Conservative sociologists self-servingly marvel at the
peaceful proximity of abject poverty and ostentatious
affluence in American - or, for that matter, Western -
cities. Devastating riots do erupt, but these are reactions
either to perceived social injustice (Los Angeles 1965) or
to political oppression (Paris 1968). The French
Revolution may have been the last time the urban sans-
culotte raised a fuss against the economically
enfranchised.
This pacific co-existence conceals a maelstrom of envy.
Behold the rampant Schadenfreude which accompanied
the antitrust case against the predatory but loaded
Microsoft. Observe the glee which engulfed many
destitute countries in the wake of the September 11
atrocities against America, the epitome of triumphant
prosperity. Witness the post-World.com orgiastic
castigation of avaricious CEO's.
Envy - a pathological manifestation of destructive
aggressiveness - is distinct from jealousy.
The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines envy as:
"A feeling of discontented or resentful longing aroused by
someone else's possessions, qualities, or luck ...
Mortification and ill-will occasioned by the contemplation
of another's superior advantages".
Pathological envy - the fourth deadly sin - is engendered
by the realization of some lack, deficiency, or inadequacy
in oneself. The envious begrudge others their success,
brilliance, happiness, beauty, good fortune, or wealth.
Envy provokes misery, humiliation, and impotent rage.
The envious copes with his pernicious emotions in five
ways:
1. They attack the perceived source of frustration in
an attempt to destroy it, or "reduce it" to their
"size". Such destructive impulses often assume the
disguise of championing social causes, fighting
injustice, touting reform, or promoting an
ideology.
2. They seek to subsume the object of envy by
imitating it. In extreme cases, they strive to get
rich quick through criminal scams, or corruption.
They endeavor to out-smart the system and
shortcut their way to fortune and celebrity.
3. They resort to self-deprecation. They idealize the
successful, the rich, the mighty, and the lucky and
attribute to them super-human, almost divine,
qualities. At the same time, they humble
themselves. Indeed, most of this strain of the
envious end up disenchanted and bitter, driving the
objects of their own erstwhile devotion and
adulation to destruction and decrepitude.
4. They experience cognitive dissonance. These
people devalue the source of their frustration and
envy by finding faults in everything they most
desire and in everyone they envy.
5. They avoid the envied person and thus the
agonizing pangs of envy.
Envy is not a new phenomenon. Belisarius, the general
who conquered the world for Emperor Justinian, was
blinded and stripped of his assets by his envious peers. I -
and many others - have written extensively about envy in
command economies. Nor is envy likely to diminish.
In his book, "Facial Justice", Hartley describes a post-
apocalyptic dystopia, New State, in which envy is
forbidden and equality extolled and everything enviable is
obliterated. Women are modified to look like men and
given identical "beta faces". Tall buildings are razed.
Joseph Schumpeter, the prophetic Austrian-American
economist, believed that socialism will disinherit
capitalism. In "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy" he
foresaw a conflict between a class of refined but dirt-poor
intellectuals and the vulgar but filthy rich businessmen
and managers they virulently envy and resent. Samuel
Johnson wrote: "He was dull in a new way, and that made
many people think him great." The literati seek to tear
down the market economy which they feel has so
disenfranchised and undervalued them.
Hitler, who fancied himself an artist, labeled the British a
"nation of shopkeepers" in one of his bouts of raging
envy. Ralph Reiland, the Kenneth Simon professor of free
enterprise at Robert Morris University, quotes David
Brooks of the "weekly Standard", who christened this
phenomenon "bourgeoisophobia":
"The hatred of the bourgeoisie is the beginning of all
virtue' - wrote Gustav Flaubert. He signed his letters
'Bourgeoisophobus' to show how much he despised 'stupid
grocers and their ilk ... Through some screw-up in the
great scheme of the universe, their narrow-minded greed
had brought them vast wealth, unstoppable power and
growing social prestige".
Reiland also quotes from Ludwig van Mises's "The Anti-
Capitalist Mentality":
"Many people, and especially intellectuals, passionately
loathe capitalism. In a society based on caste and status,
the individual can ascribe adverse fate to conditions
beyond his control. In ... capitalism ... everybody's station
in life depends on his doing ... (what makes a man rich is)
not the evaluation of his contribution from any 'absolute'
principle of justice but the evaluation on the part of his
fellow men who exclusively apply the yardstick of their
personal wants, desires and ends ... Everybody knows
very well that there are people like himself who succeeded
where he himself failed. Everybody knows that many of
those he envies are self-made men who started from the
same point from which he himself started. Everybody is
aware of his own defeat. In order to console himself and
to restore his self- assertion, such a man is in search of a
scapegoat. He tries to persuade himself that he failed
through no fault of his own. He was too decent to resort to
the base tricks to which his successful rivals owe their
ascendancy. The nefarious social order does not accord
the prizes to the most meritorious men; it crowns the
dishonest, unscrupulous scoundrel, the swindler, the
exploiter, the 'rugged individualist'".
In "The Virtue of Prosperity", Dinesh D'Souza accuses
prosperity and capitalism of inspiring vice and temptation.
Inevitably, it provokes envy in the poor and depravity in
the rich.
With only a modicum of overstatement, capitalism can be
depicted as the sublimation of jealousy. As opposed to
destructive envy - jealousy induces emulation. Consumers
- responsible for two thirds of America's GDP - ape role
models and vie with neighbors, colleagues, and family
members for possessions and the social status they endow.
Productive and constructive competition - among
scientists, innovators, managers, actors, lawyers,
politicians, and the members of just about every other
profession - is driven by jealousy.
The eminent Nobel prize winning British economist and
philosopher of Austrian descent, Friedrich Hayek,
suggested in "The Constitution of Liberty" that innovation
and progress in living standards are the outcomes of class
envy. The wealthy are early adopters of expensive and
unproven technologies. The rich finance with their
conspicuous consumption the research and development
phase of new products. The poor, driven by jealousy,
imitate them and thus create a mass market which allows
manufacturers to lower prices.
But jealousy is premised on the twin beliefs of equality
and a level playing field. "I am as good, as skilled, and as
talented as the object of my jealousy." - goes the subtext -
"Given equal opportunities, equitable treatment, and a bit
of luck, I can accomplish the same or more".
Jealousy is easily transformed to outrage when its
presumptions - equality, honesty, and fairness - prove
wrong. In a paper recently published by Harvard
University's John M. Olin Center for Law and titled
"Executive Compensation in America: Optimal
Contracting or Extraction of Rents?", the authors argue
that executive malfeasance is most effectively regulated
by this "outrage constraint":
"Directors (and non-executive directors) would be
reluctant to approve, and executives would be hesitant to
seek, compensation arrangements that might be viewed by
observers as outrageous".
Notes on the Economics of
Game Theory
Consider this:
Could Western management techniques be successfully
implemented in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE)? Granted, they have to be adapted,
modified and cannot be imported in their entirety. But
their crux, their inalienable nucleus - can this be
transported and transplanted in CEE? Theory provides us
with a positive answer. Human agents are the same
everywhere and are mostly rational. Practice begs to
differ. Basic concepts such as the money value of time or
the moral and legal meaning of property are non existent.
The legal, political and economic environments are all
unpredictable. As a result, economic players will prefer to
maximize their utility immediately (steal from the
workplace, for instance) - than to wait for longer term
(potentially, larger) benefits. Warrants (stock options)
convertible to the company's shares constitute a strong
workplace incentive in the West (because there is an
horizon and they increase the employee's welfare in the
long term). Where the future is speculation - speculation
withers. Stock options or a small stake in his firm, will
only encourage the employee to blackmail the other
shareholders by paralysing the firm, to abuse his new
position and will be interpreted as immunity, conferred
from above, from the consequences of illegal activities.
The very allocation of options or shares will be interpreted
as a sign of weakness, dependence and need, to be
exploited. Hierarchy is equated with slavery and
employees will rather harm their long term interests than
follow instructions or be subjected to criticism - never
mind how constructive. The employees in CEE regard the
corporate environment as a conflict zone, a zero sum
game (in which the gains by some equal the losses to
others). In the West, the employees participate in the
increase in the firm's value. The difference between these
attitudes is irreconcilable.
Now, let us consider this:
An entrepreneur is a person who is gifted at identifying
the unsatisfied needs of a market, at mobilizing and
organizing the resources required to satisfy those needs
and at defining a long-term strategy of development and
marketing. As the enterprise grows, two processes
combine to denude the entrepreneur of some of his initial
functions. The firm has ever growing needs for capital:
financial, human, assets and so on. Additionally, the
company begins (or should begin) to interface and interact
with older, better established firms. Thus, the company is
forced to create its first management team: a general
manager with the right doses of respectability,
connections and skills, a chief financial officer, a host of
consultants and so on. In theory - if all our properly
motivated financially - all these players (entrepreneurs
and managers) will seek to maximize the value of the
firm. What happens, in reality, is that both work to
minimize it, each for its own reasons. The managers seek
to maximize their short-term utility by securing enormous
pay packages and other forms of company-dilapidating
compensation. The entrepreneurs feel that they are
"strangled", "shackled", "held back" by bureaucracy and
they "rebel". They oust the management, or undermine it,
turning it into an ineffective representative relic. They
assume real, though informal, control of the firm. They do
so by defining a new set of strategic goals for the firm,
which call for the institution of an entrepreneurial rather
than a bureaucratic type of management. These cycles of
initiative-consolidation-new initiative-revolution-
consolidation are the dynamos of company growth.
Growth leads to maximization of value. However, the
players don't know or do not fully believe that they are in
the process of maximizing the company's worth. On the
contrary, consciously, the managers say: "Let's maximize
the benefits that we derive from this company, as long as
we are still here." The entrepreneurs-owners say: "We
cannot tolerate this stifling bureaucracy any longer. We
prefer to have a smaller company - but all ours." The
growth cycles forces the entrepreneurs to dilute their
holdings (in order to raise the capital necessary to finance
their initiatives). This dilution (the fracturing of the
ownership structure) is what brings the last cycle to its
end. The holdings of the entrepreneurs are too small to
materialize a coup against the management. The
management then prevails and the entrepreneurs are
neutralized and move on to establish another start-up. The
only thing that they leave behind them is their names and
their heirs.
We can use Game Theory methods to analyse both these
situations. Wherever we have economic players
bargaining for the allocation of scarce resources in order
to attain their utility functions, to secure the outcomes and
consequences (the value, the preference, that the player
attaches to his outcomes) which are right for them - we
can use Game Theory (GT).
A short recap of the basic tenets of the theory might be in
order.
GT deals with interactions between agents, whether
conscious and intelligent - or Dennettic. A Dennettic
Agent (DA) is an agent that acts so as to influence the
future allocation of resources, but does not need to be
either conscious or deliberative to do so. A Game is the
set of acts committed by 1 to n rational DA and one a-
rational (not irrational but devoid of rationality) DA
(nature, a random mechanism). At least 1 DA in a Game
must control the result of the set of acts and the DAs must
be (at least potentially) at conflict, whole or partial. This
is not to say that all the DAs aspire to the same things.
They have different priorities and preferences. They rank
the likely outcomes of their acts differently. They engage
Strategies to obtain their highest ranked outcome. A
Strategy is a vector, which details the acts, with which the
DA will react in response to all the (possible) acts by the
other DAs. An agent is said to be rational if his Strategy
does guarantee the attainment of his most preferred goal.
Nature is involved by assigning probabilities to the
outcomes. An outcome, therefore, is an allocation of
resources resulting from the acts of the agents. An agent is
said to control the situation if its acts matter to others to
the extent that at least one of them is forced to alter at
least one vector (Strategy). The Consequence to the agent
is the value of a function that assigns real numbers to each
of the outcomes. The consequence represents a list of
outcomes, prioritized, ranked. It is also known as an
ordinal utility function. If the function includes relative
numerical importance measures (not only real numbers) -
we call it a Cardinal Utility Function.
Games, naturally, can consist of one player, two players
and more than two players (n-players). They can be zero
(or fixed) - sum (the sum of benefits is fixed and whatever
gains made by one of the players are lost by the others).
They can be nonzero-sum (the amount of benefits to all
players can increase or decrease). Games can be
cooperative (where some of the players or all of them
form coalitions) - or non-cooperative (competitive). For
some of the games, the solutions are called Nash
equilibria. They are sets of strategies constructed so that
an agent which adopts them (and, as a result, secures a
certain outcome) will have no incentive to switch over to
other strategies (given the strategies of all other players).
Nash equilibria (solutions) are the most stable (it is where
the system "settles down", to borrow from Chaos Theory)
- but they are not guaranteed to be the most desirable.
Consider the famous "Prisoners' Dilemma" in which both
players play rationally and reach the Nash equilibrium
only to discover that they could have done much better by
collaborating (that is, by playing irrationally). Instead,
they adopt the "Paretto-dominated", or the "Paretto-
optimal", sub-optimal solution. Any outside interference
with the game (for instance, legislation) will be construed
as creating a NEW game, not as pushing the players to
adopt a "Paretto-superior" solution.
The behaviour of the players reveals to us their order of
preferences. This is called "Preference Ordering" or
"Revealed Preference Theory". Agents are faced with sets
of possible states of the world (=allocations of resources,
to be more economically inclined). These are called
"Bundles". In certain cases they can trade their bundles,
swap them with others. The evidence of these swaps will
inevitably reveal to us the order of priorities of the agent.
All the bundles that enjoy the same ranking by a given
agent - are this agent's "Indifference Sets". The
construction of an Ordinal Utility Function is, thus, made
simple. The indifference sets are numbered from 1 to n.
These ordinals do not reveal the INTENSITY or the
RELATIVE INTENSITY of a preference - merely its
location in a list. However, techniques are available to
transform the ordinal utility function - into a cardinal one.
A Stable Strategy is similar to a Nash solution - though
not identical mathematically. There is currently no
comprehensive theory of Information Dynamics. Game
Theory is limited to the aspects of competition and
exchange of information (cooperation). Strategies that
lead to better results (independently of other agents) are
dominant and where all the agents have dominant
strategies - a solution is established. Thus, the Nash
equilibrium is applicable to games that are repeated and
wherein each agent reacts to the acts of other agents. The
agent is influenced by others - but does not influence
them (he is negligible). The agent continues to adapt in
this way - until no longer able to improve his position.
The Nash solution is less available in cases of cooperation
and is not unique as a solution. In most cases, the players
will adopt a minimax strategy (in zero-sum games) or
maximin strategies (in nonzero-sum games). These
strategies guarantee that the loser will not lose more than
the value of the game and that the winner will gain at least
this value. The solution is the "Saddle Point".
The distinction between zero-sum games (ZSG) and
nonzero-sum games (NZSG) is not trivial. A player
playing a ZSG cannot gain if prohibited to use certain
strategies. This is not the case in NZSGs. In ZSG, the
player does not benefit from exposing his strategy to his
rival and is never harmed by having foreknowledge of his
rival's strategy. Not so in NZSGs: at times, a player stands
to gain by revealing his plans to the "enemy". A player
can actually be harmed by NOT declaring his strategy or
by gaining acquaintance with the enemy's stratagems. The
very ability to communicate, the level of communication
and the order of communication - are important in
cooperative cases. A Nash solution:
1. Is not dependent upon any utility function;
2. It is impossible for two players to improve the
Nash solution (=their position) simultaneously
(=the Paretto optimality);
3. Is not influenced by the introduction of irrelevant
(not very gainful) alternatives; and
4. Is symmetric (reversing the roles of the players
does not affect the solution).
The limitations of this approach are immediately evident.
It is definitely not geared to cope well with more complex,
multi-player, semi-cooperative (semi-competitive),
imperfect information situations.
Von Neumann proved that there is a solution for every
ZSG with 2 players, though it might require the
implementation of mixed strategies (strategies with
probabilities attached to every move and outcome).
Together with the economist Morgenstern, he developed
an approach to coalitions (cooperative efforts of one or
more players - a coalition of one player is possible).
Every coalition has a value - a minimal amount that the
coalition can secure using solely its own efforts and
resources. The function describing this value is super-
additive (the value of a coalition which is comprised of
two sub-coalitions equals, at least, the sum of the values
of the two sub-coalitions). Coalitions can be
epiphenomenal: their value can be higher than the
combined values of their constituents. The amounts paid
to the players equal the value of the coalition and each
player stands to get an amount no smaller than any
amount that he would have made on his own. A set of
payments to the players, describing the division of the
coalition's value amongst them, is the "imputation", a
single outcome of a strategy. A strategy is, therefore,
dominant, if: (1) each player is getting more under the
strategy than under any other strategy and (2) the players
in the coalition receive a total payment that does not
exceed the value of the coalition. Rational players are
likely to prefer the dominant strategy and to enforce it.
Thus, the solution to an n-players game is a set of
imputations. No single imputation in the solution must be
dominant (=better). They should all lead to equally
desirable results. On the other hand, all the imputations
outside the solution should be dominated. Some games are
without solution (Lucas, 1967).
Auman and Maschler tried to establish what is the right
payoff to the members of a coalition. They went about it
by enlarging upon the concept of bargaining (threats,
bluffs, offers and counter-offers). Every imputation was
examined, separately, whether it belongs in the solution
(=yields the highest ranked outcome) or not, regardless of
the other imputations in the solution. But in their theory,
every member had the right to "object" to the inclusion of
other members in the coalition by suggesting a different,
exclusionary, coalition in which the members stand to
gain a larger payoff. The player about to be excluded can
"counter-argue" by demonstrating the existence of yet
another coalition in which the members will get at least as
much as in the first coalition and in the coalition proposed
by his adversary, the "objector". Each coalition has, at
least, one solution.
The Game in GT is an idealized concept. Some of the
assumptions can - and should be argued against. The
number of agents in any game is assumed to be finite and
a finite number of steps is mostly incorporated into the
assumptions. Omissions are not treated as acts (though
negative ones). All agents are negligible in their
relationship to others (have no discernible influence on
them) - yet are influenced by them (their strategies are not
- but the specific moves that they select - are). The
comparison of utilities is not the result of any ranking -
because no universal ranking is possible. Actually, no
ranking common to two or n players is possible (rankings
are bound to differ among players). Many of the problems
are linked to the variant of rationality used in GT. It is
comprised of a clarity of preferences on behalf of the
rational agent and relies on the people's tendency to
converge and cluster around the right answer / move.
This, however, is only a tendency. Some of the time,
players select the wrong moves. It would have been much
wiser to assume that there are no pure strategies, that all
of them are mixed. Game Theory would have done well to
borrow mathematical techniques from quantum
mechanics. For instance: strategies could have been
described as wave functions with probability distributions.
The same treatment could be accorded to the cardinal
utility function. Obviously, the highest ranking (smallest
ordinal) preference should have had the biggest
probability attached to it - or could be treated as the
collapse event. But these are more or less known, even
trivial, objections. Some of them cannot be overcome. We
must idealize the world in order to be able to relate to it
scientifically at all. The idealization process entails the
incorporation of gross inaccuracies into the model and the
ignorance of other elements. The surprise is that the
approximation yields results, which tally closely with
reality - in view of its mutilation, affected by the model.
There are more serious problems, philosophical in nature.
It is generally agreed that "changing" the game can - and
very often does - move the players from a non-
cooperative mode (leading to Paretto-dominated results,
which are never desirable) - to a cooperative one. A
government can force its citizens to cooperate and to obey
the law. It can enforce this cooperation. This is often
called a Hobbesian dilemma. It arises even in a population
made up entirely of altruists. Different utility functions
and the process of bargaining are likely to drive these
good souls to threaten to become egoists unless other
altruists adopt their utility function (their preferences,
their bundles). Nash proved that there is an allocation of
possible utility functions to these agents so that the
equilibrium strategy for each one of them will be this kind
of threat. This is a clear social Hobbesian dilemma: the
equilibrium is absolute egoism despite the fact that all the
players are altruists. This implies that we can learn very
little about the outcomes of competitive situations from
acquainting ourselves with the psychological facts
pertaining to the players. The agents, in this example, are
not selfish or irrational - and, still, they deteriorate in their
behaviour, to utter egotism. A complete set of utility
functions - including details regarding how much they
know about one another's utility functions - defines the
available equilibrium strategies. The altruists in our
example are prisoners of the logic of the game. Only an
"outside" power can release them from their predicament
and permit them to materialize their true nature. Gauthier
said that morally-constrained agents are more likely to
evade Paretto-dominated outcomes in competitive games
- than agents who are constrained only rationally. But this
is unconvincing without the existence of an Hobesian
enforcement mechanism (a state is the most common
one). Players would do better to avoid Paretto dominated
outcomes by imposing the constraints of such a
mechanism upon their available strategies. Paretto
optimality is defined as efficiency, when there is no state
of things (a different distribution of resources) in which at
least one player is better off - with all the other no worse
off. "Better off" read: "with his preference satisfied". This
definitely could lead to cooperation (to avoid a bad
outcome) - but it cannot be shown to lead to the formation
of morality, however basic. Criminals can achieve their
goals in splendid cooperation and be content, but that does
not make it more moral. Game theory is agent neutral, it is
utilitarianism at its apex. It does not prescribe to the agent
what is "good" - only what is "right". It is the ultimate
proof that effort at reconciling utilitarianism with more
deontological, agent relative, approaches are dubious, in
the best of cases. Teleology, in other words, in no
guarantee of morality.
Acts are either means to an end or ends in themselves.
This is no infinite regression. There is bound to be an holy
grail (happiness?) in the role of the ultimate end. A more
commonsense view would be to regard acts as means and
states of affairs as ends. This, in turn, leads to a
teleological outlook: acts are right or wrong in accordance
with their effectiveness at securing the achievement of the
right goals. Deontology (and its stronger version,
absolutism) constrain the means. It states that there is a
permitted subset of means, all the other being immoral
and, in effect, forbidden. Game Theory is out to shatter
both the notion of a finite chain of means and ends
culminating in an ultimate end - and of the deontological
view. It is consequentialist but devoid of any value
judgement.
Game Theory pretends that human actions are breakable
into much smaller "molecules" called games. Human acts
within these games are means to achieving ends but the
ends are improbable in their finality. The means are
segments of "strategies": prescient and omniscient
renditions of the possible moves of all the players. Aside
from the fact that it involves mnemic causation (direct and
deterministic influence by past events) and a similar
influence by the utility function (which really pertains to
the future) - it is highly implausible. Additionally, Game
Theory is mired in an internal contradiction: on the one
hand it solemnly teaches us that the psychology of the
players is absolutely of no consequence. On the other, it
hastens to explicitly and axiomatically postulate their
rationality and implicitly (and no less axiomatically) their
benefit-seeking behaviour (though this aspect is much
more muted). This leads to absolutely outlandish results:
irrational behaviour leads to total cooperation, bounded
rationality leads to more realistic patterns of cooperation
and competition (coopetition) and an unmitigated rational
behaviour leads to disaster (also known as Paretto
dominated outcomes).
Moreover, Game Theory refuses to acknowledge that real
games are dynamic, not static. The very concepts of
strategy, utility function and extensive (tree like)
representation are static. The dynamic is retrospective, not
prospective. To be dynamic, the game must include all the
information about all the actors, all their strategies, all
their utility functions. Each game is a subset of a higher
level game, a private case of an implicit game which is
constantly played in the background, so to say. This is a
hyper-game of which all games are but derivatives. It
incorporates all the physically possible moves of all the
players. An outside agency with enforcement powers (the
state, the police, the courts, the law) are introduced by the
players. In this sense, they are not really an outside event
which has the effect of altering the game fundamentally.
They are part and parcel of the strategies available to the
players and cannot be arbitrarily ruled out. On the
contrary, their introduction as part of a dominant strategy
will simplify Game theory and make it much more
applicable. In other words: players can choose to compete,
to cooperate and to cooperate in the formation of an
outside agency. There is no logical or mathematical
reason to exclude the latter possibility. The ability to thus
influence the game is a legitimate part of any real life
strategy. Game Theory assumes that the game is a given -
and the players have to optimize their results within it. It
should open itself to the inclusion of game altering or
redefining moves by the players as an integral part of their
strategies. After all, games entail the existence of some
agreement to play and this means that the players accept
some rules (this is the role of the prosecutor in the
Prisoners' Dilemma). If some outside rules (of the game)
are permissible - why not allow the "risk" that all the
players will agree to form an outside, lawfully binding,
arbitration and enforcement agency - as part of the game?
Such an agency will be nothing if not the embodiment, the
materialization of one of the rules, a move in the players'
strategies, leading them to more optimal or superior
outcomes as far as their utility functions are concerned.
Bargaining inevitably leads to an agreement regarding a
decision making procedure. An outside agency, which
enforces cooperation and some moral code, is such a
decision making procedure. It is not an "outside" agency
in the true, physical, sense. It does not "alter" the game
(not to mention its rules). It IS the game, it is a procedure,
a way to resolve conflicts, an integral part of any solution
and imputation, the herald of cooperation, a representative
of some of the will of all the players and, therefore, a part
both of their utility functions and of their strategies to
obtain their preferred outcomes. Really, these outside
agencies ARE the desired outcomes. Once Game Theory
digests this observation, it could tackle reality rather than
its own idealized contraptions.