CHAPTER VI

THE ACTION AT THE HOT SPRINGS

The village of Tuna, which lies at the foot of bare yellow hills,

consists of a few deserted houses. The place is used mainly as a

halting-stage by the Tibetans. The country around is sterile and

unproductive, and wood is a luxury that must be carried from a distance

of nearly fifty miles.

It was in these dismal surroundings that Colonel Younghusband's mission

spent the months of January, February, and March. The small garrison

suffered all the discomforts of Phari. The dirt and grime of the squalid

little houses became so depressing that they pitched their tents in an

open courtyard, preferring the numbing cold to the filth of the Tibetan

hovels. Many of the sepoys fell victims to frost-bite and pneumonia, and

nearly every case of pneumonia proved fatal, the patient dying of

suffocation owing to the rarefied air.

Colonel Younghusband had not been at Tuna many days before it became

clear that there could be no hope of a peaceful solution. The Tibetans

began to gather in large numbers at Guru, eight miles to the east, on

the road to Lhasa. The Depon, or Lhasa General, whom Colonel

Younghusband met on two occasions, repeated that he was only empowered

to treat on condition that we withdrew to Yatung. Messages were sent

from the Tibetan camp to Tuna almost daily asking us to retire, and

negociations again came to a deadlock. After a month the tone of the

Tibetans became minatory. They threatened to invest our camp, and an

attack was expected on March 1, the Tibetan New Year. The Lamas,

however, thought better of it. They held a Commination Service instead,

and cursed us solemnly for five days, hoping, no doubt, that the British

force would dwindle away by the act of God. Nobody was 'one penny the

worse.'

Though we made no progress with the Tibetans during this time, Colonel

Younghusband utilized the halt at Tuna in cementing a friendship with

Bhutan. The neutrality of the Bhutanese in the case of a war with Tibet

was a matter of the utmost importance. Were these people unfriendly or

disposed to throw in their lot with their co-religionists, the Tibetans,

our line of communications would be exposed to a flank attack along the

whole of the Tuna Plain, which is conterminous with the Bhutan frontier,

as well as a rear attack anywhere in the Chumbi Valley as far south as

Rinchengong. The Bhutanese are men of splendid physique, brave, warlike,

and given to pillage. Their hostility would have involved the despatch

of a second force, as large as that sent to Tibet, and might have

landed us, if unprepared, in a serious reverse. The complete success of

Colonel Younghusband's diplomacy was a great relief to the Indian

Government, who were waiting with some anxiety to see what attitude the

Bhutanese would adopt. Having secured from them assurances of their good

will, Colonel Younghusband put their friendship to immediate test by

broaching the subject of the Ammo Chu route to Chumbi through Bhutanese

territory. Very little time was lost before the concession was obtained

from the Tongsa Penlop, ruler of Bhutan, who himself accompanied the

mission as far as Lhasa in the character of mediator between the Dalai

Lama and the British Government. The importance of the Ammo Chu route in

our future relations with Tibet I have emphasized elsewhere.

I doubt if ever an advance was more welcome to waiting troops than that

which led to the engagement at the Hot Springs.

For months, let it be remembered, we had been marking time. When a move

had to be made to escort a convoy, it was along narrow mountain-paths,

where the troops had to march in single file. There was no possibility

of an attack this side of Phari. The ground covered was familiar and

monotonous. One felt cooped in, and was thoroughly bored and tired of

the delay, so that when General Macdonald marched out of Phari with his

little army in three columns, a feeling of exhilaration communicated

itself to the troops.

Here was elbow-room at last, and an open plain, where all the army corps

of Europe might manoeuvre. At Tuna, on the evening of the 29th, it was

given out in orders that a reconnaissance in force was to be made the

next morning, and two companies of the 32nd Pioneers would be left at

Guru. The Tibetan camp at the Hot Springs lay right across our line of

march, and the hill that flanked it was lined with their sangars. They

must either fight or retire. Most of us thought that the Tibetans would

fade away in the mysterious manner they have, and build another futile

wall further on. The extraordinary affair that followed must be a unique

event in military history.

The morning of the 30th was bitterly cold. An icy wind was blowing, and

snow was lying on the ground. I put on my thick sheepskin for the first

time for two months, and I owe my life to it.

About an hour after leaving Tuna, two or three Tibetan messengers rode

out from their camp to interview Colonel Younghusband. They got down

from their ponies and began chattering in a very excited manner, like a

flock of frightened parrots. It was evident to us, not understanding the

language, that they were entreating us to go back, and the constant

reference to Yatung told us that they were repeating the message that

had been sent into the Tuna camp almost daily during the past few

months--that if we retired to Yatung the Dalai Lama would send an

accredited envoy to treat with us. Being met with the usual answer,

they mounted dejectedly and rode off at a gallop to their camp.

Soon after they had disappeared another group of horsemen were seen

riding towards us. These proved to be the Lhasa Depon, accompanied by an

influential Lama and a small escort armed with modern rifles. The rifles

were naturally inspected with great interest. They were of different

patterns--Martini-Henri, Lee-Metford, Snider--but the clumsily-painted

stocks alone were enough to show that they were shoddy weapons of native

manufacture. They left no mark on our troops.

According to Tibetan custom, a rug was spread on the ground for the

interview between Colonel Younghusband and the Lhasa Depon, who

conferred sitting down. Captain O'Connor, the secretary of the mission,

interpreted. The Lhasa Depon repeated the entreaty of the messengers,

and said that there would be trouble if we proceeded. Colonel

Younghusband's reply was terse and to the point.

'Tell him,' he said to Captain O'Connor, 'that we have been negociating

with Tibet for fifteen years; that I myself have been waiting for eight

months to meet responsible representatives from Lhasa, and that the

mission is now going on to Gyantse. Tell him that we have no wish to

fight, and that he would be well advised if he ordered his soldiers to

retire. Should they remain blocking our path, I will ask General

Macdonald to remove them.'

The Lhasa Depon was greatly perturbed. He said that he had no wish to

fight, and would try and stop his men firing upon us. But before he left

he again tried to induce Colonel Younghusband to turn back. Then he rode

away to join his men. What orders he gave them will never be known.

I do not think the Tibetans ever believed in our serious intention to

advance. No doubt they attributed our evacuation of Khamba Jong and our

long delay in Chumbi to weakness and vacillation. And our forbearance

since the negociations of 1890 must have lent itself to the same

interpretation.

As we advanced we could see the Tibetans running up the hill to the left

to occupy the sangars. To turn their position, General Macdonald

deployed the 8th Gurkhas to the crest of the ridge; at the same time the

Pioneers, the Maxim detachment of the Norfolks, and Mountain Battery

were deployed on the right until the Tibetan position was surrounded.

The manoeuvre was completely successful. The Tibetans on the hill,

finding themselves outflanked by the Gurkhas, ran down to the cover of

the wall by the main camp, and the whole mob was encircled by our

troops.

It was on this occasion that the Sikhs and Gurkhas displayed that

coolness and discipline which won them a European reputation. They had

orders not to fire unless they were fired upon, and they walked right

up to the walls of the sangars until the muzzles and prongs of the

Tibetan matchlocks were almost touching their chests. The Tibetans

stared at our men for a moment across the wall, and then turned and

shambled down sulkily to join their comrades in the redan.

No one dreamed of the sanguinary action that was impending. I

dismounted, and hastily scribbled a despatch on my saddle to the effect

that the Tibetan position had been taken without a shot being fired. The

mounted orderly who carried the despatch bore a similar message from the

mission to the Foreign Office. Then the disarming began. The Tibetans

were told that if they gave up their arms they would be allowed to go

off unmolested. But they did not wish to give up their arms. It was a

ridiculous position, Sikh and Mongol swaying backwards and forwards as

they wrestled for the possession of swords and matchlocks. Perhaps the

humour of it made one careless of the underlying danger. Accounts differ

as to how this wrestling match developed into war, how, to the delight

of the troops, the toy show became the 'real thing.' Of one thing I am

certain, that a rush was made in the south-east corner before a shot was

fired. If there had been any firing, I would not have been wandering

about by the Tibetan flank without a revolver in my hand. As it was, my

revolver was buried in the breast pocket of my Norfolk jacket under my

poshteen.

I have no excuse for this folly except a misplaced contempt for Tibetan

arms and courage--a contempt which accounted for our only serious

casualty in the affair of 1888.[12] Also I think there was in the margin

of my consciousness a feeling that one individual by an act of rashness

might make himself responsible for the lives of hundreds. Hemmed in as

the Tibetans were, no one gave them credit for the spirit they showed,

or imagined that they would have the folly to resist. But we had to deal

with the most ignorant and benighted people on earth, most of whom must

have thought our magazine rifles and Maxims as harmless as their own

obsolete matchlocks, and believed that they bore charms by which they

were immune from death.

[12] When Colonel Bromhead pursued a Tibetan unarmed. Called upon to

surrender, the Tibetan turned on Colonel Bromhead, cut off his

right arm, and badly mutilated the left.

The attack on the south-east corner was so sudden that the first man was

on me before I had time to draw my revolver.[13] He came at me with his

sword lifted in both hands over his head. He had a clear run of ten

yards, and if I had not ducked and caught him by the knees he must have

smashed my skull open. I threw him, and he dragged me to the ground.

Trying to rise, I was struck on the temple by a second swordsman, and

the blade glanced off my skull. I received the rest of my wounds, save

one or two, on my hands--as I lay on my face I used them to protect my

head. After a time the blows ceased; my assailants were all shot down or

had fled. I lay absolutely still for a while until I thought it safe to

raise my head. Then I looked round, and, seeing no Tibetans near in an

erect position, I got up and walked out of the ring between the rifles

of the Sikhs. The firing line had been formed in the meantime on a mound

about thirty yards behind me, and I had been exposed to the bullets of

our own men from two sides, as well as the promiscuous fire of the

Tibetans.

[13] The reports sent home at the time of the Hot Springs affair were

inaccurate as to the manner in which I was wounded, and also

Major Wallace Dunlop, who was the only European anywhere near me

at the time. Major Dunlop shot his own man, but at such close

quarters that the Tibetan's sword slipped down the barrel of his

rifle and cut off two fingers of his left hand. General Macdonald

and Captain Bignell, who shot several men with their revolvers,

were standing at the corner where the wall joined the ruined

house, and did not see the attack on myself and Dunlop.

The Tibetans could not have chosen a spot more fatal for their stand--a

bluff hill to the north, a marsh and stream on the east, and to the west

a stone wall built across the path, which they had to scale in their

attempted assault on General Macdonald and his escort. Only one man got

over. Inside there was barely an acre of ground, packed so thickly with

seething humanity that the cross-fire which the Pioneers poured in

offered little danger to their own men.

The Lhasa General must have fired off his revolver after I was struck

down. I cannot credit the rumour that his action was a signal for a

general attack, and that the Tibetans allowed themselves to be herded

together as a ruse to get us at close quarters. To begin with, the

demand that they should give up their arms, and the assurance that they

might go off unmolested, must have been quite unexpected by them, and I

doubt if they realized the advantage of an attack at close quarters.

My own impression is that the shot was the act of a desperate man,

ignorant and regardless of what might ensue. To return to Lhasa with his

army disarmed and disbanded, and without a shot having been fired, must

have meant ruin to him, and probably death. When we reached Gyantse we

heard that his property had been confiscated from his family on account

of his failure to prevent our advance.

The Depon was a man of fine presence and bearing. I only saw him once,

in his last interview with Colonel Younghusband, but I cannot dissociate

from him a personal courage and a pride that must have rankled at the

indignity of his position. Probably he knew that his shot was suicidal.

The action has been described as one of extreme folly. But what was left

him if he lived except shame and humiliation? And what Englishman with

the same prospect to face, caught in this dark eddy of circumstance,

would not have done the same thing? He could only fire, and let his men

take their chance, God help them!

And the rabble? They have been called treacherous. Why, I don't know.

They were mostly impressed peasants. They did not wish to give up their

arms. Why should they? They knew nothing of the awful odds against them.

They were being hustled by white men who did not draw knives or fire

guns. Amid that babel of 1,500 men, many of them may not have heard the

command; they may not have believed that their lives would have been

spared.

Looking back on the affair with all the sanity of experience, nothing is

more natural than what happened. It was folly and suicide, no doubt; but

it was human nature. They were not going to give in without having a

fling. I hope I shall not be considered a pro-Tibetan when I say that I

admire their gallantry and dash.

As my wounds were being dressed I peered over the mound at the rout.

They were walking away! Why, in the name of all their Bodhisats and

Munis, did they not run? There was cover behind a bend in the hill a few

hundred yards distant, and they were exposed to a devastating hail of

bullets from the Maxims and rifles, that seemed to mow down every third

or fourth man. Yet they walked!

It was the most extraordinary procession I have ever seen. My friends

have tried to explain the phenomenon as due to obstinacy or ignorance,

or Spartan contempt for life. But I think I have the solution. They

were bewildered. The impossible had happened.

Prayers, and charms, and mantras, and the holiest of their holy men, had

failed them. I believe they were obsessed with that one thought. They

walked with bowed heads, as if they had been disillusioned in their

gods.

After the last of the retiring Tibetans had disappeared round the corner

of the Guru road, the 8th Gurkhas descended from the low range of hills

on the right of the position, and crossed the Guru Plain in extended

order with the 2nd Mounted Infantry on their extreme left. Orders were

then received by Major Row, commanding the detachment, to take the left

of the two houses which were situated under the hills at the further

side of the plain. This movement was carried out in conjunction with the

mounted infantry. The advance was covered by the 7-pounder guns of the

Gurkhas under Captain Luke, R.A. The attacking force advanced in

extended order by a series of small rushes. Cover was scanty, but the

Tibetans, though firing vigorously, fired high, and there were no

casualties. At last the force reached the outer wall of the house, and

regained breath under cover of it. A few men of the Gurkhas then climbed

on to the roof and descended into the house, making prisoners of the

inmates, who numbered forty or fifty. Shortly afterwards the door, which

was strongly barricaded, was broken in, and the remainder of the force

entered the house.

During the advance a number of the Tibetans attempted to escape on mules

and ponies, but the greater number of these were followed up and killed.

The Tibetan casualties were at least 700.

Perhaps no British victory has been greeted with less enthusiasm than

the action at the Hot Springs. Certainly the officers, who did their

duty so thoroughly, had no heart in the business at all. After the first

futile rush the Tibetans made no further resistance. There was no more

fighting, only the slaughter of helpless men.

It is easy to criticise after the event, but it seems to me that the

only way to have avoided the lamentable affair at the Hot Springs would

have been to have drawn up more troops round the redan, and, when the

Tibetans were hemmed in with the cliff in their rear, to have given them

at least twenty minutes to lay down their arms. In the interval the

situation might have been made clear to everyone. If after the

time-limit they still hesitated, two shots might have brought them to

reason. Then, if they were mad enough to decide on resistance, their

suicide would be on their own heads. But to send two dozen sepoys into

that sullen mob to take away their arms was to invite disaster. Given

the same circumstances, and any mob in the world of men, women, or

children, civilized or savage, and there would be found at least one

rash spirit to explode the mine and set a spark to a general

conflagration.

It was thought at the time that the lesson would save much future

bloodshed. But the Tibetan is so stubborn and convinced of his

self-sufficiency that it took many lessons to teach him the disparity

between his armed rabble and the resources of the British Raj. In the

light of after-events it is clear that we could have made no progress

without inflicting terrible punishment. The slaughter at Guru only

forestalled the inevitable. We were drawn into the vortex of war by the

Tibetans' own folly. There was no hope of their regarding the British as

a formidable Power, and a force to be reckoned with, until we had killed

several thousand of their men.

After the action the Tibetan wounded were brought into Tuna, and an

abandoned dwelling-house was fitted up as a hospital. An empty cowshed

outside served as an operating-theatre. The patients showed

extraordinary hardihood and stoicism. After the Dzama Tang engagement

many of the wounded came in riding on yaks from a distance of fifty or

sixty miles. They were consistently cheerful, and always ready to

appreciate a joke. One man, who lost both legs, said: 'In my next battle

I must be a hero, as I cannot run away.' Some of the wounded were

terribly mutilated by shell. Two men who were shot through the brain,

and two who were shot through the lungs, survived. For two days

Lieutenant Davys, Indian Medical Service, was operating nearly all day.

I think the Tibetans were really impressed with our humanity, and looked

upon Davys as some incarnation of a medicine Buddha. They never

hesitated to undergo operations, did not flinch at pain, and took

chloroform without fear. Their recuperative power was marvellous. Of the

168 who were received in hospital, only 20 died; 148 were sent to their

homes on hired yaks cured. Everyone who visited the hospital at Tuna

left it with an increased respect for the Tibetans.

* * * * *

Three months after the action I found the Tibetans still lying where

they fell. One shot through the shoulder in retreat had spun as he fell

facing our rifles. Another tore at the grass with futile fingers through

which a delicate pink primula was now blossoming. Shrunk arms and shanks

looked hideously dwarfish. By the stream the bodies lay in heaps with

parched skin, like mummies, rusty brown. A knot of coarse black hair,

detached from a skull, was circling round in an eddy of wind. Everything

had been stripped from the corpses save here and there a wisp of cloth,

looking more grim than the nakedness it covered, or round the neck some

inexpensive charm, which no one had thought worth taking for its occult

powers. Nature, more kindly, had strewn round them beautiful spring

flowers--primulas, buttercups, potentils. The stream 'bubbled oilily,'

and in the ruined house bees were swarming.

Ten miles beyond the Springs an officer was watering his horse in the

Bamtso Lake. The beast swung round trembling, with eyes astare. Among

the weeds lay the last victim.

The Unveiling of Lhasa · 第 6 / 15 章