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A HISTORY OF SEA POWER
by
WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS and ALLAN WESTCOTT
Professors in the United States Naval Academy
With Maps, Diagrams, and Illustrations
New York
George H. Doran Company
PREFACE
This volume has been called into being by the absence of any brief
work covering the evolution and influence of sea power from the
beginnings to the present time. In a survey at once so comprehensive
and so short, only the high points of naval history can be touched.
Yet it is the hope of the authors that they have not, for that
reason, slighted the significance of the story. Naval history is
more than a sequence of battles. Sea power has always been a vital
force in the rise and fall of nations and in the evolution of
civilization. It is this significance, this larger, related point
of view, which the authors have tried to make clear in recounting
the story of the sea. In regard to naval principles, also, this
general survey should reveal those unchanging truths of warfare
which have been demonstrated from Salamis to Jutland. The tendency
of our modern era of mechanical development has been to forget the
value of history. It is true that the 16" gun is a great advance
over the 32-pounder of Trafalgar, but it is equally true that the
naval officer of to-day must still sit at the feet of Nelson.
The authors would acknowledge their indebtedness to Professor F.
Wells Williams of Yale, and to the Classical Departments of Harvard
and the University of Chicago for valuable aid in bibliography.
Thanks are due also to Commander C. C. Gill, U. S. N., Captain T. G.
Frothingam, U. S. N. R., Dr. C. Alphonso Smith, and to colleagues of
the Department of English at the Naval Academy for helpful criticism.
As to the "References" at the conclusion of each chapter, it should
be said that they are merely references, not bibliographies. The
titles are recommended to the reader who may wish to study a period
in greater detail, and who would prefer a short list to a complete
bibliography.
WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS
ALLAN WESTCOTT
United States Naval Academy,
_June_, 1920.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES
II ATHENS AS A SEA POWER:
1. THE PERSIAN WAR
2. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
III THE SEA POWER OF ROME:
1. THE PUNIC WARS
2. THE IMPERIAL NAVY
IV THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES:
THE EASTERN EMPIRE
V THE NAVIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES [_Continued_]:
VENICE AND THE TURK
VI OPENING THE OCEAN ROUTES:
1. PORTUGAL AND THE NEW ROUTE TO INDIA
2. SPAIN AND THE NEW WORLD
VII SEA POWER IN THE NORTH:
HOLLAND'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
VIII ENGLAND AND THE ARMADA
IX RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER:
WARS WITH THE DUTCH
X RISE OF ENGLISH SEA POWER [_continued_]:
WARS WITH FRANCE TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
XI NAPOLEONIC WARS:
THE FIRST OF JUNE AND CAMPERDOWN
XII NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Continued_]:
THE RISE OF NELSON
XIII NAPOLEONIC WARS [_Concluded_]:
TRAFALGAR AND AFTER
XIV REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE:
HAMPTON ROADS AND LISSA
XV RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
XVI THE WORLD WAR:
THE FIRST YEAR
XVII THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]:
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
XVIII THE WORLD WAR [_Concluded_]:
COMMERCE WARFARE
XIX CONCLUSION
INDEX
MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
EGYPTIAN SHIP
SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER
GREEK WAR GALLEY
GREEK MERCHANT SHIP
ROUTE OF XERXES' FLEET TO BATTLE OF SALAMIS
SCENE OF PRELIMINARY NAVAL OPERATIONS, CAMPAIGN OF SALAMIS
THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, 480 B. C.
THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT--ABOUT 450 B. C.
SCENE OF PHORMIO'S CAMPAIGN
BATTLE OF THE CORINTHIAN GULF, 429 B. C.
SCENE OF THE PUNIC WARS
ROMAN FORMATION AT ECNOMUS
CARTHAGINIAN TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS, 256 B. C.
POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
SCENE OF BATTLE OF ACTIUM, 31 B. C.
THE SARACEN EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, ABOUT 715 A. D.
EUROPE'S EASTERN FRONTIER
CONSTANTINOPLE AND VICINITY
THEATER OF OPERATIONS, VENICE AND THE TURK
16TH CENTURY GALLEY
BATTLE OF LEPANTO, OCTOBER 7, 1571
CROSS-STAFF
THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WORLD IN 1450
PORTUGUESE VOYAGES AND POSSESSIONS
FLAGSHIP OF COLUMBUS
CHART OF A. D. 1589
THE NETHERLANDS IN THE 16TH CENTURY
GALLEON
CRUISE OF THE SPANISH ARMADA
ORIGINAL "EAGLE" FORMATION OF THE ARMADA
THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL
SCENE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE 17TH CENTURY
BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND AND ENGLAND AND FRANCE
THE BATTLE OF PORTLAND, FEBRUARY 18, 1653
THE THAMES ESTUARY
THREE-DECKED SHIP OF THE LINE, 18TH CENTURY
THE WEST INDIES
SCENE OF THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN
BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, SEPTEMBER 5, 1781
BATTLE OF THE SAINTS' PASSAGE, APRIL 12, 1782
BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1794
BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN, OCTOBER 11, 1797
BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY 14, 1797
THE NILE CAMPAIGN, MAY-AUGUST, 1798
COAST MAP--FROM ALEXANDRIA TO ROSETTA MOUTH OF THE NILE
BATTLE OF THE NILE
BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN
POSITION OF BRITISH AND ENEMY SHIPS, MARCH, 1805
NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE
NELSON'S VICTORY
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21, 1805
TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30
EARLY IRONCLADS
BUSHNELL'S TURTLE
FULTON'S NAUTILUS
BATTLE OF LISSA, JULY 20, 1866
BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPTEMBER 17, 1894
APPROACHES TO MANILA
BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898
WEST INDIES--MOVEMENTS IN SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN
BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898
THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
HARBOR OF PORT ARTHUR
ROJDESTVENSKY'S CRUISE, OCTOBER 18, 1904-MAY 27, 1905
BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA, MAY 27, 1905
HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION
HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, 12:30-1:40
BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOVEMBER 1, 1914
ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS
BATTLE OF FALKLAND ISLANDS, DECEMBER 8, 1914
THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPTEMBER 1-NOVEMBER 9, 1914
THEATER OF OPERATIONS, IN THE NORTH SEA
DOGGER BANK ACTION, JANUARY 24, 1915
THE APPROACHES TO CONSTANTINOPLE
DARDANELLES DEFENSES
CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION
TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLE CRUISER: THE DERFLINGER
TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER: THE LION
BATTLE OF JUTLAND: FIRST PHASE
TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLESHIP: THE IRON DUKE
BATTLE OF JUTLAND: SECOND AND THIRD PHASES
TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLESHIP: THE KOENIG
EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY
GERMAN BARRED ZONES
OCEAN-GOING TYPES OF GERMAN SUBMARINES
OSTEND-ZEEBRUGGE AREA
ZEEBRUGGE HARBOR WITH GERMAN DEFENSES AND BRITISH BLOCKSHIPS
BRITISH, ALLIED AND NEUTRAL MERCHANT SHIPS DESTROYED BY
GERMAN RAIDERS, SUBMARINES AND MINES
A HISTORY OF SEA POWER
CHAPTER I
THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVIES
Civilization and sea power arose from the Mediterranean, and the
progress of recent archeological research has shown that civilizations
and empires had been reared in the Mediterranean on sea power long
before the dawn of history. Since the records of Egypt are far
better preserved than those of any other nation of antiquity, and
the discovery of the Rosetta stone has made it possible to read
them, we know most about the beginnings of civilization in Egypt.
We know, for instance, that an Egyptian king some 2000 years before
Christ possessed a fleet of 400 fighting ships. But it appears
now that long before this time the island of Crete was a great
naval and commercial power, that in the earliest dynasties of Egypt
Cretan fleets were carrying on a commerce with the Nile valley.
Indeed, the Cretans may have taught the Egyptians something of the
art of building sea-going ships for trade and war.[1] At all events,
Crete may be regarded as the first great sea power of history, an
island empire like Great Britain to-day, extending its influence
from Sicily to Palestine and dominating the eastern Mediterranean
for many centuries. From recent excavations of the ancient capital
we get an interesting light on the old Greek legends of the Minotaur
and the Labyrinth, going back to the time when the island kingdom
levied tribute, human as well as monetary, on its subject cities
throughout the Ægean.
[Footnote 1: It is interesting to note that the earliest empires,
Assyria and Egypt, were not naval powers, because they arose in rich
river valleys abundantly capable of sustaining their inhabitants.
They did not need to command the sea.]
On this sea power Crete reared an astonishingly advanced civilization.
Until recent times, for instance, the Phnicians had been credited
with the invention of the alphabet. We know now that 1000 years
before the Phnicians began to write the Cretans had evolved a
system of written characters--as yet undeciphered--and a decimal
system for numbers. A correspondingly high stage of excellence
had been reached in engineering, architecture, and the fine arts,
and even in decay Crete left to Greece the tradition of mastery
in laws and government.
[Illustration: EGYPTIAN SHIP
From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
The power of Crete was already in its decline centuries before
the Trojan War, but during a thousand years it had spread its own
and Egyptian culture over the shores of the Ægean. The destruction
of the island empire in about 1400 B.C. apparently was due to some
great disaster that destroyed her fleet and left her open to invasion
by a conquering race--probably the Greeks--who ravaged her cities
by sword and fire. On account of her commanding position in the
Mediterranean, Crete might again have risen to sea power but for
the endless civil wars that marked her subsequent history.
The successor to Crete as mistress of the sea was Phnicia. The
Phnicians, oddly enough, were a Semitic people, a nomadic race
with no traditions of the sea whatever. When, however, they migrated
to the coast and settled, they found themselves in a narrow strip
of coast between a range of mountains and the sea. The city of Tyre
itself was erected on an island. Consequently these descendants of
herdsmen were compelled to find their livelihood upon the sea--as
were the Venetians and the Dutch in later ages--and for several
hundred years they maintained their control of the ocean highways.
The Phnicians were not literary, scientific, or artistic; they
were commercial. Everything they did was with an eye to business.
They explored the Mediterranean and beyond for the sake of tapping
new sources of wealth, they planted colonies for the sake of having
trading posts on their routes, and they developed fighting ships for
the sake of preserving their trade monopolies. Moreover, Phnicia
lay at the end of the Asiatic caravan routes. Hence Phnician ships
received the wealth of the Nile valley and Mesopotamia and distributed
it along the shores of the Mediterranean. Phnician ships also
uncovered the wealth of Spain and the North African coast, and,
venturing into the Atlantic, drew metals from the British Isles.
According to Herodotus, a Phnician squadron circumnavigated Africa
at the beginning of the seventh century before Christ, completing
the voyage in three years. We should know far more now of the extent
of the explorations made by these master mariners of antiquity
were it not for the fact that they kept their trade routes secret
as far as possible in order to preserve their trade monopoly.
In developing and organizing these trade routes the Phnicians
planted colonies on the islands of the Mediterranean,--Sicily,
Sardinia, Corsica, and Malta. They held both shores of the Straits
of Gibraltar, and on the Atlantic shores of Spain established posts
at Cadiz and Tarshish, the latter commonly supposed to have been
situated just north of Cadiz at the mouth of the Guadalquivir River.
Cadiz was their distributing point for the metals of northern Spain
and the British Isles. The most famous colony was Carthage, situated
near the present city of Tunis. Carthage was founded during the first
half of the ninth century before Christ, and on the decay of the
parent state became in turn mistress of the western Mediterranean,
holding sway until crushed by Rome in the Punic Wars.
Of the methods of the Phnicians and their colonists in establishing
trade with primitive peoples, we get an interesting picture from
Herodotus,[1] who describes how the Carthaginians conducted business
with barbarous tribes on the northern coast of Africa.
[Footnote 1: HISTORY, translated by Geo. Rawlinson, vol. III, p.
144.]
[Illustration: SCENE OF ANCIENT SEA POWER]
"When they (the Carthaginian traders) arrive, forthwith they unload
their wares, and having disposed them in orderly fashion on the
beach, leave them, and returning aboard their ships, raise a great
smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, came dawn to the shore,
and laying out to view so much gold as they think the wares to be
worth, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come
ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it up and
go their way; but if it does not seem sufficient they go aboard
their ships once more and wait patiently. Then the others approach
and add to the gold till the Carthaginians are satisfied. Neither
party deals unfairly with the other; for the Carthaginians never
touch the gold till it comes up to the estimated value of their
goods, nor do the natives ever carry off the goads till the gold
has been taken away."
In addition to the enormous profits of the carrying trade the Phnicians
had a practical monopoly of the famous "Tyrian dyes," which were in
great demand throughout the known world. These dyes were obtained
from two kinds of shellfish together with an alkali prepared from
seaweed. Phnicians were also pioneers in the art of making glass.
It is not hard to understand, therefore, how Phnicia grew so
extraordinarily rich as to rouse the envy of neighboring rulers,
and to maintain themselves the traders of Tyre and Sidon had to
develop fighting fleets as well as trading fleets.
Early in Egyptian history the distinction was made between the
"round" ships of commerce and the "long" ships of war. The round
ship, as the name suggests, was built for cargo capacity rather
than for speed. It depended on sail, with the oars as auxiliaries.
The long ship was designed for speed, depending on oars and using
sail only as auxiliary. And while the round ship was of deep draft
and rode to anchor, the shallow flat-bottomed long ships were drawn
up on shore. The Phnicians took the Egyptian and Cretan models
and improved them. They lowered the bows of the fighting ships,
added to the blunt ram a beak near the water's edge, and strung
the shields of the fighting men along the bulwarks to protect the
rowers. To increase the driving force and the speed, they added a
second and then a third bank of oars, thus producing the "bireme" and
the "trireme." These were the types they handed down to the Greeks,
and in fact there was little advance made beyond the Phnician war
galley during all the subsequent centuries of the Age of the Oar.
About the beginning of the seventh century before Christ the Phnicians
had reached the summit of their power on the seas. Their extraordinary
wealth tempted the king of Assyria, in 725 B.C., to cross the mountain
barrier with a great army. He had no difficulty in overrunning the
country, but the inhabitants fled to their colonies. The great
city of Tyre, being on an island, defied the invader, and finally
the Assyrian king gave up and withdrew to his own country. Having
realized at great cost that he could not subdue the Phnicians
without a navy, he set about finding one. By means of bribes and
threats he managed to seduce three Phnician cities to his side.
These furnished him sixty ships officered by Phnicians, but manned
by Assyrian crews.
With this fleet an attack was made on Tyre, but such was the contempt
felt by the Tyrians for their enemy that they held only twelve ships
for defense. These twelve went out against the sixty, utterly routed
them, and took 500 prisoners. For five years longer the Assyrian
king maintained a siege of Tyre from the mainland, attempting to
keep the city from its source of fresh water, but as the Tyrians
had free command of the sea, they had no difficulty in getting
supplies of all kinds from their colonies. At the end of five years
the Assyrians again returned home, defeated by the Phnician control
of the sea. When, twenty years later, Phnicia was subjugated by
Assyria, it was due to the lack of union among the scattered cities
and colonies of the great sea empire. Widely separated, governed
by their own princes, the individual colonies had too little sense
of loyalty for the mother country. Each had its own fleets and its
own interests; in consequence an Assyrian fleet was able to destroy
the Phnician fleets in detail. From this point till the rise of
Athens as a sea power, the fleets of Phnicia still controlled the
sea, but they served the plans of conquest of alien rulers.
As a dependency of Persia, Phnicia enabled Cambyses to conquer
Egypt. However, when the Phnician fleet was ordered to subjugate
Carthage, already a strong power in the west, the Phnicians refused
on the ground of the kinship between Carthage and Phnicia. And
the help of Phnicia was so essential to the Persian monarch that
he countermanded the order. Indeed the relation of Phnicia to
Persia amounted to something more nearly like that of an ally than
a conquered province, for it was to the interests of Persia to
keep the Phnicians happy and loyal.
When, in 498 B.C., the Greeks of Asia and the neighboring islands
revolted, it was due chiefly to the loyalty of the Phnicians that the
Persian empire was saved. Thereafter, the Persian yoke was fastened
on the Asiatic Greeks, and any prospect of a Greek civilization
developing on the eastern shore of the Ægean was destroyed.
[Illustration: GREEK WAR GALLEY
From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
But on the western shore lay flourishing Greek cities still independent
of Persian rule. Moreover, the coastal towns like Corinth and Athens
were developing considerable power on the sea, and it was evident
that unless European Greece were subdued it would stand as a barrier
between Persia and the western Mediterranean. Darius perceived the
situation and prepared to destroy these Greek states before they
should become too formidable. The story of this effort, ending at
Salamis and Platea, and breaking for all time the power of Persia,
belongs in the subsequent chapter that narrates the rise and fall
of Athens as a sea power.
At this point, it is worth pausing to consider in detail the war
galley which the Phnicians had developed and which they handed
down to the Greeks at this turning point in the world's history.
The bireme and the trireme were adopted by the Greeks, apparently
without alteration, save that at Salamis the Greek galleys were
said to have been more strongly built and to have presented a lower
freeboard than those of the Phnicians. A hundred years later,
about 330 B.C., the Greeks developed the four-banked ship, and
Alexander of Macedon is said to have maintained on the Euphrates
a squadron of seven-banked ships. In the following century the
Macedonians had ships of sixteen banks of oars, and this was probably
the limit for sea-going ships in antiquity. These multiple banked
ships must have been most unhandy, for a reversal of policy set in
till about the beginning of the Christian era the Romans had gone
back to two-banked ships. In medieval times war galleys reverted
to a single row of oars on each side, but required four or five
men to every oar.
[Illustration: GREEK MERCHANT SHIP
From Torr, _Ancient Ships_.]
At the time of the Persian war the trireme was the standard type of
warship, as it had been for the hundred years before, and continued
to be during the hundred years that followed. In fact, the name
trireme was used loosely for all ships of war whether they had two
banks of oars or three. But the fleets that fought in the Persian
war and in the Peloponnesian war were composed of three-banked ships,
and fortunately we have in the records of the Athenian dockyards
accurate information as to structural detail.
The Athenian trireme was about 150 feet in length with a beam of 20
feet. The beam was therefore only 2/15 of the length. (A merchant
ship of the same period was about 180 feet long with a beam of 1/4
its length.) The trireme was fitted with one mast and square sail,
the latter being used only when the wind was fair, as auxiliary
to the oars, especially when it needed to retire from battle. In
fact, the phrase "hoist the sail" came to be used colloquially
like our "turn tail" as a term for running away.
The triremes carried two sails, usually made of linen, a larger
one used in cruising and a smaller one for emergency in battle.
Before action it was customary to stow the larger sail on shore,
and the mast itself was lowered to prevent its snapping under the
shock of ramming.
The forward part of the trireme was constructed with a view to
effectiveness in ramming. Massive catheads projected far enough to
rip away the upper works of an enemy, while the bronze beak at the
waterline drove into her hull. This beak, or ram, was constructed
of a core of timber heavily sheathed with bronze, presenting three
teeth. Although the ram was the prime weapon of the ship, it often
became so badly wrenched in collision as to start the whole forward
part of the vessel leaking.
The rowers were seated on benches fitted into a rectangular structure
inside the hull. These benches were so compactly adjusted that
the naval architects allowed only two feet of freeboard for every
bank of oars. Thus the Roman quinquiremes of the Punic wars stood
only about ten feet above water. The covering of this rectangular
structure formed a sort of hurricane deck, standing about three
feet above the gangway that ran around the ship at about the level
of the bulwarks. This gangway and upper deck formed the platform
for the fighting men in battle. Sometimes the open space between
the hurricane deck and the gangway was fenced in with shields or
screens to protect the rowers of the uppermost bank of oars from
the arrows and javelins of the enemy.
The complement of a trireme amounted to about 200 men. The captain,
or "trierarch," commanded implicit obedience. Under him were a
sailing master, various petty officers, sailors, soldiers or marines,
and oarsmen.
The trireme expanded in later centuries to the quinquereme: upper
works were added and a second mast, but in essentials it was the
same type of war vessel that dominated the Mediterranean for three
thousand years--an oar driven craft that attempted to disable its
enemy by ramming or breaking away the oars. After contact the fighting
was of a hand to hand character such as prevailed in battles on
land. These characteristics were as true of the galley of Lepanto
(1571 A.D.) as of the trireme of Salamis (480 B.C.). Of the three
cardinal virtues of the fighting ship, mobility, seaworthiness,
and ability to keep the sea, or cruising radius, the oar-driven
type possessed only the first. It was fast, it could hold position
accurately, it could spin about almost on its own axis, but it was
so frail that it had to run for shelter before a moderate wind
and sea. In consequence naval operations were limited to the summer
months. As to its cargo capacity, it was so small that it was unable
to carry provisions to sustain its own crew for more than a few
days. As a rule the trireme was beached at night, with the crew
sleeping on shore, and as far as possible the meals were cooked
and eaten on shore. In the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), for
example, the Spartans fell upon the Athenians when their ships
were drawn up on the beach and the crews were cooking their dinner.
Moreover, the factors of speed and distance were both limited by
the physical fatigue of the oarsmen. In the language of to-day,
therefore, the oar-driven man-of-war had a small "cruising radius."
This dependence on the land and this sensitiveness to weather are
important facts in ancient naval history. It is fair to say that
storms did far more to destroy fleets and naval expeditions than
battles during the entire age of the oar. The opposite extreme
was reached in Nelson's day. His lumbering ships of the line made
wretched speed and straggling formations, but they were able to
weather a hurricane and to keep the sea for an indefinite length
of time.
As a final word on the beginnings of navies, emphasis should be
laid on the enormous importance of these early mariners, such as
the Cretans and the Phnicians, as builders of civilization. The
venturesome explorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port
not only opened up a new source of wealth but also established a
reciprocal relation that quickened civilization at both ends of
his route. The cargo ships that left the Nile delta distributed the
arts of Egypt as well as its wheat, and the richest civilization of
the ancient world, that of Greece, rose on foundation stones brought
from Egypt, Assyria, and Phnicia. It may be said of Phnicia herself
that she built-up her advanced culture on ideas borrowed almost
wholly from her customers. But control of the seas for trade involved
control of the seas for war, and behind the merchantman stood the
trireme. It is significant and appropriate that a Phnician coin
that has come down to us bears the relief of a ship of war.
In contrast with these early sea explorers and sea fighters stand
the peoples of China and India. Having reached a high state of
culture at an early period, they nevertheless, sought no contact
with the world outside and became stagnant for thousands of years.
Indeed, among the Hindus the crossing of the sea was a crime to be
expiated only by the most agonizing penance. Hence these peoples
of Asia, the most numerous in the world, exercised no influence
on the development of civilization compared with a mere handful
of people in Crete or the island city of Tyre. And for the same
reason China and India ceased to progress and became for centuries
mere backwaters of history.
It is worth noting also that the Mediterranean, leading westwards
from the early developed nations of Asia Minor and Egypt, opened
a westward course to the advance of discovery and colonization,
and this trend continued as the Pillars of Hercules led to the
Atlantic and eventually to the new world. For every nation that
bordered the Mediterranean illimitable highways opened out for
expansion, provided it possessed the stamina and the skill to win
them. And in those days they were practically the only highways.
Frail as the early ships were and great as were the perils they
had to face, communications by water were far centuries faster
and safer than communications by land. Hence civilization followed
the path of the sea. Even in these early beginnings it is easy
to see that sea-borne commerce leads to the founding of colonies
and the formation of an empire whose parts are linked together
by trade routes, and finally, that the preservation of such an
empire depends an the naval control of sea. This was as true of
Crete and Phnicia as it was later true of Venice, Holland, and
England.
REFERENCES
THE SEA KINGS OF CRETE, J. Baikie, 1910.
PHNICIA, Story of the Nations Series, George Rawlinson, 1895.
THE SAILING SHIP, E. Keble Chatterton, 1909.
SHIPS AND THEIR WAYS OF OTHER DAYS, E. Keble Chatterton, 1913.
ANCIENT SHIPS, Cecil Torr, 1894.
ARCHEOLOGIE NAVALE, Auguste Jal, 1840.
THE PREHISTORIC NAVAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE NORTH OF EUROPE,
G. H. Buhmer, in Report of the U. S. National Museum, 1893.
This article contains a complete bibliography on the subject of
ancient ships.
SEA POWER AND FREEDOM (chap. 2), Gerard Fiennes, 1918.