WHETHER FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT MAY BE SUBSTANTIALLY PREDICATED OF
THE DIVINITY
The question before us is whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be
predicated of the Divinity substantially or otherwise. And I think that
the method of our inquiry must be borrowed from what is admittedly the
surest source of all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the
catholic faith. If, then, I ask whether He who is called Father is a
substance, the answer will be yes. If I ask whether the Son is a
substance, the reply will be the same. So, too, no one will hesitate to
affirm that the Holy Spirit is also a substance. But when, on the other
hand, I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the
result is not three substances but one substance. The one substance of
the Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made up of
various parts, combined into one: it is simply one. Everything,
therefore, that is affirmed of the divine substance must be common to
the Three, and we can recognize what predicates may be affirmed of the
substance of the godhead by this sign, that all those which are affirmed
of it may also be affirmed severally of each of the Three combined into
one. For instance if we say "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the
Holy Spirit is God," then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God. If
then their one godhead is one substance, the name of God may with right
be predicated substantially of the Divinity.
Similarly the Father is truth, the Son is truth, and the Holy Spirit is
truth; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three truths, but one truth.
If, then, they are one substance and one truth, truth must of necessity
be a substantial predicate. So Goodness, Immutability, Justice,
Omnipotence and all the other predicates which we apply to the Persons
singly and collectively are plainly substantial predicates. Hence it
appears that what may be predicated of each single One but not of all
Three is not a substantial predicate, but of another kind--of what kind
I will examine presently. For He who is Father does not transmit this
name to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Hence it follows that this name
is not attached to Him as something substantial; for if it were a
substantial predicate, as God, truth, justice, or substance itself, it
would be affirmed of the other Persons.
Similarly the Son alone receives this name; nor does He associate it
with the other Persons, as in the case of the titles God, truth, and the
other predicates which I have already mentioned. The Spirit too is not
the same as the Father and the Son. Hence we gather that Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit are not predicated of the Divinity in a substantial
manner, but otherwise.[27] For if each term were predicated
substantially it would be affirmed of the three Persons both separately
and collectively. It is evident that these terms are relative, for the
Father is some one's Father, the Son is some one's Son, the Spirit is
some one's Spirit. Hence not even Trinity may be substantially[28]
predicated of God; for the Father is not Trinity--since He who is Father
is not Son and Holy Spirit--nor yet, by parity of reasoning, is the Son
Trinity nor the Holy Spirit Trinity, but the Trinity consists in
diversity of Persons, the Unity in simplicity of substance.
Now if the Persons are separate, while the Substance is undivided, it
must needs be that that term which is derived from Persons does not
belong to Substance. But the Trinity is effected by diversity of
Persons, wherefore Trinity does not belong to Substance. Hence neither
Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor Trinity can be substantially
predicated of God, but only relatively, as we have said. But God, Truth,
Justice, Goodness, Omnipotence, Substance, Immutability, Virtue, Wisdom
and all other conceivable predicates of the kind are applicable
substantially to divinity.
If I am right and speak in accordance with the Faith, I pray you confirm
me. But if you are in any point of another opinion, examine carefully
what I have said, and if possible, reconcile faith and reason.[29]
[27] i.e. _personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
[28] i.e. _sed personaliter_ (Ioh. Scottus _ad loc._).
[29] _Vide supra_, Introduction, p. xii.
ITEM EIVSDEM
AD EVNDEM
QVOMODO SVBSTANTIAE IN EO QVOD
SINT BONAE SINT CVM NON SINT
SVBSTANTIALIA BONA
Postulas, ut ex Hebdomadibus nostris eius quaestionis obscuritatem quae
continet modum quo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint, cum non sint
substantialia bona, digeram et paulo euidentius monstrem; idque eo dicis
esse faciendum, quod non sit omnibus notum iter huiusmodi scriptionum. Tuus
uero testis ipse sum quam haec uiuaciter fueris ante complexus. Hebdomadas
uero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conseruo
quam cuiquam participo quorum lasciuia ac petulantia nihil a ioco risuque
patitur esse seiunctum.[30] Prohinc tu ne sis obscuritatibus breuitatis
aduersus, quae cum sint arcani fida custodia tum id habent commodi, quod
cum his solis qui digni sunt conloquuntur. Vt igitur in mathematica fieri
solet ceterisque etiam disciplinis, praeposui terminos regulasque quibus
cuncta quae sequuntur efficiam.
I. Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam.
Harum duplex modus est. Nam una ita communis est, ut omnium sit hominum,
ueluti si hanc proponas: "Si duobus aequalibus aequalia auferas, quae
relinquantur aequalia esse," nullus id intellegens neget. Alia uero est
doctorum tantum, quae tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus uenit,
ut est: "Quae incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse," et cetera; quae non
uulgus sed docti comprobant.
II. Diuersum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at uero
quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.
III. Quod est participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo
participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est; est autem aliquid,
cum esse susceperit.
IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum
uero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
V. Diuersum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic
enim accidens hic substantia significatur.
VI. Omne quod est[31] participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio uero
participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per hoc id quod est participat eo quod est
esse ut sit; est uero ut participet alio quolibet.