THE SEA POWER OF ROME
1. THE PUNIC WARS
When peoples have migrated in the past, they have frequently changed
their habits to conform to new topographical surroundings. We have
seen that the Phnicians, originally a nomadic people, became a
seafaring race because of the conditions of the country they settled
in; and on the other hand, at a later period, the Vikings who overran
Normandy or Britain forsook the sea and became farmers. The popular
idea that a race follows the sea because of an "instinct in the blood
of the race" has little to stand on. When, however, the colonists
from Phnicia settled Carthage and founded an empire, they continued
the traditions of their ancestors and built up their power on a
foundation of ships. This was due to the conditions--topographical
and geographical--which surrounded them, and which were much like
those of the mother country. Carthage possessed the finest harbor
on the coast of Africa, situated in the middle of the Mediterranean,
where all the trade routes crossed. To counteract these attractions
of the sea there was nothing but the arid and mountainous character
of the interior. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Carthaginians,
like their ancestors, should build an empire of the sea.
As early as the sixth century B.C. Carthage had established her
power so securely in the western Mediterranean as to be able to
set down definite limits beyond which Rome agreed not to go. Thus
the opening sentence of a treaty between the two nations in 509
B. C. ran as follows:
"Between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and
their allies there shall be peace and alliance upon the conditions
that neither the Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the
Fair Promontory[1] unless compelled by bad weather or an enemy;
and in case they are forced beyond it they shall not be allowed
to take or purchase anything except what is barely necessary for
refitting their vessels or for sacrifice, and they shall depart
within five days."[2]
[Footnote 1: A cape on the African coast about due north from
Carthage.]
[Footnote 2: GENERAL HISTORY, Polybius, Bk. III, chap. 3.]
A second and a third treaty emphasized even mare strongly the
Carthaginian dictatorship over the Mediterranean.
[Illustration: SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS]
It was inevitable, therefore, that as Rome expanded her interests
should come in collision with those of Carthage. The immediate
causes of the Punic wars are of no consequence for our purpose;
the two powers had rival interests in Sicily, and the clash of
these brought on the war in the year 264 B.C. There followed a
mortal struggle between Rome and Carthage that extended through
three distinct wars and a period of aver a hundred years.
When the two nations faced each other in arms, Carthage had the
advantage of prestige and the greatest navy in the world. Her weaknesses
lay in the strife of political factions and the mercenary character
of her forces. Her officers were usually Carthaginians, but it was
considered beneath the dignity of a Carthaginian to be a private.
The rank and file, therefore, were either hired or pressed into
service from the subject provinces. In the case of Xanthippus,
who defeated Regulus in the first Punic war, even the commanding
officer was a Spartan mercenary. These troops would do well so
long as campaigns promised plunder but would became disaffected
if things went wrong.
The Romans, on the other hand, had only a small navy and no naval
experience; their strength lay in their legionaries. And in further
contrast with their enemy they had none but Romans in their forces,
or allies who were proud of fighting on the side of Rome. Consequently
they fought in the spirit of intense patriotism which could stand
the moral strain of defeat and even disaster. On land there was
no better fighter than the Roman soldier. At sea, however, all
the advantage lay with the Carthaginian, and it soon became clear
that if the Romans were to succeed they would have to learn to
fight on water.
For the first three years Carthaginian fleets raided the coasts of
Sicily and Italy with impunity. Finally, in desperation, Rome set
about the creation of a fleet, and the story is that a Carthaginian
quinquereme that had been wrecked an the coast was taken as a model,
and while the ships were building, rowers were trained in rowing
machines set up an shore. The first contact with the enemy was not
encouraging. The new fleet, which was constructed in two months,
consisted of 100 quinqueremes and 30 triremes. Seventeen of these
while on a trial cruise were blockaded in the harbor of Messina
by twenty Carthaginian ships, and the Roman commander was obliged
to surrender after his crews had landed and escaped.
The next encounter was a different story. The Romans, realizing
their ignorance of naval tactics and their superiority in land
fighting, determined to make the next naval battle as nearly as
possible like an engagement of infantry. Accordingly the ships
were fitted with boarding gangways with a huge hooked spike at the
end, like the beak of a crow, which gave them their name, "corvi"
or "crows."[1]
[Footnote 1: The following is the description in Polybius of what
they were like and how they were worked.
"They [the Romans] erected on the prow of every vessel a round pillar
of wood, of about twelve feet in height, and of three palms breadth
in diameter, with a pulley at the top. To this pillar was fitted a
kind of stage, eighteen feet in length and four feet broad, which
was made ladder-wise, of strong timbers laid across, and cramped
together with iron: the pillar being received into an oblong square,
which was opened for that purpose, at the distance of six feet
within the end of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways
was a parapet, which reached just above the knee. At the farthest
end of this stage or ladder was a bar of iron, whose shape was
somewhat like a pestle; but it was sharpened at the bottom, or
lower point; and on the top of it was a ring. The whole appearance
of this machine very much resembled those that are used in grinding
corn. To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, by which, with
the help of the pulley that was at the top of the pillar, they
hoisted up the machines, and, as the vessels of the enemy came near,
let them fall upon them, sometimes on their prow, and sometimes
on their sides, as occasion best served. As the machine fell, it
struck into the decks of the enemy, and held them fast. In this
situation, if the two vessels happened to lie side by side, the
Romans leaped on board from all parts of their ships at once. But
in case that they were joined only by the prow, they then entered
two and two along the machine; the two foremost extending their
bucklers right before them to ward off the strokes that were aimed
against them in front; while those that followed rested the boss
of their bucklers upon the top of the parapet on either side, and
thus covered both their flanks." GENERAL HISTORY, Book 1.]
Armed with this new device, the Consul Duilius took the Roman fleet
to sea to meet an advancing Carthaginian fleet and encountered
it off the port of Mylæ (260 B.C.). The Carthaginians had such
contempt for their enemy that they advanced in irregular order,
permitting thirty of their ships to begin the battle unsupported
by the rest of the fleet. One after the other the Carthaginian
quinqueremes were grappled and stormed, for once the great _corvus_
crashed down on a deck all the arts of seamanship were useless.
Before the day was over the Carthaginians had lost 14 ships sunk
and 31 captured, a total of half their fleet, and the rest had
fled in disorder towards Carthage.
The unexpected had happened, as it so frequently does in history.
The amateurs had beaten the professionals, not by trying to achieve
the same efficiency but by inventing something new that would make
that efficiency useless. Thus, as we nave seen, the Syracusans,
who were no match for the Athenians in the open sea, destroyed
the sea power of Athens by bottling up her fleet in a harbor and
bombarding it with catapults. It is an instance such as we shall
see recurring throughout naval history, in which the power of a
great fleet is largely or completely neutralized by a new or device
in the hands of the nation with the smaller navy.
The significance of Mylæ lay in the fact that a new naval power
had arisen, that henceforth Rome must be reckoned with on the sea.
The victory served to encourage the Romans to enlarge their navy,
and with it to press the war into the enemy's territory. Soon after
Mylæ they gained possession of the greater part of Sicily, and in
the year 256 they dispatched a fleet to carry the offensive into
Africa. This Roman fleet of 330 ships met, just off Ecnomus, on
the southern coast of Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet of 350, and a
great battle took place, interesting for the grand scale on which
it was fought and the tactics employed.
The Romans, an seeing their enemy, assumed a formation hitherto
unknown in tactics at sea. Their first and second squadrons formed
the sides of an acute-angled triangle; the third squadron formed
the base of the triangle, towing the transports, and the fourth
squadron brought up the rear, covering the transports. The whole
formed a compact wedge, pushing forward like a great spear head
to pierce the enemy's line.
Admirable as this formation was, the Carthaginians were no less
skillful in their tactics for destroying it. Instead of keeping
an unbroken line to receive the attack, they stationed their left
wing at same distance from the center so as to overlap the Roman
right, and their right wing in column ahead, so as to overlap the
Roman left. As the Romans advanced, the Carthaginian center purposely
gave way, drawing the advance wings of their enemy away from the
transports and the two squadrons in the rear. Then they faced about
and attacked. Meanwhile the two Carthaginian squadrons on the flanks
swung round the Roman wedge, the left wing engaging the Roman third
squadron, which was hampered by the transports, and driving it
toward the shore. At the same time the Carthaginian right wing
attacked the fourth, or reserve, squadron from the rear and drove
it into the open sea. Thus the battle went on in three distinct
engagements, each separated by considerable distance from the others.
The outcome is thus narrated by Polybius:
[Illustration: ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS]
"Because in each of these divisions the strength of the combatants
was nearly equal, the success was also for some time equal. But
in the progress of the action the affair was brought at last to
a decision: a different one, perhaps, from what might reasonably
have been expected in such circumstances. For the Roman squadron
that had begun the engagement gained so full a victory, that Amilcar
[the Carthaginian commander] was forced to fly, and the consul
Manlius brought away the vessels that were taken.
"The other consul, having now perceived the danger in which the
triarii[1] and the transports were involved, hastened to their
assistance with the second squadron, which was still entire. The
triarii, having received these succors, when they were Just upon
the point of yielding, again resumed their courage, and renewed
the fight with vigor: so that the enemy, being surrounded on every
side in a manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at once
both in the front and rear were at last constrained to steer away
to sea.
[Footnote 1: The rear guard, or fourth squadron.]
"About this time Manlius also, returning from the engagement, observed
that the ships of the third squadron were forced in close to the
shore, and there blocked up by the left division of the Carthaginian
fleet. He joined his forces, therefore, with those of the other
consul, who had now placed the transports and triarii in security,
and hastened to assist these vessels, which were so invested by
the enemy that they seemed to suffer a kind of siege. And, indeed,
they must have all been long before destroyed if the Carthaginians,
through apprehension of the _corvi_, had not still kept themselves
at distance, and declined a close engagement. But the consuls,
having now advanced together, surround the enemy, and take fifty
of their ships with all the men. The rest, being few in number,
steered close along the shore, and saved themselves by flight.
[Illustration: CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS, 256
B.C.]
"Such were the circumstances of this engagement; in which the victory
at last was wholly on the side of the Romans. Twenty-four of their
ships were sunk in the action, and more than thirty of the
Carthaginians. No vessel of the Romans fell into the hands of the
enemy; but sixty-four of the Carthaginians were taken with their
men."[2]
[Footnote 2: Polybius's GENERAL HISTORY, Book I, Chap. 2.]
The battle of Ecnomus had no such decisive effect on history as
the battle of Salamis, but it was on a far greater scale and it
reveals an enormous advance in tactics. Three hundred thousand
men, rowers and warriors, were engaged, and nearly 700 ships. Up
to the battle of Actium, two centuries later, Ecnomus remained
the greatest naval action in history. Moreover, the tactics of the
rival fleets show a high degree of discipline and efficiency. The
Carthaginian plan of dividing their enemy's force and defeating it
by a concentrated attack on his transport division, was skillfully
carried out and came perilously near succeeding. Had the first
and second squadrons of the Carthaginians been able to carry out
their part of the plan and "contain" the corresponding advance
squadrons of the Romans, the result would have been an overwhelming
victory for Carthage, involving not only the destruction of the
Roman fleet but also the capture of the Roman army of invasion.
This victory left open the way for the advance into Africa. The
Romans had landed and marched almost to the gates of Carthage when
the army was destroyed by the skill of a Spartan, Xanthippus, and
Regulus, the Consul in command, was captured. This astonishing
catastrophe inflicted on the Roman legionaries was due to the use
of elephants, and offers a curious parallel to the effect of the
_corvi_ on the Carthaginian sailors. Such was the terror inspired
by these animals that the Roman soldier would not stand before
them until a year or two later, in Sicily, the Consul Cecilius
showed how they could not only be repulsed but turned back on their
own army by the use of javelins and arrows.
Nothing daunted by the loss of their army, Rome dispatched a fleet
of 350 ships to Africa to carry off the remnants of the defeated
army that were besieged in the city of Aspis. They were met by a
hastily organized Carthaginian fleet off the promontory of Hermæa
in a brief action in which the Romans were overwhelmingly victorious.
The latter took 114 vessels with their crews. The Roman expedition
continued on its course to Africa, rescued the besieged troops and
turned back in high feather toward Sicily. The Consuls in command
had been warned by the pilots not to attempt to skirt the southern
coast of Sicily at that season of the year, but the warning was
disregarded. Suddenly, as the fleet was approaching the shore it
was overwhelmed by a great gale, and out of 464 vessels only eighty
survived.
Frightful as this loss was in ships and men, Rome proceeded at
once to build another fleet, to the number of 250, which, with
characteristic energy, was made ready for service in three months.
This force also, after an ineffectual raid on the African coast,
fell victim to a storm on the way home with the loss of 150 ships.
Unwilling to relinquish the mastery of the sea that had been won
by an uninterrupted series of victories, Rome sent another fleet
to attack a Carthaginian force lying in the harbor of Drepanum.
As the Romans approached, the Carthaginians went out to meet them,
and so maneuvered as to force them to fight with an enemy in front
and the rocks and shoals of the coast in their rear. The Roman ships
were never able to extricate themselves from this predicament,
and the greater part were either taken or wrecked on the coast.
The Consul in command managed to escape with about thirty of his
vessels, but 93 were taken with their crews. This is the single
instance of a pitched battle between Roman and Carthaginian fleets
in which the victory went to Carthage, a victory due entirely to
better seamanship. The immediate result of this success was the
destruction of the Roman squadron lying in the port of Lilybæum
which was assisting the troops in the siege of that town.
Still another Roman fleet that had the temerity to anchor in an
exposed position was destroyed by a storm. "For so complete was
the destruction," writes Polybius, "that scarcely a single plank
remained entire."
Stunned by these disasters, the government at Rome gave up the idea
of contesting any further the command of the sea. The citizens, how
ever, were not willing to submit, and displayed a magnificent spirit
of patriotism in this the darkest period of the war. Individuals
of means, or groups of individuals, pledged each a quinquereme,
fully equipped, for a new fleet, asking reimbursement from the
government only in case of victory. By these private efforts a
force of 200 quinqueremes was constructed. At this time, as at the
very beginning, the model for the Roman ships was a prize taken
from the enemy.
[Illustration: POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC WAR]
Meanwhile the Carthaginians, confident that the Romans were finally
driven from the sea, had allowed their own fleet to disintegrate.
Accordingly when the astonishing news reached them that the Romans
were again abroad they were compelled to fill their ships with
raw levies of troops and inexperienced rowers and sailors. And,
since the Carthaginian troops who were besieging the city of Eryx
in Sicily were in need of supplies, a large number of transports
were sent with the fleet. The Carthaginian commander planned to
make a landing unobserved, leave his transports, exchange his raw
crews for some of the veterans before Eryx and then give battle
to the Roman fleet.
This program failed because of the initiative of the Roman Consul
commanding the new fleet. Having got word of the coming of the
Carthaginians and divining their plan, he braved an unfavorable
wind and a rough sea for the sake of forcing an action before they
could establish contact with their army. Accordingly he sought
out his enemy and met him (in the year 241 B.C.) off the island
of Ægusa, near Lilybæum. Almost at the first onset the Romans won
an overwhelming victory, capturing seventy and sinking fifty of
the Carthaginian force.
This final desperate effort of Rome was decisive. The Carthaginians
had no navy left, and their armies in Sicily were cut off from
all communications with their base. Accordingly ambassadors went
to Rome to sue for peace, and the great struggle that had lasted
without intermission for twenty-four years and reduced both parties
to the point of exhaustion, ended with a triumph for Rome through
a victory on the sea. By the treaty of peace Carthage was obliged
to pay a heavy indemnity and yield all claim to Sicily.
Whatever historical moral may be drawn from the story of the first
Punic war, the fact remains that a nation of landsmen met the greatest
maritime power in the world and defeated it on its own element. In
every naval battle save one the Romans were victors. It is true,
however, that in the single defeat off Drepanum and in the dreadful
disasters inflicted by storms, Rome lost through lack of knowledge
of wind and sea. No great naval genius stands above the rest, to
whom the final success can be attributed. Rome won simply through
the better fighting qualities of her rank and file and the stamina
of her citizens. To quote the phrase of a British writer,[1] Rome
showed the superior "fitness to win."
[Footnote 1: Fred Jane, HERESIES OF SEA POWER, _passim_.]
_The Second Punic War_
In the first Punic war the prize was an island, Sicily. Naturally,
therefore, the fighting was primarily naval. The second Punic war
(218-202 B.C.) was essentially a war on land. Carthage, driven
from Sicily, turned to Spain and made the southern part of the
peninsula her province. Using this as his base, Hannibal marched
overland, crossed the Alps, and invaded Italy from the north. Had
he followed up his unbroken series of victories by marching on
the capital instead of going into winter quarters at Capua, it is
possible that Rome might have been destroyed and all subsequent
history radically changed. The Romans had no general who could
measure up to the genius of Hannibal, but their spirit was unbroken
even by the slaughter of Cannæ, and their allies remained loyal.
Moreover, Carthage, thanks to factional quarrels and personal
jealousies, was deaf to all the requests sent by Hannibal for
reënforcements when he needed them most. In the end, Scipio, after
having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, dislodged Hannibal
from Italy by carrying an invasion into Africa. At the battle of
Zama the Romans defeated Hannibal and won the war.
It is difficult to see any significant use of sea power in this
second Punic war. Neither side seemed to realize what might be
done in cutting the communications of the other, and both sides
seemed to be able to use the sea at will. Of course due allowance
must be made for the limitations of naval activity. The quinquereme
was too frail to attempt a blockade or to patrol the sea lanes in
all seasons. Nevertheless both sides used the sea for the transport
of troops and the conveying of intelligence, and neither side made
any determined effort to establish a real control of the sea.[1]
[Footnote 1: For a distinguished opinion to the contrary, v. Mahan,
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 14 ff. In this view, however,
Mahan is not supported by Mommsen (vol. II, p. 100). See also Jane,
HERESIES OF SEA POWER, 60 ff.]
_The Third Punic War_ (149-146 B.C.)
The third Punic war has no naval interest. Rome, not satisfied with
defeating her rival in the two previous wars, took a convenient
pretext to invade Carthage and destroy every vestige of the city.
With this the great maritime empire came to an end, and Rome became
supreme in the Mediterranean.
2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY; THE CAMPAIGN OF ACTIUM
After the fall of Carthage no rival appeared to contest the sovereignty
of Rome upon the sea. The next great naval battle was waged between
two rival factions of Rome herself at the time when the republic
had fallen and the empire was about to be reared on its ruins. This
was the battle of Actium, one of the most decisive in the world's
history.
The rivalry between Antony and Octavius as to who should control
the destinies of Rome was the immediate cause of the conflict.
In the parceling out of spoil from the civil wars following the
murder of Cæsar, Octavius had taken the West, Lepidus the African
provinces, and Antony the East. Octavius soon ousted Lepidus and
then turned to settle the issue of mastery with Antony. In this he
had motives of revenge as well as ambition. Antony had robbed him
of his inheritance from Cæsar, and divorced his wife, the sister of
Octavius, in favor of Cleopatra, with whom he had become completely
infatuated. In this quarrel the people of Rome were inclined to
support Octavius, because of their indignation over a reported
declaration made by Antony to the effect that he intended to make
Alexandria rather than Rome the capital of the empire and rule East
and West from the Nile rather than the Tiber. Both sides began
preparations for the conflict. Antony possessed the bulk of the
Roman navy and the Roman legions of the eastern provinces. To his
fleet he added squadrons of Egyptian and Phnician vessels of war,
and to his army he brought large bodies of troops from the subject
provinces of the East. In addition he spent great sums of money by
means of his agents in Rome to arouse disaffection against Octavius.
At the outset he acted with energy and caused his antagonist the
gravest anxiety. It was clear also that Antony intended to take
the offensive. He established winter quarters at Patras, on the
Gulf of Corinth, during the winter of 32-31 B.C., billeting his
army in various towns on the west coast of Greece, and keeping
it supplied by grain ships from Alexandria. His fleet he anchored
in the Ambracian Gulf, a landlocked bay, thirty miles wide, lying
north of the Gulf of Corinth; it is known to-day as the Gulf of
Arta.
Octavius, however, was equally determined not to yield the offensive
to his adversary, and boldly collected ships and troops for a movement
in force against Antony's position. His troops were also Roman
legionaries, experienced in war, but his fleet was considerably
less in numbers and the individual ships much smaller than the
quinqueremes and octiremes of Antony. The ships of Octavius were
mostly biremes and triremes. These disadvantages, however, were
offset by the fact that his admiral, Agrippa, was an experienced
sea-fighter, having won a victory near Mylæ during the civil wars,
and by the other fact that the crews under him, recruited from
the Dalmatian coast, were hardy, seafaring men. These were called
Liburni, and the type of ship they used was known as the _Liburna_.
This was a two-banked galley, but the term was already becoming
current for any light man of war, irrespective of the number of
banks of oars. In contrast with these Liburni, who divided their
days between fishing and piracy and knew all the tricks of fighting
at sea, the crews of Antony's great fleet were in many cases landsmen
who had been suddenly impressed into service.
As soon as Antony had moved his force to western Greece he seemed
paralyzed by indecision and made no move to avail himself of his
advantageous position to strike. He had plenty of money, while
his adversary was at his wit's end to find even credit. He had
the admiration of his soldiers, who had followed him through many
a campaign to victory, while Octavius had no popularity with his
troops, most of whom were reluctant to fight against their old
comrades in arms. And finally, Antony had a preponderating fleet
with which he could command the sea and compel his opponent to
fight on the defensive in Italian territory. All these advantages
he allowed to slip away.
During the winter of 32-31 one-third of Antony's crews perished
from lack of proper supplies and the gaps were filled by slaves,
mule-drivers, and plowmen--any one whom his captains could seize and
impress from the surrounding country. The following spring Agrippa
made a feint to the south by capturing Methone at the southern tip
of the Peloponnesus, thus threatening the wheat squadrons from
Egypt on which Antony depended. Next came the news that Octavius
had landed an army in Epirus and was marching south. Then Antony
realized that his adversary was aiming to destroy the fleet in the
Ambracian Gulf and hastened thither. He arrived with a squadron
ahead of his troops, at almost the same instant as Octavius, and if
Octavius had had the courage to attack the tired and disorganized
crews of Antony's squadron, Antony would have been lost. But by
dressing his crews in the armor of legionaries and drawing up his
ships in a position for fighting, with oars suspended, he "bluffed"
his enemy into thinking that he had the support of his troops.
When the latter arrived Antony established a great camp on Cape
Actium, which closes the southern side of the Gulf, and fortified
the entrance on that side.
Thereafter for months the two forces faced each other on opposite
sides of the Gulf, neither side risking more than insignificant
skirmishes. During this time Octavius had free use of the sea for
his supplies, while the heavier fleet of Antony lay idle in harbor.
Nevertheless, Octavius did not dare to risk all on a land battle, and
conducted his campaign in a characteristically timid and vacillating
manner which should have made it easy for Antony to take the aggressive
and win. But the famous lieutenant of Julius Cæsar was no longer the
man who used to win the devotion of his soldiers by his courage and
audacity. He was broken by debauchery and torn this way and that by
two violently hostile parties in his own camp. One party, called the
Roman, wanted him to come to an understanding with Octavius, or beat
him in battle, and go to Rome as the restorer of the republic. The
other party, the Egyptian, was Cleopatra and her following. Cleopatra
was interested in holding Antony to Egypt, to consolidate through
him a strong Egyptian empire, and she was not at all interested in
the restoration of Roman liberties. In Antony's desire to please
Cleopatra and his attempt to deceive his Roman friends into thinking
that he was working for their aims, may be seen the explanation
of the utter lack of strategy or consistent plan in his entire
campaign against Octavius.
At the beginning of July Antony apparently proposed a naval battle.
Instantly the suspicions of the Roman party were awakened. They
cried out that Antony was evidently going back to Egypt without
having won the decisive battle against Octavius on land, which
would really break the enemy's power, and without paying any heed
to the political problems at Rome. Such a furor was raised between
the two parties that Antony abandoned his plan and made a feint
toward the land battle in Epirus that the Romans wanted. Meanwhile
two of his adherents, one a Roman, the other a king from Asia Minor,
exasperated by the insolence of Cleopatra, deserted to Octavius.
August came and went without action or change in the situation.
Meanwhile as Antony's camp had been placed in a pestilential spot
for midsummer heat, he suffered great losses from disease. By this
time Cleopatra was interested in nothing but a return to Egypt.
Accordingly she persuaded Antony to order a naval battle without
asking anybody's advice, and he set the date August 29 for the
sally of his fleet. The Romans were amazed and protested, but in
vain. Preparations went on in such a way as to make it clear to the
observing that what Antony was planning was not so much a battle
as a return to Egypt. Vessels which he did not need outside for
battle he ordered burned, although such ships would usually be kept
as reserves to make up losses in fighting. Moreover, he astonished
the captains by ordering them to take out into action the big sails
which were always left ashore before a battle. Nor did his explanation
that they would be needed in pursuit satisfy them. It appeared also
that he was employing trusted slaves at night to load the Egyptian
galleys with all of Cleopatra's treasure. Two more Roman leaders,
satisfied as to Antony's real intention, deserted to Octavius and
informed him of Antony's plans.
Meanwhile a heavy storm had made it impossible to attempt the action
on August 29 or several days after. On the 2d of September (31
B.C.) the sea became smooth again. Octavius and Agrippa drew out
their fleet into open water, about three-quarters of a mile from
the mouth of the gulf, forming line in three divisions. They waited
till nearly noon before Antony's fleet began to make its expected
appearance to offer battle. This also was formed in three divisions
corresponding to those of their enemy. The Egyptian division of
sixty ships under Cleopatra took up a safe position in the rear
of the center.
[Illustration: SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B.C.]
There was a striking contrast in the types of ships in the opposing
ranks. The galleys of Octavius were low in the water, and nimble in
their handling; those of Antony were bulky and high, with five to
ten banks of oars, and their natural unhandiness was made worse by
a device intended to protect them against ramming. This consisted
of a kind of boom of heavy timbers rigged out on all sides of the
hull. In addition to the higher sides these ships supported towers
and citadels built upon their decks, equipped with every form of
the artillery of that day, especially catapults capable of hurling
heavy stones upon the enemy's deck.
Against such formidable floating castles, the light ships of Agrippa
and Octavius could adopt only skirmishing tactics. They rushed in
where they could shear away the oar blades of an enemy without
getting caught by the great grappling irons swung out from his
decks. They kept clear of the heavy stones from the catapults through
superior speed and ability to maneuver quickly, but they were unable
to strike their ponderous adversaries any vital blow. On the other
hand the great hulks of Antony were unable to close with them,
and though the air was filled with a storm of arrows, stones and
javelins, neither side was able to strike decisively at the other.
As at Salamis the opposite shores were lined with the opposing
armies, and every small success was hailed by shouts from a hundred
thousand throats on the one side and long drawn murmurs of dismay
from an equal host on the other.
In these waters a north wind springs up every afternoon--a fact
that Antony and Cleopatra had counted on--and as soon as the breeze
shifted the royal galley of Cleopatra spread its crimson sail and,
followed by the entire Egyptian division, sailed through the lines
and headed south. Antony immediately left his flagship, boarded
a quinquereme and followed. This contemptible desertion of the
commander in chief was not generally known in his fleet; as for the
disappearance of the Egyptian squadron, it was doubtless regarded
as a good riddance. The battle, therefore, went on as stubbornly
as ever.
Late in the afternoon Agrippa, despairing of harming his enemy by
ordinary tactics, achieved considerable success by the use of javelins
wrapped in burning tow, and fire rafts that were set drifting upon
the clumsy hulks which could not get out of their way. By this means
a number of Antony's ships were destroyed, but the contest remained
indecisive. At sunset Antony's fleet retired in some disorder to
their anchorage in the gulf. Octavius attempted no pursuit but
kept the sea all night, fearing a surprise attack or an attempted
flight from the gulf.
Meanwhile a flying wing of Octavius's fleet had been sent in pursuit
of Antony and Cleopatra, who escaped only after a rear guard action
had been fought in which two of Cleopatra's ships were captured.
The fugitives put ashore at Cape Tænarus, to enable Antony to send
a message to his general, Canidius, ordering him to take his army
through Macedonia into Asia. Then the flight was resumed to Alexandria.
On the morning of the 3d Octavius sent a message to the enemy's
camp announcing the fact of Antony's desertion and calling on the
fleet and army to surrender. The Roman soldiers were unwilling to
believe that their commander had been guilty of desertion, and
were confident that he had been summoned away on important business
connected with the campaign. Their general, however, did not dare
convey to them Antony's orders because they would betray the truth
and provoke mutiny. Consequently he did nothing. Certain Roman
senators and eastern princes saw the light and quietly went over
to the camp of Octavius. Several days of inaction followed, during
which the desertions continued and the rumor of Antony's flight
found increasing belief. On the seventh day, Canidius, who found
himself in a hopeless dilemma, also went over to Octavius. This
desertion by the commander settled the rest of the force. A few
scattered into Macedonia, but the great bulk of the army and all
that was left of the fleet surrendered. Nineteen legions and more
than ten thousand cavalry thus came over to Octavius and took service
under him. This was the real victory of Actium. In the words of
the Italian historian Ferrero, "it was a victory gained without
fighting, and Antony was defeated in this supreme struggle, not
by the valor of his adversary or by his own defective strategy
or tactics, but by the hopeless inconsistency of his double-faced
policy, which, while professing to be republican and Roman, was
actually Egyptian and monarchical."
The story of the naval battle of Actium is a baffling problem to
reconstruct on account of the wide divergence in the accounts.
For instance, the actual number of ships engaged is a matter of
choice between the extremes of 200 to 500 on a side. And the
consequences were so important to Octavius and to Rome that the
accounts were naturally adorned afterwards with the most glowing
colors. Every poet who lived by the bounty of Augustus in later
years naturally felt inspired to pay tribute to it in verse. But the
actual naval battle seems to have been of an indecisive character.
For that matter, even after the wholesale surrender of Antony's
Roman army and fleet, neither Anthony nor Octavius realized the
importance of what had happened. Antony had recovered from worse
disasters before, and felt secure in Alexandria. Octavius at first
followed up his advantage with timid and uncertain steps. Only
after the way was made easy by the hasty submission of the Asiatic
princes and the wave of popularity and enthusiasm that was raised
in Rome by the news of the victory, did Octavius press the issue
to Egypt itself. There the war came to an end with the suicide
of both Antony and Cleopatra.
As in the case of the indecisive naval battle off the capes of
the Chesapeake, which led directly to the surrender of Cornwallis,
an action indecisive in character may be most decisive in results.
Actium may not have been a pronounced naval victory but it had
tremendous consequences. As at Salamis, East and West met for the
supremacy of the western world, and the East was beaten back. It
is not likely that the Egyptian or the Syrian would have dominated
the genius of the western world for any length of time, but the
defeat of Octavius would have meant a hybrid empire which would
have fallen to pieces like the empire of Alexander, leaving western
Europe split into a number of petty states. On the other hand,
Octavius was enabled to build on the consequences of Actium the
great outlines of the Roman empire, the influence of which on the
civilized world to-day is still incalculable. When he left Rome
to fight Antony, the government was bankrupt and the people torn
with faction. When he returned he brought the vast treasure of
Egypt and found a people united to support him. Actium, therefore,
is properly taken as the significant date for the beginning of the
Roman empire. Octavius took the name of his grand-uncle Cæsar,
the title of Augustus, and as "Imperator" became the first of the
Roman emperors.
The relation of the battle of Actium to this portentous change
in the fortunes of Octavius was formally recognized by him on the
scene where it took place. Nicopolis, the City of Victory, was
founded upon the site of his camp, with the beaks of the captured
ships as trophies adorning its forum. The little temple of Apollo on
the point of Actium he rebuilt on an imposing scale and instituted
there in honor of his victory the "Actian games," which were held
thereafter for two hundred years.
After the battle of Actium and the establishment of a powerful
Roman empire without a rival in the world, there follows a long
period in which the Mediterranean, and indeed all the waterways
known to the civilized nations, belonged without challenge to the
galleys of Rome. Naval stations were established to assist in the
one activity left to ships of war, the pursuit of pirates, but
otherwise there was little or nothing to do. And during this long
period, indeed, down to the Middle Ages, practically nothing is
known of the development in naval types until the emergence of the
low, one- or two-banked galley of the wars between the Christian
and the Mohammedan. The first definite description we have of warships
after the period of Actium comes at the end of the ninth century.
There was some futile naval fighting against the Vandals in the days
when Rome was crumbling. Finally, by a curious freak of history,
Genseric the Vandal took a fleet out from Carthage against Rome,
and swept the Mediterranean. In the year 455, some six centuries
after Rome had wreaked her vengeance on Carthage, this Vandal fleet
anchored unopposed in the Tiber and landed an army that sacked
the imperial city, which had been for so long a period mistress
of the world, and had given her name to a great civilization.
During the four centuries in which the _Pax Romana_ rested upon
the world, it is easy to conceive of the enormous importance to
history and civilization of having sea and river, the known world
over, an undisputed highway for the fleets of Rome. Along these
routes, even more than along the military roads, traveled the
institutions, the arts, the language, the literature, the laws,
of one of the greatest civilizations in history. And ruthless as
was the destruction of Vandal and Goth in the city itself and in
the peninsula, they could not destroy the heritage that had been
spread from Britain to the Black Sea and from the Elbe to the upper
waters of the Nile.
REFERENCES
HISTORY OF ROME, Theodor Mommsen, tr. by W. P. Dickson, 1867.
GENERAL HISTORY, Polybius, transl. by Hampton, 1823.
HISTORY OF THE ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE, Chas. Merivale (vol. III.),
1866.
THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME, G. Ferrero, tr. by A. E.
Zemmern, 1909.
ÉTUDES SUR L'HISTOIRE MILITAIRE ET MARITIME DES GRECS ET DES
ROMAINS, Paul Serre, 1888.
FLEETS OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, W. W. Tarn, in _Journal of
Hellenic Studies_, 1907.
HERESIES OF SEA POWER (pp. 40-71), Fred Jane, 1906.
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON HISTORY (pp. 15 ff.), A. T. Mahan, 1889.
For a complete bibliography of Roman sea power, v. INFLUENCE OF
SEA POWER ON THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (Doctoral Dissertation),
F. W. Clark, 1915.