America; not because we were more to blame than others for the unjust
decision, but because the Chinese had entertained a deeper belief in
our power, influence, and loyalty to principle. They would hardly
understand so abject and complete a surrender. Foreign papers, also,
placed the chief responsibility on the United States. The British in
China felt that their government had been forced into the unfortunate
secret agreements with Japan when it could not help itself, because of
the German danger and the difficulties Japan might raise by going over
to the other side. The United States, whose hands were free, could have
saved us all, they said, by insisting on the right solution. They had
really hoped for this; their saying so now in their editorials and in
private conversation was in no spirit of petty hostility, but they had
to give vent to their feelings. I feared the Chinese might feel that
they had been betrayed in the house of their friends, but they met the
blow with sturdy spirit. They never wounded my feelings by anything
approaching an upbraiding of the United States for the part that
President Wilson played at Paris. They expressed to me their terrible
dejection, but said merely that President Wilson must have encountered
very great difficulties which they could know nothing about.
They all knew, of course, that the case of China had been weakened
by the treaties made through the connivance of Tsao Ju-lin and his
associates in the fall of 1918. Their resentment was turned toward
Japan, which had thus taken advantage of the war and the weakness of
China, and against the Chinese politicians who had become Japan's tools.
The Americans in China, as well as the British and the Chinese, were
deeply dejected during these difficult weeks. From the moment America
entered the war there had been a triumphant confidence that all this
sacrifice and suffering would establish just principles of world
action, under which mankind could live more happily and in greater
security. That hope was now all but crushed.
In commemoration of the soldier dead, the American community gathered
on May 30th, Decoration Day. It fell to me to make the address, in
which I spoke of those recently stationed in Peking who had died during
the war. Especially, I spoke of the fruitful career of Major Willard
Straight. It was remarkable how many officers of the Marine Guard
recently in Peking had gone through the brunt of the war and had been
distinguished in their service. I spoke of General Neville, General
Bowley, Commander Hutchins, Colonel Newell, and Colonel Holcombe, all
of whom had been in the thick of it, and rejoiced in their record and
the fact that though they passed through the valley of death they had
been spared. My eyes often rested on the sad face of Mrs. Deering,
transfigured with the mother's pride in that heroic son whose war
letters, published by her, are one of the intimately human memorials of
the great struggle.
I was impressed with how inadequately this wonderful country of
China and the promise of its people were understood in America. I
knew the difficulties and dangers to be overcome there, and I felt
that Americans well-disposed toward China would take a hand in its
development. But the "folks back home," especially the interests that
controlled the economic life of America, remained blind and deaf,
lavishing their money in Europe.
I had spent my energies freely, withholding assistance from none who
deserved it, although I could easily have limited my official action
within narrower and more convenient bounds. In developments that would
mean a slow lift of this fine old civilization to a modern plane real
American interests had come in. Foundations had been laid in the
Canal Contract, the China Medical Board, the railway concessions, the
creation of a Chino-American bank, and many other enterprises. America
stood no longer with empty hands; she could not be confronted with the
gibe so often used before: "It is easy for you to suggest generous
action, for you have nothing to contribute."
With these as beginnings, I arrived at the conclusion that more,
possibly, could be done by way of arousing American interests in Far
Eastern affairs by going to the United States than by staying in China.
I feared, also, that if I remained away from America too long, it would
be difficult readily to get in touch again with affairs there.
For such reasons, I came to the decision that I should send my
resignation to the President. I did not wish to run away from a
difficult and disagreeable situation. Indeed, until the first effects
of the Paris decision had been overcome, I would not leave. Beyond that
time, I had no desire to remain. Like the Chinese, I at that time still
believed that President Wilson had probably met tremendous difficulties
of which I had no knowledge. At any rate, it was far from my purpose to
embarrass him or the Government through my action. Therefore, the only
motive I gave for my resignation was my desire to return to the United
States. However, in my letter to the President I tried to express in
moderate but serious terms my view of the situation and of the action
which had been taken at Paris. This letter follows:
June 7, 1919.
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honour to place in your hands my resignation as minister to
China and to request that I may be relieved of the duties of this post
as soon as convenient to yourself and to the Secretary of State. My
reason for this action is that I am wearied after nearly six years of
continuous strain, that I feel that the interests of my family demand
my return to the United States, and that I should like to reënter
affairs at home without making my absence so long as to break off all
of the most important relationships.
I desire to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me,
and it shall be my greatest desire to continue in the future to
coöperate in helping to realize those great purposes of national and
international policy which you have so clearly and strongly put before
the American nation and the world.
In making this communication to you I cannot but refer to recent
developments with respect China. The general outlook is indeed most
discouraging, and it seems impossible to accomplish anything here
at present or until the home governments are willing to face the
situation and to act. It is not difficulties that deter me, and I
should stay at my post if it were necessary and if I did not think
that I could be of more use in the United States than in China at the
present time. But in fact, the situation requires that the American
people should be made to realize what is at stake here for us in
order that they may give the necessary backing to the Government for
support in any action which the developments here may Inquire. Unless
the American people realize this and the Government feels strong
enough to take adequate action, the fruits of one hundred and forty
years of American work in China will inevitably be lost. Our people
will be permitted to exist here only on the sufferance of others, and
the great opportunity which has been held out to us by the Chinese
people to assist in the development of education and free institutions
will be gone beyond recall. In its stead there will come a sinister
situation dominated by the unscrupulous methods of the reactionary
military régime centred in Tokyo, absolutist in tendency, cynical of
the principles of free government and human progress. If this force,
with all the methods it is accustomed to apply, remains unopposed
there will be created in the Far East the greatest engine of military
oppression and dominance that the world has yet seen. Nor can we
avoid the conclusion that the brunt of evil results will fall on the
United States, as is already foreshadowed by the bitter hostility and
abnormal vituperativeness of the Japanese press with regard to America.
The United States and Great Britain will have to stand together in
this matter; I do not think this is realized as fully by Britishers
at home as by those out here. If Russia can become an independent
representative government its interests would parallel ours. The
forces of public opinion and strength which can thus be mobilized are
entirely sufficient to control the situation here and to keep it from
assuming the menacing character which is threatened at present; but
this can only be done if the situation is clearly seen and if it is
realized that the military party of Japan will continue its present
methods and purposes which have proved so successful until it becomes
a dead wall of firm, quiet opposition. There will be a great deal of
talk of friendship for China, of restoration of Shantung, of loyalty
to the League of Nations, but it will be dangerous to accept this and
to stop questioning what are the methods actually applied; as long as
they exist the menace is growing all the time. We cannot rest secure
on treaties nor even on the League of Nations without this checking
up of the facts. Otherwise these instruments would only make the game
a little more complicated but not change its essential character.
The menace can be avoided only if it is made plain to Japan that her
purposes are unmistakable and that the methods utilized to effect
them will by no means be tolerated. Such purposes are the stirring
up of trouble and revolution, encouragement of bandits and pirates,
morphia, financial corruption, misleading of the press, refusal of
just satisfaction when Americans are injured in order to gain prestige
for absolute power, and chief of all official duplicity, such as
the disavowal of knowledge when loans are being made to the Chinese
Government by leading Japanese banks and the subsequent statement by
the Japanese minister that these loans were private arrangements by
"merchants."
If continuous support could be given not only to the activities of
American merchants but to the constructive forces in Chinese national
life itself these purposes and methods would not have the chance to
flourish and succeed which they now enjoy.
During the war our action in the support of constructive forces
in China necessarily could not be effective, as our energies were
required elsewhere. Yet I believe that a great opportunity was missed
when China had broken of relations with Germany. The very least
recognition of her sentiments, support and efforts, on our part, would
have changed the entire situation. But while millions upon millions
were paid to the least important of the countries of Europe not a cent
was forthcoming for China. This lack of support drove Tuan and his
followers into the arms of the pro-Japanese agents. Instead of support
we gave China the Lansing-Ishii Note.
Throughout this period the Japanese game has still been in the stage
of bluff; while Germany seemed at her strongest in the war, indeed the
Japanese were perhaps making their veiled threats with a feeling that
if they should ally themselves with a strong Germany the two would
be invincible; but even at that time a portion of the American navy
detached could have checkmated Japan. Since the complete breakdown of
Germany the case of Japan has been carried through solely on bluff
though perhaps it may be that the Japanese militarists have succeeded
in convincing themselves that their establishment is formidable. But
it is plain that they would be absolutely powerless in the face of a
stoppage of commerce and a navy demonstration on the part of any one
of the great powers. No one desires to think of this contingency, but
it is plain that after the breakdown of Germany it was not feasible
for Japan to use force nor could she have suffered a greater damage
than to exclude herself from the Peace Conference where she had
everything to gain and nothing to lose. In ten years there may be a
very different situation. Then also our people, having grown wise,
will be sure to shout: "Why was not this stopped while there was yet
time?" It seems to me necessary that someone in the Government ought
to give attention primarily to China and the Far Eastern situation.
It is very difficult to get any attention for China. I mean any
continuous attention that results in getting something actually
done. Everything else seems to come first because Europe seems so
much nearer; and yet the destinies of Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, and
Greece are infinitesimal in their importance to the future of America
compared With those of China.
During my service here I have constantly suffered from this lack of
continuous attention at home to the Far Eastern situation. It has
reacted on the consular service; the interpreter service which is
absolutely necessary to make our consular corps in China effective
has been starved, as no new appointments have been made. In my own
case promises of assistance which had been given repeatedly went
unfulfilled. In this matter I have not the least personal feeling.
I know the result is not due to the personal neglect or ill-will of
any man or group of men, only it seems to me to indicate a general
sentiment of the unimportance of Far Eastern affairs, which ought to
be remedied. I repeat that these statements are not made in a spirit
of complaint; all individual members of the Department of State have
shown nothing but consideration and readiness to assist, but there
has been lacking a concentrated interest in China, which ought to be
represented in some one of the high officials, designated to follow
up Far Eastern affairs and accorded influence commensurate with
responsibilities in this matter.
CHAPTER XXXII
A NATION STRIKES AND UNITES
The students of Peking "started something." For the first time in
thousands of years public opinion was aroused and organized in China.
Through the action of the students, with whom the merchants made common
cause, before and after the Shantung decision, China found herself.
The Japanese papers insisted steadfastly that these student
disturbances had been brought on at the "instigation of certain
countries." But instigation was not needed. If foreigners had wished
to make trouble in this way, they would have been kept extremely
busy trying to keep pace with the Chinese themselves. You do not
have to instigate a man to resist a pillager who is trying to break
into his house. Those who started this tremendous movement toward
nationalism--for that is what it grew into--were students in the
government schools and in the private schools of Peking and Tientsin.
In the beginning the students were alone in the agitation, but not for
long. Throughout the agitators were referred to as "students," but this
term came to be used in a broad sense; it came to mean Young China,
including all of the youth of the land who had been educated in modern
schools.
China is the home of the strike and the boycott; but never before
had these weapons been employed on such a scale. The merchants and
students of north China met during the second half of May, declared a
general boycott of Japanese goods, and demanded the dismissal of the
three men called traitors, the notorious agents in the Chino-Japanese
negotiations. The boycott spread rapidly, a spontaneous expression of
deep resentment. But the movement strove also to control and purify
the action of the Chinese Government. The instrument for this was the
strike--passive resistance--the stopping of the wheels of commerce and
industry till the will of the people was listened to.
The popular sense of equity, which in China asserts itself naturally
in strikes, responded everywhere. Unless the Government dismissed the
three offenders, merchants would close their shops. Teachers, students,
shopkeepers, chauffeurs, dockhands, all classes of workmen would
strike. All China, indeed, would go on strike.
The movement gained momentum like an avalanche thundering down a
mountain. Its fury was first of all concentrated on the attempt to
force the dismissal of the three officials who were, in the popular
mind, guilty of trading away the national birthright. The organization
of the uprising seemed to be almost spontaneous. Active little groups,
similar to the Committees of Correspondence in the time of Adams and
Franklin, sprang up in all parts of China. The masses of the people
were marshalled for action. From the ten thousand students who had
originally struck in Shanghai the movement expanded swiftly until it
included merchants and chambers of commerce and dozens of other bodies
in every walk of life. Associations of servants were formed under the
title of The Industrial National Salvation Society. Even Japanese
bankers were put under the ban by the Chinese financiers; finally the
boycott went so far that it blacklisted the foreign goods which were
brought to Chinese ports by Japanese steamers.
In Peking, fifty groups of student speakers were sent out to appeal
to the public. General Tuan Chi-jui, who, among others, was held
responsible by the students for the nation's troubles, stoutly stood by
his subordinates. The militarists in general, feeling that the student
movement was not favourable to them, prevailed on the Government to try
to suppress it. Martial law was proclaimed, and students trying to
speak were arrested. The students were undaunted and working en masse.
The Government soon saw that it could imprison them, but that it was
powerless to stem the tide of feeling they were creating. Thundering
from all parts of the country, it was recognized that the students
could, if they chose, turn the entire people against the Government.
By June 4th, nearly a thousand students were under forcible detention
in Peking; those recently arrested had wisely provided themselves with
knapsacks stocked with food before taking their lecture trips.
Then the girl students came forth. They fully shared the patriotic
feelings of their brothers. Seven hundred girls from the Peking schools
assembled and marched to the President's palace to request the release
of the young men under arrest.
The Government made a technical mistake. When the student feeling
seemed to be a little on the ebb, the Government took occasion to issue
a decree trying to white-wash Tsao Ju-lin and his confederates. That
fanned the flame which ultimately swept all over China.
Weakening, the Government offered the students release if they would
return to work and make no further trouble. The students saw their
advantage, and stated that they had no wish to leave their prisons, if
it meant promising to abstain from expressing their opinion in future;
moreover, they would not leave until the Government had apologized for
their unjust arrest.
The jailing of this large number of the youth of China finally
brought such ill-concealed opposition that the Government complied
with the students' ultimatum. An apology was offered them, whereupon
the students returned to their colleges and their work. But they
continued their street lectures, calling upon the people to join in a
powerful expression of national opinion through which their country's
institutions and policies might be put on a sounder basis, and Japanese
aggression powerfully resisted.
In Shanghai the boycott and the strike of the shopkeepers were in full
force. Their shops were closed, they threatened to pay no taxes unless
the "traitors" were ousted. American officials at Shanghai sent me
alarming reports. The British there, particularly those of the official
class, were inclined to repress the movement.
The Japanese, who were feeling the full force of the popular thrust,
tried to brand it anti-foreign and to reawaken memories of the Boxer
period. Some of the influential British in Shanghai, frightened by the
successful efforts of the merchants and students among the industrial
workers, began to call them anti-foreign, too. I was told that the
municipal council in Shanghai might take very stringent action against
the boycott and strike. The British minister had gone to the seashore,
and I sent him word that the situation was serious.
It would have been the height of folly had either we or the British
let ourselves be dragged into the disturbance, which was directed
solely against the Japanese, and was fortunately not our concern,
and in no sense anti-foreign. I sent specific instructions to the
consulate-general at Shanghai advising the American community neither
to encourage nor oppose this movement, which was the affair of the
Chinese. The Americans saw the point clearly, and realized how
undesirable it would be to entangle the municipal council in the
business. I told the Consul-General that, illegal and overt acts
excepted, the foreign authorities in China had nothing to do with the
strike; being happily free of Chinese ill-will, we wished to remain
free. In order to avoid all danger of more general trouble, Americans
exerted considerable influence with the Chinese leaders to cause them
to abstain from action that would tend to involve foreigners generally.
They responded willingly.
By this time even the mafoos (horse boys) at the Shanghai Race Club
were on strike. A run on the Bank of Communications was started because
Tsao Ju-lin was associated with it. More and more serious grew the
situation, but the demand on the Government remained unchanged: "When
the three traitors are dismissed, the strike will be called off;
otherwise, still more people will strike."
The Government finally yielded on the 11th of June. The insistent
demand had come from all parts of China that the three unpopular
officials go in disgrace. The Peking Government complied. But the great
public in Shanghai was not content until the British minister and I
gave confirmation of the report that the mandate of dismissal had been
issued. Then the strike was off.
However, the boycott against Japanese goods continued unabated. Yet
it must not be supposed that the movement, which at the beginning was
distinctly turned against Japan, was either essentially anti-Japanese
or purely oppositional and negative. Quite early, its true, positive,
national Chinese character stood revealed. The Japanese had stung the
Chinese national pride to the quick. It turned against them, not in a
spirit of blind hostility, but only in so far as the Japanese stood in
the way of the national Chinese regeneration.
Out of this unprecedented popular uprising several momentous facts
emerged. First, public opinion must be so awakened that it would be
a continuing force, so organized that it would at all times have the
means of expressing its will, so that it would be able to compel the
Government to resist further encroachments on China's rights. That
would take time; but it could be done, the strike and boycott proved
that. For the first time in her history China had roused herself and
wrung from her government a specific surrender. That lesson sank deep.
The leaders realized that this single act was merely a very small
beginning. But the important thing was that it did constitute a
beginning.
The second important result was the sudden focussing of attention on
the means by which native Chinese industry might be built up. The
boycott of Japanese goods had had a positive as well as a negative
side. Indeed it had been stated positively all along. The people were
not told to refrain from buying Japanese goods; they were advised to
avoid buying goods of an inferior quality--which would be interpreted
to mean Japanese products, of course--and they were pointedly urged to
patronize home industries. The people responded with a will. They did
buy the wares produced by their own factories. It gave great impetus to
the development of Chinese industry, and gave both the manufacturers
and the Government a clue as to what a definite campaign for the
stimulation of the home industries might accomplish.
While we were talking together informally at a meeting of the
diplomatic corps, the French minister, M. Boppe, remarked: "We are in
the presence of the most astounding and important thing that has ever
happened--the organization of a national public opinion in China for
positive action."
Thus out of the evil of the Paris decision came an inspiring national
awakening of the Chinese people, a welding together for joint thought
and joint action. All ranks of the population were affected. When
to avoid foreign complications student delegates went among the
workers of a factory in Shanghai to persuade them not to strike, the
workers asked: "Do you think we have no feeling for our country, nor
indignation against the traitors?"
About the evil of the Shantung decision the foreign communities were
unanimous, nor did they feel that they ought to be silent. They were on
the ground; they knew the inevitable consequences that would follow the
rigid application of the decision. They spoke out. Sir Edward Walker,
chairman of the Commercial Bank of Canada, gave an address on June 6th
before the Anglo-American Association of Peking, dealing particularly
with the needs of transportation. What the completion of two or three
trunk lines would mean to China he fully realized. After his address
the British minister and I, who were honorary members, took our leave,
as it had been intimated that the Association would discuss the
Shantung matter. The meeting then adopted a resolution which expressed
the conviction of Americans and British in China in this wise:
We express our solemn conviction that this decision will create
conditions that must inevitably bring about extreme discord between
the Chinese people and Japan, and raise a most serious hindrance
to the development of the economic interests of China and other
countries. A settlement which perpetuates the conditions created by
Germany's aggression in Shantung in 1898, conditions that led to
similar action on the part of other states, that were contributing
causes to the disorders in North China in 1900, and that made
inevitable the Russo-Japanese war, cannot make for peace in the Far
East, for political stability in China itself, or for development of
trade and commerce equally open to all.
Further, the evil consequences of conditions which are not only
subversive of the principle of national self-determination, but also
a denial of the policy of the open door and of the principle of
equality of opportunity, will be greatly accentuated if Japan, a near
neighbour, be now substituted for Germany, whose centre of political
and economic activities was on the other side of the globe.
Therefore we, the members of the Peking Anglo-American Association,
resolve that representations be made to the British and American
Governments urging that the states taking part in the Peace Conference
devise and carry through a just settlement which will not endanger the
safety of China and the peace of the world.
CHAPTER XXXIII
TAKING LEAVE OF PEKING
The Government was now confronted with the question of whether its
delegates at Paris should or should not sign the Treaty and Covenant.
The Chinese people were opposed to signing, for with China's signature
would go specific recognition of the transfer of German rights to
Japan. They had learned one great lesson: that to make concessions to
foreign powers never got them out of trouble, but only aggravated it.
If the Peking officials in 1898 had turned a deaf ear to the German
demands, despite threats of naval demonstrations, the Germans could
never have secured the things which the Chinese actually gave them. The
Chinese people now said: "Never again!"
I was informed on the 28th of May that nearly all the officials in
Peking were agreed that the Treaty should be signed. Knowledge of
their readiness to capitulate brought the national movement of the
Chinese people to its height almost immediately, in opposition to the
reactionary militarist control. By the 1st of July, a gentleman from
the immediate entourage of the President, who often came to see me on
the latter's behalf, told me that the President had instructed the
delegates at Paris not to sign the Treaty. They did not sign it then,
and steadfastly resisted all efforts to make them sign it later.
When the student troubles were at their height, on the 2nd of June
I was at the Legation late one evening to answer some cablegrams. I
was interrupted by an American woman teacher who with five Chinese
schoolgirls came to my office in a state of great excitement. The girls
had stood with a crowd for forty-eight hours asking admission to the
President's palace to present their grievance. They had endured these
hardships as bravely as any of the young men, but they were now alarmed
because two of the student leaders had been seized and taken inside the
palace. The girls feared their execution, and begged me to intercede.
As I could not quiet their apprehensions, I finally said I would direct
that an inquiry be made at the palace. By telephone I learned that the
students were being detained because they had been too forward in their
demonstrations, but that nothing untoward would happen to them. The
girls, happy and thankful at this reassurance, went home.
No one could fail to sympathize with the aims and ideals of the
students, who were striving for national freedom and regeneration. I,
too, felt a strong sympathy, though I, of course, abstained from all
direct contact with the movement, as it was a purely Chinese matter.
Nevertheless, the Japanese papers reported quite in detail how I
had organized the student movement, and how I had spent $2,000,000
in getting it under way. As everybody knew how spontaneous and
irrepressible the movement of the students was, these items excited
only amusement.
Pessimism reigned among liberal-minded people in early June. They
feared that followers of General Tuan would insist upon putting him
back into the Premiership, in which case there would be no escape from
another revolution to oppose him, with the general demoralization
and waste of national resources which would attend it. The second
_aide mémoire_ of the associated representatives was presented to the
President by Sir John Jordan on the 5th of June; it conveyed the hope
that China's internal difficulties might now come to an end, that
the peace conference at Shanghai might be resumed and successfully
concluded without delay, and it stated that meanwhile military
measures should not be resumed. The friendly advice encouraged the
liberal elements, particularly the express desire that there should
be no further fighting. It was felt that the President's hands were
strengthened for peace.
Dr. Chiang Monlin, Acting Chancellor of Peking University in the
absence of Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, went to Shanghai because the militarist
faction wished to hold him responsible for the acts of the students.
He was, indeed, one of their chief counsellors, but he counselled
wisdom and moderation. He told me that the leaders were conscious of
much progress in organizing public opinion, but that at least ten
years of further work and experience would be necessary before there
could be any approach to a public opinion consciously and unceasingly
active in support, or in proper restraint, of the Government. "All we
ask," Doctor Chiang said, "is ten years' time--freedom from outside
interference--then the New China will be organized."
I visited General Tuan, finding him calm but stubborn as usual. I
asked him whether, if the students should call on him, he would go out
to speak to them. "I would certainly do that," he replied; "I am in
sympathy with them, but I feel that they are often misled by people
whose motives are not disinterested." I told him that I believed the
students would gladly follow him and make him their leader if they
could be assured that he would not be controlled by counsellors who had
not the true welfare of China at heart.
This movement of the Chinese people impressed me the more vividly in
the light of a letter from R.F. Johnston on July 3rd which led me to
hark back to the days of the old Empire. Mr. Johnston was a tutor of
the young Emperor, and he inclosed a translation of a Chinese poem
which the Emperor had written out for me. It bore the Imperial seals,
and was dated: "Eleventh year of Hsuan Tung, sixth month, fifth day."
Here is the first verse:
The red bows unbent,
Were received and deposited.
I have here an admirable guest,
And with all my heart I bestow one on him.
The bells and drums have been arranged in order,
And all the morning will I feast him.
Shortly after, in a talk I had with Mr. Johnston, he told me that the
little Emperor had himself conceived the idea of writing something for
me. Johnston had suggested a certain poem but it did not satisfy his
pupil, who finally made his own selection. He said to his tutor: "I
want to imagine that the American minister is coming to the palace as
my guest."
The young Emperor, Mr. Johnston said, was interested in everything
that went on in the political and social life of the capital, and read
the papers every day. I attributed his interest in my doings to the
fact that the Emperor shared the love for America that is general in
China; but, also, I think the repeated likelihood of being taken to
the American Legation for refuge and shelter had impressed itself very
strongly on his youthful mind, so that it seemed to him a haven of
escape from all terror and danger.
Reports came at the end of July that President Wilson was defending
the Shantung settlement, by stating that it conferred on Japan no
political rights but only economic privileges. Had Mr. Wilson given
attention to the details of the question, as reported over and over
again in telegrams and dispatches from the Legation and consulates in
China, he could not have harboured such a misunderstanding. In this
instance the President based his action rather on vague assurances
given by Japan, the actual bearing of which he did not know. The term
"economic privileges" can hardly apply to such matters as control
of the port of Tsingtao and the Shantung Railway, and to a general
commercial preference in Shantung Province; yet these were plainly what
Japan wished to retain. Her pledge "to return Shantung Peninsula with
full sovereignty" sounded satisfactory, but it was never defined to
cover more than the 150 square miles of agricultural and mountain land
which the Germans had held as a leasehold, exclusive of Tsingtao port.
That important harbour the Japanese intended to retain, as well as the
terminals, railway, and mines.
The refusal of the Chinese to sign the Paris Treaty afforded an
opportunity for saving Shantung to China. But if the German rights
were to be confirmed to Japan under the term of "economic privileges,"
we should soon find that these economic privileges meant an end of
independent American enterprise in Shantung Province. Japan had used
such "economic privileges" in Manchuria. We were amply warned what to
expect from an extension of that policy to other parts of China.
President Wilson stated later that the League would prevent Japan from
assuming full sovereignty over Shantung. Here he again misunderstood.
Japan had no idea of asking for sovereignty over Shantung; she had
absolutely no right to it, and did not need it for carrying out her
plans, so long as she could retain the politico-economic rights awarded
at Paris.
I reiterated these statements in my telegrams to Washington. I
explained again that ownership by a foreign government of port
facilities and of a railway leading into the interior of China,
together with exclusive commercial preferences, are economic rights
so fortified politically that they constitute political control--as
Manchuria shows--without the name. In fact, they could be safely
accompanied with most profuse protestations to respect Chinese
sovereignty.
The question of political sovereignty was beside the mark. It had
been broached, as I have pointed out, to make the world believe that
something was being returned. "Returning Shantung Peninsula with full
sovereignty" was a big phrase and it had an imposing sound. But the
sovereignty of Shantung was not involved, it had never been either
German or Japanese: it had always been Chinese. The 150 square miles of
unimportant land outside the port of Tsingtao might be "returned with
full sovereignty," but nobody cared for that. To talk of sovereignty
merely obscured the issue.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen was just then busying himself with the task of
drawing up projects for the further economic development of China
with international participation, and I corresponded with him. In
one of my letters I considered how rapid and sweeping the industrial
transformation of China should be. I wrote:
I believe that we should at all times keep in mind the fact that we
are not dealing with a new country, but with one in which social
arrangements are exceedingly intricate and in which a long-tested
system of agricultural and industrial organization exists. It is to
my mind most important that the transition to new methods of industry
and labour should not be sudden but that the old values should be
gradually transmuted. It is highly important that artistic ability,
such as exists, for instance, in silk and porcelain manufacture,
should be maintained and protected, and not superseded by cheaper
processes. The one factor in modern organization which the Chinese
must learn to understand better is the corporation, and the fiduciary
relationship which the officers of the corporation ought to occupy
with respect to the stockholders. If the Chinese cannot learn to use
the corporation properly, the organization of the national credit
cannot be effected. Here, too, it is necessary that the principle of
personal honesty which was fostered under the old system should not
be lost, but transferred to the new methods of doing business. So,
at every point where we are planning for a better and more efficient
organization, it seems necessary to hold on to the values created in
the past, and not to disturb the balance of Chinese society by too
sudden changes.
Among his suggestions for constructive works, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had
spoken of a northern port, somewhere on the coast of Chihli Province,
which should have water deep enough to admit large ocean-going
ships. The port of Tientsin is not adequate: it is far up river,
and lacks satisfactory anchorage where the river empties into the
sea. Chinwangtao is a far better port, but so exposed that enormous
expenditure would be needed to improve it; and its capacity, even then,
would be too small. I asked Mr. Paul P. Whitham, special commissioner
of the Department of Commerce, to go to the Chihli coast to see
whether about half way between Tientsin and Chinwangtao a satisfactory
port site might be found. He succeeded in finding a site where, with
comparatively moderate expense, a deep-sea port could be built. It
was easy to see the transformation in north China commerce that this
would bring about. Here would be an outlet for a rich and extensive
hinterland, including the Province of Chihli and all the region to the
north and northwest of it, particularly inner Mongolia and western
Manchuria. I talked the matter over with the civil governor and other
provincial leaders of Chihli Province, also with the representatives
of Governor Li Hsun of Nanking, besides certain members of the Central
Government. They greatly favoured the project, and before many weeks
preliminary surveys were made. It was to be known as the Great Northern
Port.
I visited Sir John Jordan on August 14th telling him of my resignation,
at which he expressed regret; but he admitted that he could understand
why I wished to return to the United States. He, too, wished to be
relieved of his duties as soon as possible. I had on that day a very
full talk about Shantung with Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese Chargé, in which
we considered ways which might render the Shantung arrangement more
satisfactory, especially if Tsingtao should be made into a genuine
international settlement. But I emphasized the importance of the return
of the railway.
The negotiations for the new Consortium had been going on for some
time. The Japanese proposed that the Consortium should not apply to
Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. The Japanese-controlled press had
attacked the first proposal of this Consortium, as Japan purposed
during the war to achieve complete leadership of foreign finance in
China. If the United States would join the _old_ Consortium, Japan
would have been pleased, for there she led. But ordinarily the
financial power of Japan is of distinctly secondary importance, and the
abnormal conditions of the war could not last. Now Japan approved of
the new Consortium in principle, but continued to procrastinate when a
decision on details was required.
My resignation was accepted in a cablegram received on the 18th of
August, the President expressing formally his regret that I should find
it necessary to insist upon relinquishing my post. Even now, when I
knew how decidedly the President had misjudged the Chinese situation,
notwithstanding my insistent and detailed warnings, I had no desire
to advertise differences in policy. The Japanese press, I knew, would
consider my resignation due to the defeat of my "policy" to have
America maintain her honourable and trusted position in China. I did
not wish to favour this sort of interpretation by a controversy with
the administration.
The Chinese understood the situation quite completely. When I told
the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Premier, and
non-official Chinese friends, they seemed discouraged at the prospect
of my leaving China at this juncture. I had the good fortune to make
many friendships in China with men whose loyalty and truthfulness could
be relied upon. Though seemingly distressed at the idea of my going,
they knew I only hoped it might enable the work of developing close
relations between the two countries to continue more effectively. I
wished to bring about positive practical action. The spirit of the
American policies and declarations was admirable, but not enough
individual and specific American activity in China accompanied them.
Mr. Fu, Acting Minister of Education, and a number of his associates
visited me on the 25th of August, to consider arrangements for exchange
professorships in American and Chinese universities. I had always
favoured bringing young Chinese scholars into lectureships in American
universities, to make accessible to the American public the treasures
of Chinese literature, philosophy, and art. President Yuan Shih-kai had
supported this idea, and, but for the unfortunate monarchical movement,
would have done much to promote intellectual contact between the United
States and China. His successors shared his sentiments, and only the
turmoil in Peking's political life prevented their working out plans in
detail.
General Hsu Shu-cheng called on me from time to time and told me about
his Mongolian venture. When the War Participation Bureau became plainly
obsolete its name was changed to "Northwest Frontier Defence Bureau."
Everybody knew against whom this Bureau was to "defend" China, though
there was talk about Bolshevik activity in Mongolia, also of the
designs of General Semenoff to create a Pan-Mongolian state. General
Hsu unfolded in his talks with me very large schemes for developing
Mongolia, including a colonial bank, the building of highways for
motor transport, the digging of artesian wells, and the establishment
of model farms. He would, he said, also promote the completion of
the railway from Kalgan to Urga, and would even extend it to Chinese
Turkestan. Report had it that the Japanese had promised General Hsu
an advance of $50,000,000 for his enterprises. But he told me that he
would carry them out with capital entirely subscribed in China. The
President and other Peking leaders, it was said, apprehensive of the
direction the overflowing energies of General Hsu might take next,
bethought themselves of the undeveloped reaches of Mongolia. There
would be the field ample enough for his ebullient nature. All this
time the Japanese were carefully watching any factor that might become
active in Mongolia, including General Semenoff, General Chang Tso-lin,
the Viceroy of Manchuria, and General Hsu Shu-cheng. Whatever might
happen there, they undoubtedly intended that it should fit in with
their policy of imposing their influence upon that dependency.
Mrs. Reinsch and my family had sailed from Chinwangtao on the 12th
of June for Honolulu, where they were to spend the summer. As my
resignation had already gone forward, it was a farewell to Peking for
Mrs. Reinsch, who was reluctant to leave the city which she had enjoyed
so much. A series of farewell luncheons, dinners, and receptions began
for me in August which, with the heavy work of winding up the business
of my office, filled the remaining weeks with activity every day from
sunrise until after midnight. When President Hsu Shih-chang entertained
me for the last time, he said: "The Chinese look to you to be a friend
and guide to them, and we hope your action and influence may continue
for many decades." On the next day he invited me, through Mr. Chow
Tsu-chi, to act as counsellor to the Chinese Government, with residence
in America.
I left Peking on the evening of September 13th. All my colleagues with
members of their staffs, the high Chinese officials, and a throng of
other people, had gathered at the station to say "good-bye." Drawn up
on the platform were companies of the American marines, the Indian
troops of the British Legation Guard, and Chinese troops. With the
Acting Premier, Mr. Kung Shin-Chan, I inspected them, accepted their
salute, and made a few farewell remarks to the faithful marines. As
the American band played "Auld Lang Syne," the train moved out of the
station, and the thousands of faces of those who had come to see me
off became blurred in the distance, leaving impressed on my mind a
composite face, friendly, eager, urging to endeavour.
My friend, Chow Tsu-chi, accompanied me as far as Tientsin where
I parted with him. It had, all in all, been a truly heart-warming
leave-taking. I felt that the spontaneous expressions of deep
confidence both on the part of my countrymen and of the Chinese would
remain with me as the best reward for any exertions and efforts I had
made.
Dr. Charles D. Tenney, American Chargé d'Affaires after my departure,
wrote the following report to the Secretary of State concerning the
farewell hospitalities:
I have the honour to state that the departure from Peking of the
Honourable Paul S. Reinsch, American Minister to China, whose
resignation has been accepted by the President, was made the occasion
of gratifying manifestations of cordiality toward the United States
and of the highest popular and official esteem for the retiring
Minister.
Mr. Reinsch was naturally the guest of honour at numerous dinners
and receptions in the period just preceding his departure, at which
the Chinese present expressed the deepest appreciation of his
diversified activities during the six years of his tenure of office.
Published references to Mr. Reinsch's career as American Minister,
also, refer to his many-sided interest in and efforts to promote the
joint commercial, industrial, and educational interests of China
and the United States, in addition to the usual duty of fostering
international unity between the two nations. It was made strikingly
evident that the Government and people of this Republic have come
earnestly to desire and expect a policy of vigorous advancement of
these interests by the United States in China. The feeling of all was
epitomized by President Hsu Shih-chang, who, at Mr. Reinsch's farewell
interview, asserted his profound belief that the latter's activities
as Minister had advanced and strengthened in a very real way all
those economic and social relations that to-day bind the governments
and peoples of China and the United States in close friendship, at
the same time expressing his hope that on his return to the United
States Mr. Reinsch would abate none of his efforts toward these ends,
but that in his altered capacity he would continue to work in the
interests of China.
Mr. Reinsch left Peking on the evening of the thirteenth instant and
the scene at the railway station was of an unusual and gratifying
description. Although it is not customary for guards of honour to
be tendered by other legations on the departure of ministers,
on this occasion there was present a detachment from the British
Legation Guard, and there were also present detachments from the
American Legation Guard, the Peking police force and the Peking
gendarmerie, with military music. The Acting Premier came in person
to the station to bid farewell to Mr. Reinsch and there were present
a thousand persons, including Chinese officials, foreign diplomats,
representatives of all varieties of institutions and societies, and
personal friends of all nationalities.
I had turned over arrangements for my trip through Japan to Mr. Willing
Spencer, the First Secretary, who had consulted with Mr. Tokugawa,
of the Japanese Legation. Their main difficulty had been the fact
that Korea was under quarantine because of the cholera. An amusing
experience ensued. In order to avoid any risk of delay I agreed to be
inoculated; this was done deferentially by a little physician who came
from the Japanese Legation. At Shimonoseki our steamer arrived in the
early morning, and was held in quarantine. The inspecting officers who
boarded said I should be permitted to land almost immediately. However,
they left and said a launch would be sent for me before noon. As the
evening train would be the last that could make my connection with the
steamer at Yokohama, I waited somewhat nervously for the launch. It
was three o'clock before the officers returned, saying that my baggage
could now be taken ashore; soon they disappeared with the baggage, but
left me still on the boat. I wired the embassy at Tokyo, telling them
of my predicament. The train was to leave at half-past seven, and no
launch had appeared at six.
Suddenly out of the evening mist covering the bay a little launch
emerged, and an official I had not seen before boarded and asked me
to accompany him. Descending to the launch with my two servants, I
was surprised to notice that it did not head toward Shimonoseki, but
took the opposite direction. I remonstrated, but the officer, smiling
reassuringly, said: "It will be all right." Then the two inspecting
officers appeared from below; smiling and bowing they told me we were
going to the Isolation Hospital!
And to the Isolation Hospital we went. There in the central reception
room I was introduced to the chief, who, after a brief exchange of
civilities, announced, "Now, everything is all right."
We took the launch, and arrived at Shimonoseki with still a quarter
of an hour to spare before the train departed, whereon a special
compartment had been reserved for me. Everything was now clear. The
Japanese passengers on the steamer were as little pleased at being
detained there as I was. Had a foreigner, even a foreign minister, been
taken off the ship to Shimonoseki, a small riot might be looked for.
So the word was passed around that I was being taken to the Isolation
Hospital, where nobody had any particular wish to go. I could not but
admire the resourcefulness of these little officials, and to feel
thankful to them for all the trouble they took to solve this knotty
problem without doing violence to any of their quarantine regulations.
I had only one day in Tokyo. A luncheon had been arranged for me
at the house of Baron Okura, where I went with Ambassador Morris
and met several Japanese gentlemen, among them Mr. Hanihara, just
made Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Baron Shidehara, the new
Ambassador to the United States. We took lunch on an open veranda,
overlooking delightful gardens, and after an animated conversation
I took my leave and hurried to Yokohama, with the same agreeable
impression of Japanese hospitality that I had received six years
before, on my first arrival in the Far East.
THE END
INDEX
Abbott, John J., 256, 260
Adams, Dr. Henry C., 30, 32, 35, 68, 154
Administrative Conference, 46
Advice from America, 269
Advisers, Foreign, 47, 68
Aglen, Sir Francis, 233
Aide mémoire of December 2, 1918, 326
Alston, Mr., 151, 233
American activity, 75
American aims in China, 65
American Chamber of Commerce, 200
American coöperation, 72, 73
American enterprise in China, 64, 65, 82, 88, 91, 102, 106, 128, 200,
207, 210, 214, 226
American International Corporation, 208, 217, 219, 225
American Legation, 19
American Marines, 17, 18
American minister, 143, 309, 319, 358, 378, 385
American Red Cross, 14, 80, 81, 151, 163, 218
American University Club, 200
American-French coöperation, 223
Ancestor worship, 34
Anderson, Meyer & Co., 208
Anderson, Roy S., 12, 85, 109, 213, 244, 264
Anfu Club, 317
Anglo-American Association, 156, 374
Anglo-American friendship, 155
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 135
Anhui Party, 188
Anti-foreign propaganda, 141
Aoki, General, 267, 351
Ariga, Professor, 154
Armistice, 317
Arms, Importation of, 342
Army, 53, 189
Arnold, Julean, 103, 185, 329
Arsenals, 297
Associated Press, 132
Authority, 177
Automobiles, 108, 117
Backhouse, Edward, 52
Bain, Dr. F., 224
Baker, J.E., 329
Bandits, 190, 347
Bank of China, 90, 91, 97, 202
Bank of Communications, 190, 299, 372
Banking, 102
Bashford, Bishop, 50
Battle of Peking, 284
Beelaerts, van Blokland, M., 52
Belin, F.L., 272, 277, 283
Bemis, E.W., 223
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 67, 82, 84, 99, 140
Bevan, Professor, 154
Billings, Dr. Frank, 151
"Bite to death," 110
Blood of enemies, 109
Blythe, Sam L., 245, 255
Boardman, Miss, 93
Bolshevism, 351
Botanical Gardens, 29
Bowley, Major, 109, 362
Boxer indemnity payments, 297
Bredon, Sir Robert, 154
Brigands, 54, 347
British Legation, 114
British minister, 325, 371
British-American Tobacco Company, 66, 67, 75, 89
Bryan, Secretary, 84, 140, 269, 270
Business representatives, 215
Buttrick, Dr., 150
Calhoun, W.J., 161
Carey, W.F., 207, 208, 209, 213
Central Government, 54, 55, 56, 292, 293, 321
Chadbourne, Mrs., 235
Chang Chien, 29, 70, 71, 80, 81
Chang Chin-yao, 351
Chang Chung-hsiang, 113, 359
Chang Hsun, General, 11, 184, 262, 265, 267, 270, 272, 274, 283
Chang Hu, 172
Chang Tso-lin, 262, 384
Chen Chin-tao, Dr., 100, 201, 202, 222, 232, 247, 251, 257, 260, 264
Chen, Eugene, 247
Chen Huan-chang, Dr., 23
Chen Lu, 340
Chen Pan-ping, 213
Chiang, Dr. Monlin, 377
Chien Neng-hsun, 227, 325
Chienmen, 17
Chin Pu Tang, 96, 103, 288, 340
Chin Yun-peng, General, 266, 301
China Medical Board, 150, 363
China Press, 62
Chinchow-Aigun Railway, 67, 97
Chinda, Ambassador, 140
Chinese art, 29, 157, 228
Chinese dinners, 32, 33, 152
Chinese ethics, 34
Chinese life, 22, 49
Chinese handwriting, 29
Chinese industry, 373
Chinese iron industry, 224, 293
Chinese language, 51
Chinese manners, 71
Chinese _materia medica_, 151
Chinese musicians, 196
Chinese navy, 74
Chinese politics, 13, 42, 53
Chinese Social and Political Science Association, 153, 235
Chinese traditions, 177
Chinese women, 27, 28
Chino-American Bank, 227, 363
Chino-American steamship line, 164
Chino-Japanese entente, 352
Chinwangtao, 381
Chou Hsueh-hsi, 227
Chow Tsu-chi, 95, 96, 105, 118, 152, 175, 176, 179, 183, 184, 190, 192,
201, 207, 213, 322, 330, 385
Chu Chi-chien, 24, 27, 182, 189, 201, 215
Chu Jui, 167, 261
Chu Ying-kuang, 167, 314
Chuan Liang, 225
Chuchow Chinchow Railway, 221
Chüfu, 35, 37, 40, 41
Chung Hua Hsin Pao, 311
Claims, 113, 166
Coal Hill, 19
Communications, Ministry of, 104
Confucian family, 38
Confucian Society, 26, 111
Confucianism, 23, 26, 35, 111
Consortium, 62, 63, 69, 70, 80, 97, 216, 239, 287, 298, 327, 355, 382
Constitution, 199
Continental & Commercial Bank loan, 222, 236, 238, 256
Coolidge, Charles A., 320
Corruption, 57, 291
Crane, Charles R., 40
Currency loan, 97
Currency loan agreement, 319, 346
Currency reform loan, 327
Customs, 55, 68, 69
Dane, Sir Richard, 68
Davis, Arthur P., 82
Decoration Day, 362
Deering, Mrs., 362
Democratic party, 43, 45, 86, 96, 203
Denby, Charles, 211
Denials, diplomatic, 132, 135
Dennis, Dr. W.C., 329
Department of State, 101, 102, 148, 171, 176, 258, 297, 307, 313, 354
Diplomacy and commerce, 65
Diplomatic corps in Peking, 114
Diplomatic tactics, 116
Disorganization, 56
Donald, W.H., 48, 78, 244, 255, 312
Dragon flags, 275
Economic development, 380
Eliot, President, 68
Emerson, Miss, 185
Emperor, 283, 377
Empress Dowager, 15, 18, 29, 33, 108
Equal opportunity, 100
Extra-territoriality, 114
Famine, 50, 162
Fan Yuen-lin, 151
Farewell, 384
Feng Kuo-chang, General, 54, 172, 183, 184, 236, 237, 255, 258, 262,
292, 314
Feng Yu-hsiang, 262
Ferguson, Dr. John C., 244, 268, 283
Festivities, 323
Fifteenth United States Infantry, 14, 282
Finance, 89, 105, 214, 296, 317, 326, 345, 355
Finch, John W., 224
Fleisher, B.W., 159
Flexner, Dr. Simon, 150, 151
Forbidden City, 18, 19
Foreign Office ball, 27
Frazar, E.W., 163
Frazar & Company, 67
French interests, 222
French minister, 302, 325, 344, 353
Fu Liang-tso, 294
Fukien, 84, 99, 100, 133, 139, 140
Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai, 194
Gailey, Robert, 118
Gary, Judge Elbert H., 230
Gattrell, Dr., 52
Gest, G.M., 90, 101, 105
Gilbert, Mrs., 12
Gold-note scheme, 318
Goodnow, Dr. F.J., 30, 31, 32, 47, 68, 154, 172
Grand Canal, 81, 170, 207, 213, 217, 331
Grant, Ulysses S., Jr., 185
Great northern port, 381
Group V demands, 134, 135, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 147
Guthrie, Ambassador, 234
Han Yeh Ping Co., 87, 224
Hanihara, Mr., 387
Hankow-Canton line, 97, 294, 297
Harrison, Governor-General, 164
Hayashi, Baron, 233, 237, 250, 307, 327, 339, 346
Haxthausen, Von, Baron, 88
Herrera de Huerta, M., 233
Hicks claim, 166
Hilfsaktion, 163
Hintze, Admiral von, 167
Hioki, Mr. Eki, 126, 129, 136, 137, 142, 189, 233
Ho, J.C., 295
Holcombe, Lieut.-Colonel, 362
Holy Duke, 37, 38, 40, 41, 59
Honorary LL.D., 157
Hornbeck, Dr. Stanley K., 12, 61
House, Colonel, 360
Hsiung Hsi-ling, 86, 98, 103, 223, 341
Hsu Shih-chang, 47, 103, 154, 172, 192, 266, 273, 279, 281, 317, 319,
325, 344, 351, 385
Hsu Shih-ying, 201
Hsu Shu-cheng, General, 202, 243, 301, 302, 383
Hsu Sing-loh, 227
Hsu Un-yuen, 202, 227, 231, 257, 260
Hukuang Railways, 67, 97, 169, 210, 211, 294, 297
Hunan, 351
Hutchins, Lieut.-Commander, 183, 184, 362
Hwai River conservancy, 13, 60, 71, 74, 80, 98, 162, 207
Immortality, 34
Imperial City, 24, 164, 323
Imperial Family, 154, 280
Imperial movement of Yuan Shih-kai, 171-179
Imperial Palace, 18, 281, 283
Imperial restoration, 1917, 272
Industrial Bank, 72, 227, 263
Industrial Bank of Japan, 299, 341
Industrial loans, 341
International Banking Corporation, 47, 74, 102, 208
International railway syndicate, 101
Iron deposits, 224
_Japan Mail_, 141
Japanese activity, 73
Japanese coöperation, 217
Japanese diplomats, 83
Japanese hegemony, 191
Japanese in Manchuria, 113
Japanese in Shantung, 124, 126
Japanese loan, 232
Japanese methods, 335
Japanese minister, 287, 310, 331, 339, 344, 346
Japanese morphia, 332
Japanese opposition to Yuan, 178
Japanese papers, 269, 331, 352, 365, 382
Japanese post offices, 332
Jeme Tien-yew, Dr., 210
Jenks-Conant Monetary Commission, 300
Jernigan, T.R., 89
Johnston, Archibald, 67, 99
Johnston, R.F., 377
Jordan, Sir John, 51, 77, 155, 157, 323, 376
_Journal de Pekin_, 61, 88
Judson, President, 32
Kalgan-Urga route, 117, 219
Kang Yu-wei, 272, 279
Kiang, General, 110, 271
King Ya-mei, Dr., 28, 112
Knight, Admiral, 151, 351
Knox, Secretary, 311
Kobayashi, Dr., 299
Kolchak, Admiral, 350
Konovalov, M., 154
Koo, Dr. Wellington, 5, 10, 144, 171, 256, 268
Korea, 332
Koudacheff, Prince, 197, 220, 237, 239, 323
Krupenski, M., 77, 127
Ku Chung-hsiu, 204
Kuangsi, 186, 221
Kuangtung, 187
Kung Shin-chan, 384
Kuo Min Tang, 2, 9, 43, 46, 86, 200, 203, 244, 247, 263, 264, 288, 340
Kyle, Mr., 348, 349
Lama priests, 194
Lansing, Secretary, 268, 346
Lansing Ishii Notes, 307, 337, 366
Lee Higginson loan, 187, 191, 202
Legal talent, 208
Legation guards, 77
Legation Quarter, 19
Li Ching-hsi, 264
Li Ho-chi, 262
Li Shun, 262, 314, 319, 381
Li Yuan-hung, General, 44, 45, 174, 181, 193, 198, 235, 237, 239, 242,
258, 265, 273, 276
Liang Chi-chao, 32, 33, 174, 275, 288, 289, 292, 298, 299, 340, 345
Liang Chi-chao, resignation of, 174
Liang Shih-yi, 89, 90, 95, 109, 172, 173, 184, 188, 190, 193, 201,
209, 213, 288, 322, 330, 350
Liang Tun-yen, 103, 104, 124, 169, 192, 273, 275
Library, 238
Liggett, General, 235
Living Buddha, 28
Liu, Civil Governor, 14
Loans, 287, 303, 317, 326, 345
Localized privileges, 337
London _Times_, 136
Lowry, Dr., 156
Lu Tsung-hsiang, 4, 136, 137, 141, 148, 153, 169
Lu Tsung-yu, 112, 299, 359
_Lusitania_, 168
Ma Liang, 46
MacMurray, J.V.A., 50, 241
Mailed fist, 117
Manchuria, 133, 137
Martel, Count, 22, 233, 257
Martin, Dr. W.A.P., 50, 66
Mayers, Sidney, 52, 330
Mazot, M., 154
McClatchey, C.K., 159
Mead, Professor D.W., 82
Medical missions, 28
Midzuno, Mr., 82
Militarists, 318
Missionaries, 23, 39, 66, 333, 349
Mongolia, 76, 79, 383
Moratorium, 190
Morris, Ambassador, 387
Morrison, Dr. George E., 48, 68, 154, 238, 244, 246, 255, 304, 312,
319, 320
Morton, Joy, 257
Murdock, Mr. Victor, 240
Music, 26
Nan Tung-chow, 70
Nanking, 11, 293
Nanking Road, 11
Naval base, 99
Neville, Colonel Wendell C., 185, 212, 234, 362
New China, 30
New Year, 164, 165, 183
Newell, Major, 183, 362
News from abroad, 158
News service, 159
Newspapers, 157
Ni Tze-chung, General, 266
Nishihara, Mr., 353
Nobility, 181
Norris, Bishop, 151
North China _Daily News_, 88
Note of May 13, 1915, 148
Obata Mr., 137, 339, 340, 344
Oil Development Bureau, 86
Okuma, Count, 126, 311
Open Door policy, 73
Orphans strike, 112
_Ostasiatische Lloyd_, 88
Ostrougoff, Mr., 350
Padoux, M., 154
Pan Fu, 117, 208, 217, 395
Paris, Chinese delegation at, 339
Parliament, 2, 3, 43, 46, 58, 199, 204, 231, 236, 263, 350
Pastor, Don Luis, 51
Paulding & Company, 101
Peace Planning Society, 173
Peace Conference, 360
Peace Conference at Shanghai, 345
Peck, Willys R., 2, 17, 50, 161
Peitaiho, 201
Peking, 18, 52
Peking, city walls of, 16
Peking _Gazette_, 247
Peking Language School, 157
Peking tramways, 91
Peking University, 156
Peking-Kalgan Railway, 210
Pelliot, Paul, 154, 257
People's Convention, 186
Pettus, W.B., 52
Political discussions, 269
Pott, Dr. Hawks, 10
Prisoners in Siberia, 162
Progressive party, 103
Provisional Constitution of 1912, 199, 201
Pu Lun, Prince, 108, 118
Putnam Weale, 49, 78, 136
Quo Tai-chi, 234, 242
Railway contract, 142, 213, 232
Railway guards, 267
Railway unification, 329
Randolph, W., 98
Rank in seating, 234
Rank of precedence, 324
Real property value, 150
Recognition, question of, 176
"Regional understanding," 328
Reinsch, Mrs., 40, 78, 118, 384
Reorganization Loan, 62
Republicanism, 3, 25, 31, 42, 198, 290
Resignation, A Chinese, 174
Resignation, letter of, 364
Resources, 76
Revolutionists, 130
Roads, 163
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 150
Rockhill, W.W., 20, 30, 31, 32, 161
Rogers, Walter, 159
Rosthorn, von, M., 52
Russia and Siberia, 355, 356
Russian ambassador at Tokyo, 311
Russo-Asiatic Bank, 77, 83
Russo-Japanese entente, 72
Salt Revenue, 55, 68
Sakatani, Baron, 345, 346
Sarajevo, 105
Saturday Lunch Club, 9
Savings banks, 228
Secret agreements, 361
Sforza, Count, 52
Shanghai, 9, 115, 200, 371, 373
Shansi Bankers' Guild, 90
Shantung, 14, 35, 123, 129, 180, 188, 190, 209, 218, 251, 315, 333,
337, 338, 340, 352, 359, 374, 378, 379
Shantung railway, 125, 190, 379
Sheng Hsuan-huai, 96
Shidehara, Baron, 387
Shimonoseki, 386
Shun Tien Shih Pao, 191, 322
Sibert, Colonel, 92, 99, 207
Siems-Carey Company, 207, 219, 225
Simpson, B. Lenox, 48, 49, 52, 103, 131, 132, 154
Sinologists, 52
Smith, Dr. Arthur H., 50
Smith, Charles Stevenson, 235, 245
Social life, 208
Southern party, 291
Special interests, 100, 309, 312
Spencer, Willing, 386
Spheres of interest, 100, 219, 221, 309, 312
Spiritualism, Dr. Wu, 258
St. John's University, 10, 200
Staël-Holstein, Baron, 154
Standard Oil Company, 62, 66, 83, 84, 85, 89, 98, 105, 223
Statement of 5th of June, 268
Stevens, John F., 350
Stewart, Dr. M.A., 233
Stone, Dr. Mary, 28
Straight, Williard, 91, 94, 212, 300
Strike and boycott, 372
Strikes, 369
Student movement, 358, 368, 375
Sun Hung-yi, 203
Sun Pao-chi, 5, 17, 27, 169
Sun, T.C., 295
Sun Yat-sen, Dr., 43, 263, 334, 380
Surplus salt revenue, 325
Sze, Alfred, 4, 10
Szechuan, 211
Taft, President, 74
Taishan, 35, 37, 39
Tanaka, General, 351
Tang Shao-yi, 200, 201
Tartar City Wall, 211
Taxation, 55, 115
Telephone and telegraph agreement, 225
Temple of Confucius, 39
Temple of Heaven, 25, 277, 282, 284
Tenney, Dr. Charles D., 66, 161, 241, 309, 348, 385
Terauchi, General, 353
Thanksgiving, 325
Tien Chung-yu, Tuchun, 117, 262
Tientsin, 14
Tobacco and wine revenue, 353
Tobacco and wine tax, 222
Tokugawa, Mr., 386
Tokutomi, Mr., 303
Troops, foreign, 79, 115
Tsai, Duke, 33, 279, 281
Tsai Ao, 180, 182
Tsai Chu-tung, 14
Tsai Ting-kan, Admiral, 6, 108, 129, 246
Tsai, Dr. Yuan-pei, 377
Tsao Ju-lin, 113, 137, 189, 213, 243, 267, 288, 289, 299, 314, 318,
353, 358, 362, 370
Tsao Kun, 262, 277, 326
Tsing Hua College, 112, 113
Tsur, Dr. T.T., 112
Tuchuns, 43, 54, 261, 264, 265
Tuan Chi-Jui, General, 54, 174, 188, 189, 193, 199, 202, 226, 242, 243,
250, 260, 265, 266, 268, 275, 276, 282, 286, 288, 293, 298, 300, 313,
317, 354, 369, 376
Twenty-one demands, 129, 149
Ultimatum, 143, 145, 146, 147
Versailles Conference, 358
Walker, Sir Edward, 373
Wang, Dr. C.C., 112
Wang Chung-hui, Dr., 10, 247
Wang, C.T., 43, 231, 247, 250, 290
Wang Shih-chen, 273, 314
War Participation Office, 315, 318, 341, 342, 343, 351, 383
War Works Drive, 322
Weil, Miss, 185
Welch, Dr. George A., 150, 151
Western Hills, 16
White, Corporation, J.G., 82, 98
White Wolf, 54
Whitham, W.P., 329, 381
Williams, E.T., 2, 17, 50
Willoughby, Dr. W.F., 154
Willoughby, Dr. W.W., 233, 235, 265, 329
Wilson, President, 63, 89, 125, 239, 268, 308, 319, 331, 356, 360,
362, 363, 378, 379
Winterhalter, Admiral, 237
Wireless telegraph, 159
Wu Fu Ssu, 89
Women's Medical College, 28
Worship of heaven, 23, 24, 25
Wu Pei-fu, 262
Wu, C.C., 186, 243, 247, 251, 253, 290
Wu Ting-fang, Dr., 9, 226, 258, 268, 270, 279
Y.M.C.A., 62, 66, 88, 89, 118, 155, 163
Yamaza, Mr., 82, 83, 87
Yang Shih-chi, 172
Yangtse, 211
Yangtse Valley, 133
Yeh Kung-cho, 104, 172, 330
Yen Fu, Dr., 46, 235
Yen, Mr. Hawkling L., 185
Yen Hsi-shan, 261
Yen, Dr. W.W., 10
Yi Shih Pao, 157
Ying Chang, General, 2, 4, 110
Yin Chang-heng, General, 110, 111
Yokohama Specie Bank, 299
Yoshizawa, Mr., 381
Young China, 368
Yuan, Madame, 165
Yuan Ko-ting, 195, 196
Yuan Shih-kai, 1, 3, 5, 8, 23, 25, 31, 43, 47, 58, 72, 79, 95, 108,
125, 129, 134, 138, 145, 146, 171, 172, 174, 177, 180, 184, 185, 192,
193, 383
Yunnan, 180, 182, 183, 184
End of Project Gutenberg's An American Diplomat in China, by Paul S. Reinsch