CHAPTER II.--THE FRENCH IN EGYPT

_Napoleon’s campaign: Battles of the Pyramids and of Abukir: Siege of

Acre: Kléber’s administration: The evacuation of Egypt._

At the close of the eighteenth century Egypt’s destiny passed into the

hands of the French. Napoleon’s descent upon Egypt was part of his

vast strategic plan for the overthrow of Great Britain. He first of all

notified the Directory of this design in September, 1797, in a letter

sent from Italy. Late in the same year and during 1798 vast preparations

had been in progress for the invasion of England. Napoleon then visited

all the seaports in the north of France and Holland, and found that a

direct invasion of England was a practical impossibility because the

British held command over the sea. The suggested invasion of Egypt was

now seriously considered. By the conquest of Egypt, it was contended,

England would be cut off from the possession of India, and France,

through Egypt, would dominate the trade to the Orient. From Egypt

Napoleon could gather an army of Orientals and conquer the whole of the

East, including India itself. On his return, England would prove to be

too exhausted to withstand the French army at home and would fall a

prey to the ambitions of the First Consul. The Directory assented to

Bonaparte’s plans the more readily because they were anxious to keep

so popular a leader, the idol of the army, at a great distance from the

centre of government. While the preparations were in process, no one

in England knew of this undertaking. The French fleet lay in various

squadrons in ports of Italy, from which thirty thousand men were

embarked.

Bonaparte arrived at Toulon on May 9, 1798. His presence rejoiced the

army, which had begun to murmur and to fear that he would not be at the

head of the expedition. It was the old army of Italy, rich and covered

with glory, and hence had much less zeal for making war; it required all

the enthusiasm with which the general inspired his soldiers to induce

them to embark and proceed to an unknown destination. On seeing him at

Toulon, they were inflamed with ardour. Bonaparte, without acquainting

them with their destination, exhorted the soldiers, telling them that

they had great destinies to fulfil, and that “the genius of liberty,

which had made the republic from her birth the arbitress of Europe,

decreed that she should be so to the most remote seas and nations.”

[Illustration: 083 BEDOUINS IN THE DESERT]

The squadron of Admiral Brueys consisted of thirteen sail of the line,

and carried about forty thousand men of all arms and ten thousand

seamen. It had water for one month and provisions for two. It sailed on

the 19th of May, amid the thunders of the cannons and the cheers of the

whole army. Violent gales did some damage to a frigate on leaving the

port, and Nelson, who was cruising with three sail of the line in search

of the French fleet, suffered so severely from the same gales that he

was obliged to bear up for the islands of St. Pierre to refit. He was

thus kept at a distance from the French fleet, and did not see it pass.

It steered first towards Genoa to join the convoy collected in that

port, under the command of General Baraguay d’Hilliers. It then sailed

for Corsica, to call for the convoy at Ajaccio commanded by Vaubois, and

afterwards proceeded to the sea of Sicily to join the division of Civita

Vecchia, under the command of Desaix.

Bonaparte’s intention was to stop at Malta, and there to make by the

way a bold attempt, the success of which he had long since prepared by

secret intrigues. He meant to take possession of that island, which,

commanding the navigation of the Mediterranean, became important to

Egypt and could not fail soon to fall into the hands of the English,

unless they were anticipated.

Bonaparte made great efforts to join the division from Civita Vecchia;

but this he could not accomplish until he was off Malta. The five

hundred French sail came in sight of the island on June 9th, twenty-two

days after leaving Toulon. This sight filled the city of Malta with

consternation. The following day (June 10th) the French troops landed

on the island, and completely invested Valetta, which contained a

population of nearly thirty thousand souls, and was even then one of

the strongest fortresses in Europe. The inhabitants were dismayed and

clamoured for surrender, and the grand master, who possessed little

energy, and recollected the generosity of the conqueror of Rivoli at

Mantua, hoping to save his interest from shipwreck, released one of

the French knights, whom he had thrown into prison when they refused to

fight against their countrymen, and sent him to Bonaparte to negotiate.

A treaty was soon concluded, by which the Knights of Malta gave up to

France the sovereignty of Malta and the dependent islands. Thus France

gained possession of the best harbour in the Mediterranean, and one of

the strongest in the world. It required the ascendency of Bonaparte to

obtain it without fighting; and it necessitated also the risk of losing

some precious days, with the English in pursuit of him.

The French fleet weighed anchor on the 19th of June, after a stay of

ten days. The essential point now was not to fall in with the English.

Nelson, having refitted at the islands of St. Pierre, had returned on

June 1st to Toulon, but the French squadron had been gone twelve days.

He had run from Toulon to the roads of Taglia-mon, and from the roads

of Tagliamon to Naples, where he had arrived on June 20th, at the very

moment when Bonaparte was leaving Malta. Learning that the French had

been seen off Malta, he followed, determined to attack them, if he

could overtake them. At one moment, the English squadron was only a few

leagues distant from the immense French convoy, and neither party was

aware of it. Nelson, supposing that the French were bound for Egypt,

made sail for Alexandria, and arrived there before them; at not finding

them, he flew to the Dardanelles to seek them there. By a singular fate,

it was not till two days afterwards that the French expedition came in

sight of Alexandria, on the 1st of July, which was very nearly six weeks

since it sailed from Toulon. Bonaparte immediately sent on shore for the

French consul. He learned that the English had made their appearance

two days before, and, supposing them to be not far off, he resolved that

very moment to attempt a landing. It was impossible to enter the harbour

of Alexandria, for the place appeared disposed to defend itself;

it became necessary, therefore, to land at some distance on the

neighbouring coast, at an inlet called the Creek of the Marabou. The

wind blew violently and the sea broke with fury over the reefs on the

shore. It was near the close of the day, but Bonaparte gave the signal

and resolved to go on shore immediately. He was the first to disembark,

and, with great difficulty, four or five thousand men were landed in

the course of the evening and the following night. Bonaparte resolved

to march forthwith for Alexandria, in order to surprise the place and

to prevent the Turks from making preparations for defence. The troops

instantly commenced their march. Not a horse was yet landed: the staff

of Bonaparte, and Caffarelli himself, notwithstanding his wooden leg,

had to walk four or five leagues over the sands, and came at daybreak

within sight of Alexandria.

That ancient city no longer possessed its magnificent edifices, its

innumerable houses, and its immense population. Three-fourths of it was

in ruins. The Turks, the wealthy Egyptians, the European merchants dwelt

in the modern town, which was the only part preserved. A few Arabs lived

among the ruins of the ancient city: an old wall, flanked by towers,

enclosed the new and the old town, and all around extended those sands

which in Egypt are sure to advance wherever civilisation recedes. The

four thousand French led by Bonaparte arrived there at daybreak. Upon

this sandy beach they met with Arabs only, who, after firing a few

musket-shots, fled to the desert. Napoleon divided his men into three

columns. Bon, with the first column, marched on the right towards the

Rosetta gate; Kléber, with the second, marched in the centre towards the

gate of the Catacombs.

The Arabs and the Turks, excellent soldiers behind a wall, kept up a

steady fire, but the French mounted with ladders and got over the old

wall. Kléber was the first who fell, seriously wounded on the forehead.

The Arabs were driven from ruin to ruin, as far as the new town, and

the combat seemed likely to be continued from street to street, and

to become sanguinary, when a Turkish captain served as a mediator for

negotiating an arrangement. Bonaparte declared that he had not come to

ravage the country, or to wrest it from its ruler, but merely to deliver

it from the domination of the Mamluks, and to revenge the outrages which

they had committed against France. He promised that the authorities of

the country should be upheld; that the ceremonies of religion should

continue to be performed as before; that property should be respected.

On these conditions, the resistance ceased, and the French were masters

of Alexandria. Meanwhile, the remainder of the army had landed. It

was immediately necessary to decide where to place the squadron

safely--whether in the harbour or in one of the neighbouring roads;--to

form at Alexandria an administration adapted to the manners of the

country; and also to devise a plan of invasion in order to gain

possession of Egypt.

At this period the population of Egypt was, like the towns that covered

it, a mixture of the wrecks of several nations,--Kopts, the survivors of

the ancient inhabitants of the land; Arabs, who conquered Egypt from

the Kopts; and Turks, the conquerors of the Arabs. On the arrival of

the French, the Kopts amounted at most to two hundred thousand:

poor, despised, brutalised, they had devoted themselves, like all the

proscribed classes, to the most ignoble occupations. The Arabs formed

almost the entire mass of the population. Their condition was infinitely

varied: some were of high birth, carrying back their pedigree to

Muhammed himself; and some were landed proprietors, possessing traces

of Arabian knowledge, and combining with nobility the functions of the

priesthood and the magistracy, who, under the title of sheikhs, were the

real aristocracy of Egypt.

[Illustration: 091.jpg THE PROPHET MUHAMMED]

The original of the illustration (upon the opposite page) is

to be seen in a finely illuminated MS. of the ninth century,

A. D., preserved in the India Office, London. The picture is

of peculiar interest, being the only known portrait of

Muhammed, who is evidently represented as receiving the

divine command to propagate Muhammedanism.

In the divans, they represented the country, when its tyrants wished

to address themselves to it; in the mosques, they formed a kind of

university, in which they taught the religion and the morality of the

Koran, and a little philosophy and jurisprudence. The great mosque of

Jemil-Azar constituted the foremost learned and religious body in the

East. Next to these grandees came the smaller landholders, composing the

second and more numerous class of the Arabs; then the great mass of the

inhabitants, who had sunk into the state of absolute helots. These last

were hired peasants or fellahs who cultivated the land, and lived in

abject poverty. There was also a class of Arabs, namely, the Bedouins

or rovers, who would never attach themselves to the soil, but were the

children of the desert. These wandering Arabs, divided into tribes

on both sides of the valley, numbered nearly one hundred and twenty

thousand, and could furnish from twenty to twenty-five thousand horse.

They were brave, but fit only to harass the enemy, not to fight him. The

third and last race was that of the Turks; but it was not more numerous

than the Kopts, amounting to about two hundred thousand souls at most,

and was divided into Turks and Mamluks. The Turks were nearly all

enrolled in the list of janizaries; but it is well known that they

frequently had their names inscribed in those lists, that they might

enjoy the privileges of janizaries, and that a very small number of them

were really in the service. Very few of them composed the military force

of the pasha. This pasha, sent from Constantinople, was the sultan’s

representative in Egypt; but, escorted by only a few janizaries, he

found his authority invalidated by the very precautions which Sultan

Selim had formerly taken to preserve it. That sultan, judging that

Egypt was likely from its remoteness to throw off the dominion of

Constantinople, and that a clever and ambitious pasha might create there

an independent empire, had, as we have seen, devised a plan to frustrate

such a motive, should it exist, by instituting a Mamluk soldiery; but it

was the Mamluks, and not the pasha, who rendered themselves independent

of Constantinople and the masters of Egypt.

Egypt was at this time an absolute feudality, like that of Europe in

the Middle Ages. It exhibited at once a conquered people, a conquering

soldiery in rebellion against its sovereign, and, lastly, an ancient

degenerate class, who served and were in the pay of the strongest.

Two beys, superior to the rest, ruled Egypt: the one, Ibrahim Bey,

wealthy, crafty, and powerful; the other, Murad Bey, intrepid,

valiant, and full of ardour. They had agreed upon a sort of division

of authority, by which Ibrahim Bey had the civil, and Murad Bey the

military, power. It was the business of the latter to fight; he excelled

in it, and he possessed the affection of the Mam-luks, who were all

eager to follow him.

Bonaparte immediately perceived the line of policy which he had to

pursue in Egypt. He must, in the first place, wrest that country from

its real masters, the Mam-luks; it was necessary for him to fight them,

and to destroy them by arms and by policy. He had, moreover, strong

reasons to urge against them; for they had never ceased to ill-treat the

French. As for the Porte, it was requisite that he should not appear to

attack its sovereignty, but affect, on the contrary, to respect it.

In the state to which it was reduced, that sovereignty was not to be

dreaded, and he could treat with the Porte, either for the cession of

Egypt, by granting certain advantages elsewhere, or for a partition of

authority, in which there would be nothing detrimental; for the French,

in leaving the pasha at Cairo, and transferring to themselves the power

of the Mamluks, would not occasion much regret. As for the inhabitants,

in order to make sure of their attachment, it would be requisite to win

over the Arab population. By respecting the sheikhs, by flattering their

old pride, by increasing their power, by encouraging their secret desire

for the re-establishment of their ancient glories, Bonaparte reckoned

upon ruling the land, and attaching it entirely to him. By afterwards

sparing persons and property, among a people accustomed to consider

conquest as conferring a right to murder, pillage, and devastate, he

would create a sentiment that would be most advantageous to the French

army. If, furthermore, the French were to respect women and the Prophet,

the conquest of hearts would be as firmly secured as that of the soil.

Napoleon conducted himself agreeably to these conclusions, which

were equally just and profound. He immediately made his plans for

establishing the French authority at Alexandria, and for quitting the

Delta and gaining possession of Cairo, the capital of Egypt. It was

the month of July; the Nile was about to inundate the country. He was

anxious to reach Cairo before the inundation, and to employ the time

during which it should last in establishing himself there. He ordered

everything at Alexandria to be left in the same state as formerly; that

the religious exercises should be continued; and that justice should be

administered as before by the cadis. His intention was merely to possess

himself of the rights of the Mamluks, and to appoint a commissioner to

levy the accustomed imposts. He caused a divan, or municipal council,

composed of the sheikhs and principal persons of Alexandria, to be

formed, in order to consult them on all the measures which the French

authority would have to take. He left three thousand men in garrison in

Alexandria, and gave the command of it to Kléber, whose wound was liable

to keep him in a state of inactivity for a month or two. He directed a

young Frenchman of extraordinary merit, and who gave promise of becoming

a great engineer, to put Alexandria in a state of defence, and to

construct there all the necessary works. This was Colonel Cretin,

who, in a short time, and at a small expense, executed superb works at

Alexandria. Bonaparte then ordered the fleet to be put in a place of

security. It was a question whether the large ships could enter the port

of Alexandria. A commission of naval officers was appointed to sound the

harbour and make a report. Meanwhile, the fleet was anchored in the road

of Abukir, and Bonaparte ordered Brueys to see to it that this question

should be speedily decided, and to proceed to Corfu if it should be

ascertained that the ships could not enter the harbour of Alexandria.

After he had attended to all these matters, he made preparations for

marching. A considerable flotilla, laden with provisions, artillery,

ammunition, and baggage, was to run along the coast to the Rosetta

mouth, enter the Nile, and ascend the river at the same time as the

French army. He then set out with the main body of the army, which,

after leaving the two garrisons in Malta and Alexandria, was about

thirty thousand strong. He had ordered his flotilla to proceed as high

as Ramanieh, on the banks of the Nile. There he purposed to join it, and

to proceed up the Nile parallel with it, in order to quit the Delta and

to reach Upper Egypt, or Bahireh. There were two roads from Alexandria

to Ramanieh; one through an inhabited country, along the sea-coast and

the Nile, and the other shorter and as the bird flies, but across the

desert of Damanhour. Bonaparte, without hesitation, chose the shorter.

It was of consequence that he should reach Cairo as speedily as

possible. De-saix marched with the advanced guard, and the main body

followed at a distance of a few leagues. They started on the 6th of

July. When the soldiers found themselves amidst this boundless plain,

with a shifting sand beneath their feet, a scorching sun over their

heads, without water, without shade, with nothing for the eye to rest

upon but rare clumps of palm-trees, seeing no living creatures but small

troops of Arab horsemen, who appeared and disappeared at the horizon,

and sometimes concealed themselves behind sand-hills to murder the

laggards, they were profoundly dejected. They found all the wells, which

at intervals border the road through the desert, destroyed by the Arabs.

There were left only a few drops of brackish water, wholly insufficient

for quenching their thirst.

[Illustration: 097.jpg STREET DOGS]

They had been informed that they should find refreshments at Damanhour,

but they met with nothing there but miserable huts, and could procure

neither bread nor wine; only lentils in great abundance, and a little

water. They were obliged to proceed again into the desert. Bonaparte saw

the brave Lannes and Murat take off their hats, dash them on the sand,

and trample them under foot. He, however, overawed all: his presence

imposed silence, and sometimes restored cheerfulness. The soldiers would

not impute their sufferings to him, but grew angry with those who took

pleasure in observing the country. On seeing the men of science stop to

examine the slightest ruins, they said they should not have been there

but for them, and revenged themselves with witticisms after their

fashion. Caffarelli, in particular, brave as a grenadier, and

inquisitive as a scholar, was considered by them as the man who had

deceived the general and drawn him into this distant country. As he had

lost a leg on the Rhine, they said, “He, for his part, laughs at this:

he has one foot in France.” At last, after severe hardships, endured at

first with impatience, and afterwards with gaiety and fortitude, they

reached the Nile on the 10th of July, after a march of four days. At

the sight of the Nile and of the water so much longed for, the soldiers

flung themselves into it, and, bathing in its waves, forgot their

fatigues. Desaix’ division, which from the advance-guard had become the

rear-guard, saw two or three hundred Mamluks galloping before it, whom

they dispersed by a few volleys of grape. These were the first that had

been seen, which warned the French that they would speedily fall in with

the hostile army. The brave Murad Bey, having received the intelligence

of the arrival of Bonaparte, was actually collecting his forces around

Cairo. Until they should have assembled, he was hovering with a thousand

horse about the army, in order to watch its march.

The army waited at Ramanieh for the arrival of the flotilla. It rested

till July 13th, and set out on the same day for Chebreiss. Murad Bey was

waiting there with his Mamluks. The flotilla, which had set out

first and preceded the army, found itself engaged before it could be

supported. Murad Bey had a flotilla also, and from the shore he joined

his fire to that of his light Egyptian vessels. The French flotilla had

to sustain a very severe combat. Perrée, a naval officer who commanded

it, displayed extraordinary courage; he was supported by the cavalry,

who had come dismounted to Egypt, and who, until they could equip

themselves at the expense of the Mamluks, had taken their passage

by water. Two gunboats were retaken from the enemy, and Perrée was

repulsed.

At that moment the army came up; it was composed of five divisions, and

had not yet been in action with its singular enemies. To swiftness and

the charge of horse, and to sabre-cuts, it would be necessary to

oppose the immobility of the foot-soldier, his long bayonet, and masses

presenting a front on every side. Bonaparte formed his five divisions

into five squares, in the centre of which were placed the baggage and

the staff. The artillery was at the angles. The five divisions flanked

one another. Murad Bey flung upon these living citadels a thousand or

twelve hundred intrepid horse; who, bearing down with loud shouts and

at full gallop, discharging their pistols, and then drawing their

formidable sabres, threw themselves upon the front of the squares.

Encountering everywhere a hedge of bayonets and a tremendous fire, they

hovered about the French ranks, Fell before them, or scampered off in

the plain at the utmost speed of their horses. Murad Bey, after losing

a few of his bravest men, retired for the purpose of proceeding to the

point of the Delta, and awaiting them near Cairo at the head of all his

forces.

This action was sufficient to familiarise the army with this new kind of

enemy, and to suggest to Bonaparte the kind of tactics which he ought to

employ with them. He pursued his march towards Cairo, and the flotilla

ascended the Nile abreast of the army. It marched without intermission

during the following days, and, although the soldiers had fresh

hardships to endure, they kept close to the Nile, and could bathe every

night in its waters.

The army now approached Cairo, where the decisive battle was to be

fought. Murad Bey had collected here the greater part of his Mamluks,

nearly ten thousand in number, and they were attended by double the

number of fellahs, to whom arms were given, and who were obliged to

fight behind the intrenchments. He had also assembled some thousands

of janizaries, or spahis, dependent on the pasha, who, notwithstanding

Bonaparte’s letter of conciliation, had suffered himself to be persuaded

to join his oppressors. Murad Bey had made preparations for defence

on the banks of the Nile. The great capital, Cairo, is situated on the

right bank of the river, and on the opposite bank Murad Bey had pitched

his tent, in a long plain extending from the river to the pyramids of

Gizeh.

On the 21st of July, the French army set itself in motion before

daybreak. As they approached, they saw the minarets of Cairo shooting

up; they saw the pyramids increase in height; they saw the swarming

multitude which guarded Embabeh; they saw the glistening arms of ten

thousand horsemen resplendent with gold and steel, and forming an

immense line.

[Illustration: GATHERING DATES]

The face of Bonaparte beamed with enthusiasm. He began to gallop before

the ranks of the soldiers, and, pointing to the pyramids, he exclaimed,

“Consider, that from the summit of those pyramids forty centuries have

their eyes fixed upon you.”

In the battle of the Pyramids, as it was called, the enemy’s force

of sixty thousand men was almost completely annihilated. The Mamluks,

bewildered by European tactics, impaled themselves upon the bayonets

of the French squares. Fifteen thousand men of all arms fell upon the

field. The battle had cost the French scarcely a hundred killed and

wounded; for, if defeat is terrible for broken squares, the loss is

insignificant for victorious squares. The Mamluks had lost their

best horsemen by fire or water: their forces were dispersed, and the

possession of Cairo secured. The capital was in extraordinary agitation.

It contained more than three hundred thousand inhabitants, many of whom

were indulging in all sorts of excesses, and intending to profit by the

tumult to pillage the rich palaces of the beys.

The French flotilla, however, had not yet ascended the Nile, and there

was no means of crossing to take possession of Cairo. Some French

traders who happened to be there were sent to Bonaparte by the sheikhs

to arrange concerning the occupation of the city. He procured a few

light boats, or djerms, and sent across the river a detachment of

troops, which at once restored tranquillity, and secured persons and

property from the fury of the populace.

Bonaparte established his headquarters at Gizeh, on the banks of the

Nile, where Murad Bey had an imposing residence. A considerable store

of provisions was found both at Gizeh and at Embabeh, and the soldiers

could make amends for their long privations. No sooner had he settled

in Cairo than he hastened to pursue the same policy which he had already

adopted at Alexandria, and by which he hoped to gain the country.

The essential point was to obtain from the sheikhs of the mosque of

Jemil-Azar a declaration in favour of the French. It corresponded to

a papal bull among Christians. On this occasion Bonaparte exerted his

utmost address, and was completely successful. The great sheikhs issued

the desired declaration, and exhorted the Egyptians to submit to the

envoy of God, who reverenced the Prophet, and who had come to deliver

his children from the tyranny of the Mamluks. Bonaparte established a

divan at Cairo, as he had done at Alexandria, composed of the principal

sheikhs, and the most distinguished inhabitants. This divan, or

municipal council, was intended to serve him in gaining the minds of the

Egyptians, by consulting it, and learning from it all the details of the

internal administration. It was agreed that similar assemblies should

be established in all the provinces, and that these subordinate divans

should send deputies to the divan of Cairo, which would thus be the

great national divan.

Bonaparte resolved to leave the administration of justice to the cadis.

In execution of his scheme of succeeding to the rights of the Mamluks,

he seized their property, and caused the taxes previously imposed to

continue to be levied for the benefit of the French army. For this

purpose it was requisite that he should have the Kopts at his disposal.

He omitted nothing to attach them to him, holding out hopes to them of

an amelioration of their condition. He sent generals with detachments

down the Nile to complete the occupation of the Delta, which the army

had merely traversed, and sent others towards the Upper Nile, to take

possession of Middle Egypt. Desaix was placed with a division at the

entrance of Upper Egypt, which he was to conquer from Murad Bey, as

soon as the waters of the Nile should subside in the autumn. Each of

the generals, furnished with detailed instructions, was to repeat in

the country what had been done at Alexandria and at Cairo. They were to

court the sheikhs, to win the Kopts, and to establish the levy of the

taxes in order to supply the wants of the army. Bonaparte was also

attentive to keep up the relations with the neighbouring countries,

in order to uphold and to appropriate to himself the rich commerce of

Egypt. He appointed the Emir Hadgi, an officer annually chosen at Cairo,

to protect the great caravan from Mecca. He wrote to all the French

consuls on the coast of Barbary to inform the beys that the Emir Hadgi

was appointed, and that the caravans might set out. At his desire the

sheikhs wrote to the sherif of Mecca, to acquaint him that the pilgrims

would be protected, and that the caravans would find safety and

protection. The pasha of Cairo had followed Ibraham Bey to Belbeys.

Bonaparte wrote to him, as well as to the several pashas of St. Jean

d’Acre and Damascus, to assure them of the good disposition of the

French towards the Sublime Porte. The Arabs were struck by the character

of the young conqueror. They could not comprehend how it was that the

mortal who wielded the thunderbolt should be so merciful. They called

him the worthy son of the Prophet, the favourite of the great Allah, and

sang in the great mosque a litany in his praise.

Napoleon, in carrying out his policy of conciliating the natives, was

present at the Nile festival, which is one of the greatest in Egypt.

It was on the 18th of August that this festival was held. Bonaparte

had ordered the whole army to be under arms, and had drawn it up on the

banks of the canal. An immense concourse of people had assembled, who

beheld with joy the brave man of the West attending their festivals.

It was by such means that the young general, as profound a politician as

he was a great captain, contrived to ingratiate himself with the people.

While he flattered their prejudices for the moment, he laboured

to diffuse among them the light of science by the creation of the

celebrated Institute of Egypt. He collected the men of science and the

artists whom he had brought with him, and, associating with them some of

the best educated of his officers, established the institute, to which

he appropriated a revenue and one of the most spacious palaces in Cairo.

The conquest of the provinces of Lower and Middle Egypt had been

effected without difficulty, and had cost only a few skirmishes with the

Arabs. A forced march upon Belbeys had been sufficient to drive Ibrahim

Bey into Syria, where Desaix awaited the autumn for wresting Upper Egypt

from Murad Bey, who had retired thither with the wrecks of his army.

Fortune was, meanwhile, preparing for Bonaparte the most terrible of all

reverses. On leaving Alexandria, he had earnestly recommended to Admiral

Brueys to secure his squadron from the English, either by taking it into

the harbour of Alexandria, or by proceeding with it to Corfu; and he had

particularly enjoined him not to leave it in the road of Abukir, for it

was much better to fall in with an enemy when under sail than to receive

him at anchor. A warm discussion had arisen on the question whether

the ships of 80 and 120 guns could be carried into the harbour of

Alexandria. As to the smaller ships, there was no doubt; but the larger

would require lightening so much as to enable them to draw three feet

less water. For this purpose it would be necessary to take out their

guns, or to construct floats. On such conditions, Admiral Brueys

resolved not to take his squadron into the harbour. The time which he

spent, either in sounding the channels to the harbour, or in waiting for

news from Cairo, caused his own destruction.

Admiral Brueys was moored in the road of Abukir. This road is a very

regular semicircle, and his thirteen ships formed a line parallel to

the shore, and so disposed that he believed no British ship could pass

between him and the shore, if an attack were made.

Nelson, after visiting the Archipelago, and returning to the Adriatic,

Naples, and Sicily, had at length obtained the certain knowledge of

the landing of the French at Alexandria. He immediately steered in that

direction in order to seek and put to flight their squadron. He sent a

frigate to look out for it, and to reconnoitre its position. The English

frigate, having made her observations, rejoined Nelson, who, being

informed of all the particulars, immediately stood in for Abukir, and

arrived there August 1, 1798, at about six o’clock in the evening.

Admiral Brueys was at dinner. He immediately ordered the signal for

battle to be given; but so unprepared was the squadron to receive the

enemy, that the hammocks were not stowed away on board any of the ships,

and part of the crews were on shore. The admiral despatched officers to

send the seamen on board, and to demand part of those who were in the

transports. He had no conception that Nelson would dare to attack him

the same evening, and conceived that he should have time to receive the

reinforcements for which he had applied.

Nelson resolved to attack immediately, and to push in between the French

ships and the shore at all hazards. “Before this time to-morrow” said

he, “I shall have gained a peerage or Westminster Abbey.”

The number of vessels was equal on both sides, namely, thirteen ships

of war. The engagement lasted upwards of fifteen hours. All the crews

performed prodigies of valour. The brave Captain Du Petit-Thouars had

two of his limbs shot off. He ordered snuff to be brought him,

and remained on his quarter-deck, and, like Brueys, waited till a

cannon-ball despatched him. The entire French squadron, excepting the

two ships and two frigates carried off by Villeneuve, was destroyed.

Nelson had suffered so severely that he could not pursue the fugitives.

Such was the famous battle of Abukir, the most disastrous that

the French had ever sustained, and involved the most far-reaching

consequences. The fleet which had carried the French to Egypt, which

might have served to succour or to recruit them, which was to

second their movements on the coast of Syria,--had there been any to

execute,--which was to overawe the Porte, to force it to put up with

false reasoning, and to oblige it to wink at the invasion of Egypt,

which finally, in case of reverses, was to convey the French back to

their country,--that fleet was destroyed. The French ships were burned.

The news of this disaster spread rapidly in Egypt, and for a moment

filled the army with despair. Bonaparte received the tidings with

imperturbable composure. “Well,” he said, “we must die in this country,

or get out of it as great as the ancients.” He wrote to Kléber: “This

will oblige us to do greater things than we intended. We must hold

ourselves in readiness.” The great soul of Kléber was worthy of

this language: “Yes,” replied Kléber, “we must do great things. I am

preparing my faculties.” The courage of these men supported the army,

and restored its confidence.

Bonaparte strove to divert the thoughts of the soldiers by various

expeditions, and soon made them forget this disaster. On the festival of

the foundation of the republic, he endeavoured to give a new stimulus to

their imagination; he engraved on Pompey’s Pillar the names of the first

forty soldiers slain in Egypt. They were the forty who had fallen in

the attack on Alexandria; and the names of these men, sprung from the

villages of France, were thus associated with the immortality of Pompey

and Alexander.

Bonaparte, after the battle of the Pyramids, found himself master of

Egypt. He began to establish himself there, and sent his generals into

the provinces to complete their conquest. Desaix, placed at the entrance

of Upper Egypt with a division of about three thousand men, was directed

to reduce the remnants of Murad Bey’s force in that province. It was in

the preceding year (October, 1798), at the moment when the inundation

was over, that Desaix had commenced his expedition. The enemy had

retired before him, and did not wait for him till he reached Sediman;

there, on October 7th, Desaix fought a sanguinary battle with the

desperate remainder of Murad Bey’s forces. Two thousand French had to

combat with four thousand Mamluks and eight thousand fellahs, intrenched

in the village of Sediman. The battle was conducted in the same manner

as that of the Pyramids, and like all those fought in Egypt. The fellahs

were behind the walls of the village, and the horse in the plain. The

field of battle was thickly strewn with slain. The French lost three

hundred men. Desaix continued his march during the whole winter, and,

after a series of actions, reduced Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts.

He made himself equally feared for his bravery and beloved for his

clemency. In Cairo, Bonaparte had been named Sultan Kebir, the Fire

Sultan. In Upper Egypt, Desaix was called the “Just Sultan.”

Bonaparte had meanwhile marched to Belbeys, to drive Ibrahim Bey into

Syria, and he had collected by the way the wrecks of the caravan of

Mecca, plundered by the Arabs. Returning to Cairo, he continued to

establish there an entirely French administration. Thus passed the

winter between 1798 and 1799 in the expectation of important events.

During this interval, Bonaparte received intelligence of the declaration

of war by the Porte, and of the preparations which it was making against

him with the aid of the English. Two armies were being formed, one at

Rhodes, the other in Syria. These two armies were to act simultaneously

in the spring of 1799, the one by landing at Abukir near Alexandria, the

other by crossing the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. Bonaparte

was instantly aware of his position, and determined, as was his custom,

to disconcert the enemy and to forestall any offensive movement by a

sudden attack. He could not cross the desert which parts Egypt from

Syria in summer, and he resolved to avail himself of the winter for

destroying the assemblages of troops forming at Acre, at Damascus,

and in the principal towns. Djezzar, the celebrated pasha of Acre, was

appointed seraskier of the army collected in Syria. Abd Allah Pasha of

Damascus commanded its advanced-guard, and had proceeded as far as the

fort of El Arish, which is the key to Egypt on the side next to Syria.

Bonaparte resolved to act immediately. He was in communication with the

tribes of the Lebanon. The Druses, Christian tribes, the Mutualis, and

schismatic Muhammedans offered him assistance, and ardently wished for

his coming. By a sudden assault on Jaffa, Acre, and some other badly

fortified places, he might in a short time gain possession of Syria,

add this fine conquest to that of Egypt, make himself master of

the Euphrates, as he was of the Nile, and thus command all the

communications with India.

[Illustration: 112.jpg A FOUNTAIN AT CAIRO]

Bonaparte commenced his march very early in February at the head of

Kléber’s, Régnier’s, Lannes’s, Bon’s, and Murat’s divisions, about

thirteen thousand strong. He arrived before the fort El Arish on

February 15th, and, after a slight resistance, the garrison surrendered

themselves prisoners, to the number of thirteen hundred men. Ibrahim

Bey, having attempted to relieve it, was put to flight, and, after a

severe march across the desert, they reached Gaza. They took that place

in the sight of Djezzar Pasha, and found there, as in the fort of El

Arish, a great quantity of ammunition and provisions. From Gaza the army

proceeded to Jaffa (the ancient Joppa), where it arrived on March 3rd.

This place was surrounded by a massive wall, flanked by towers, and it

contained a garrison of four thousand men. Bonaparte caused a breach

to be battered in the wall, and then summoned the commandant, who only

answered by cutting off the head of the messenger. The assault was made,

and the place stormed with extraordinary intrepidity, and given up

for thirty hours to pillage and massacre. Here, too, was found a

considerable quantity of artillery and supplies of all kinds. There

were some thousands of prisoners, whom the general could not despatch to

Egypt, because he had not the ordinary means for escorting them, and he

would not send them back to the enemy to swell their ranks. Bonaparte

decided on a terrible measure, the most cruel act of his life.

Transported into a barbarous country, he had adopted its manners, and he

ordered all the prisoners to be put to death. The army consummated with

obedience, but with a sort of horror, the execution that was commanded.

Bonaparte then advanced upon St. Jean d’Acre, the ancient Ptolemais,

situated at the foot of Mount Carmel. It was the only place that could

now stop him. If he could make himself master of this fortress, Syria

would be his. But the ferocious Djezzar had shut himself up there, with

all his wealth and a strong garrison, and he also reckoned upon support

from Sir Sidney Smith, then cruising off that coast, who supplied him

with engineers, artillerymen, and ammunition. It was probable, moreover,

that he would be soon relieved by the Turkish army collected in Syria,

which was advancing from Damascus to cross the Jordan. Bonaparte

hastened to attack the place, in hopes of taking it, as he had done

Jaffa, before it was reinforced with fresh troops, and before the

English had time to improve its defences. The trenches were immediately

opened. The siege artillery sent by sea from Alexandria had been

intercepted by Sir Sidney Smith, who captured seven vessels out of the

nine. A breach was effected, and dispositions were made for the assault,

but the men were stopped by a counterscarp and a ditch. They immediately

set about mining. The operation was carried on under the fire of all

the ramparts, and of the fine artillery which Sir Sidney Smith had taken

from the French. The mine was exploded on April 17th, and blew up only

a portion of the counterscarp. Unluckily for the French, the place had

received a reinforcement of several thousand men, a great number of

gunners trained after the European fashion, and immense supplies. It was

a siege on a large scale to be carried on with thirteen thousand men,

almost entirely destitute of artillery. It was necessary to open a new

mine to blow up the entire counterscarp, and to commence another covered

way.

Bonaparte now ordered Kléber’s division to oppose the passage of the

Jordan by the army coming from Damascus. The enemy was commanded by Abd

Allah Pasha of Damascus, and numbered about twenty-five thousand men

and twelve thousand horse. A desperate battle was fought in the plain of

Fouli, and for six hours Kléber, with scarcely three thousand infantry

in square, resisted the utmost fury of the Turkish cavalry. Bonaparte,

who had been making a rapid march to join Kléber, suddenly made his

appearance on the field of battle. A tremendous fire, discharged

instantaneously from the three points of this triangle, assailed the

Mamluks who were in the midst, drove them in confusion upon one another,

and made them flee in disorder in all directions. Kléber’s division,

fired with fresh ardour at this sight, rushed upon the village of Eouli,

stormed it at the point of the bayonet, and made a great carnage among

the enemy. In a moment the whole multitude was gone, and the plain was

left covered with dead. During this interval the besiegers had never

ceased mining and countermining about the walls of St. Jean d’Acre. The

siege of Acre lasted for sixty-five days. Bonaparte made eight desperate

but ineffectual assaults upon the city, which were repulsed by eleven

furious sallies on the part of the besieged garrison. It was absolutely

necessary to relinquish the enterprise. The strategic point in the East

was lost.

[Illustration: 116b.jpg Cairo--Eskibieh Quarter]

For two months the army had been before Acre; it had sustained

considerable losses, and it would have been imprudent to expose it to

more. The plague was in Acre, and the army had caught the contagion at

Jaffa. The season for landing troops approached, and the arrival of a

Turkish army near the mouths of the Nile was expected. By persisting

longer, Bonaparte was liable to weaken himself to such a degree as

not to be able to repulse new enemies. The main point of his plan was

effected, since he had rendered the enemy in that quarter incapable of

acting. He now commenced his march to recross the desert.

Bonaparte at length reached Egypt after an expedition of nearly

three months. It was high time for him to return; for the spirit

of insurrection had spread throughout the whole Delta. His presence

produced everywhere submission and tranquillity. He gave orders for

magnificent festivities at Cairo to celebrate his triumphs in Syria. He

had to curb not only the inhabitants, but his own generals and the army

itself. A deep discontent pervaded it. They had been for a whole year

in Egypt. It was now the month of June, and they were still ignorant of

what was passing in Europe, and of the disasters of France. They

merely knew that the Continent was in confusion, and that a new war was

inevitable. Bonaparte impatiently waited for further particulars, that

he might decide what course to pursue, and return, in case of need, to

the first theatre of his exploits. But he hoped first to destroy the

second Turkish army assembled at Rhodes, the very speedy landing of

which was announced.

This army, put on board numerous transports and escorted by Sir Sidney

Smith’s squadron, appeared on July 11th in sight of Alexandria, and

came to anchor in the road of Abukir, where the French squadron had been

destroyed. The point chosen by the English for landing was the peninsula

which commands the entrance to the road, and bears the same name. The

Turks landed with great boldness, attacked the intrenchments sword

in hand, carried them, and made themselves masters of the village of

Abukir, putting to death the garrison. The village being taken, it was

impossible for the fort to hold out, and it was obliged to surrender.

Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, left the city at the head of

twelve hundred men to hasten to the assistance of the troops at Abukir.

But, learning that the Turks had landed in considerable numbers, he did

not dare to attempt to throw them into the sea by a bold attack, and

returned to Alexandria, leaving them to establish themselves quietly in

the peninsula of Abukir.

[Illustration: 119.jpg CAIRO FROM THE LEFT BANK OF THE NILE]

The Turks amounted to nearly eighteen thousand infantry. They had no

cavalry, for they had not brought more than three hundred horses, but

they expected the arrival of Murad Bey, who was to leave Upper Egypt,

skirt the desert, cross the oases, and throw himself into Abukir with

two or three thousand Mamluks.

When Bonaparte was informed of the particulars of the landing, he

immediately left Cairo, and made from that city to Alexandria one of

those extraordinary marches of which he had given so many examples in

Italy. He took with him the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat. He had

ordered Desaix to evacuate Upper Egypt, and Kleber and Régnier, who were

in the Delta, to approach Abukir. He had chosen the point of Birket,

midway between Alexandria and Abukir, at which to concentrate his

forces, and to manouvre according to circumstances. He was afraid that

an English army had landed with the Turks. The next day, the 7th, he was

at the entrance of the peninsula.

Bonaparte made his dispositions with his usual promptitude and decision.

He ordered General D ‘Estaing, with some battalions, to march to the

hill on the left, where the one thousand Turks were posted; Lannes to

march to that on the right, where the two thousand others were; and

Murat, who was at the centre, to make the cavalry file on the rear of

the two hills. D’Estaing marched to the hill on the left and boldly

ascended it: Murat caused it to be turned by a squadron. The Turks, at

sight of this, quitted their post, and fell in with the cavalry, which

cut them to pieces, and drove them into the sea, into which they chose

rather to throw themselves than to surrender. Precisely the same thing

was done on the right. Lannes attacked the two thousand janizaries;

Murat turned them, cut them in pieces, and drove them into the sea.

D’Estaing and Lannes then moved towards the centre, formed by a village,

and attacked it in front. The Turks there defended themselves bravely,

reckoning upon assistance from the second line. A column did in fact

advance from the camp of Abukir; but Murat, who had already filed upon

the rear of the village, fell sword in hand upon this column, and drove

it back into Abukir. D’Estaing’s infantry and that of Lannes entered the

village at the charge step, driving the Turks out of it, who were pushed

in all directions, and who, obstinately refusing to surrender, had no

retreat but the sea, in which they were drowned.

From four to five thousand had already perished in this manner.

The first line was carried: Bonaparte’s object was accomplished. He

immediately followed up his success with desperate fighting to complete

his victory on the moment. The Turks, affrighted, fled on all sides, and

a horrible carnage was made among them. They were pursued at the point

of the bayonet and thrust into the sea. More than twelve thousand

corpses were floating in the bay of Abukir, and two or three thousand

more had perished by the fire or by the sword. The rest, shut up in the

fort, had no rescue but the clemency of the conqueror. Such was that

extraordinary battle in which a hostile army was entirely destroyed.

Thus, either by the expedition to Syria, or by the battle of Abukir,

Egypt was delivered, at least for a time, from the forces of the Porte.

Having arrived in the summer before the inundation, Bonaparte had

employed the first moments in gaining possession of Alexandria and the

capital, which he had secured by the battle of the Pyramids. In the

autumn, after the inundation, he had completed the conquest of the

Delta, and consigned that of Upper Egypt to Desaix. In the winter he had

undertaken the expedition to Syria, and destroyed Djezzar’s Turkish army

at Mount Tabor. He had now, in the second summer, just destroyed the

second army of the Porte at Abukir. The time had thus been well spent;

and, while Victory was forsaking in Europe the banners of France, she

adhered to them in Africa and Asia. The tricolour waved triumphant over

the Nile and the Jordan, and over the places which were the cradle of

the Christian religion.

Bonaparte was as yet ignorant of what was passing in France. None of the

despatches from the Directory or from his brothers had reached him,

and he was a prey to the keenest anxiety. With a view to obtaining some

intelligence, he ordered brigs to cruise about, to stop all merchantmen,

and to gain from them information of the occurrences in Europe. He

sent to the Turkish fleet a flag of truce, which, under the pretext of

negotiating an exchange of prisoners, was for the purpose of obtaining

news. Sir Sidney Smith stopped this messenger, treated him exceedingly

well, and, perceiving that Bonaparte was ignorant of the disasters of

France, took a spiteful pleasure in sending him a packet of newspapers.

The messenger returned and delivered the packet to Bonaparte. The latter

spent the whole night in devouring the contents of those papers,

and informing himself of what was passing in his own country. His

determination was immediately taken, and he resolved to embark secretly

for Europe, and on August 22nd, taking with him Berthier, Lannes, Murât,

Andréossy, Marmont, Berthollet, and Monge, and escorted by some of his

guides, he proceeded to a retired spot on the beach, where boats were

awaiting them. They got into them and went on board the frigates, _La

Muiron_ and _La Carrère_. They set sail immediately, that by daylight

they might be out of sight of the English cruisers. Unfortunately

it fell calm; fearful of being surprised, some were for returning to

Alexandria, but Bonaparte resolved to proceed. “Be quiet,” said he, “we

shall pass in safety.” Like Cæsar, he reckoned upon his fortune. Menou,

who alone had been initiated into the secret, made known in Alexandria

the departure of General Bonaparte, and the appointment which he had

made of General Kléber to succeed him. This intelligence caused a

painful surprise throughout the army. The most opprobrious epithets

were applied to this departure. They did not consider that irresistible

impulse of patriotism and ambition, which, on the news of the disasters

of the republic, had urged him to return to France. They perceived only

the forlorn state in which he had left the unfortunate army, which had

felt sufficient confidence in his genius to follow him.

Kléber was not fond of General Bonaparte, and endured his ascendency

with a sort of impatience, and now he was sorry that he had quitted the

banks of the Rhine for the banks of the Nile. The chief command did

not counterbalance the necessity of remaining in Egypt, for he took no

pleasure in commanding.

[Illustration: 124.jpg STATUE OF GENERAL KLEBER AT STRASBURG]

Kléber, however, was the most popular of the generals among the

soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confidence, and

somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious commander who had

just left them. He returned to Cairo, assumed the command with a sort of

ostentation, and took possession of the fine Arabian mansion which his

predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekieh Place. But it was not long

before the solicitudes of the chief command, which were insupportable

to him, the new dangers with which the Turks and the English threatened

Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his soul with

the most gloomy discouragement.

Kléber, together with Poussielgue, the administrator of the army, at

once prepared and addressed despatches to the Directory, placing the

condition of the troops, the finances, and the number of the enemy in

the most melancholy light. These despatches fell into the hands of the

English, and the duplicate reports found their way into the hands of

Bonaparte himself. Bonaparte had left instructions with Kléber to meet

every possible contingency during his absence, even to the necessity of

an evacuation of Egypt. “I am going to France,” said he, “either as a

private man or as a public man; I will get reinforcement sent to you.

But if by next spring (he was writing in August, 1799) you have received

no supplies, no instructions; if the plague has carried off more than

fifteen hundred men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable

force, which you should be incapable of resisting, presses you hard,

negotiate with the vizier: consent even, if it must be so, to an

evacuation; subject to one condition, that of referring to the French

government; and meanwhile continue to occupy. You will thus have gained

time, and it is impossible that, during the interval, you should not

have received succour.”

The instructions were very sound; but the case foreseen was far from

being realised at the time when Kléber determined to negotiate for the

evacuation of Egypt. Murad Bey, disheartened, was a fugitive in Upper

Egypt with a few Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who, under the government of

the Mamluks, shared the sovereignty with him, was then in Lower Egypt

towards the frontier of Syria.. He had four hundred horse. Djezzar

Pasha was shut up in St. Jean d’Acre, and, so far from preparing a

reinforcement of men for the army of the grand vizier, he viewed, on the

contrary, with high displeasure, the approach of a fresh Turkish army,

now that his pashalik was delivered from the French. As for the grand

vizier, he was not yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops

at Mahon, and were not at this moment aggressive. At Kléber’s side was

General Menou, who viewed everything under the most favourable colours,

and believed the French to be invincible in Egypt, and regarded the

expedition as the commencement of a near and momentous revolution in the

commerce of the world. Kléber and Menou were both honest, upright men;

but one wanted to leave Egypt, the other to stay in it; the clearest and

most authentic returns conveyed to them totally contrary significations;

misery and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.

In September, 1799, Desaix, having completed the conquest and

subjugation of Upper Egypt, had left two movable columns for the pursuit

of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming

a vassal of France. He then returned to Cairo by the order of Kléber,

who wished to make use of his name in those negotiations into which

he was about to enter. During these proceedings, the army of the grand

vizier, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who

convoyed with his squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported

by sea, had just arrived off Dami-etta with eight thousand janizaries,

and on the first of November, 1799, the landing of the first division

of four thousand janizaries was effected. At the first tidings of this

disembarkation, Kléber had despatched Desaix with a column of three

thousand men; but the latter, uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the

victory won,--the Turkish division having been completely destroyed by

General Verdier,--and the French filled with unbounded confidence.

This brilliant achievement ought to have served to encourage Kléber;

unfortunately, he was swayed at once by his own lack of confidence and

that of the army. In this disposition of mind, Kléber had sent one

of his officers to the vizier (who had entered Syria), to make new

overtures of peace. General Bonaparte, with a view to embroiling the

vizier with the English, had previously entertained the idea of setting

on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were nothing more than a

feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and pride.

Kléber ‘s advances met with a favourable reception, through the

influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a prominent

part in the affairs of Egypt. This officer had largely contributed to

prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d’Acre; he was proud of it,

and had devised a _ruse de guerre_ by taking advantage of a momentary

weakness to wrest from the French their valuable conquest. With this

view, he had disposed the grand vizier to listen to the overtures

of Kléber. Kléber, on his part, despatched Desaix and Poussielgue as

negotiators to Sir Sidney Smith; for, since the English were masters of

the sea, he wished to induce them to take part in the negotiation,

so that the return to France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney

manifested a disposition to enter into arrangements, acting as “Minister

Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty,” and attributing to himself

a power which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of Lord Elgin

as ambassador at Constantinople. Poussielgue was an advocate for

evacuation; Desaix just the reverse. The conditions proposed by Kléber

were unreasonable: not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what

was given up in giving up Egypt, but because they were not feasible.

Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this. Officers treating for a mere

suspension of arms could not include topics of vast extent in their

negotiation, such as the demand for the possession of the Venetian

Islands, and the annulment of the Triple Alliance. But it was urgently

necessary to settle two points immediately: the departure of the wounded

and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix

solicited safe-conduct; and secondly, a suspension of arms, for the army

of the grand vizier, though marching slowly, would soon be in presence

of the French. It had actually arrived before the fort of El Arish,

the first French post on the frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to

surrender. The negotiations, in fact, had been going on for a fortnight

on board _Le Tigre_, while floating at the pleasure of the winds off the

coasts of Syria and Egypt: the parties had said all they had to say, and

the negotiations could not be continued to any useful purpose without

the concurrence of the grand vizier. Sir Sidney, availing himself of a

favourable moment, pushed off in a boat which landed him on the coast,

after incurring some danger, and ordered the captain of _Le Tigre_ to

meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were to be

put ashore, if the conferences were to be transferred to the camp of the

grand vizier.

At the moment when the English commodore reached the camp, a horrible

event had occurred at El Arish. The grand vizier had collected around

him an army of seventy or eighty thousand fanatic Mussulmans. The

Turks were joined by the Mamluks. Ibrahim Bey, who had some time before

retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by a long circuit

from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had become the auxiliaries

of their former adversaries. The English had made for this army a sort

of field-artillery, drawn by mules. The fort of El Arish, before which

the Turks were at this moment, was, according to the declaration of

General Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt; Alexandria was the

other.

The Turkish advanced-guard having reached El Arish, Colonel Douglas,

an English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the

commandant, to surrender. The culpable sentiments which the officers had

too much encouraged in the army then burst forth. The soldiers in the

garrison at El Arish, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave

Egypt, declared to the commandant that they would not fight, and that he

must make up his mind to surrender the fort.

[Illustration: 130.jpg A MODERN FANATIC]

The gallant Cazals indignantly refused, and a struggle with the

Turks ensued. During this contest, the recreants, who insisted on

surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks; these ferocious enemies, once

hoisted up into the fort, rushed, sword in hand, upon those who had

given them admission into the fort, and slaughtered a great number

of them. The others, brought back to reason, joined the rest of the

garrison, and, defending themselves with desperate courage, were most of

them killed. A small number obtained quarter, thanks to that humane and

distinguished officer, Colonel Douglas.

It was now the 30th of December: the letter written by Sir Sidney Smith

to the grand vizier, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not

reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arish.

Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings: this barbarous massacre

of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made him

fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time in sending

explanations to Kléber, both in his own name and that of the grand

vizier, and he added the formal assurance that all hostility should

cease during the negotiations.

Kléber, when informed of the massacre of El Arish, did not manifest as

much indignation as he ought to have done; he was aware that, if he was

too warm upon that subject, all the negotiations might be broken off.

He was more urgent than ever for a suspension of arms; and, at the

same time, by way of precaution, and to be nearer to the theatre of

the conferences, he left Cairo, and transferred his headquarters to

Salahieh, on the very border of the desert, two days’ march from El

Arish.

In the meantime, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by contrary winds,

had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th, and to reach El Arish

before the 13th.

The evacuation and its conditions soon became the sole subject of

negotiation. After long discussions it was agreed that all hostility

should cease for three months; that those three months should be

employed by the vizier in collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Abukir,

and Alexandria, the vessels requisite for the conveyance of the French

army; by General Kléber, in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the

contiguous provinces, and in concentrating his troops about the point of

embarkation; that the French should depart with the honours of war;

that they should cease to impose contributions; but that, in return,

the French army should receive three thousand purses, equivalent at that

time to three million francs, and representing the sum necessary for its

subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh,

Salahieh, and the Belbeys, forming the frontier of Egypt towards the

desert of Syria, were to be given up ten days after the ratification;

Cairo forty days after.

The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing more to

be done but sign it. Kléber, who had a vague feeling of his fault,

determined, in order to cover it, to assemble a council of war, to which

all the generals of the army were summoned. The council met on the 21st

of January, 1800. The minutes of it still exist. Desaix, although deeply

grieved, was swept along by the torrent of popular opinion, gave way

to it himself, and affixed his signature on the 28th of January to the

convention of El Arish.

Meanwhile preparations were being made for departure; Sir Sidney Smith

had returned to his ship. The vizier advanced and took possession,

consecutively, of the entrenched positions of Katieh, Salahieh, and

Belbeys, which Kléber, in haste to execute the convention, faithfully

delivered up to him. Kléber returned to Cairo to make his preparations

for departure, to call in the troops that were guarding Upper Egypt, to

concentrate his army, and then to direct it upon Alexandria and Rosetta

at the time stipulated for embarkation.

While these events were occurring in Egypt, the English cabinet had

received advice of the overtures made by General Kléber to the grand

vizier and to Sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French army was

reduced to the last extremity, it lost no time in sending off an express

order not to grant any capitulation unless they surrendered themselves

prisoners of war. These orders, despatched from London on the 17th of

December, reached Admiral Keith in the island of Minorca in the first

days of January, 1800; and, on the 8th of the same month, the admiral

hastened to forward to Sir Sidney Smith the instructions which he had

just received from the government. He lost no time in writing to Kléber,

to express his mortification, to apprise him honestly of what was

passing, to advise him to suspend immediately the delivery of the

Egyptian fortresses to the grand vizier, and to conjure him to wait

for fresh orders from England before he took any definite resolutions.

Unfortunately, when these advices from Sir Sidney arrived at Cairo, the

French army had already executed in part the treaty of El Arish.

Kléber instantly countermanded all the orders previously given to the

army. He brought back from Lower Egypt to Cairo part of the troops that

had already descended the Nile; he ordered his stores to be sent up

again; he urged the division of Upper Egypt to make haste to rejoin him,

and gave notice to the grand vizier to suspend his march towards Cairo,

otherwise he should immediately commence hostilities. The grand vizier

replied that the convention of El Arish was signed; that it must be

executed; that, in consequence, he should advance towards the capital.

At the same instant, an officer sent from Minorca with a letter from

Lord Keith to Kléber, arrived at the headquarters. Kléber, fired with

indignation at the demand for surrender, caused Lord Keith’s letter

to be inserted in the order of the day, adding to it these few words:

“Soldiers, to such insults there is no other answer than victory.

Prepare for action.”

Agents from Sir Sidney had hastened up to interpose between the French

and the Turks, and to make fresh proposals of accommodation. Letters,

they said, had just been written to London, and, when the convention of

El Arish was known there, it would be ratified to a certainty; in this

situation, it would not be right to suspend hostilities, and wait. To

this the grand vizier and Kléber consented, but on conditions that were

irreconcilable. The grand vizier insisted that Cairo should be given up

to him; Kléber, on the contrary, that the vizier should fall back to the

frontier. Under these conditions, fighting was the only resource.

On the 20th of March, 1800, in the plain of Heliopolis, ten thousand

soldiers, by superiority in discipline and courage, dispersed seventy

or eighty thousand foes. Kléber gave orders for the pursuit on the

following day. When he had ascertained with his own eyes that the

Turkish army had disappeared, he resolved to return and reduce the towns

of Lower Egypt, and Cairo in particular, to their duty.

He arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Important events had occurred

there since his departure. The population of that great city, which

numbered nearly three hundred thousand inhabitants, fickle, inflammable,

inclined to change, had followed the suggestions of Turkish emissaries,

and fallen upon the French the moment they heard the cannon at

Heliopolis. Pouring forth outside the walls during the battle, and

seeing Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey, with some thousand horse and

janizaries, they supposed them to be the conquerors. Taking good care

not to undeceive the inhabitants, the Turks affirmed that the grand

vizier had gained a complete victory, and that the French were

exterminated. At these tidings, fifty thousand men had risen in Cairo,

at Bulak, and at Gizeh, and Cairo became a scene of plunder, rapine, and

murder.

[Illustration: 137.jpg CITADEL OF CAIRO]

During these transactions, General Friant arrived, detached from

Belbeys, and lastly Kléber himself. Though conqueror of the grand

vizier’s army, Kléber had a serious difficulty to surmount to subdue an

immense city, peopled by three hundred thousand inhabitants, partly in

a state of revolt, occupied by twenty thousand Turks, and built in the

Oriental style; that is to say, having narrow streets, divided into

piles of masonry, which were real fortresses. These edifices, receiving

light from within, and exhibiting without nothing but lofty walls, had

terraces instead of roofs, from which the insurgents poured a downward

and destructive fire. Add to this that the Turks were masters of the

whole city, excepting the citadel and the square of Ezbekieh, which,

in a manner, they had blockaded by closing the streets that ran into it

with embattled walls.

In this situation, Kléber showed as much prudence as he had just

shown energy in the field. He resolved to gain time, and to let the

insurrection wear itself out. The insurgents could not fail at length

to be undeceived respecting the general state of things in Egypt, and to

learn that the French were everywhere victorious, and the vizier’s army

dispersed. Nassif-Pasha’s Turks, Ibrahim Bey’s Mamluks, and the Arab

population of Cairo could not agree together long. For all these

reasons, Kléber thought it advisable to temporise and to negotiate.

While he was gaining time, he completed his treaty of alliance with

Murad Bey. He granted to him the province of Sai’d, under the supremacy

of France, on condition of paying a tribute equivalent to a considerable

part of the imposts of that province. Murad Bey engaged, moreover, to

fight for the French; and the French engaged, if they should ever quit

the country, to facilitate for him the occupation of Egypt. Murad Bey

faithfully adhered to the treaty which he had just signed, and began

by driving from Upper Egypt a Turkish corps which had occupied it. The

insurgents of Cairo obstinately refused to capitulate, and an attack by

main force was, therefore, indispensable for completing the reduction of

the city, during which several thousand Turks, Mamluks, and insurgents

were killed, and four thousand houses were destroyed by fire. Thus

terminated that sanguinary struggle, which had commenced with the battle

of Heliopolis on the 20th of March, and which ended on the 25th of

April with the departure of the last lieutenants of the vizier, after

thirty-five days’ fighting between twenty thousand French on one side,

and, on the other, the whole force of the Ottoman empire, seconded by

the revolt of the Egyptian towns.

In the Delta all the towns had returned to a state of complete

submission. Murad Bey had driven from Upper Egypt the Turkish detachment

of Dervish Pasha. The vanquished everywhere trembled before the

conqueror, and expected a terrible chastisement. Kléber, who was humane

and wise, took good care not to repay cruelties with cruelties. The

Egyptians were persuaded that they should be treated harshly; they

conceived that the loss of life and property would atone for the crime

of those who had risen in revolt. Kléber called them together, assumed

at first a stern look, but afterwards pardoned them, merely imposing a

contribution on the insurgent villages. Cairo paid ten million francs,

a burden far from onerous for so large a city, and the inhabitants

considered themselves as most fortunate to get off so easily. Eight

millions more were imposed upon the rebel towns of Lower Egypt. The

army, proud of its victories, confident in its strength, knowing that

General Bonaparte was at the head of the government, ceased to doubt

that it would soon receive reinforcements. Kléber had in the plain of

Heliopolis made the noblest amends for his momentary faults.

He entered upon a second conquest, showing clemency and humanity on

all sides, and everywhere he laboured hard to encourage the arts and

industries and agriculture. He assembled the administrators of the army,

the persons best acquainted with the country, and turned his attention

to the organisation of the finances of the colony. He restored the

collection of the direct contributions to the Kopts, to whom it had

formerly been entrusted, and imposed some new customs’ duties and taxes

on articles of consumption. He gave orders for the completion of the

forts constructing around Cairo, and set men to work at those of Lesbeh,

Damietta, Burlos, and Rosetta, situated on the sea-coast. He pressed

forward the works of Alexandria, and imparted fresh activity to the

scientific researches of the Institute of Egypt, and a valuable mass of

information was embodied in the great French work, the “Description

de l’Egypte.” From the cataracts to the mouths of the Nile, everything

assumed the aspect of a solid and durable establishment. Two months

afterwards, the caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Darfur began to appear

again at Cairo.

But a deplorable event snatched away General Kléber in the midst of his

exploits and of his judicious government. He was assassinated in the

garden of his palace by a young man, a native of Aleppo, named Suleiman,

who was a prey to extravagant fanaticism.

With Kléber’s death, Egypt was lost for France. Menou, who succeeded

him, was very far beneath such a task. The English offered to make good

the convention of El Arish, but Menou refused, and England prepared for

an invasion, after attempting vainly to co-operate with the Turks.

Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who had been appointed as British commissioner,

landed with the English army alone at Abukir. After fierce skirmishing,

the French and English met on the plains of Alexandria. In the frightful

conflict which ensued, Sir Ralph Abercrombie was slain, but the battle

ended with the retreat of the French. Damietta surrendered on April

19th. The French were now divided, while Menou hesitated. General

Hutchinson took the place of the deceased British commander. A great

battle was fought at Cairo, which was won by the British, and the

capital itself now fell into their hands. General Hutchinson then

closed in upon Alexandria; and, after hard fighting, Menou at length

surrendered. The French troops were allowed to return to France with all

their belongings, except the artillery, August 27, 1801.

History of Egypt From 330 B.C. To the Present Time, Volume 12 (of 12) · 第 2 / 8 章