SECTION XIV.

If, now, you wish to form some rational opinion of the extent of the

robbery practised in this country, by the holders of this monopoly of

money, you have only to look at the following facts.

There are, in this country, I think, at least twenty-five millions of

persons, male and female, sixteen years old, and upwards, mentally and

physically capable of running machinery, producing wealth, and supplying

their own needs for an independent and comfortable subsistence.

To make their industry most effective, and to enable them,

_individually_, to put into their own pockets as large a portion as

possible of their own earnings, they need, _on an average_, one thousand

dollars each of _money capital_. Some need one, two, three, or five

hundred dollars, others one, two, three, or five thousand. These

persons, then, need, _in the aggregate_, twenty-five thousand millions

of dollars ($25,000,000,000), of money capital.

They need all this _money capital_ to enable them to buy the raw

materials upon which to bestow their labor, the implements and machinery

with which to labor, and their means of subsistence while producing

their goods for the market.

Unless they can get this capital, they must all either work at a

disadvantage, or not work at all. A very large portion of them, to save

themselves from starvation, have no alternative but to sell their labor

to others, at just such prices these others choose to pay. And these

others choose to pay only such prices as are far below what the laborers

could produce, if they themselves had the necessary capital to work

with.

But this needed capital your lawmakers arbitrarily forbid them to have;

and for no other reason than to reduce them to the condition of

servants; and subject them to all such extortions as their

employers--the holders of the privileged money--may choose to practise

upon them.

If, now, you ask me where these twenty-five thousand millions of dollars

of money capital, which these laborers need, are to come from, I answer:

_Theoretically_, there are, in this country, fifty thousand millions of

dollars of money capital ($50,000,000,000)--or twice as much as I have

supposed these laborers to need--NOW LYING IDLE! _And it is lying idle,

solely because the circulation of it, as money, is prohibited by the

lawmakers._

If you ask how this can be, I will tell you.

_Theoretically,_ every dollar's worth of material property, that is

capable of being taken by law, and applied to the payment of the owner's

debts, is capable of being represented by a promissory note, that shall

circulate as money.

But taking all this material property at _only half_ its actual value,

it is still capable of supplying the twenty-five thousand millions of

dollars--or one thousand dollars each--which these laborers need.

Now, we know--because experience has taught us--that _solvent_

promissory notes, made payable in coin on demand, are the best money

that mankind have ever had; (although probably not the best they ever

will have).

To make a note solvent, and suitable for circulation as money, it is

only necessary that it should be made payable in coin on demand, and be

issued by a person, or persons, who are known to have in their hands

abundant material property, that can be taken by law, and applied to the

payment of the note, with all costs and damages for non-payment on

demand.

_Theoretically,_ I repeat, all the material property in the country,

that can be taken by law, and applied to the payment of debt can be used

as banking capital; and be represented by promissory notes, made payable

in coin on demand. And, _practically_, so much of it can be used as

banking capital as may be required for supplying all the notes that can

be kept in circulation as money.

Although these notes are made legally payable in coin on demand, it is

seldom that such payment is demanded, _if only it be publicly known that

the notes are solvent_: that is, if it be publicly known that they are

issued by persons who have so much material property, that can be taken

by law, and sold, as may be necessary to bring the coin that is needed

to pay the notes. In such cases, the notes are preferred to the coin,

because they are so much more safe and convenient for handling,

counting, and transportation, than is the coin; and also because we can

have so many times more of them.

These notes are also a legal tender, to the banks that issue them, in

payment of the notes discounted; that is, in payment of the notes given

by the borrowers to the banks. And, in the ordinary course of things,

_all_ the notes, issued by the banks for circulation, are wanted, and

come back to the banks, in payment of the notes discounted; thus saving

all necessity for redeeming them with coin, except in rare cases. For

meeting these rare cases, the banks find it necessary to keep on hand

small amounts of coin; probably not more than one per cent. of the

amount of notes in circulation.

As the notes discounted have usually but a short time to run,--say three

months on an average,--the bank notes issued for circulation will _all_

come back, _on an average_, once in three months, and be redeemed by the

bankers, by being accepted in payment of the notes discounted.

Then the bank notes will be re-issued, by discounting new notes, and

will go into circulation again; to be again brought back, at the end of

another three months, and redeemed, by being accepted in payment of the

new notes discounted.

In this way the bank notes will be continually re-issued, and redeemed,

in the greatest amounts that can be kept in circulation long enough to

earn such an amount of interest as will make it an object for the

bankers to issue them.

Each of these notes, issued for circulation, if known to be solvent,

will always have the same value in the market, as the same nominal

amount of coin. And this value is a just one, because the notes are in

the nature of a lien, or mortgage, upon so much property of the bankers

as is necessary to pay the notes, and as can be taken by law, and sold,

and the proceeds applied to their payment.

There is no danger that any more of these notes will be issued than will

be wanted for buying and selling property at its true and natural market

value, relatively to coin; for as the notes are all made legally payable

in coin on demand, if they should ever fall below the value of coin in

the market, the holders of them will at once return them to the banks,

and demand coin for them; _and thus take them out of circulation_.

The bankers, therefore, have no motive for issuing more of them than

will remain long enough in circulation, to earn so much interest as will

make it an object to issue them; the only motive for issuing them being

to draw interest on them while they are in circulation.

The bankers readily find how many are wanted for circulation, by the

time those issued remain in circulation, before coming back for

redemption. If they come back immediately, or very quickly, after being

issued, the bankers know that they have over-issued, and that they must

therefore pay in coin--to their inconvenience and perhaps loss--notes

that would otherwise have remained in circulation long enough to earn so

much interest as would have paid for issuing them; and would then have

come back to them in payment of notes discounted, instead of coming back

on a demand for redemption in coin.

Now, the best of all possible banking capital is real estate. It is the

best, because it is visible, immovable, and indestructible. It cannot,

like coin, be removed, concealed, or carried out of the country. And its

aggregate value, in all civilized countries, is probably a hundred times

greater than the amount of coin in circulation. It is therefore capable

of furnishing a hundred times as much money as we can have in coin.

The owners of this real estate have the greatest inducements to use it

as banking capital, because all the banking profit, over and above

expenses, is a clear profit; inasmuch as the use of the real estate as

banking capital does not interfere at all with its use for other

purposes.

Farmers have a double, and much more than a double, inducement to use

their lands as banking capital; because they not only get a direct

profit from the loan of their notes, but, by loaning them, they furnish

the necessary capital for the greatest variety of manufacturing

purposes. They thus induce a much larger portion of the people, than

otherwise would, to leave agriculture, and engage in mechanical

employments; and thus become purchasers, instead of producers, of

agricultural commodities. They thus get much higher prices for their

agricultural products, and also a much greater variety and amount of

manufactured commodities in exchange.

The amount of money, capable of being furnished by this system, is so

great that every man, woman, and child, who is worthy of credit, could

get it, and do business for himself, or herself--either singly, or in

partnerships--and be under no necessity to act as a servant, or sell his

or her labor to others. All the great establishments, of every kind, now

in the hands of a few proprietors, but employing a great number of wage

laborers, would be broken up; for few, or no persons, who could hire

capital, and do business for themselves, would consent to labor for

wages for another.

The credit furnished by this system would always be stable; for the

system is probably capable of furnishing, _at all times_, all the

credit, and all the money, that can be needed. It would also introduce a

substantially universal system of cash payments. Everybody, who could

get credit at all, would be able to get it at a bank, _in money_. With

the money, he would buy everything he needed for cash. He would also

sell everything for cash; for when everybody buys for cash, everybody

sells for cash; since buying for cash, and selling for cash, are

necessarily one and the same thing.

We should, therefore, never have another crisis, panic, revulsion of

credit, stagnation of industry, or fall of prices; for these are all

caused by the lack of money, and the consequent necessity of buying and

selling on credit; whereby the amount of indebtedness becomes so great,

so enormous, in fact, in proportion to the amount of money extant, with

which to meet it, that the whole system of credit breaks down; to the

ruin of everybody, except the few holders of the monopoly of money, who

reap a harvest in the fall of prices, and the consequent bankruptcy of

everybody who is dependent on credit for his means of doing business.

It would be inadmissible for me, in this letter, to occupy the space

that would be necessary, to expose all the false, absurd, and ridiculous

pretences, by which the advocates of the monopoly of money have

attempted to justify it. The only real argument they ever employed has

been that, by means of the monopoly, the few holders of it were enabled

to rob everybody else in the prices of their labor and property.

And our governments, State and national, have hitherto acted together in

maintaining this monopoly, in flagrant violation of men's natural right

to make their own contracts, and in flagrant violation of the

self-evident truth, that, to make all traffic just and equal, it is

indispensable that the money paid should be, in all cases, a _bona fide_

equivalent of the labor or property that is bought with it.

The holders of this monopoly now rule and rob this nation; and the

government, in all its branches, is simply their tool. And being their

tool for this gigantic robbery, it is equally their tool for all the

lesser robberies, to which it is supposed that the people at large can

be made to submit.

A Letter to Grover Cleveland On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, Ignorance, and Servitude Of The People · 第 14 / 27 章