THE SECOND BALLOT AND THE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IN SINGLE-MEMBER
CONSTITUENCIES
"Le député, au lieu de représenter la majorité des électeurs, devient
prisonnier de la minorité qui lui a donné l'appoint nécessaire pour son
élection."
--YVES GUYOT
" ... every fool knows that a man represents
Not the fellers that sent him, but them on the fence."
--J. RUSSELL LOWELL
_Three-cornered contests._
It was stated in the first chapter that the rise of the Labour Party as
a political force, with an organization wholly independent of those of
the older parties, would make a change in our voting system imperative.
Both prior and subsequent to the appointment of the Royal Commission on
Electoral Systems political organizations have shown themselves keenly
alive to the necessity of such a change. At the meeting of the General
Committee of the National Liberal Federation at Leicester, on 21
February 1908, a resolution in favour of the early adoption of the
second ballot was carried unanimously. The Trades Union Congress, at its
meeting in September 1908, less eager to pronounce in favour of a reform
of such doubtful value, passed a resolution in favour of an
authoritative "inquiry into proportional representation, preference or
second ballots, so that the most effective means of securing the true
representation of the electors may be embodied in the new Reform Bill."
The spokesman of a deputation from the Manchester Liberal Federation,
which waited upon Mr. Winston Churchill on 22 May 1909, said: "The point
on which we wish to speak to you to-day is the reform of the present
system of voting, which we hold to be out of date, archaic, and in
great need of reform." Mr. Churchill's reply was a significant
reinforcement of Mr. Asquith's previous declaration, that "it was
impossible to defend the present rough and ready methods." "I think,"
said Mr. Churchill, "the present system has clearly broken down. The
results produced are not fair to any party, nor to any section of the
community. In many cases they do not secure majority representation, nor
do they secure an intelligent representation of minorities. All they
secure is fluke representation, freak representation, capricious
representation." The figures of two bye-elections--those of the Jarrow
Division of Durham and the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield--will show
how completely Mr. Churchill's language is justified. The figures are as
follows:--
JARROW ELECTION, 4 July 1907
Curran (Labour) 4,698
Rose-Innes (Conservative) 3,930
Hughes (Liberal) 3,474
O'Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,124
___
14,226
ATTERCLIFFE ELECTION, 4 May 1909
Pointer (Labour) . . . . 3,531
King-Farrow (Unionist) . . . 3,380
Lambert (Liberal) . . . . 3,175
Wilson (Ind. Unionist) . . . 2,803
___
12,889
In the case of Jarrow the successful candidate obtained just less than
one-third of the votes polled, and in the case of Attercliffe the member
returned represented a little more than a quarter of the electors. The
representation which results from elections of this kind is without
doubt most capricious and uncertain in character. A House of Commons so
built up could have no claim to be representative of the nation, and its
composition would be so unstable as seriously to impair its efficiency.
Nor can we afford to regard such elections as being a mere temporary
feature of our parliamentary system. The General Election of 1906 showed
a notable increase in the number of three-cornered fights over previous
general elections, and the bye-elections during the four years
1906--1909 were marked by a still further increase. The Report submitted
by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party to the Portsmouth
Conference in January 1909 foreshadowed a very large addition to the
number of Labour candidates. Some thirty-eight candidates, in addition
to the then existing Labour members in Parliament, had been formally
approved by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party after due
election by the Labour organizations to which the candidates belonged,
and although constituencies were not found for all of these new
candidates, the number of three-cornered contests in the election of
Jan. 1910, in which Liberal, Unionist, Labour (or Socialist) took part,
was no less than forty-one, and this number would have been greater had
not several Liberal candidates withdrawn. Owing to the desire on the
part of the Liberal and Labour parties to avoid the risk of losing seats
there were in the elections of December 1910 fewer three-cornered
fights. But the Labour party, the permanence of which is no longer open
to question, will not be content to remain with its present share of
representation. It can however gain additional seats only at the expense
of the older parties, and although the Liberal party, as in the
Mid-Derby bye-election of May 1908, may sometimes yield seats to Labour
nominees, it is not to be expected that the Liberal organizations will
always be willing to give way. At the Mid-Glamorgan bye-election in May
1910 the local organization, against the advice of the chief Liberal
Whip, nominated a Liberal candidate, and succeeded in retaining the seat
although it had been "ear-marked" by the Labour Party. In Scotland,
where Liberalism is less complaisant than in England, no seat has been
surrendered to the Labour Party without a fight, and when a Labour
candidature was threatened in December 1910, in the Bridgeton division
of Glasgow, the Liberals retaliated by threatening to place a Liberal
candidate in the Blackfriars division where Mr. Barnes, the Labour
representative was again standing. These facts should dispel any
illusion, if such still exist, that the problem of three-cornered fights
is a transitory phenomenon which can safely be ignored. The political
organizations, with a true instinct, have realized the importance and
urgency of this problem, and increasing pressure will doubtless be
brought to bear upon the Government to introduce a system of second
ballots, or some other electoral method, that will give effect to what
Mr. Churchill has described as "the broad democratic principle, that a
majority of voters in any electoral unit, acting together, shall be able
to return their man." The advocates of the second ballot and cognate
methods of reform seek a solution of this one problem only. They desire
to maintain the essential characteristic of the present system--the
exclusive representation of the majority in each constituency--and make
no attempt to remedy any of the other evils associated with
single-member constituencies. But the question at once arises whether
the problem of three-cornered contests can be solved by attempts to
preserve the distinctive feature of the present system--the
representation of the majority only. A little reflection must convince
the reader that such a solution deals with the form of the problem
rather than with its essence. For the new problem arises from the fact
that three parties instead of two are now seeking representation in
Parliament, and no remedy can be regarded as effective which does not
provide for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of all three
parties. This the system of second ballots has completely failed to do;
indeed its results only reinforce the arguments of previous chapters,
that so long as we compel the electors of any one district, whatever
their divisions of opinion, to be all represented by one man, their real
representation will be impossible. An examination of the effects of the
second ballot in those countries in which the system has been tried
fully justifies these statements, and fortunately the body of
experience now available is so considerable that the conclusions to be
drawn therefrom have an authoritative character.
_The second ballot._
The Reports furnished by His Majesty's representatives abroad show that
the second ballot, in one form or another, is, or has been, in force in
the majority of continental countries. The forms differ in detail, but
reference need only be made to the three chief types. In Germany the two
candidates highest at the first poll proceed to a second election. It
was this form of the second ballot that was introduced into New Zealand
in 1908. In France all candidates in the original election and even
fresh candidates may stand at the second election. At this second poll a
relative--not an absolute--majority of votes is sufficient to secure the
election of a candidate. As a rule only the two candidates highest at
the first election take part in the second ballot, and therefore in
practice the German and French methods closely approximate to one
another. The third type concerns the application of the second ballot to
the _scrutin de liste_ or block vote in multi-member constituencies. It
was formerly used in the Belgian parliamentary elections, and is still
employed in the election for the Belgian Provincial Councils. The
candidates who receive the support of an absolute majority of the
electors voting at the first ballot are at once declared elected; the
candidates next highest on the poll, but only so many as are equal to
double the number of vacancies remaining to be filled, take part in a
second ballot.
The object of the second ballot--to ensure that every elected candidate
should finally have obtained the support of a majority of the electors
voting in the constituency for which he has been returned--has,
generally speaking, been achieved. But that does not solve the problem
of the representation of three parties; a general election based on such
a system yields results which are far from satisfactory. The party which
is unsuccessful in one constituency may suffer the same fate in the
majority of the constituencies, and this is the fatal flaw in all forms
of the second ballot. Moreover experience has shown, and it is evident
_a priori_, that with this system the representation of any section of
political opinion depends not upon the number of its supporters, but
very largely upon the attitude taken towards it by other parties. For,
at a second ballot, the result is determined by the action of those
smaller minorities which were at the bottom of the poll at the first
ballot. No party can be certain of securing representation unless in its
own strength it can obtain an absolute majority in at least some of the
constituencies. The largest party in the State, if its voting strength
is evenly distributed, may be at the mercy of hostile combinations at
the second ballots, unless it is so large as to command a majority of
votes throughout the country, and when three parties have entered the
political arena it rarely happens that any one of them is in this
favourable position. That being so, the new element of uncertainty
associated with the system of second ballots may yield results which are
further removed from the true representation of the whole electorate
than the results of the first ballots.
_Experience in Germany._
Continental experience has shown that the coalitions at the second
ballots are of two types. One party may incur the hostility of all other
parties, and if so, the second ballots will tend uniformly to the
suppression of that party. The combination of parties whose aims and
purposes are to some degree allied may be regarded as legitimate, but
the cumulative effect of such combinations over a large area is most
unfair to the party adversely affected. No defence at all can be urged
in palliation of the evils of certain other coalitions also
characteristic of second ballots--the coalitions of extreme and opposed
parties which temporarily combine for the purpose of wrecking a third
party in the hope of snatching some advantage from the resulting
political situation. Sometimes such coalitions are merely the expression
of resentment by an advanced party at the action of a party somewhat
less advanced than itself. But, whatever the cause, the coalitions at
the second ballots do not result in the creation of a fully
representative legislative chamber; on the contrary, they tend to take
away all sincerity from the parliamentary system. Illustrations of the
first type of coalitions abound. The German general elections afford
numerous examples, but as a special note on the working of the second
ballots in Germany is to be found in Appendix II., it will suffice to
quote some of the results of the election of 1907. The Social Democrats
were engaged at the second ballots in ninety constituencies. At the
first ballots they were at the head of the poll in forty-four of these
constituencies, but at the second ballots they only succeeded in
retaining that position in eleven. In the forty-six constituencies in
which they were second at the poll they were only able to improve their
condition in three cases. These figures show how the German Social
Democrats suffered from hostile combinations. It was with the utmost
difficulty that they obtained representation in constituencies other
than those in which at the first elections they were in an absolute
majority. No wonder that one of the planks of the platform of the Social
Democratic party is proportional representation.
_Austria._
The Social Democrats of Austria suffered in the General Election of 1907
in the same way. Professor Kedlich,[1] in an article entitled "The
Working of Universal Suffrage in Austria," wrote as follows: "The
Christian Socialists have ninety-six seats in the new House, the Social
Democrats eighty-six ... The number of seats won by them weighs still
heavier in the balance when we reflect that in many second ballots the
majority of the opponents of social democracy joined their forces
against them. Not less instructive are the relative numbers of the votes
recorded for each of the parties. Over a million votes were given to the
Social Democrats as against 531,000 for the Christian Socialists." Such
results destroy the representative character of legislative bodies. The
same lesson on a smaller scale is to be gathered from the Italian
elections. Speaking of the General Election of 1904, the Rome
correspondent of _The Morning Post_ pointed out that, in not a few
constituencies, like the second division of Rome, a rally of Clericals
at the second ballots enabled the Conservative Monarchists to triumph
over the Socialists.
_Belgium._
The combinations of allied parties against a third party, as in the
examples already given, may be defended, but the coalitions at second
ballots, as has been pointed out, are not always of this character.
Should parties, angered and embittered by being deprived of
representation, use their power at the second ballots to render a stable
Government impossible, then the results are disastrous. Such were the
conditions which obtained in Belgium before the abandonment of second
ballots. "The system," says Sir Arthur Hardinge, "answered well enough
so long as only two parties contested an election; but the moment the
Socialist Party formed a distinct third party, after the establishment
of universal suffrage in 1894, it began to act in a manner which
produced unsatisfactory results.... The overwhelming victory of the
Clerical party in 1894 was largely due to the fact that in every second
ballot between Catholics and Socialists the Liberals voted for the
former, whilst in every second ballot between Catholics and Liberals,
with the single exception of the Thuin Division, the Socialists
preferred the Catholics as the creators of universal suffrage and as, in
some respects, a more genuinely democratic party, to the Liberals, whom
the Labour leaders regarded with peculiar hatred as the apostles of free
competition and individualism. In 1896 the Socialists were in their turn
the victims, as the Liberals had been in 1894, of the working of the
system of second ballots. Liberal electors at these elections voted
everywhere at the second ballots for Clerical against Labour candidates,
with the result that the Clericals won every one of the eighteen seats
for Brussels, although the total number of Clerical electors in a total
electorate of 202,000 was only 89,000, as against 40,000 Liberals and
73,000 ultra-Radicals and Labour men. Two years later the Liberals swung
round to an alliance with the Socialists against the Clericals, and in
several constituencies, owing to the system of second ballots, the
Socialists, although actually in a minority, won all the seats with the
help of the Liberals, who on the first ballot had voted unsuccessfully
for Liberal as against both Catholic and Labour candidates. It was the
practical experience of conditions such as these which gradually
convinced all the Belgian parties that, given a three-cornered fight in
every, or nearly every, constituency, the only way of preventing a
minority from turning the scales and excluding from all representation
the views of nearly half the electorate was to adopt the system of
proportional representation."[2]
Count Goblet d'Alviella furnishes an excellent example of the working of
the second ballots at Verviers in the General Election of 1898, the last
parliamentary election in Belgium, at which second ballots were used. In
the election for Senators the Socialists spoiled the chances of the
Liberals by voting for the Clericals, whilst, in the election for the
Chamber, the Liberals, not to be outdone, spoiled the chances of the
Socialists by also supporting the Clericals. The Clericals thus obtained
all the seats both in the Senate and in the Chamber with the assistance
of the Socialists and of the Liberals in turn. The absurdities of the
General Election of 1898 were so flagrant that on the day after the
election so determined an opponent of proportional representation as _La
Chronique_ exclaimed, "Can anything be more absurd than the working of
the second ballots in this country? ... What becomes of the moral force
of an election in which parties are obliged, if they wish to win, to
implore the support of electors who yesterday were their enemies? Such
support is never obtained without conditions, and these conditions are
either promises which it is not intended to keep or a surrender of
principles--in either case a proceeding utterly immoral."[3]
_France_.]
French elections also furnish examples of the use of the second ballots
for the purpose of fostering dissension between opponents. At the
General Election in 1906 it was stated that the Conservatives in the
South of France, despairing of obtaining representation themselves,
intended to support the Socialists at the second ballot in the hope of
obtaining an advantage by accentuating the difference between the
Socialists and the Radicals. M. Jaurès indignantly denied that there was
any understanding between the Socialists and the Conservatives, and took
advantage of the accusation to write in _L'Humanité_ a powerful plea for
proportional representation. "This reform," he declared, "would make
such unnatural alliances impossible. Each party would be induced and,
indeed, it would be to each party's advantage to fight its own battle,
for every group would have an opportunity of obtaining its full share of
representation. There would no longer be any question of doubtful
manoeuvres, of confused issues; Socialism would have its advocates,
Radicalism its exponents, Conservatism its leaders, and there would be a
magnificent propaganda of principles which would inevitably result in
the political education of the electorate. Every movement would be
assured of representation in proportion to its real strength in the
country; every party, freed from the necessity of entering into
alliances which invariably beget suspicion, would be able to formulate
quite clearly its essential principles; governmental and administrative
corruption would be reduced to a minimum; the real wishes of the people
would find expression; and if parties still continued to dispute for
power, it would be to enable them to promote the more effectually the
measures for which they stood." In spite, however, of this eloquent
disclaimer on the part of M. Jaurès, the Conservatives have at the
bye-elections continued their policy of supporting the Socialists. The
bye election of Charolles in December 1908 is a case in point. At the
first ballot the figures were as follows:--
M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,770 votes
M. Duoarouge (Socialist) 4,367 "
M. Magnien (Conservative) 3,968 "
At the second ballot--
M. Ducarouge (Socialist) 6,841 " Elected
M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,339 "
M. Magnien (Conservative) 301 "
It should be explained that the Conservative candidate, although his
name still appeared upon the ballot paper, retired before the second
election, and it is evident that the votes of many of his supporters
were given to the Socialist candidate. In the following April (1909)
several further instances occurred. At Uzès a vacancy was caused by the
death of a Radical Socialist member who, at the General Election of
1906, had beaten the Duc d'Uzès, a Reactionary, the Socialist candidate
on that occasion being at the bottom of the poll. In the bye-election
the Socialist was returned at the head of the poll, but so obvious was
the fact that the Socialist owed his victory to Conservative support,
that he was received in the Chamber by the Radicals with the cry of "M.
le duc d'Uzès." Uzès was typical of other elections and, as the Paris
correspondent of _The Morning Post_ remarked, "the successes of the
Unified Socialists in the recent series of bye-elections are in part to
be attributed to the votes of the Reactionaries, who voted for the
Unified candidates as being enemies of the Republic." This abuse of the
purpose of second ballots--an abuse engendered by the failure of the
minority to obtain direct representation--destroys the last semblance of
sincerity in the representation of a constituency, and must hasten the
abolition of the second ballots in France in the same way as
combinations of a similar nature rendered imperative the introduction of
a more rational system of election in Belgium.
The foregoing facts are sufficient to show that a system of second
ballots does not necessarily result in the formation of a legislative
chamber fully representative of the electorate. In Germany the largest
party has had its representation ruthlessly cut down by the operation of
the second ballots. Indeed, were it not for the overwhelming
predominance of this party in certain areas it might not have obtained
any representation whatever. In Belgium the effect of the second ballots
was to deprive the middle party, the Liberals, of their fair share of
representation. In 1896, owing to the coalitions of Socialists and
Catholics at the polls, the Liberals had only eleven representatives in
the popular chamber. All their leaders had been driven from Parliament,
their electoral associations had become completely disorganized save in
some large towns, and in many constituencies they had ceased to take
part in elections. Yet the results of the very first elections (1900)
after the establishment of proportional representation, showed that the
Liberals were the second largest party in the State, and that it was a
party which still responded to the needs and still gave voice to the
views of large numbers of citizens.
_The bargainings at the second ballots in France_.]
The system of second ballots not only deprives large sections of the
electorate of representation, but the very coalitions which produce this
result bring parliamentary institutions into still further disrepute.
These coalitions are condemned in unequivocal terms by Continental
writers and statesmen of widely differing schools of thought. The
scathing language of M. Jaures has already been quoted, and we find his
views endorsed by politicians of the type of M. Deschanel, an
ex-President of the Chamber of Deputies, who declared that these
coalitions entirely falsify the character of the popular verdict. Again,
M. Yves Guyot, an ex-Minister, asserts that "the second ballots give
rise to detestable bargainings which obliterate all political sense in
the electors." M. Raymond Poincare, a Senator and a former Minister,
condemns the system of second ballots in equally forcible language. "It
will be of no use," he says, "to replace one kind of constituency by
another if we do not, at the same time, suppress the gamble of the
majority system and the jobbery of the second ballots." These
expressions of opinion on the part of individual French politicians
could be multiplied, but it will be sufficient to add to them the more
formal and official declaration of the Commission du Suffrage Universel,
a Parliamentary Committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. In the
Report issued by this Committee in 1907, it is declared that "the
abolition of the second ballots with the bargainings to which they give
rise will not be the least of the advantages of the new system
[proportional representation]."
_The "Kuh-Handel" in Germany._
It would appear that the German second ballots are also characterized by
this same evil of bargaining. Karl Blind, writing in _The Nineteenth
Century_, March 1907, stated that "in this last election the oddest
combinations have taken place for the ballots in the various parts of
the Empire and within different States. There was no uniformity of
action as to coming to a compromise between Conservative and Liberal, or
Liberal and Social Democrat, or Centre and any other party, as against
some supposed common enemy who was to be ousted from his insufficient
majority by a subsequent alliance between otherwise discordant groups,
or who wanted to have his insufficient majority increased to an absolute
one by the addition of the vote of one of the defeated candidates whose
friends finally choose the 'lesser evil'....
"To some extent these necessary, but sometimes rather sordid,
transactions are made all the more difficult through the very existence
of separate States with 'Home Rule' legislatures of their own. Political
development has in them gone so far in a centrifugal sense that the
nation has been sadly split up and the public mind too much divided into
merely local concerns and issues....
"Irrespective of this baneful influence of a so-called 'Home Rule' state
of things on the life of the nation at large, I must confess that the
huckstering at the second ballots does not strike me as an ideal
institution. It generally goes, in Germany, under the name of
_Kuh-Handel_ (cow-bargain). It often brings out the worst symptoms of
intrigue and political immorality.... Those who dabble in the
_Kuh-Handel_ either lead their own contingent as allies into an enemy's
camp from spite against another adversary, or they induce their own men
to desist from voting at all at a second ballot, so as to give a chance
to another candidate, whom they really detest with all their heart, but
whom they wish to use as a means of spiting one still more
deeply hated."
_The position of a deputy elected at a second ballot_.]
The separate experiences, therefore, of France, Belgium, and Germany all
yield convincing and corroborative testimony to the demoralizing
influence on political life which results from the coalitions at the
second ballots. Insufficient attention, however, has been directed to
one aspect of this influence, its pernicious effect upon the inner
working of parliamentary institutions. The deputy who is elected as the
result of a coalition of forces at the second ballot finds himself in an
extremely difficult and unstable position. Instead of being the
representative of the majority of the electors he too often becomes, in
the apt phrase of M. Yves Guyot, "the prisoner of the minority," and,
whilst in Parliament, he is being continually reminded of the power of
that minority to make or unmake him at the next election. The persistent
pressure of that minority explains those contradictory votes in the
French Chamber which, to a foreigner, are often incomprehensible. The
deputy will usually act in accordance with the opinion of the group to
which he belongs and vote accordingly, but at a subsequent sitting he
will find it necessary to vote in such a way as will give satisfaction
to that minority whose support assured his success at the previous
election, and without whose support he cannot hope for re-election when
the time comes for a fresh appeal to the country. The pressure which
such a minority can exert must often be intolerable, and must, in any
case, render it impossible for any deputy either to do justice to
himself or to the legislative chamber to which he belongs.[3]
_The alternative vote._
The shortcomings of the system of the second ballot are so pronounced
and are so generally recognized that there now exists but little, if
any, demand for its introduction into this country, and more attention
has therefore been given to the mechanism of the alternative vote as
affording a means of securing the object of the second ballot whilst
avoiding many of its inconveniences. Under this suggested plan the voter
is invited to mark his preferences against the names of the candidates
on the voting paper by putting the figure "1" against his first
favourite; the figure "2" against the man he next prefers, and so on
through as many names as he may choose to mark. At the end of the poll
the number of papers in which each candidate's name is marked "1" is
ascertained, and if one of them is found to have secured the first
preferences of an absolute majority of all the persons voting, he is
declared elected; but if no candidate has obtained such a majority the
papers of the candidate who has obtained the least number of first
preferences are examined and transferred one by one to the candidate
marked "2" upon them. In this transfer, the papers on which only one
preference had been marked would be ignored, the preferences, to use
the current phrase, being "exhausted." If, as the result of this
transfer, any candidate has secured the support of an absolute majority
of the number of effective preferences he is declared duly elected; but
if there is still no candidate with an absolute majority the process is
repeated by distributing the papers of the candidate who is left with
the lowest number of votes, and so on until some candidate has got an
absolute majority of effective preferences.
The alternative vote undoubtedly possesses many and valuable advantages
as compared with the second ballot. In the first place, its introduction
into the English electoral system would keep English voters in touch
with Colonial rather than with Continental practice. Preferential
voting[4] has been in use in Queensland since 1892; it was adopted in
1907 by the West Australian Parliament, and was proposed in a Bill
submitted by Mr. Deakin to the Australian Commonwealth Parliament in
1906. Moreover, the alternative vote enables the election to be
completed in a single ballot; and the fortnight that is wasted between
the first and second ballots on the Continent would be saved. There has
also been claimed for this method of voting this further advantage, that
it would prepare the way (perhaps by rendering it inevitable) for the
more complete reform--proportional representation.
The principle of the alternative vote is extremely simple. It is
embodied in two Bills which were introduced into the House of Commons in
1908 by Mr. John M. Robertson and by Mr. Dundas White; and also in a
modified form in a Bill introduced in 1907 by Mr. A.E. Dunn. Its purpose
and mechanism is set forth in the memorandum of Mr. Robertson's Bill as
follows:--
"The object is to ensure that in a parliamentary election effect shall
be given as far as possible to the wishes of the majority of electors
voting. Under the present system when there are more than two candidates
for one seat it is possible that the member elected may be chosen by a
minority of the voters.
"The Bill proposes to allow electors to indicate on their ballot papers
to what candidate they would wish their votes to be transferred if the
candidate of their first choice is third or lower on the poll and no
candidate has an absolute majority. It thus seeks to accomplish by one
operation the effect of a second ballot."
Mr. Robertson's Bill, as originally introduced in 1906, was applicable
to single-member constituencies only; but the amended form in which the
Bill was re-introduced provided for the use of the transferable vote in
double-member constituencies as well, but, in doing so, still maintained
the essential characteristic of the existing system of voting--that each
member returned should have obtained the support of a majority of the
electors voting. Mr. Dundas White, however, in applying the alternative
vote to double-member constituencies, made a departure from this
principle, and proposed to render it possible for a candidate to be
returned who had obtained the support of less than one-half but more
than one-third of the voters.[5] The effect of Mr. Robertson's Bill
would have been that it would still be possible in double-member
constituencies for the party finally victorious to secure both seats;
whilst with Mr. Dundas White's provisions the two largest parties would
in all probability have obtained one seat each.[6]
The difference between the two measures is, however, of no great
consequence; the number of double-member constituencies is not very
large, and their number may be still further reduced in any future
scheme of redistribution of seats. It will, therefore, be sufficient to
consider what effect the alternative vote would have in single-member
areas. Let us take the Jarrow election, in which there were four
candidates, and apply to that election the possible working of the
alternative vote. The figures for the election may be repeated:--
Curran(Labour) . . . . 4,698
Rose-limes (Unionist). . . 3,930
Hughes (Liberal) . . . . 3,474
O'Hanlon (Nationalist) . . 2,122
The electors would, with the alternative vote, have numbered the
candidates on the ballot papers in the order of their choice, and, as
none of the candidates had obtained an absolute majority, the votes of
the lowest candidate on the poll would be transferred to the second
preferences marked by his supporters. If, for purposes of illustration,
it is assumed that every one of the 2122 supporters of Mr. O'Hanlon had
indicated a second preference, that 1000 had chosen Mr. Curran, 1000 had
chosen Mr. Hughes, and 122 had chosen Mr. Rose-Innes, then the following
table will show the effect of the transfer:--
Candidate. First Count. Transfer of O'Hanlou's Votes. Result.
Curran (Labour) 4,698 +1,000 5,698
Rose-Innes (Unionist) 3,930 + 122 4,052
Hughes (Liberal) 3,474 +1,000 4,474
O'Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,122 -2,112 --
Total 14,224 -- 14,224
Only three candidates now remain for consideration, and their position
on the poll as the result of the transfer is as follows:--
Curran . . . . . . 5,698
Hughes . . . . . . 4,474
Rose-Innes . . . . . 4,052
As neither has as yet obtained a majority of the total votes polled, it
becomes necessary that the votes given for Mr. Rose-Innes, who is now
lowest on the poll, should be transferred in accordance with the next
preferences of his supporters. It is conceivable that the larger
proportion of these preferences would have been given for the Liberal
candidate, Mr. Hughes, rather than for Mr. Curran, and, if so, the final
result might easily have been the election of Mr. Hughes as member
for Jarrow.
_The alternative or contingent vote in Queensland_.]
Before considering the value of the transferable vote in single-member
constituencies as a means of securing a true expression of the national
will, it may perhaps be pointed out that the procedure prescribed by the
Queensland Act differs from that contained in the English Bills. The
regulations of the Queensland Act are as follows:--
"When one member only is to be returned at the election, if there is no
candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes, all the candidates
except those two who receive the greatest number of votes shall be
deemed defeated candidates.
"When two members are to be returned, and there are more than four
candidates, if there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority
of votes, all the candidates except those four who receive the greatest
number of votes shall be deemed defeated candidates."
It will be seen that the system here prescribed approximates to the
German form of the second ballot, according to which only the two
candidates highest on the poll may stand again. Were the Queensland form
of preferential voting applied to the Jarrow election, both Mr. Hughes
and Mr. O'Hanlon would be declared defeated candidates, and only the
further preferences recorded by their supporters would be taken into
account in determining the relative position of the two highest
candidates, Curran and Rose-Innes. The provisions of the West Australian
Act of 1907, and of Mr. Deakin's Bill of 1906, followed the more
elastic and undoubtedly superior method embodied in the English
proposals.
Sir J.G. Ward, in introducing the Second Ballot Bill into the New
Zealand Parliament in 1908, defended the selection of this electoral
method on the ground that the system of preferential voting introduced
into Queensland had been a partial failure. He stated that the privilege
of marking preferences had not been extensively used, and quoted the
opinion of Mr. Kidston, a former Queensland Premier, that the marking of
preferences should be made compulsory. As explained in the course of the
New Zealand debates, part of the alleged failure of the Queensland
system was due to the unnecessarily cumbrous nature of the regulations.
The Queensland Electoral Acts still retain the old method of
voting--that of striking out from the ballot paper the names of such
candidates as the elector does not intend to vote for. The confusion
produced in the mind of the elector may readily be imagined when he is
instructed to strike out the names of candidates for whom he does not
intend to vote in the first instance, and then to mark such candidates
in the order of his choice. Moreover, the provisions, as detailed above,
for giving effect to preferences are so defective that only a proportion
of the preferences marked can be taken into account. Even so,
preferential voting in Queensland sometimes has a decisive influence
upon the result of the election, as the following example, taken from
the elections of 1908, will show:--
WOOLLOONGABBA ELECTION
_First Count_.
Votes.
1st Candidate . . . 1,605
2nd " . . . 1,366
3rd " . . . 788
-----
Total . . . 3,759
The votes recorded for the third candidate were then
distributed according to the preferences marked, which were as follows:--
1st Candidate . . . 15
2nd ,, . . . 379
No preferences . . . 394
---
788
The result of the distribution brought the second candidate to the top
of the poll, the final figures being as follows:--
2nd Candidate . . . 1,745
1st ,, . . . 1,620
_West Australia_
Where the more simple and straightforward instructions have been
adopted, as in West Australia, it has been found that a larger
percentage of the electors make use of the privilege of marking
preferences. Here are the figures for the constituency of Claremont in
the elections of 1908:--
_First Count._
Foulkes . . . . 1,427
Briggs . . . . 825
Stuart . . . . 630
-----
Total . . . 2,888
When the votes recorded for the candidate lowest on the poll were
distributed it was found that nearly 75 per cent, of his papers were
marked with additional preferences. The numbers were as follows:--
Briggs . . . . . 297
Foulkes . . . . 174
No preferences . . . 165
---
Total . . . 636
The final figures were as follows:--
Foulkes . . . . 1,601
Briggs . . . . 1,122
These figures doubtless show that even in West Australia, when the
transferable vote is applied to single-member constituencies, a
considerable number of the electors will not indicate a preference for
any candidate other than for that of their own party, but similar
abstentions occur at the second ballots in France, where it is found
that a considerable percentage of the electors usually refrain from
going to the poll on the second occasion. The Labour Party in Queensland
has sometimes issued instructions to its supporters to abstain from
marking preferences for the purpose of keeping the party solid and
absolutely separate from other parties. Such action necessarily
increases the percentage of abstentions. Nor can any remedy for action
of this kind be found in making the marking of preferences compulsory.
Even in Belgium, where "compulsory voting" is in force, the compulsion
only extends to an enforced attendance at the polling place. The act of
voting is not compulsory, for a blank unmarked ballot paper may be
dropped into the voting urn. The compulsory marking of preferences when
the elector has none may still further vitiate the results of elections
in a most undesirable way, whilst abstention from preference marking
merely deprives those abstaining of a privilege which they might
exercise if they chose. It is quite conceivable that an elector after
voting for the candidate of his choice may be indifferent to the fate of
the remaining candidates and, if so, an enforced expression of opinion
on his part would not be of any real value, and should not be counted in
determining the result of an election.
_Mr. Deakin's failure to carry the alternative vote._
Does then the alternative, or contingent vote, as used in West
Australia, solve the problem of three-cornered fights--the problem of
three distinct parties seeking representation in Parliament? When a
single seat is being contested it is doubtless sufficient if the member
elected represents the average views of his constituents, but a General
Election based on such a system would yield results no more satisfactory
than those of the second ballots. Neither the second ballot nor the
contingent vote are acceptable after their true effects are understood,
a fact which explains the failure of Mr. Deakin's Government to carry
their Preferential Ballot Bill in 1906. Several of the seats held by the
Australian Labour Party--as in the elections of Jarrow, Colne Valley,
and Attercliffe--were won by a minority vote; the _Melbourne Age_
published the following list of seven constituencies in Victoria where
Labour members represented only a minority of the voters:--
Non-Labour Labour
Constituencies. Votes. Votes
Geelong . . . . 1,704 1,153
Ballarat West . . . 2,038 1,034
Jika Jika . . . . 1,366 1,183
Williamstown . . . 1,931 1,494
Bendigo West . . . 1,654 1,248
Grenville . . . . 1,457 1,268
Maryborough . . . 1,929 1,263
Totals . . . 12,079 8,643
Preferential voting would have placed these seats at the mercy of a
combination of the other parties, and, somewhat alarmed by the too eager
advocacy of the measure on the part of the _Age_, the Labour Party,
which had voted for the second reading of the Bill, procured its defeat
on the first division in committee. It is impossible to defend the
present system by which the Labour Party, which numbered two-fifths of
the voters in these seven constituencies, obtained all seven seats, but,
on the other hand, it cannot be alleged that a system of preferential
voting, which would have enabled the other parties to have deprived
these electors of all representation, was a satisfactory solution of the
difficulty. In neither case would justice be done to the claims of three
parties to representation.
_Probable effect of the alternative vote in England._
A consideration of the possible results of the introduction into the
English electoral system of second ballots or the transferable vote in
single-member constituencies will show that neither reform will solve
the problem presented by the rise of a new party. It is obvious that the
Labour Party could by a combination of Conservative and Liberal voters
be deprived of representation in all constituencies save those in which
they had the support of an absolute majority of the electorate. Nor
would the conditions remain the same as they are to-day. In many
constituencies in which the Liberals have allowed a straight fight to
take place between Tariff Reform and Labour candidates, the Liberal
Party would intervene; and should combinations at the polls result in
the defeat of Labour candidates, what would be the effect upon the
temper and spirit of Labour voters who found themselves under an
"improved" voting system less able than before to secure representation
in Parliament? Would there not possibly arise a disposition on the part
of the disfranchised minority to pursue on the next occasion a wrecking
policy such as has distinguished the second ballots both in Belgium and
in France? Even apart from precipitate action which might arise as the
result of ill-feeling, the alternative vote would afford an opportunity
for a predetermined policy on the part of a minority to create
dissension between the opponents. The manipulation of the alternative
vote would be easily understood. An angry minority of electors could be
instructed beforehand to use it, as we know from experience they _have_
used the second ballot on the Continent. Would politicians, following an
exclusive electoral policy, hesitate to avail themselves of the weapon
which the alternative vote would place in their hands for the purpose of
annihilating any section they especially disliked, in the same way as
the Liberal Party in Belgium was destroyed by Catholic and Socialist
combinations at the second ballots? We cannot escape the conclusion
which all experience yields, that both these electoral methods place
the representation of any party at the mercy of either temporary or
permanent coalitions of other parties. To an even greater degree than
under the existing régime, the result of a General Election would fail
to reflect public opinion.
The advocates of the alternative vote assume, with but little
justification, that this method will be free from the bargainings that
have distinguished the second ballots on the Continent. The bargainings
naturally take place between the first and second ballots, because that
is the most suitable time for the striking of bargains, for the strength
of parties is definitely known. With the alternative vote such
transactions would take place before the election, upon the basis of the
probable position of parties as ascertained by the party agents. Even if
experience should show that the transferable vote did not lend itself so
easily as the second ballot to the perpetration of those bargains which
are detested by all Continental statesmen, yet it is probable that the
successful candidate would, like the deputy elected under the system of
second ballots, become "the prisoner of the minority." The figures of
the election would disclose to what extent the member returned had owed
his success to the smallest minority. This minority would be only too
conscious that it held the key of the situation, and the member would
doubtless be exposed to the same intolerable pressure as has been
brought to bear upon members of the French Chamber of Deputies. In any
case the position of the elected member would be most unsatisfactory.
Were a Labour member returned with the assistance of Tariff Reform
votes, would not the parliamentary relations between the various parties
become as embittered as when the Unified Socialist candidate at Uzès was
enabled by Reactionary votes to capture a Radical seat? What
recriminations would accompany the election of a Conservative candidate
whose victory was due to Labour votes given to him as an expression of
resentment at the action of Liberals in other constituencies? What would
be the relations between the Liberal and Labour parties if in a
constituency now represented by a Labour member, a Liberal candidate,
with the aid of Conservative votes, displaced him? These strained
relations would not only exist within the House of Commons itself, but
also and perhaps in a more pronounced form in the constituencies
themselves. Such conditions would not only invite the sarcasm of all
critics of democracy, they would produce the much more serious effect of
crippling the successful working of parliamentary institutions.
_The alternative vote not a solution of the problem of
three-cornered contests_.]
Neither second ballots nor preferential voting can solve the problem of
three parties seeking representation. They may preserve the outward form
of the distinguishing characteristic of the present system--that each
successful candidate should secure the support of the majority of the
electors voting--but this apparent conformity to the requirements of
majority representation is only secured at the cost of destroying the
sincerity of the parliamentary system and of rendering the composition
of the House of Commons still more unstable than it is to-day. In
England the competition of the three parties is most pronounced in the
industrial areas, and Mr. Winston Churchill, apparently recognizing the
futility of the alternative vote as a solution of the new difficulty,
had good grounds for his suggestion that electoral reformers should
concentrate their minds upon the proportional representation of the
great cities.[7] For proportional representation attacks the new problem
on entirely different lines. It provides for the realization of the
essentially democratic principle, that the various sections of
political' opinion are entitled to representation in proportion to their
respective strengths, and that such representation should be independent
of the action of other parties. Once this democratic principle is
admitted we are in view of the only effective solution of the problem of
three-cornered fights--a solution which not only solves this particular
difficulty, but meets those serious defects of our electoral system to
which attention has been directed in the two preceding chapters. "The
theory of Government by party," says Professor Nanson of Melbourne, "is
to find the popular mind by the issue of a number of contests between
the 'ins' and the 'outs.' But owing to the multiplicity of political
issues, this theory is now no more tenable than is the theory that every
question can be answered by a plain 'yes' or 'no.' ... We require a
system capable of finding the mind of the people on more than one issue.
With such a system all the difficulties caused at present by the
existence of three parties disappear. Instead of being a hindrance three
parties will be a help. For each will help to organize public opinion,
and so enable the mind of the public on important issues to be more
definitely and clearly ascertained."
[Footnote 1: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.]
[Footnote 2: Reports on the Second Ballot at Elections in Foreign
Countries. Miscellaneous. No. 2. 1908. (Cd. 3875.)]
[Footnote 2: _La Representation Proportionnelle en Belgique_, p. 7.]
[Footnote 3: An illuminating passage occurs in M. Guyot's article on
"The French Senate and Chamber of Deputies," in _The Contemporary
Review_, February 1910:--
"A deputy is only elected for four years, and almost on the morrow he
becomes again a candidate. If he has been elected at the second ballot,
with a rallying of the minority of electors, who have only voted for him
as better than nothing, and who can desert him at the next elections,
his position is very uncertain. Universal suffrage results in many
constituencies in great instability, and it is threatening especially
for the men who having had power have been obliged to act, and in acting
have dispersed certain illusions which they had perhaps entertained when
candidates, and have thus given offence.... Though one be an ex-Minister
one is none the less a man. The greater number of men--not only
ex-Ministers but men who have any reputation in Parliament--have sought
to migrate from the Palais Bourbon to the Luxemburg. The result is that
the Chamber of Deputies has not ceased to suffer from a species of
inverse selection. No body could retain its vigour under such a system.
The most experienced men have left; the composition of the Chamber of
Deputies has grown steadily weaker and weaker."]
[Footnote 4: In Australia the system is known as the contingent or
preferentinal vote. In recent years the phrase "alternative vote" has
been employed in England, and was adopted by the Royal Commission on
Electoral Systems as a means of distinguishing the use of the
transferable vote in single-member constituencies from its use in
multi-member constituencies for the purpose of securing proportional
representation.]
[Footnote 5: The regulations as to counting the votes contained in the
Schedule to the Bill were based upon those in Lord Courtney's Municipal
Representation Bill (see Appendix VI.), the practical application of
which is described in Chapter VII.]
[Footnote 6: Mr. Crawshay-Williams introduced a further Bill (based on
that of Mr. Robertson) in 1910. This Bill, in its final form, was made
applicable, in accordance with the recommendation of the Royal
Commissions on Electoral Systems, to single-member constituencies only.]
[Footnote 7: Reply to deputation of Manchester Liberal Federation, 23
May 1909.]