But, not content with having always sanctioned the unlimited power of
the _State_ lawmakers to abolish all men's natural right to make their
own contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States has, within the
last twenty years, taken pains to assert that congress also has the
arbitrary power to abolish the same right.
1. It has asserted the arbitrary power of congress to abolish all men's
right to make their own contracts, by asserting its power _to alter the
meaning of all contracts, after they are made_, so as to make them
widely, or wholly, different from what the parties had made them.
Thus the court has said that, after a man has made a contract to pay a
certain number of dollars, at a future time,--_meaning such dollars as
were current at the time the contract was made_,--congress has power to
coin a dollar of less value than the one agreed on, and authorize the
debtor to pay his debt with a dollar of less value than the one he had
promised.
To cover up this infamous crime, the court asserts, over and over
again,--what no one denies,--that congress has power (constitutionally
speaking) to alter, at pleasure, the value of its coins. But it then
asserts that congress has this additional, and wholly different, power,
to wit, the power to declare that this alteration in the value of the
coins _shall work a corresponding change in all existing contracts for
the payment of money_.
In reality they say that a contract to pay money is not a contract to
pay any particular amount, or value, of such money as was known and
understood by the parties at the time the contract was made, but _only
such, and so much, as congress shall afterwards choose to call by that
name, when the debt shall become due_.
They assert that, by simply retaining the name, while altering the
thing,--_or by simply giving an old name to a new thing_,--congress has
power to utterly abolish the contract which the parties themselves
entered into, and substitute for it any such new and different one, as
they (congress) may choose to substitute.
Here are their own words:
_The contract obligation ... was not a duty to pay gold or
silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time when
the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal
intrinsic value in the market.... But the obligation of a
contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall
recognize as money when the payment is to be made.--Legal
Tender Cases, 12 Wallace 548._
This is saying that the obligation of a contract to pay money is not an
obligation to pay what both the law and the parties recognize as money,
_at the time when the contract is made_, but only such substitute as
congress shall afterwards prescribe, "_when the payment is to be made_."
This opinion was given by a majority of the court in the year 1870.
In another opinion the court says:
Under the power to coin money, and to regulate its value,
congress may issue coins of same denomination [that is, bearing
the same name] as those already current by law, but of less
intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less
weight of the precious metals, _and thereby enable debtors to
discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real
value_. A contract to pay a certain sum of money, without any
stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be made,
may always be satisfied by payment of that sum [that is, that
_nominal_ amount] in any currency _which is lawful money at the
place and time at which payment is to be made_.--_Juilliard vs.
Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_, 449.
This opinion was given by the entire court--save one, Field--at the
October term of 1883.
Both these opinions are distinct declarations of the power of congress
to alter men's contracts, _after they are made_, by simply retaining the
name, while altering the thing, that is agreed to be paid.
In both these cases, the court means distinctly to say that, _after the
parties to a contract have agreed upon the number of dollars to be
paid_, congress has power to reduce the value of the dollar, and
authorize all debtors to pay the less valuable dollar, instead of the
one agreed on.
In other words, the court means to say that, after a contract has been
made for the payment of a certain number of dollars, _congress has power
to alter the meaning of the word dollar_, and thus authorize the debtor
to pay in something different from, and less valuable than, the thing he
agreed to pay.
Well, if congress has power to alter men's contracts, _after they are
made_, by altering the meaning of the word dollar, and thus reducing the
value of the debt, it has a precisely equal power to _increase_ the
value of the dollar, and thus compel the debtor to pay _more_ than he
agreed to pay.
Congress has evidently just as much right to _increase_ the value of the
dollar, after a contract has been made, as it has to _reduce_ its value.
It has, therefore, just as much right to cheat debtors, by compelling
them to pay _more_ than they agreed to pay, as it has to cheat
creditors, by compelling them to accept _less_ than they agreed to
accept.
All this talk of the court is equivalent to asserting that congress has
the right to alter men's contracts at pleasure, _after they are made_,
and make them over into something, or anything, wholly different from
what the parties themselves had made them.
And this is equivalent to denying all men's right to make their own
contracts, or to acquire any contract rights, which congress may not
_afterward_, at pleasure, alter, or abolish.
It is equivalent to saying that the words of contracts are not to be
taken in the sense in which they are used, by the parties themselves, at
the time when the contracts are entered into, but only in such different
senses as congress may choose to put upon them at any future time.
If this is not asserting the right of congress to abolish altogether
men's natural right to make their own contracts, what is it?
Incredible as such audacious villainy may seem to those unsophisticated
persons, who imagine that a court of law should be a court of justice,
it is nevertheless true, that this court intended to declare the
unlimited power of congress to alter, at pleasure, the contracts of
parties, _after they have been made_, by altering the kind and amount of
money by which the contracts may be fulfilled. That they intended all
this, is proved, not only by the extracts already given from their
opinions, but also by the whole tenor of their arguments--too long to be
repeated here--and more explicitly by these quotations, _viz._:
There is no well-founded distinction to be made between the
constitutional validity of an act of congress declaring
treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts
contracted after its passage, and that of an act making them a
legal tender for the discharge of _all_ debts, _as well those
incurred before, as those made after, its enactment_.--_Legal
Tender Cases_, 12 _Wallace_ 530 (1870).
Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily
subject to the constitutional power of the government over the
currency, whatever that power may be, _and the obligation of
the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that
power_.--12 _Wallace_ 549.
Contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority
of congress, _at least so far as relates to the means of
payment_.--12 _Wallace_ 549.
The court means here to say that "every contract for the payment of
money, simply," is necessarily made, by the parties, _subject to the
power of congress to alter it afterward_--by altering the kind and value
of the money with which it may be paid--_into anything, into which_ they
(congress) _may choose to alter it_.
And this is equivalent to saying that all such contracts are made, by
the parties, with _the implied understanding that the contracts, as
written and signed by themselves, do not bind either of the parties to
anything_; but that they simply suggest, or initiate, some non-descript
or other, which congress may afterward convert into a binding contract,
_of such a sort, and only such a sort, as_ they (congress) _may see fit
to convert it into_.
Every one of these judges knew that no two men, having common honesty
and common sense,--unless first deprived of all power to make their own
contracts,--would ever enter into a contract to pay money, with any
understanding that the government had any such arbitrary power as the
court here ascribes to it, to alter their contract after it should be
made. Such an absurd contract would, in reality, be no _legal_ contract
at all. It would be a mere gambling agreement, having, naturally and
really, no _legal_ "obligation" at all.
But further. A _solvent_ contract to pay money is in reality--in law,
and in equity--_a bona fide mortgage upon the debtor's property_. And
this mortgage right is as veritable a right of property, as is any right
of property, that is conveyed by a warranty deed. And congress has no
more right to invalidate this mortgage, by a single iota, than it has to
invalidate a warranty deed of land. And these judges will sometime find
out that such is "the obligation of contracts," if they ever find out
what "the obligation of contracts" is.
The justices of that court have had this question--what is "the
obligation of contracts"?--before them for seventy years, and more. But
they have never agreed among themselves--even by so many as a
majority--as to what it is. And this disagreement is very good evidence
that _none_ of them have known what it is; for if any one of them had
known what it is, he would doubtless have been able, long ago, to
enlighten the rest.
Considering the vital importance of men's contracts, it would evidently
be more to the credit of these judges, if they would give their
attention to this question of "the obligation of contracts," until they
shall have solved it, than it is to be telling fifty millions of people
that they have no right to make any contracts at all, except such as
congress has power to invalidate after they shall have been made. Such
assertions as this, coming from a court that cannot even tell us what
"the obligation of contracts" is, are not entitled to any serious
consideration. On the contrary, they show us what farces and impostures
these judicial opinions--or decisions, as they call them--are. They show
that these judicial oracles, as men call them, are no better than some
of the other so-called oracles, by whom mankind have been duped.
But these judges certainly never will find out what "the obligation of
contracts" is, until they find out that men have the natural right to
make their own contracts, and unalterably fix their "obligation"; and
that governments can have no power whatever to make, unmake, alter, or
invalidate that "obligation."
Still further. Congress has the same power over weights and measures
that it has over coins. And the court has no more right or reason to say
that congress has power to alter existing contracts, by altering the
value of the coins, than it has to say that, after any or all men have,
for value received, entered into contracts to deliver so many bushels of
wheat or other grain, so many pounds of beef, pork, butter, cheese,
cotton, wool, or iron, so many yards of cloth, or so many feet of
lumber, congress has power, by altering these weights and measures, to
alter all these existing contracts, so as to convert them into contracts
to deliver only half as many, or to deliver twice as many, bushels,
pounds, yards, or feet, as the parties agreed upon.
To add to the farce, as well as to the iniquity, of these judicial
opinions, it must be kept in mind, that the court says that, after A has
sold valuable property to B, and has taken in payment an honest and
sufficient mortgage on B's property, congress has the power to compel
him (A) to give up this mortgage, and to accept, in place of it, not
anything of any real value whatever, but only the promissory note of a
so-called government; and that government one which--if taxation without
consent is robbery--never had an honest dollar in its treasury, with
which to pay any of its debts, and is never likely to have one; but
relies wholly on its future robberies for its means to pay them; and can
give no guaranty, but its own interest at the time, that it will even
make the payment out of its future robberies.
If a company of bandits were to seize a man's property for their own
uses, and give him their note, promising to pay him out of their future
robberies, the transaction would not be considered a very legitimate
one. But it would be intrinsically just as legitimate as is the one
which the Supreme Court sanctions on the part of congress.
Banditti have not usually kept supreme courts of their own, to legalize
either their robberies, or their promises to pay for past robberies, out
of the proceeds of their future ones. Perhaps they may now take a lesson
from our Supreme Court, and establish courts of their own, that will
hereafter legalize all their contracts of this kind.