As if to place beyond controversy the fact, that the court may forever
hereafter be relied on to sanction every usurpation and crime that
congress will ever dare to put into the form of a statute, without the
slightest color of authority from the constitution, necessity, utility,
justice, or reason, it has, on three separate occasions, announced its
sanction of the monopoly of money, as finally established by congress in
1866, and continued in force ever since.
This monopoly is established by a prohibitory tax--a tax of ten per
cent.--on all notes issued for circulation as money, other than the
notes of the United States and the national banks.
This ten per cent. is called a "tax," but is really a penalty, and is
intended as such, and as nothing else. Its whole purpose is--_not to
raise revenue_--but solely to establish a monopoly of money, by
prohibiting the issue of all notes intended for circulation as money,
except those issued, or specially licensed, by the government itself.
This prohibition upon the issue of all notes, except those issued, or
specially licensed, by the government, is a prohibition upon all freedom
of industry and traffic. It is a prohibition upon the exercise of men's
natural right to lend and hire such money capital as all men need to
enable them to create and distribute wealth, and supply their own
wants, and provide for their own happiness. Its whole purpose is to
reduce, as far as possible, the great body of the people to the
condition of servants to a few--a condition but a single grade above
that of chattel slavery--in which their labor, and the products of their
labor, may be extorted from them at such prices only as the holders of
the monopoly may choose to give.
This prohibitory tax--so-called--is therefore really a penalty imposed
upon the exercise of men's natural right to create and distribute
wealth, and provide for their own and each other's wants. And it is
imposed solely for the purpose of establishing a practically omnipotent
monopoly in the hands of a few.
Calling this penalty a "tax" is one of the dirty tricks, or rather
downright lies--that of calling things by false names--to which congress
and the courts resort, to hide their usurpations and crimes from the
common eye.
Everybody--who believes in the government--says, of course, that
congress has power to levy taxes; that it must do so to raise revenue
for the support of the government. Therefore this lying congress call
this penalty a "tax," instead of calling it by its true name, a penalty.
It certainly is no tax, because no revenue is raised, or intended to be
raised, by it. It is not levied upon property, or persons, as such, but
only upon a certain act, or upon persons for doing a certain act; an act
that if not only perfectly innocent and lawful in itself, but that is
naturally and intrinsically useful, and even indispensable for the
prosperity and welfare of the whole people. Its whole object is simply
to deter everybody--except those specially licensed--from performing
this innocent, useful, and necessary act. And this it has succeeded in
doing for the last twenty years; to the destruction of the rights, and
the impoverishment and immeasurable injury of all the people, except the
few holders of the monopoly.
If congress had passed an act, in this form, to wit:
No person, nor any association of persons, incorporated or
unincorporated--_unless specially licensed by congress_--shall
issue their promissory notes for circulation as money; and a
_penalty_ of ten per cent. upon the amount of all such notes
shall be imposed upon the persons issuing them,
the act would have been the same, in effect and intention, as is this
act, that imposes what it calls a "tax." The penalty would have been
understood by everybody as a punishment for issuing the notes; and would
have been applied to, and enforced against, those only who should have
issued them. And it is the same with this so-called tax. It will never
be collected, except for the same cause, and under the same
circumstances, as the penalty would have been. It has no more to do with
raising a revenue, than the penalty would have had. And all these lying
lawmakers and courts know it.
But if congress had put this prohibition distinctly in the form of a
_penalty_, the usurpation would have been so barefaced--so destitute of
all color of constitutional authority--that congress dared not risk the
consequences. And possibly the court might not have dared to sanction
it; if, indeed, there be any crime or usurpation which the court dare
not sanction. So these knavish lawmakers called this penalty a "tax";
and the court says that such a "tax" is clearly constitutional. And the
monopoly has now been established for twenty years. And substantially
all the industrial and financial troubles of that period have been the
natural consequences of the monopoly.
If congress had laid a prohibitory tax upon all food--that is, had
imposed a penalty upon the production and sale of all food--except such
as it should have itself produced, or specially licensed; and should
have reduced the amount of food, thus produced or licensed, to one
tenth, twentieth, or fiftieth of what was really needed; the motive and
the crime would have been the same, in character, if not in degree, as
they are in this case, _viz._, to enable the few holders of the licensed
food to extort, from everybody else, by the fear of starvation, all
their (the latter's) earnings and property, in exchange for this small
quantity of privileged food.
Such a monopoly of food would have been no clearer violation of men's
natural rights, than is the present monopoly of money. And yet this
colossal crime--like every other crime that congress chooses to
commit--is sanctioned by its servile, rotten, and stinking court.
On what _constitutional_ grounds--that is, on what provisions found in
the constitution itself--does the court profess to give its sanction to
such a crime?
On these three only:
1. On the power of congress to lay and collect taxes, etc.
2. On the power of congress to coin money.
3. On the power of congress to borrow money.
Out of these simple, and apparently harmless provisions, the court
manufactures an authority to grant, to a few persons, a monopoly that is
practically omnipotent over all the industry and traffic of the country;
that is fatal to all other men's natural right to lend and hire capital
for any or all their legitimate industries; and fatal absolutely to all
their natural right to buy, sell, and exchange any, or all, the products
of their labor at their true, just, and natural prices.
Let us look at these constitutional provisions, and see how much
authority congress can really draw from them.
1. The constitution says:
The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts, and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States_.
This provision plainly authorizes no taxation whatever, except for the
raising of revenue to pay the debts and legitimate expenses of the
government. It no more authorizes taxation for the purpose of
establishing monopolies of any kind whatever, than it does for taking
openly and boldly all the property of the many, and giving it outright
to a few. And none but a congress of usurpers, robbers, and swindlers
would ever think of using it for that purpose.
The court says, _in effect_, that this provision gives congress power to
establish the present monopoly of money; that the power to tax all other
money, is a power to prohibit all other money; and a power to prohibit
all other money is a power to give the present money a monopoly.
How much is such an argument worth? Let us show by a parallel case, as
follows.
Congress has the same power to tax all other property, that it has to
tax money. And if the power to tax money is a power to prohibit money,
then it follows that the power of congress to tax all other property
than money, is a power to prohibit all other property than money; and a
power to prohibit all other property than money, is a power to give
monopolies to all such other property as congress may not choose to
prohibit; or may choose to specially license.
On such reasoning as this, it would follow that the power of congress to
tax money, and all other property, is a power to prohibit all money, and
all other property; and thus to establish monopolies in favor of all
such money, and all such other property, as it chooses not to prohibit;
or chooses to specially license.
Thus, this reasoning would give congress power to establish all the
monopolies, it may choose to establish, not only in money, but in
agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; and protect these monopolies
against infringement, by imposing prohibitory taxes upon all money and
other property, except such as it should choose not to prohibit; or
should choose to specially license.
Because the constitution says that "congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes," etc., to raise the revenue necessary for paying the
current expenses of the government, the court say that congress have
power to levy prohibitory taxes--taxes that shall yield no revenue at
all--but shall operate only as a penalty upon all industries and
traffic, and upon the use of all the means of industry and traffic, that
shall compete with such monopolies as congress shall choose to grant.
This is no more than an unvarnished statement of the argument, by which
the court attempts to justify a prohibitory "tax" upon money; for the
same reasoning would justify the levying of a prohibitory tax--that is,
penalty--upon the use of any and all other means of industry and
traffic, by which any other monopolies, granted by congress, might be
infringed.
There is plainly no more connection between the "power to lay and
collect taxes," etc., for the necessary expenses of the government, and
the power to establish this monopoly of money, than there is between
such a power of taxation, and a power to punish, as a crime, any or all
industry and traffic whatsoever, except such as the government may
specially license.
This whole cheat lies in the use of the word "tax," to describe what is
really a penalty, upon the exercise of any or all men's natural rights
of providing for their subsistence and well-being. And none but corrupt
and rotten congresses and courts would ever think of practising such a
cheat.
2. The second provision of the constitution, relied on by the court to
justify the monopoly of money, is this:
The congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coins.
The only important part of this provision is that which says that "the
congress shall have power to coin money, [and] regulate the value
thereof."
That part about regulating the value of foreign coins--if any one can
tell how congress can regulate it--is of no appreciable importance to
anybody; for the coins will circulate, or not, as men may, or may not,
choose to buy and sell them as money, and at such value as they will
bear in free and open market,--that is, in competition with all other
coins, and all other money. This is their only true and natural market
value; and there is no occasion for congress to do anything in regard to
them.
The only thing, therefore, that we need to look at, is simply the power
of congress "to coin money."
So far as congress itself is authorized to coin money, this is simply a
power to weigh and assay metals,--gold, silver, or any other,--stamp
upon them marks indicating their weight and fineness, and then sell them
to whomsoever may choose to buy them; and let them go in the market for
whatever they may chance to bring, in competition with all other money
that may chance to be offered there.
It is no power to impose any restrictions whatever upon any or all other
honest money, that may be offered in the market, and bought and sold in
competition with the coins weighed and assayed by the government.
The power itself is a frivolous one, of little or no utility; for the
weighing and assaying of metals is a thing so easily done, and can be
done by so many different persons, that there is certainly no
_necessity_ for its being done at all by a government. And it would
undoubtedly have been far better if all coins--whether coined by
governments or individuals--had all been made into pieces bearing simply
the names of pounds, ounces, pennyweights, etc., and containing just the
amounts of pure metal described by those weights. The coins would then
have been regarded as only so much metal; and as having only the same
value as the same amount of metal in any other form. Men would then have
known exactly how much of certain metals they were buying, selling, and
promising to pay. And all the jugglery, cheating, and robbery that
governments have practised, and licensed individuals to practise--by
coining pieces bearing the same names, but having different amounts of
metal--would have been avoided.
And all excuses for establishing monopolies of money, by prohibiting all
other money than the coins, would also have been avoided.
As it is, the constitution imposes no prohibition upon the coining of
money by individuals, but only by State governments. Individuals are
left perfectly free to coin it, except that they must not
"_counterfeit_ the securities and current coin of the United States."
For quite a number of years after the discovery of gold in
California--that is, until the establishment of a government mint
there--a large part of the gold that was taken out of the earth, was
coined by private persons and companies; and this coinage was perfectly
legal. And I do not remember to have ever heard any complaint, or
accusation, that it was not honest and reliable.
The true and only value, which the coins have as money, is that value
which they have as metals, for uses in the arts,--that is, for plate,
watches, jewelry, and the like. This value they will retain, whether
they circulate as money, or not. At this value, they are so utterly
inadequate to serve as _bona fide_ equivalents for such other property
as is to be bought and sold for money; and, after being minted, are so
quickly taken out of circulation, and worked up into articles of
use--plate, watches, jewelry, etc.--that they are practically of almost
no importance at all as money.
But they can be so easily and cheaply carried from one part of the world
to another, that they have substantially the same market value all over
the world. They are also, in but a small degree, liable to great or
sudden changes in value. For these reasons, they serve well as
standards--are perhaps the best standards we can have--by which to
measure the value of all other money, as well as other property. But to
give them any monopoly as money, is to deny the natural right of all men
to make their own contracts, and buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and
receive, all such money as the parties to bargains may mutually agree
upon; and also to license the few holders of the coins to rob all other
men in the prices of the latter's labor and property.
3. The third provision of the constitution, on which the court relies to
justify the monopoly of money, is this:
The congress shall have power to borrow money.
Can any one see any connection between the power of congress "to borrow
money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money?
Certainly no such connection is visible to the legal eye. But it is
distinctly visible to the political and financial eye; that is, to that
class of men, for whom governments exist, and who own congresses and
courts, and set in motion armies and navies, whenever they can promote
their own interests by doing so.
To a government, whose usurpations and crimes have brought it to the
verge of destruction, these men say:
Make bonds bearing six per cent. interest; sell them to us at
half their face value; then give us a monopoly of money based
upon these bonds--such a monopoly as will subject the great
body of the people to a dependence upon us for the necessaries
of life, and compel them to sell their labor and property to us
at our own prices; then, under pretence of raising revenue to
pay the interest and principal of the bonds, impose such a
tariff upon imported commodities as will enable us to get fifty
per cent. more for our own goods than they are worth; in short,
pledge to us all the power of the government to extort for us,
in the future, everything that can be extorted from the
producers of wealth, and we will lend you all the money you
need to maintain your power.
And the government has no alternative but to comply with this infamous
proposal, or give up its infamous life.
This is the only real connection there is between the power of congress
"to borrow money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money. It
was only by an outright sale of the rights of the whole people, for a
long series of years, that the government could raise the money
necessary to continue its villainous existence.
Congress had just as much constitutional power "to borrow money," by the
sale of any and all the other natural rights of the people at large, as
it had "to borrow money" by the sale of the people's natural rights to
lend and hire money.
When the Supreme Court of the United States--assuming to be an oracle,
empowered to define authoritatively the legal rights of every human
being in the country--declares that congress has a constitutional power
to prohibit the use of all that immense mass of money capital, in the
shape of promissory notes, which the real property of the country is
capable of supplying and sustaining, and which is sufficient to give to
every laboring person, man or woman, the means of independence and
wealth--when that court says that congress has power to prohibit the use
of all this money capital, and grant to a few men a monopoly of money
that shall condemn the great body of wealth-producers to hopeless
poverty, dependence, and servitude--and when the court has the audacity
to make these declarations on such nakedly false and senseless grounds
as those that have now been stated, it is clearly time for the people of
this country to inquire what constitutions and governments are good for,
and whether they (the people) have any natural right, as human beings,
to live for themselves, or only for a few conspirators, swindlers,
usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who employ lawmakers, judges, etc., to
do their villainous work upon their fellow-men.
The court gave their sanction to the monopoly of money in these three
separate cases, _viz._: _Veazie Bank vs. Fenno_, 8 _Wallace_, 549
(1869). _National Bank vs. United States_, 101 _U. S. Reports_, 5 _and_
6 (1879). _Juilliard vs. Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_ 445-6 (1884).