But in criticism one always has hard work in steering a straight course

between optimism and pessimism. These are the Scylla and Charybdis of

the critic's career. Almost every man who thinks or speaks about public

affairs is either an optimist or a pessimist; which he is, depends a

good deal on temperament, but often on character. The political jobber

or corruptionist is almost always an optimist. So is the prosperous

business man. So is nearly every politician, because the optimist is

nearly always the more popular of the two. As a general rule, people

like cheerful men and the promise of good times. The kill-joy and bearer

of bad news has always been an odious character. But for the cultivated

man there is no virtue in either optimism or pessimism. Some people

think it a duty to be optimistic, and for some people it may be a duty;

but one of the great uses of education is to teach us to be neither one

nor the other. In the management of our personal affairs, we try to be

neither one nor the other. In business, a persistent and uproarious

optimist would certainly have poor credit. And why? Because in business

the trustworthy man, as everybody knows, is the man who sees things as

they are: and to see things as they are, without glamor or illusion, is

the first condition of worldly success. It is absolutely essential in

war, in finance, in law, in every field of human activity in which the

future has to be thought of and provided for. It is just as essential in

politics. The only reason why it is not thought as essential in politics

is, the punishment for failure or neglect comes in politics more

slowly.

The pessimist has generally a bad name, but there is a good deal to be

said for him. To take a recent illustration, the man who took

pessimistic views of the silver movement was for nearly twenty years

under a cloud. This gloomy anticipation of 1873 was not realized until

1893. For a thousand years after Marcus Aurelius, the pessimist, if I

may use the expression, was "cock of the walk." He certainly has no

reason to be ashamed of his role in the Eastern world for a thousand

years after the Mohammedan Hegira. In Italy and Spain he has not needed

to hang his head since the Renaissance. In fact, if we take various

nations and long reaches of time, we shall find that the gloomy man has

been nearly as often justified by the course of events as the cheerful

one. Neither of them has any special claim to a hearing on public

affairs. A persistent optimist, although he may be a most agreeable man

in family life, is likely, in business or politics, to be just as

foolish and unbearable as a persistent pessimist. He is as much out of

harmony with the order of nature. The universe is not governed on

optimistic any more than on pessimistic principles. The best and wisest

of men make their mistakes and have their share of sorrow and sickness

and losses. So also the most happily situated nations must suffer from

internal discord, the blunders of statesmen, and the madness of the

people. What Cato said in the Senate of the conditions of success,

"vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo, prospere omnia cedunt," is as true

to-day as it was two thousand years ago. We must remember that though

the optimist may be the pleasantest man to have about us, he is the

least likely to take precautions; that is, the least likely to watch and

work for success. We owe a great deal of our slovenly legislation to his

presence in large numbers in Congress and the legislatures. The great

suffering through which we are now passing, in consequence of the

persistence in our silver purchases, is the direct result of unreasoning

optimism. Its promoters disregarded the warnings of economists and

financiers because they believed that somehow, they did not know how,

the thing would come out right in the end. The silver collapse, together

with the Civil War over slavery, are striking illustrations to occur in

one century, of the fact that if things come out right in the end, it is

often after periods of great suffering and disaster. Could people have

foreseen how the slavery controversy would end, what frantic efforts

would have been made for peaceful abolition! Could people have foreseen

the panic of last year, with its wide-spread disaster, what haste would

have been made to stop the silver purchases! And yet the experience of

mankind afforded abundant reason for anticipating both results.

This leads me to say that the reason why educated men should try and

keep a fair mental balance between both pessimism and optimism, is that

there has come over the world in the last twenty-five or thirty years a

very great change of opinion touching the relations of the government to

the community. When Europe settled down to peaceful work after the great

wars of the French Revolution, it was possessed with the idea that the

freedom of the individual was all that was needed for public prosperity

and private happiness. The old government interference with people's

movements and doings was supposed to be the reason why nations had not

been happy in the past. This became the creed, in this country, of the

Democratic party, which came into existence after the foundation of the

federal government. At the same time there grew up here the popular idea

of the American character, in which individualism was the most marked

trait. If you are not familiar with it in your own time, you may

remember it in the literature of the earlier half of the century. The

typical American was always the architect of his own fortunes. He sailed

the seas and penetrated the forest, and built cities and lynched the

horse thieves, and fought the Indians and dug the mines, without

anybody's help or support. He had even an ill-concealed contempt for

regular troops, as men under control and discipline. He scorned

government for any other purposes than security and the administration

of justice. This was the kind of American that Tocqueville found here in

1833. He says:--

"The European often sees in the public functionaries simply

force; the American sees nothing but law. One may then say

that in America a man never obeys a man, or anything but

justice and law. Consequently he has formed of himself an

opinion which is often exaggerated, but is always salutary.

He trusts without fear to his own strength, which appears to

him equal to anything. A private individual conceives some

sort of enterprise. Even if this enterprise have some sort of

connection with the public welfare, it never occurs to him to

address himself to the government in order to obtain its aid.

He makes his plan known, offers to carry it out, calls other

individuals to his aid, and struggles with all his might

against any obstacles there may be in his way. Often,

without doubt, he succeeds less well than the State would in

his place; but in the long run the general result of

individual enterprises far surpasses anything the government

could do."

Now there is no doubt that if this type of character has not passed

away, it has been greatly modified; and it has been modified by two

agencies--the "labor problem," as it is called, and legislative

protection to native industry. I am not going to make an argument about

the value of this protection in promoting native industry, or about its

value from the industrial point of view. We may or we may not owe to it

the individual progress and prosperity of the United States. About that

I do not propose to say anything. What I want to say is that the

doctrine that it is a function of government, not simply to foster

industry in general, but to consider the case of every particular

industry and give it the protection that it needs, could not be preached

and practiced for thirty years in a community like this, without

modifying the old American conception of the relation of the government

to the individual. It makes the government, in a certain sense, a

partner in every industrial enterprise, and makes every Presidential

election an affair of the pocket to every miner and manufacturer and to

his men; for the men have for fully thirty years been told that the

amount of their wages would depend, to a certain extent at least, on the

way the election went. The notion that the government owes assistance to

individuals in carrying on business and making a livelihood has in fact,

largely through the tariff discussions, permeated a very large class of

the community, and has materially changed what I may call the American

outlook. It has greatly reinforced among the foreign-born population the

socialistic ideas which many bring here with them, of the powers and

duties of the State toward labor; for it is preached vehemently by the

employing class.

What makes this look the more serious is, that our political and social

manners are not adapted to it. In Europe, the State is possessed of an

administrative machine which has a finish, efficacy, and permanence

unknown here. Tocqueville comments on its absence among us; and it is,

as all the advocates of civil-service reform know, very difficult to

supply. All the agencies of the government suffer from the imposition on

them of what I may call non-American duties. For instance, a

custom-house organized as a political machine was never intended to

collect the enormous sum of duties which must pass through its hands

under our tariff. A post-office whose master has to be changed every

four years to "placate" Tammany, or the anti-Snappers, or any other body

of politicians, was never intended to handle the huge mass which

American mails have now become. One of the greatest objections to the

income tax is the prying into people's affairs which it involves. No man

likes to tell what his income is to every stranger, much less to a

politician, which our collectors are sure to be. Secrecy on the part of

the collector is in fact essential to reconcile people to it in England

or Germany, where it is firmly established; but our collectors sell

their lists to the newspapers in order to make the contributors pay up.

In all these things, we are trying to meet the burdens and

responsibilities of much older societies with the machinery of a much

earlier and simpler state of things. It is high time to halt in this

progress until our administrative system has been brought up to the

level even of our present requirements. It is quite true that, with our

system of State and federal constitutions laying prohibitions on the

Legislature and Congress, any great extension of the sphere of

government in our time seems very unlikely. Yet the assumption by

Congress, with the support of the Supreme Court, of the power to issue

paper money in time of peace, the power to make prolonged purchases of a

commodity like silver, the power to impose an income tax, to execute

great public works, and to protect native industry, are powers large

enough to effect a great change in the constitution of society and in

the distribution of wealth, such as, it is safe to say, in the present

state of human culture, no government ought to have and exercise.

One hears every day from educated people some addition to the number of

things which "governments" ought to do, but for which any government we

have at present is totally unfit. One listens to them with amazement,

when looking at the material of which our government is composed,--for

the matter of that, of which all governments are composed; for I suppose

there is no question that all legislative bodies in the world have in

twenty years run down in quality. The parliamentary system is apparently

failing to meet the demands of modern democratic society, and is falling

into some disrepute; but it would seem as if there was at present just

as little chance of a substitute of any kind as of the dethronement of

universal suffrage. It will probably last indefinitely, and be as good

or as bad as its constituents make it. But this probable extension of

the powers and functions of government makes more necessary than ever a

free expression of opinion, and especially of educated opinion. We may

rail at "mere talk" as much as we please, but the probability is that

the affairs of nations and of men will be more and more regulated by

talk. The amount of talk which is now expended on all subjects of human

interest--and in "talk" I include contributions to periodical

literature--is something of which no previous age has had the smallest

conception. Of course it varies infinitely in quality. A very large

proportion of it does no good beyond relieving the feelings of the

talker. Political philosophers maintain, and with good reason, that one

of its greatest uses is keeping down discontent under popular

government. It is undoubtedly true that it is an immense relief to a man

with a grievance to express his feelings about it in words, even if he

knows that his words will have no immediate effect. Self-love is apt to

prevent most men from thinking that anything they say with passion or

earnestness will utterly and finally fail. But still it is safe to

suppose that one half of the talk of the world on subjects of general

interest is waste. But the other half certainly tells. We know this from

the change in ideas from generation to generation. We see that opinions

which at one time everybody held became absurd in the course of half a

century--opinions about religion and morals and manners and government.

Nearly every man of my age can recall old opinions of his own on

subjects of general interest, which he once thought highly respectable,

and which he is now almost ashamed of having ever held. He does not

remember when he changed them, or why, but somehow they have passed away

from him.

In communities these changes are often very striking. The

transformation, for instance, of the England of Cromwell into the

England of Queen Anne, or of the New England of Cotton Mather into the

New England of Theodore Parker and Emerson, was very extraordinary, but

it would be very difficult to say in detail what brought it about or

when it began. Lecky has some curious observations in his "History of

Rationalism" on these silent changes in new beliefs, apropos of the

disappearance of the belief in witchcraft. Nobody could say what had

swept it away; but it appeared that in a certain year people were ready

to burn old women as witches, and a few years later were ready to laugh

at or pity any one who thought old women could be witches. "At one

period," says he, "we find every one disposed to believe in witches; at

a later period we find this predisposition has silently passed away."

The belief in witchcraft may perhaps be considered a somewhat violent

illustration, like the change in public opinion about slavery in this

country. But there can be no doubt that it is talk--somebody's,

anybody's, everybody's talk--by which these changes are wrought, by

which each generation comes to feel and think differently from its

predecessor.

No one ever talks freely about anything without contributing something,

let it be ever so little, to the unseen forces which carry the race on

to its final destiny. Even if he does not make a positive impression, he

counteracts or modifies some other impression, or sets in motion some

train of ideas in some one else, which helps to change the face of the

world. So I shall, in disregard of the great laudation of silence which

filled the earth in the days of Carlyle, say that one of the functions

of an educated man is to talk; and of course he should try to talk

wisely.

[Illustration: GOETHE.]

GOETHE

(1749-1832)

BY EDWARD DOWDEN

Johann Wolfgang Goethe was born at Frankfort-on-the-Main on August 28th,

1749, and died at Weimar on March 22d, 1832. His great life, extending

over upwards of fourscore years, makes him a man of the eighteenth

century and also of the nineteenth. He belongs not only to German but to

European literature. And in the history of European literature his

position is that of successor to Voltaire and Rousseau. Humanity, as

Voltaire said, had lost its title-deeds, and the task of the eighteenth

century was to recover them. Under all Voltaire's zeal for destruction

in matters of religious belief lay a positive faith and a creative

sentiment,--a faith in human intellect and the sentiment of social

justice. What indefatigable toil! what indefatigable play! Surely it was

not all to establish a negation. Voltaire poured a gay yet bitter _elan_

into the intellectual movement of his time. Yet amid his various efforts

for humanity he wanted love; he wanted reverence. And although a

positive tendency underlies his achievements, we are warranted in

repeating the common sentence, that upon the whole he destroyed more

than he built up.

Voltaire fought to enfranchise the understanding. Rousseau dreamed,

brooded, suffered, to emancipate the heart. A wave of passion, or at

least of sentiment, swept over Europe with the 'Nouvelle Heloise,' the

'Emile,' the 'Confessions.' It was Rousseau, exclaims Byron, who "threw

enchantment over passion," who "knew how to make madness beautiful."

Such an emancipation of the heart was felt, in the eighteenth century,

to be a blessed deliverance from the material interests and the eager

yet too arid speculation of the age. But Byron in that same passage of

'Childe Harold' names Rousseau "the self-torturing sophist." And a

sophist Rousseau was. His intellect fed upon fictions, and dangerous

fictions,--fictions respecting nature, respecting the individual man,

respecting human society. Therefore his intellect failed to illuminate,

clarify, tranquilize his heart. His emotions were turbid, restless, and

lacking in sanity.

Here then were Goethe's two great predecessors: one a most vivacious

intelligence, the other a brooding sensibility; one aiming at an

emancipation of the understanding, but deficient in reverence and in

love; the other aiming at an emancipation of the affections, but

deficient in sanity of thought. In what relation stood Goethe to these

great forces of the eighteenth century?

In his old age Goethe, speaking of Voltaire, uses the words "a universal

source of light." But as a young man he was repelled by "the factious

dishonesty of Voltaire, and his perversion of so many worthy subjects."

"He would never have done," says Goethe, "with degrading religion and

the sacred books, for the sake of injuring priestcraft, as they called

it." Goethe, indeed, did not deny a use to the spirit of negation.

Mephistopheles lives and works. Yet he lives and works as the unwilling

servant of the Lord, and the service he renders is to provoke men from

indolence to activity.

Into the influence of Rousseau, on the contrary, and into the general

movement of feeling to which Rousseau belonged, Goethe in his youth was

caught, almost inevitably; and he abandoned himself to it for a time, it

might seem without restraint.

Yet Goethe differed from Rousseau as profoundly as he differed from

Voltaire. Rousseau's undisciplined sensibility, morbidly excited by the

harshness or imagined harshness of his fellows, by bodily torment, by

broodings in solitude, became at last one quivering mass of disease. "No

tragedy had ever a fifth act so squalid." What a contrast to the closing

scenes of Goethe's life in that house of his, like a modest temple of

the Muses, listening to Plutarch read aloud by his daughter-in-law, or

serenely active, "ohne Hast aber ohne Rast" (without haste, but without

rest), in widening his sympathies with men or enlarging his knowledge of

nature.

How was this? Why did the ways part so widely for Rousseau and for

Goethe?

The young creator of 'Werther' may seem to have started on his career as

a German Rousseau. In reality, 'Werther' expressed only a fragment of

Goethe's total self. A reserve force of will and an intellect growing

daily in clearness and in energy would not permit him to end as Rousseau

ended. In 'Goetz von Berlichingen' there goes up a cry for freedom; it

presents the more masculine side of that spirit of revolt from the bonds

of the eighteenth century, that "return to nature," which is presented

in its more feminine aspects by 'Werther.' But by degrees it became

evident to Goethe that the only true ideal of freedom is a liberation

not of the passions, not of the intellect, but of the whole man; that

this involves a conciliation of all the powers and faculties within us;

and that such a conciliation can be effected only by degrees, and by

steadfast toil.

And so we find him willing during ten years at Weimar to undertake work

which might appear to be fatal to the development of his genius. To

reform army administration, make good roads, work the mines with

energetic intelligence, restore the finances to order,--was this fit

employment for one born to be a poet? Except a few lyrics and the prose

'Iphigenie,' these years produced no literary work of importance; yet

Goethe himself speaks of them as his "zweite Schriftstellerepoche."--his

second epoch as a writer. They were needful to make him a master in the

art of life, needful to put him into possession of all his powers.

Men of genius are quick growers; but men of the highest genius, which

includes the wisdom of human life, are not speedily ripe. Goethe

had entered literature early; he had stormed the avenues. Now at

six-and-twenty he was a chief figure in German, even in European,

literature; and from twenty-six to thirty-seven he published, we may

say nothing. But though he ceased to astonish the world, he was well

employed in widening the basis of his existence; in organizing his

faculties; in conciliating passions, intellect, and will; in applying

his mind to the real world; in endeavoring to comprehend it aright; in

testing and training his powers by practical activity.

A time came when he felt that his will and skill were mature; that he

was no longer an apprentice in the art of living, but a master

craftsman. Tasks that had grown irksome and were felt to be a

distraction from higher duties, he now abandoned. Goethe fled for a time

to Italy, there to receive his degree in the high school of life, and to

start upon a course of more advanced studies. Thenceforward until his

closing days the record is one of almost uninterrupted labor in his

proper fields of literature, art, and science. "In Rome," he wrote, "I

have for the first time found myself, for the first time come into

harmony with myself, and grown happy and rational." He had found

himself, because his passions and his intellect now co-operated; his

pursuit of truth had all the ardor of a first love; his pursuit of

beauty was not a fantastic chase, but was subject to rational law; and

his effort after truth and his effort after beauty were alike supported

by an adult will.

Library of the World's Best Literature, Ancient and Modern — Volume 16 · 第 12 / 35 段