insurrection which threatened the colony of St. Domingo,

we stepped forward to their relief with arms and money, taking freely

on ourselves the risk of an unauthorized aid, when delay would have been

denial; that we have received according to our best abilities the wretched

fugitives from the catastrophe of the principal town of that colony, who,

escaping from the swords and flames of civil war, threw themselves on us

naked and houseless, without food or friends, money or other means, their

faculties lost and absorbed in the depth of their distresses; that the

exclusive admission to sell here the prizes made by France on her enemies,

in the present war, though unstipulated in our treaties, and unfounded in

her own practice, or in that of other nations, as we believe; the spirit

manifested by the late grand jury in their proceedings against those

who had aided the enemies of France with arms and implements of war, the

expressions of attachment to his nation, with which Mr. Genet was welcomed

on his arrival and journey from south to north, and our long forbearance

under his gross usurpations and outrages of the laws and authority of

our country, do not bespeak the partialities intimated in his letters.

And for these things he rewards us by endeavors to excite discord and

distrust between our citizens and those whom they have entrusted with

their government, between the different branches of our government,

between our nation and his. But none of these things, we hope, will be

found in his power. That friendship which dictates to us to bear with his

conduct yet a while, lest the interests of his nation here should suffer

injury, will hasten them to replace an agent whose dispositions are such

a misrepresentation of theirs, and whose continuance here is inconsistent

with order, peace, respect, and that friendly correspondence which we hope

will ever subsist between the two nations. His government will see too

that the case is pressing. That it is impossible for two sovereign and

independent authorities to be going on within our territory at the same

time without collision. They will foresee that if Mr. Genet perseveres in

his proceedings, the consequences would be so hazardous to us, the example

so humiliating and pernicious, that we may be forced even to suspend his

functions before a successor can arrive to continue them. If our citizens

have not already been shedding each other's blood, it is not owing to the

moderation of Mr. Genet, but to the forbearance of the government. It is

well known that if the authority of the laws had been resorted to, to stop

the Little Democrat, its officers and agents were to have been resisted

by the crew of the vessel, consisting partly of American citizens. Such

events are too serious, too possible, to be left to hazard, or to what is

more than hazard, the will of an agent whose designs are so mysterious.

Lay the case then immediately before his government. Accompany it with

assurances, which cannot be stronger than true, that our friendship for

the nation is constant and unabating; that, faithful to our treaties, we

have fulfilled them in every point to the best of our understanding; that

if in anything, however, we have construed them amiss, we are ready to

enter into candid explanations, and to do whatever we can be convinced

is right; that in opposing the extravagances of an agent, whose character

they seem not sufficiently to have known, we have been urged by motives of

duty to ourselves and justice to others, which cannot but be approved by

those who are just themselves; and finally, that after independence and

self-government, there is nothing we more sincerely wish than perpetual

friendship with them.

I have the honor to be, with great respect and esteem, Dear Sir, your most

obedient, and most humble servant.[1]

FOOTNOTE:

[1] [A copy of the preceding letter was sent, enclosed by the

Secretary of State, to Mr. Genet.]

TO DUKE AND CO.

PHILADELPHIA, August 21, 1793.

GENTLEMEN,--Complaint having been made to the government of the United

States of some instances of unjustifiable vexation and spoliation

committed on our merchant vessels by the privateers of the powers at war,

and it being possible that other instances may have happened of which no

information has been given to the government, I have it in charge from

the President to assure the merchants of the United States concerned

in foreign commerce or navigation, that due attention will be paid to

any injuries they may suffer on the high seas, or in foreign countries,

contrary to the law of nations, or to existing treaties, and that on

the forwarding hither well-authenticated evidence of the same, proper

proceedings will be adopted for their relief. The just and friendly

dispositions of the several belligerent powers afford well-founded

expectation that they will not hesitate to take effectual measures for

restraining their armed vessels from committing aggressions and vexations

on our citizens or their property.

There being no particular portion or description of the mercantile body

pointed out by the law for receiving communications of this nature, I take

the liberty of addressing it to the merchants of Savannah for the State

of Georgia, and of requesting that through them it may be made known to

all those of their State whom it may concern. Information will be freely

received either from the individuals aggrieved or from any associations of

merchants who will be pleased to take the trouble of giving it in a case

so interesting to themselves and their country.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, Gentlemen, your most obedient

servant.

TO J. MADISON.

August 25, 1793.

SIR,--You will perceive by the enclosed papers that Genet has thrown

down the gauntlet to the President by the publication of his letter and

my answer, and is himself forcing that appeal to the people, and risking

that disgust which I had so much wished should have been avoided. The

indications from different parts of the continent are already sufficient

to show that the mass of the republican interest has no hesitation to

disapprove of this intermeddling by a foreigner, and the more readily as

his object was evidently, contrary to his professions, to force us into

the war. I am not certain whether some of the more furious republicans may

not schismatize with him.

TO J. MADISON.

September 1, 1793.

SIR,--My last was of the 25th, since that I have received yours of the

20th, and Col. M's of the 21st. Nothing further has passed with Mr.

Genet, but one of his consuls has committed a pretty serious deed at

Boston, by going with an armed force taken from a French frigate in the

harbor, and rescuing a vessel out of the hands of the marshal who had

arrested her by process from a court of justice; in another instance

he kept off the marshal by an armed force from serving a process on a

vessel. He is ordered, consequently, to be arrested himself, prosecuted

and punished for the rescue, and his exequatur will be revoked. You will

see in the newspapers the attack made on our commerce by the British king

in his _additional instruction_ of June 8. Though we have only newspaper

information of it, _provisional_ instructions are going to Mr. Pinckney

to require a revocation of them, and indemnification for all losses which

individuals may sustain by them in the meantime. Of the revocation I have

not the least expectation. I shall therefore be for laying the whole

business (respecting both nations) before Congress. While I think it

impossible they should not approve of what has been done disagreeable to

the friendly nation, it will be in their power to soothe them by strong

commercial retaliation against the hostile one. Pinching their commerce

will be just against themselves, advantageous to us, and conciliatory

towards our friends of the hard necessities into which their agent has

drawn us. His conduct has given room for the enemies of liberty and of

France, to come forward in a state of acrimony against that nation, which

they never would have dared to have done. The disapprobation of the agent

mingles with the reprehension of his nation, and gives a toleration to

that which it never had before. He has still some defenders in Freneau,

and Greenlief's paper, and who they are I know not: for even Hutcheson and

Dallas give him up. I enclose you a Boston paper, which will give you a

specimen of what all the papers are now filled with. You will recognize

Mr. A---- under the signature of Camillus. He writes in every week's

paper, and generally under different names. This is the first in which

he has omitted some furious incartade against me. Hutcheson says that

Genet has totally overturned the republican interest in Philadelphia.

However, the people going right themselves, if they always see their

republican advocates with them, an accidental meeting with the monocrats

will not be a coalescence. You will see much said, and again said, about

G.'s threat to appeal to the people. I can assure you it is a fact. I

received yesterday the MS. you mentioned to me from F----n. I have only

got a dozen pages into it, and never was more charmed with anything.

Profound arguments presented in the simplest point of view entitle him

really to his ancient signature. In the papers received from you, I have

seen nothing which ought to be changed, except a part of one sentence

not necessary for its object, and running foul of something of which you

were not apprized. A malignant fever has been generated in the filth of

Water street, which gives great alarm. About 70 people had died of it two

days ago, and as many more were ill of it. It has now got into most parts

of the city, and is considerably infectious. At first 3 out of 4 died,

now about 1 out of 3. It comes on with a pain in the head, sick stomach,

then a little chill, fever, black vomiting and stools, and death from the

2d to the 8th day. Everybody who can, is flying from the city, and the

panic of the country people is likely to add famine to disease. Though

becoming less mortal, it is still spreading, and the heat of the weather

is very unpropitious. I have withdrawn my daughter from the city, but am

obliged to go to it every day myself. My threshing machine has arrived at

New York. Mr. Pinckney writes me word that the original from which this

model is copied, threshes 150 bushels of wheat in 8 hours, with 6 horses

and 5 men. It may be moved either by water or horses. Fortunately the

workman who made it (a millwright) is come in the same vessel to settle in

America. I have written to persuade him to go on immediately to Richmond,

offering him the use of my model to exhibit, and to give him letters to

get him into immediate employ in making them. I expect an answer before I

write to you again. I understand that the model is made mostly in brass,

and in the simple form in which it was first ordered, to be worked by

horses. It was to have cost 5 guineas, but Mr. Pinckney having afterwards

directed it to be accommodated to water movement also, it has made it

more complicated, and costs 13 guineas. It will thresh any grain from the

Windsor bean down to the smallest. Adieu.

TO MR. GORE.

PHILADELPHIA, September 2, 1793.

SIR,--The President is informed through the channel of a letter from

yourself to Mr. Lear, that M. Duplaine, consul of France at Boston, has

lately, with an armed force, seized and rescued a vessel from the officer

of a court of justice, by process from which she was under arrest in his

custody: and that he has in like manner, with an armed force, opposed

and prevented the officer, charged with process from a court against

another vessel, from serving that process. This daring violation of the

laws requires the more attention, as it is by a foreigner clothed with a

public character, arrogating an unfounded right to admiralty jurisdiction,

and probably meaning to assert it by this act of force. You know that by

the law of nations, consuls are not diplomatic characters, and have no

immunities whatever against the laws of the land. To put this altogether

out of dispute, a clause was inserted in our consular convention

with France, making them amenable to the laws of the land, as other

inhabitants. Consequently, M. Duplaine is liable to arrest, imprisonment,

and other punishments, even capital, as other foreign subjects resident

here. The President therefore desires that you will immediately institute

such a prosecution against him, as the laws will warrant. If there be any

doubt as to the character of his offence, whether of a higher or lower

grade, it will be best to prosecute for that which will admit the least

doubt, because an acquittal, though it might be founded merely on the

opinion that the grade of offence with which he is _charged_ is higher

than his _act_ would support, yet it might be construed by the uninformed

to be a judiciary decision against his amenability to the law, or perhaps

in favor of the jurisdiction these consuls are assuming. The process

therefore, should be of the surest kind, and all the proceedings well

grounded. In particular, if an arrest, as is probable, be the first step,

it should be so managed as to leave room neither for escape nor rescue.

It should be attended with every mark of respect, consistent with safe

custody, and his confinement as mild and comfortable also, as that would

permit. These are the distinctions to which a consul is entitled, that is

to say, of a particular decorum of deportment towards him, indicative of

respect to the sovereign whose officer he is.

The President also desires you will immediately obtain the best evidence

it shall be in your power to procure, under oath or affirmation, of the

transaction stated in your letter, and that in this, you consider yourself

as acting as much on behalf of M. Duplaine as the public, the candid

truth of the case being exactly that which is desired, as it may be the

foundation of an act, the justice of which should be beyond all question.

This evidence I shall be glad to receive within as few days, or even

hours, of delay as possible.

I am also instructed to ask the favor of you to communicate copies of any

memorials, representations or other written correspondence which may have

passed between the Governor and yourself, with respect to the privateers

and prizes which have been the subject of your letters to Mr. Lear.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your most obedient

servant.

TO MR. HAMMOND.

PHILADELPHIA, September 5, 1793.

SIR,--I am honored with yours of August the 30th. Mine of the 7th of that

month assured you that measures were taking for excluding from all further

asylum in our ports, vessels armed in them to cruise on nations with which

we are at peace, and for the restoration of the prizes, the Lovely Lass,

Prince William Henry, and the Jane of Dublin, and that should the measures

for restitution fail in their effect, the President considers it as

incumbent on the United States, to make compensation for the vessels.

We are bound by our treaties with three of the belligerent nations,

_by all the means in our power_ to protect and defend their vessels and

effects in our ports or waters, or on the seas near our shores, and to

recover and restore the same to the right owners, when taken from them. If

all the means in our power are used, and fail in their effect, we are not

bound by our treaties with those nations to make compensation.

Though we have no similar treaty with Great Britain, it was the opinion of

the President that we should use towards that nation the same rule which,

under this article, was to govern us with the other nations; and even to

extend it to captures made on _the high seas_ and brought into our ports,

if done by vessels which had been armed within them.

Having, for particular reasons, forborne to use _all the measures in our

power_ for the restitution of the three vessels mentioned in my letter of

August the 7th, the President thought it incumbent on the United States

to make compensation for them; and though nothing was said in that letter

of other vessels taken under like circumstances, and brought in after

the 5th of June and _before the date of that letter_, yet where the same

forbearance had taken place, it was and is his opinion that compensation

would be equally due.

As to prizes made under the same circumstances, and brought in _after the

date of that letter_, the President determined that all the means in our

power should be used for their restitution. If these fail us, as we should

not be bound by our treaties to make compensation to the other powers, in

the analogous case, he did not mean to give an opinion that it ought to be

done to Great Britain. But still, if any cases shall arise subsequent to

that date, the circumstances of which shall place them on similar ground

with those before it, the President would think compensation equally

incumbent on the United States.