_December 4_: I called on Doctor Morrison to take a look at his

library. This unusual collection contains about twenty thousand books

in European languages, dealing with China. The rare editions of early

works are almost completely represented. Doctor Morrison, who lives in

a Chinese-style house, has built a fireproof building for his books.

He has devoted the last fifteen years to getting them together, and

I believe has spent the larger part of his income on them. Recently

he married a lady who had been for a while his secretary. They now

have a little boy. I am told that his marriage and fatherhood have

greatly augmented Doctor Morrison's standing and influence among

the Chinese. A bachelor does not fit into their scheme of life. We

repaired to his study, and for a long time were discussing affairs.

We spoke particularly about the railway situation and the fact that

construction on all the lines contracted for has practically been

stopped. This is an enormous disadvantage to the Chinese. They have to

pay heavy interest charges on the initial loans, for which there is as

yet no income-paying property to show, but only surveys and partial

construction. We agreed that the Four-Power bankers, for instance, have

a very weak case if China should decide to cancel their contract for

non-performance, as money to continue the building is not forthcoming.

On the British concession of the Pukow-Singyang Railway, on which

virtually no work has yet been done, the Government nevertheless has to

pay interest on a million dollars of capital that has been advanced.

_December 7_: I visited Prince Koudacheff, the Russian minister. I

jokingly asked him whether he found that the Chinese thought of the

Russians as half-Asiatic, therefore as brothers. "No," he replied;

"they count us with you and with the other Europeans, as a scourge and

pestilence." In this conversation the Prince uttered a prophecy. "As a

result of this war," he said, "the empire will be abolished in Germany."

(Neither of us at this time dreamed of the enormous subversions and

convulsions which were soon to take place in Russia.)

_December 8_: I called on President Li in order to present a personal

letter from President Wilson, in which the latter sends his good

wishes. We discussed the American loan policy. The President, like

other Chinese, finds it difficult to understand why America, with

her great capital strength and industrial development, is so slow in

taking advantage of opportunities for investment and development in

China. The President said: "Americans love pioneering. In China there

is pioneering to do, with the added advantage of having a ready labour

supply and local capital, which may be enlisted. Why are they so slow

to come in?" I agree with him that it is difficult to understand.

_December 16_: Mr. Victor Murdock is in Peking, bringing a breeze

of American good-fellowship, and a vision unobstructed by theories.

He finds China interesting, but, I fear, he will suffer the usual

disability of the passing visitor, that is, he will see the

unfavourable aspects of Chinese life and will not stay long enough to

appreciate the deeper virtues.

* * * * *

This diary account of some of the happenings during the fall of 1916

contains nothing of the daily work of conferences, discussions,

interviews, dictations dealing with the innumerable problems that come

up from the consulates, or that arise in the capital directly, or

referring to general policies which are hammered out and formed for

action.

A great part of the work of a legation is concerned with foreseeing

trouble and trying to avoid it. Such work usually does not appear at

all in the record. In a country where conditions are complicated as

they are in China, where there is such a crisscrossing of influences,

it is easy to make a mistake if constant care be not exercised to keep

informed of every detail and to head off trouble.

CHAPTER XXI

CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY

The time came for the United States to sever relations with the German

Kaiser's government. I had taken advantage of the clear sunshine and

mild air on Sunday, February 4, 1917, to visit Doctor Morrison at his

cottage outside of Peking near the race-course. After lunch a messenger

came from the Legation, bringing word that an important cablegram had

arrived and was being decoded. I returned to town, and at the Legation

Mr. White handed me the decoded message which said that the American

Government had not only broken off diplomatic relations with Germany,

but that it trusted the neutral powers would associate themselves

with the American Government in this action of protest against an

intolerable practice; this would make for the peace of the world. I was

instructed to communicate all this to the Chinese Government.

After a conference with the first secretary, Mr. MacMurray, and the

Chinese secretary, Doctor Tenney, I made an engagement to see the

President and the Premier on that same evening. I felt justified in

assuming that the invitation to the neutrals to join the United States

was more than a pious wish and that there was some probability that

the European neutrals would support our protest. As to China I had

already informed the Government that we could reasonably expect support

there. I therefore considered it to be the policy of the Government to

assure a common demonstration on the part of all neutral powers, strong

enough to bring Germany to a halt. So far as my action was concerned,

I therefore saw the plain duty to prevail upon China to associate

herself with the American action as proposed by my government.

I found President Li Yuan-hung resting after dinner in his palace

and in an amiably expectant mood. With him was Mr. Quo Tai-chi, his

English secretary. He was plainly startled by the prospect of having to

consider so serious a matter, and did not at first say anything, but

sat silently thinking. His doubts and objections were revealed rather

through questions than by direct statements. "What is the present state

of the war, and what the relative strength or degree of exhaustion of

the belligerent parties?" "Could the Allies, even with the assistance

of the United States, win a decisive victory?" Finally, he said: "The

effect of such a far-reaching international act upon the internal

situation in China will have to be carefully considered."

The President's secretary appeared strongly impressed with the

favourable aspects of our proposal, so that he began to argue a little

with the President. On my part, I pointed out the effects which a

positive act of international assertion in behalf of a just cause and

well-disposed associates would have upon China by taking attention off

her endless factional conflicts. When I touched upon the ethical phases

of the matter, the President fully agreed with me. I had particularly

impressed upon him the need of prompt action in order that counsels

might not be confused by adverse influences from without.

We next drove to the residence of the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui,

who was then playing an important part in the politics Of China.

I recalled my first interview with him when he had received me in

a dingy room, himself wearing a frowzy long coat and exhibiting a

general air of tedium and lack of energy. There was no suggestion of

the military man about him. The qualities upon which General Tuan's

great influence is founded become apparent only upon a longer and more

intimate acquaintance. Despite his real indolence, his wisdom, his

fundamental honesty, and his readiness to shield his subordinates and

to assume responsibility himself have made this quiet and unobtrusive

man the most prominent leader among the Chinese militarists. His

interest centres chiefly in the education of military officers. He is

no politician and is bored by political theory. He is always ready to

turn over the handling of affairs to subordinates, by whom he is often

led into a course which he might not himself have chosen. This, coupled

with extraordinary stubbornness, accounts for his influence often

tending to be disastrous to his country. His personality, however, with

its simplicity and pensiveness, and his real wisdom when he lets his

own nature guide him, make him one of the attractive figures of China.

Though in himself the principal influence in the Government, Tuan

left all details to his assistants, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin and General Hsu

Shu-cheng. He preferred to play chess. He was, however, always ready

to shoulder responsibility for what his subordinates had done. Often

when he was deep in a game of Chinese chess, his mind focussed on the

complexities of this difficult pastime, General Hsu would approach

him with some proposal. Giving only half an ear to it, the Premier

would respond, "All right" (_How how_). When, later, the results of

the action thus taken turned out to be bad and the Premier asked for

an explanation, he was reminded that he had himself authorized it.

He would then faintly recollect, and would make a gesture toward his

shoulder, which indicated that--very well--he took the responsibility.

But on this occasion General Tuan was all attention. He had with

him Mr. C.C. Wu of the Foreign Office, who continued throughout

these negotiations to act as interpreter. The circumstance that the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, was ill and had to

be represented by his son, and that in all important interviews both

the Premier and young Mr. Wu were present, greatly facilitated the

business and saved time which would have been needed to carry on

parallel conversations in the Foreign Office and with the Premier.

General Tuan was far from accepting the proposal at first sight. "It

would be wise for Germany to modify her submarine policy," he stated,

"because in land warfare she could press her opponents so seriously

that her absolute defeat would be difficult unless the United States

entered the war." He appeared to contemplate the possibility of China

taking so unprecedented a step as the breaking of relations with a

great power with less concern than did the President. We arranged for a

longer discussion on the following day.

Far into that night I was in conference with the legation staff, and

with certain non-official Americans and Britishers of great influence

among the Chinese. These men looked with enthusiasm upon the idea of

an association with the United States, aligning against Germany the

vast population of China. While the energies and resources of China

were not sufficiently mobilized to be of immediate use in the war,

yet by systematic preparation they might bring an enormous accession

of strength to the Allies if the war should last long. We felt,

also, that through positive alliance with the declared policy of the

United States, China would greatly strengthen herself internally and

externally.

Dr. John C. Ferguson addressed himself directly to the Premier and

the President; his thorough knowledge of Chinese enabled him to

bring home to them the essential points in favour of prompt action.

Mr. Roy S. Anderson and Mr. W.H. Donald, an Australian acting as

editor of the _Far Eastern Review_, who were close to the members of

the Communications Party and the Kuo Min Tang, addressed themselves

especially to the leaders in parliament. Dr. G.E. Morrison, the British

adviser of the President of China, had long worked to have China join

in the war: he quietly used all his influence with the President and

high officials, in order to make them understand what was at stake.

Other Americans and British newspapermen, like Charles Stevenson Smith

and Sam Blythe, who happened to be in Peking, all tirelessly working in

their own way with men whose confidence they enjoyed, urged the policy

proposed by America. These men made a spontaneous appeal based upon the

fundamental justice of the policy of resisting an intolerable practice,

and on the beneficent effect which a great issue like this would have

in pulling the Chinese nation together and in making it realize its

status as a member of the family of nations. However, what counted most

with the Chinese was the fact that America had acted, and had invited

China to take a similar step.

At a second long interview with the President, he asked me: "Would not

a positive active foreign policy, particularly if it should lead to

war, strengthen the militarist party?"

I replied that in my opinion such a contingency would strengthen

decisively the Central Government, enabling it to keep the military in

their proper place as an organ of the state and preventing the further

growth of the pseudo-feudalism inherited from Yuan Shih-kai.

"But would the American Government assist China in bearing the

responsibilities of such a step?"

Before replying to this question, I had to cable the Department of

State for instructions as to what assurances I would be authorized to

give to the Chinese Government in the event of their taking the action

suggested by the United States. Unfortunately, as was several times the

case during some critical situation, the cable connection was broken

and I failed to get any reply to assist me during the negotiations.

With a map the Premier and I, later that afternoon, analyzed the

military situation of the European Powers. From the analogy of the

American Civil War, I expressed to him the belief that Germany could

not resist the enormous pressure from all sides. "What," the Premier

asked, "may be expected of America by way of direct military action?

Bear in mind that I wish for nothing more than for a strong America,

able to exercise a guiding influence in the affairs of the world."

My positive belief that America would, if necessary, follow the

severance of relations with the strongest kind of military action

interested him. America had been represented to the Chinese as a big,

over-rich country which lacked energy for a supreme military effort.

"What, then, will happen at the conclusion of the war?" he asked.

The fact that Japan had already made efforts to assure for herself the

right to speak for China was worrying the Chinese. With the Premier,

as with the President, the idea that, through breaking with Germany,

China could assure herself of an independent position at the peace

table, had much weight. Both men also faced the possibility of being

drawn into the war. The Premier appeared to regard this with a certain

degree of positive satisfaction; to the President it seemed a less

agreeable prospect. I made it plain that the American proposal did not

go beyond breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany, and, that

by taking that step, China would effectually rebuke and discourage

the illegal and inhuman acts of Germany on the high seas, keeping her

hands entirely free as to future action. Should further steps be later

needed, the road would be open.

Intensive discussions were going on all day Monday and deep into the

night among the Chinese officials and the leaders of parliament. I

received calls on Tuesday from many Chinese leaders who wished to talk

over the situation. The progressive, modern-minded, and forward-looking

among the Chinese readily supported the idea that China should range

herself alongside the United States in this action. Admiral Tsai

Ting-kan, who was very close to the President, laboured in company with

Doctor Morrison to bring before Li Yuan-hung all the considerations

favouring positive action. The President, however, still adhered to his

idea that it was safer for China to remain entirely neutral.

In the cabinet, Dr. Chen Chin-tao, the Minister of Finance, and Mr.

C.C. Wu, representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs, from the

earliest moment associated themselves with those of the opinion

that China must act, and they led the younger officials. In the Kuo

Min Tang, Mr. C.T. Wang, vice-president of the senate; Dr. Wang

Chung-hui, the leading jurist of China; and General Niu Yung-chien,

of revolutionary fame, were the first to become active. The Peking

_Gazette_, with its brilliant editor, Eugene Chen, came out strongly

in favour of following the United States. A powerful public opinion

was quietly forming among the Chinese. The Young China party was

beginning to see the advantage which lay in having China emerge from

her passivity.

When I returned from a dinner with the Alstons at the British Legation

on Tuesday night, Mr. C.C. Wu brought me word from the cabinet that

it would be quite impossible to take action unless the American

Government could adequately assure China assistance in bearing the

responsibilities which she might incur, without impairment of her

sovereign rights and the independent control of her national forces.

The Chinese ministers had in mind two things: In the first place, the

need of financial assistance, in order to make it possible for China

eventually to participate in the war, if that should be desired; and,

second, the prevention of all arrangements whereby Chinese natural

resources, military forces, arsenals, or ships, would be placed

under foreign control incompatible with her undiminished national

independence.

All through Wednesday I struggled with this difficult problem. I had

to act on my own responsibility, as I could not reach the Department

of State by cable. If all the influences unfavourable to the action

proposed were given time to assert themselves, the American proposal

would be obstructed and probably defeated. The Chinese Government

would act only on such assurances as I could feel justified in giving

to them at this time; if I gave them none, no action would be taken.

It seemed almost a matter of course, should China follow the lead of

the American Government, that the latter would not allow China to

suffer through lack of all possible support in aiding China to bear

the responsibilities she assumed, and in preventing action from any

quarter which would impose on China new burdens because of her break

with Germany. Unable to interpret my instructions otherwise than that a

joint protest of the neutrals had actually been planned by the American

Government, and feeling that the effect upon Germany of the American

protest depended on the early concurrence of the important neutral

powers, I considered prompt action essential. I was sure that all sorts

of unfavourable and obstructive influences would presently get to work

in Peking.

When discussion had reached its limit, on the afternoon of February

7th, I felt it necessary to draw up a note concerning the attitude of

the American Government. The tenor of this note I communicated to the

Premier and the Foreign Office, with the understanding that I should

send the note if favourable action were decided upon by the Chinese

Government.

I believed that without such assurances the instructions of the

American Government could not be carried out, and that it would act

in all respects in a manner consonant with its position as a powerful

government and as a leader of protest among the neutrals; moreover,

that its relations with those who gave support in a policy of such

fundamental importance would be determined by principles of equity

and justice. I felt that the United States could not be less liberal

toward a country coming to its support than toward those countries

which the American Government was now going to help. It was only these

self-evident conclusions which I cautiously expressed in my note. The

text of this note, in its essential part, had the following form:

Excellency:

In our recent conversation concerning the policy of your Government in

associating itself with the United States in active opposition to the

unrestricted submarine warfare by which Germany is indiscriminately

jeopardizing the lives of neutral citizens, you have with entire

frankness pointed out to me that, whereas the Chinese Government is

in principle disposed to adopt the suggestion of the President of

the United States in that regard, it nevertheless finds itself in a

position in which it would not feel safe in so doing unless assured

that it could obtain from American sources such financial and other

assistance as would enable it to take the measures appropriate to the

situation which would thus be created.

With like candour I have stated to you that I have recommended to my

Government that in the event of the Chinese Government's associating

itself with the President's suggestion, the Government of the United

States should take measures to put at its disposition the funds

immediately required for the purposes you have indicated, and should

take steps with a view to such a funding of the Boxer Indemnity as

would for the time being make available for the purposes of the

Chinese Government at least the major portion of the current indemnity

instalments; and I have indicated to you my personal conviction that

my Government would be found just and liberal in effecting this or

other such arrangements to enable the Chinese Government to meet

the responsibilities which it might assume upon the suggestion of

the President. I should not be wholly frank with you, however, if I

were to fail to point out that the exact nature of any assistance

to be given or any measure to be taken must be determined through

consultation of various administrative organs, in some cases including

reference to Congress, in order to make effective such arrangements

as might have been agreed to in principle between the executive

authorities of the two countries; and I therefore could not in good

faith make in behalf of my Government any definite commitments upon

your suggestions at the present time.

I do, however, feel warranted in assuming the responsibility of

assuring you in behalf of my Government that by the methods you have

suggested, or otherwise, adequate means will be devised to enable

China to fulfill the responsibilities consequent upon associating

herself with the action of the United States Government, without any

impairment of her national independence and of her control of her

military establishment and general administration.

Final presentation of everything that had to be considered in making a

decision was arranged with the Premier for Wednesday evening. I found

General Tuan alone. We spoke awhile about the news of the day, then

I began to go into the main matter. But General Tuan appeared weary

and worried. This may have been the reason for the failure of the

interpreters to make smooth connection: I suggested, as the Premier had

had an excessively long day, that we meet again the following morning.

It was arranged for ten o'clock at the cabinet office, just before the

Thursday morning cabinet conference.

I had just dined with Mr. C.T. Wang and a number of parliamentary

leaders. They were keen on the policy of following the United States.

They had seen President Li during the day; he was still full of

doubts, but stated that he would leave the decision in the hands of

the cabinet, and would abide by the results. Mr. Wang believed that

the President was gradually coming around to the American point of

view, and that his acceptance of it would be the stronger and heartier

because of the conscientious doubts which he was overcoming.

The negotiations of these three days had gone on quietly. The men upon

whom rested the responsibility of making the decision were constantly

in conference. Several men of influence worked with officials of the

Government and leaders in parliament. But the outside foreign public

was not fully alive to what was going on, and those who knew and were

interested generally believed that ancient China would not take so

unprecedented a step. The Japanese minister, Baron Hayashi, was absent

from Peking. The German official representatives apparently had no idea

that any radical action could come from the Chinese Government.

I arrived at the cabinet office on Thursday morning, at ten, and was

shown to the room where the Premier was to receive me. As he had told

me that Mr. C.C. Wu would be present to interpret, I had not brought

an interpreter for this informal and intimate interview. The Premier

soon entered unattended and we sat down together, smoking cigarettes,

and observing an enforced silence, as Mr. Wu had not appeared. We

were without an interpreter, but even in such circumstances the

perfection of Chinese manners allows no embarrassment to arise. We had

been sitting in mute thought a little while, when Admiral Chen, the

Minister of the Navy, came in; he spoke English quite well, so that

our conversation could begin; soon we were in the midst of earnest

discussion. Within another ten minutes Dr. Chen Chin-tao, the Minister

of Finance, arrived, and shortly after him came Mr. C.C. Wu. Thus,

quite by chance, I had the opportunity of talking over these momentous

matters jointly with the representatives of the four departments of

government most nearly concerned: Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, and

Navy.

We could now once more thoroughly go over all doubts and objections,

and look at the proposed policy in all its manifold aspects and

probable results. In this intense and earnest conversation no formal

interpreting was needed. Whoever replied to my remarks would first

repeat in Chinese what I had said for the benefit of the Premier. When

the Premier had spoken, Mr. Wu would interpret his thought for me. All

the others addressed me directly in English. I advanced arguments on

every point, of which the following is a memorandum:

The American Government has taken the present action because the

wilful disregard of neutral rights went to the extent of imperilling

not only neutral property, but the lives of our citizens. In this

matter the interests of China are entirely parallel to those of the

United States; both nations are peaceful and see in the maintenance

of international right and peaceful conditions a vital guarantee of

their national safety. Through association with the United States,

China would enter upon this controversy with a position consonant with

every tradition and interest of her national life, a position which

would have to be respected by friends and foes alike, as dictated by

the highest principles which could guide national action. By taking

this action, China would improve her independent standing among the

nations, she would have to be consulted during the course of the

controversy and at the conclusion of the war; she would, in all this,

be most closely associated with that nation which she has always

looked upon as peculiarly friendly and just to her. In addition to

these arguments, many favourable results were discussed which China

would obtain in international diplomacy.

Many arguments were advanced by the Chinese officials in doubt of

the policy suggested; it was stated that China had not led up to

a breach with Germany by notes of protest, such as had made the

action of the United States seem natural and unavoidable; Germany

had of late years always been considerate in her treatment of China,

a sudden breach might seem treacherous; it might also be taken by

Japan as so surprising an action as to give a favourable pretext for

pressing the dreaded demands of Group V. It was also apparent that

the representatives of the European Allies were not in a position to

give China, at the present time, any advice favourable to the action

suggested.

I pointed out in turn that were the action suggested once taken by

China, the representatives of the Allied Powers would have no choice

but to applaud it, which some of them, at least, would do from the

fulness of their hearts. As far as Japan was concerned, the situation

would be such as to indicate that that country, too, would decide

to express approval of the action. Having taken a definite position

on this side of the controversy, without yet entirely associating

herself with the Allies, China would be in a position to command their

goodwill; any interference with China's sovereign rights would be

rendered more difficult because of the situation thus created. It was

almost inconceivable that coercive action should be taken against the

friend who had declared himself. Moreover, the United States having

taken the initiative in inviting China to participate in the protest,

it would be unlikely that any action could be taken over the head of

the United States or without consulting the American Government.

As to the suddenness of the action suggested, I urged that the

action of the German Government in announcing unrestricted submarine

warfare was itself so astounding in its disregard of neutral rights

that no action taken in reply could be considered too drastic. It

was virtually a threat to kill Chinese citizens navigating certain

portions of the high seas; and injury could be prevented only by

taking a determined and forceful position.

We continued our discussion until nearly twelve o'clock, when I took

my leave, thanking the ministers for their courtesy and goodwill. The

cabinet sat until six in the evening. Shortly after six I received a

telephone call from Mr. C.C. Wu, who said: "I am very happy to tell

you that the cabinet has decided to make a protest to Germany, and

to indicate that diplomatic relations will be broken off unless the

present submarine warfare is abandoned."

It is interesting to remember, as the publication of the Russian secret

archives has shown, that on this very day the Japanese Minister for

Foreign 'Affairs was urging the Russian ambassador at Tokyo to get from

his government assurances of various benefits (including Shantung)

to come to Japan if she undertook the supposedly difficult task of

inducing China to join the Allies. Japan was thus asking a commission

for persuading the Chinese to join the Allies, although they were

willing to do so freely of their own accord, as their action this day

showed.

The Chinese had made a great decision. These men had acted

independently upon their judgment of what was just and in the best

interests of their own nation. It was the act of a free government,

without a shadow of attempt at pressure, without a thought of exacting

compensations on their part. When it is considered in comparison with

the manner in which some other governments entered the war, it will

stand as an honour to China for all time. Incidentally, this was

China's first independent participation in world politics. She had

stepped out of her age-long aloofness and taken her place among the

modern nations.

I now sent the note to the Chinese Government which contained the

simple assurance of fair treatment by the United States. In return I

received this promise:

In case an act should be performed by the German Government which

should be considered by the American Government as a sufficient cause

for a declaration of war, the Chinese Government will at least break

off its diplomatic relations with Germany.

In his formal note to me, dated February 9th, the Minister for Foreign

Affairs declared:

The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth

in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the

Government of the United States of America, has taken similar action

by protesting energetically to the German Government against the

new measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to

take such action in the future as will be deemed necessary for the

maintenance of the principles of international law.

On the same day a formal note of protest was dispatched to the German

minister.

The entire cabinet reported on February 10th to a secret session of

parliament on the diplomatic action it had taken. The report was well

received; only a few questions were asked concerning the procedure

which had been followed. Parliament did not take a vote on this matter,

as it was considered to be an action by the cabinet within the range of

its legal functions.

A wave of exultation passed over the country. There seemed to be

hope for harmony among factions; the self-respect of the Government

was visibly heightened. That China had without coercion or sordid

inducement taken a definite stand on so momentous a matter inspired the

Chinese with new hope. In coming to the support of international right,

they felt that they were strengthening the forces which make for the

independence of their own country.

Expressing themselves unofficially the representatives of the Allied

governments during these negotiations cautiously favoured the step

proposed. When the decision had once been taken, the approval of the

Chinese action was unanimous. My Belgian colleague remarked to me:

"The air has been cleared, a weight has been lifted off China and the

powers. The stock of America has risen 100 per cent."

Mr. Sam Blythe gave a dinner on the evening of February 9th, at which

Dr. George Morrison and many other American and British friends were

present. The dinner became a celebration. Greeting me, Doctor Morrison

said: "This is the greatest thing ever accomplished in China. It means

a new era. It will make the Chinese nationally self-conscious; and

that, not for narrow, selfish purposes, but to vindicate human rights."

But the thing was not yet accomplished. I knew well enough that the

decision of the Central Government would not be immediately accepted

in all parts of China. Opposition might crop out. In certain regions

men of strong German sympathies were in control, or political intrigues

to cause embarrassment and difficulties to the Central Government were

going on. All China must understand and support the decision taken by

the Government.

Of the leaders in the provinces the Vice-President, General Feng, at

Nanking, was most important; as the blunder had been committed of not

consulting him, he was predisposed against the decision; moreover,

General Feng had several German advisers in whom he placed confidence,

and who had given him a strong notion of German invincibility.

Fortunately, Mr. Sam Blythe was going to stop at Nanking on his way to

Shanghai, in order as a journalist to interview the Vice-President.

Blythe argued the matter out with him. He found that General Feng

really felt injured. This was smoothed over. With Mr. W.H. Donald as

an able second, Sam Blythe impressed upon the General that China had

merely been asked to break off relations, which did not imply going to

war. After a long and serious conversation, with some side-flashes from

Sam Blythe, the Vice-President declared himself fully satisfied, and he

came out in favour of the Government's policy. (Thus, as has often been

the case, an unofficial visit by private individuals accomplished the

good results.)

In other ways and by other persons, different leaders were visited and

familiarized with the underlying reasons for the act of the Central

Government. These influences interplayed with cumulative effect; no

concerted opposition was formed; by a sort of football "interference"

the policy to condemn German submarine warfare, and, if necessary, to

break relations with Germany, scored its touchdown.

Intelligent teamwork and American energy were in a fair way to give

China the backing she needed, having first assured her concerted

action with the United States. At a diplomatic dinner which I gave

the Minister for Foreign Affairs in February, the absorbing talk was

about the diplomatic action taken by China. Count Martel and M. Pelliot

of the French Legation, Miles Lampson of the British Legation, Mr.

Konovalov, Russia's financial adviser for China, and other Allied

representatives all came to me during the evening to say how enormously

gratified they were at the initiative of the United States and the

stand taken by China. For once nobody could disapprove of Chinese

action.

The Japanese also expressed approval, but immediately tried to get

China to take the further step of declaring war, and the French

minister, too, worked actively for this. Japan was eager to recover the

lead. A great campaign of intrigue and counter-intrigue resulted among

the various factions in China which threatened to destroy the unifying

and inspiring effects of China's action. The question of joining the

Allies out and out was thrown into politics. From all this most of the

ministers held aloof. When Liang Chi-chao sounded me on this question,

I told him, while lacking instructions from my government, that I

thought the rupture of diplomatic relations would be enough, if it

should come to that. Within a few days instructions came from the State

Department to the same effect.

During March I repeatedly saw Vice-President Feng and President Li.

Feng, small and slender, intelligent in appearance, bald, with keen but

shifty eyes, was courtesy itself. I was specially delighted with the

refinement and musical quality of his diction. I went over the whole

ground with him, satisfying him, especially, on the question of the

specific American objections to the German U-boats. "I approve heartily

and completely," he finally assured me, "of the proposed break with

Germany."

I found that General Li was not only in favour of breaking with

Germany, but of an internal break with his own premier, General Tuan.

"I cannot trust him," said Li; "he wishes to eliminate me from real

power." This friction within distressed me not a little, as I had

sincerely hoped that these two men would come to coöperate.

Then I saw Dr. Wu Ting-fang. Besides being China's foreign minister,

Doctor Wu is a spiritualist. When I entered, he followed his usual

bent, bundled the morning's business details over to the counsellor

in attendance, and devoted himself to philosophizing. Spiritualism,

longevity, and the advantages of a vegetarian diet, were to him topics

for real thought and speculation. In mystic language, he remarked:

"There is an aura gradually spreading from Europe over the entire

surface of the world. It enters the brains of the people and penetrates

them, making them war-mad. We are having the first signs here."

By March 10th, submarine warfare had not been modified. Parliament then

formally approved the breach of diplomatic relations with Germany.

I had almost belaboured the department for instructions during the

progress of our work. But it was not until the 13th of March, the very

day the break of diplomatic relations was formally notified, that the

instructions came. These rather implied that the circular inviting

coöperation on the part of the neutral powers had been too strongly

acted upon by me. I could not but be inwardly amused.

When a government takes a step involving life and death and all the

interests of its own and of general civilization; when, in connection

therewith, it calls upon other powers to associate themselves with

it--it ought to be safe to presume that the government means what

it says. It should see that the action it invokes involves great

sacrifices, and it must not invoke it lightly. A responsible official

would not be justified in interpreting such a note in a platonic sense.

At once questions of finance arose. Ancient China had taken her

brave step in modern world affairs. She might now have to go to war.

That would take money, and money would be needed to guard such a

contingency--indeed, internally and externally China had need to put

her financial house in order. Yuan Shih-kai's imperialism had left a

burden of debt. The Republic required strengthening by a new system of

national credit and by the building up of its natural resources. Now

the public debt was relatively still small, the rate of taxation upon

the hundreds of millions of citizens low. The situation was basically

sound. The question had been asked since last summer: Would America

supply China with an investment loan of a hundred millions, thus

delivering her of lenders who were seeking to dominate her and to split

her up into "spheres of influence"?

Minister Wellington Koo, who had journeyed to the United States in

behalf of Yuan Shih-kai's imperial ambitions, now worked for the

Republic there. I suggested at first that the firm of Lee, Higginson

& Company, which still held its option, should complete its loan.

This was not done. Then other capitalists were approached and in

November, 1916, Doctor Koo arranged for a large loan with Mr. John J.

Abbott, president of the Continental and Commercial Savings Bank of

Chicago. Mr. Abbott, wishing to study the Chinese financial situation,

arrived in Peking during April, 1917, bringing his lawyer. I got him

acquainted with the Chinese ministers, and took him and Mr. Joy Morton,

also of Chicago, to lunch with President Li and Dr. Chen Chin-tao and

Hsu Un-yuen. The President said: "I will back all financial legislation

which American experts may find necessary for the proper organization

of China's credit."

Doctor Chen was arrested and put in prison through the plotting of his

enemies, but Hsu Un-yuen remained, with his sound financial training.

Finally Mr. Abbott proposed an ingenious scheme, with the wine and

tobacco taxes as the basis--for every $1,000,000 of annual revenue

there should be a loan of $5,000,000; if the taxes amounted to ten

millions, they would serve as security for a loan of fifty millions.

Mr. Abbott left behind him a plan for reorganizing these taxes, and a

promise to take up at any time the question of loans on this basis, in

addition to five millions lent the preceding November and an option for

twenty-five millions more.

CHAPTER XXII

CHINA'S BOSSES COME TO PEKING

I have noted that Dr. Chen Chin-tao, Chinese Minister of Finance, was

put in prison. Doctor Chen had administered Chinese finances strictly

and well, in a most difficult period. For the military governors or

Tuchuns, who were the real bosses of China's vast population, he was

too honest and too strict. The Tuchuns looked upon the Minister of

Finance as in duty bound to procure funds for them by hook or crook.

When the government banks were broken and had declared a moratorium,

their large over-issues of notes were worth only one half their face

value. Working with Doctor Chen was Hsu Un-yuen, managing director

of the Bank of China. Mr. Hsu managed judiciously to bring the notes

of his bank virtually to par. The Tuchuns, aided by the pro-Japanese

clique, which formed part of the Premier's entourage, attacked both Hsu

and Doctor Chen. For the latter the cabal laid a trap. It was made to

appear that he gave support to a certain company in return for having

his brother employed. So the cabal, using this pretext to satisfy their

grievances, got him arrested and jailed, thus ending his negotiations

with the Chicago bank of John J. Abbott. President Li was interested

and distressed. When I asked Premier Tuan about Doctor Chen, he

smilingly stated that he should have a chance to clear himself.

Meanwhile, the breach between the Premier and the President widened.

To strengthen himself in his policy of favouring a declaration of war,

the Premier called all the Tuchuns to Peking for a conference. Nine

governors-general came, and all the other provinces sent delegates.

General Tuan was successful with them, and by April 28th they had

decided to support his war policy.

The Tuchun of Shantung was bulky, coarse-looking. I had some idea of

his views on representative government from his inaugural address

to the Shantung Assembly. "Gentlemen," the Tuchun said with genial

frankness, "you resemble birds who are in a large cage together. If

you behave well, and sing songs that are pleasing, we shall feed you;

otherwise, you shall have to go without food."

Several of the Tuchuns called on me by appointment, and later I gave

them a formal reception, at which I saw all who had come to Peking,

observed their personalities, and tried to fathom the source of their

personal prominence and power. I talked with them individually and in

groups, chiefly about the progress of the war and the relative strength

of the combatants. My guests were full of smiles and good cheer,

particularly did the Tuchun of Fukien radiate joy. In their sociability

they were true Chinese, and here, where they had been received with

the military honours due to their position and in the spirit of

hospitality, they could show themselves in a more amiable light than

when maintaining their power in their provinces. To a brief speech of

welcome which I made when they had all arrived General Hsu Shu-cheng

replied with a most emphatic expression of friendship for America.

That so many of these governors should have risen from the lowliest

position was indeed strong evidence of the underlying democracy of

Chinese life. But that a mere handful of men should wield such power,

each in his province, did not bespeak strength in representative

government.

Some of the military commanders were men of education, although most of

them had risen from very modest surroundings: Yen Hsi-shan, of Shansi;

Chu Jui, of Chekiang; Tang Chi-yao, of Yunnan; Chen Kuang-yuan, of

Kiangsi; Ni Tze-chung, of Anhwei; Li Shun, of Nanking, a fisherman's

son; Li Ho-chi of Fukien, Tien Chung-yu of Kalgan, both of middle-class

families--all these were fair scholars. General Wu Pei-fu, who rose

from the post of a private in the Chino-Japanese War, had through great

intelligence and industry acquired a good education, as likewise had

General Feng Yu-hsiang; both of these generals professed the Christian

religion. President Feng Kuo-chang came of a poor family, and as a

young man played a fiddle in a small local theatre.

Among the other Tuchuns were many to whom the Chinese applied the

proverb: "A good man will never become a soldier." These men, indeed,

deserve credit for having risen from their original state as coolies,

bandits, or horse-thieves, but they often owe their prominence to

qualities which by no means make for the good of the state. Chang

Tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria, commenced his career as a bandit; he

was pardoned by Chao Er-shun, and became a government officer. Chang

Huai-chi was a coolie, and never got much education. Tsao Kun, of

Chihli, was a huckster. Wang Chan-yuan was a hostler. The trio, Chang

Hsun, Lu Yung-ting, and Mu Yung-hsing, headed the so-called Black Flag

Band; at one time the partners put up fifty thousand taels to enable

Chang Hsun to buy himself an office and become respectable. But he

spent it all in high living. With the antecedents of some of these men

one marvels not only at the position they have acquired, but at the

personal polish and air of refinement of many of them.

All of them dealt with political power as a commodity, secured

through the use of money and soldiers. They were somewhat like the

_condottieri_ of the Italian renaissance, looking ahead only to the

goal of their personal ambition for wealth and power. Even among these

militarists, however, there were those who gave some attention to

matters of public policy, and the idea of national welfare and unity

had begun to dawn upon their consciousness. Moreover, in them I felt

a mixture of the old and the new. They had suddenly come into great

power, thought in terms of airplanes and modern armaments, but had as

yet few other modern ideas to inspire their action with anything beyond

personal motives. In their human qualities, however, several of them

excelled; and some, even, showed a real spirit of public service and

ability as administrators.

The Japanese Government was still trying to get China into the war,

and its minister called on President Li to urge it. I talked on May

9th with the President, who said that he favoured a declaration of war

provided parliament was not overridden in the process. Then I saw the

Premier. "If parliament is obstinate," General Tuan said bluntly, "it

will be dissolved."

I told him it would make a very bad impression in the United States and

with other Western powers if parliament were ignored in so important

a matter. I knew that parliament did not oppose declaring war, but

desired to control the war policy. "But," the Premier urged, "the

opposition of parliament disregards national interests. It desires

merely to secure partisan advantage." Tuan discussed the attitude of

Japan. "The Japanese have assured me," he declared, "that if I follow a

strong policy I may count on their support. Now circumstances force the

Chinese Government to be friendly to Japan. Of course, I will not give

up any valuable rights to anybody, and I will strengthen China in every

way so that resistance may be offered to any attempted injustice."

Ironically, he asked whether confidence could be placed in the southern

leaders of the Kuo Min Tang. "I have proof," he continued, "that both

Sun Yat-sen and Tsen Liang-kuang have given written assurances to the

Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai that if either of them becomes

President of China he will conclude a treaty granting to Japan rights

of supervision of military and administrative affairs more extensive

than those sought in Group V of the twenty-one demands." So each party

believed the worst of the other.

Events were tending to a climax. The Government was demoralized. Doctor

Chen was in prison; Mr. Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang,

who was to take Chen's place, would not assume office while affairs

remained so unsettled. The Ministry of Communications was in charge of

an underling. The Minister of Education, who also acted as Minister of

the Interior, was seriously ill. The Kuo Min Tang ministers had lost

their influence with their party in parliament because of their failure

effectively to oppose the Tuchuns' policy. It was believed that the

Tuchuns, with the followers of General Tuan, were planning a _coup_

against Parliament.

In the midst of this I had a personal chat with Chen Lu, the

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at an evening reception at the

British Legation. I told him of my surprise that the Tuchuns, instead

of attending to the urgent business in their provinces, should be

gathered here, interfering with the Central Government. I let it be

distinctly understood that any movement to overthrow parliament in

order to carry out the war policy could not be expected to receive the

sympathy of the United States. The vice-minister was in close touch

with the Tuchuns. I expected that he would repeat my remarks to them.

He did.

As I was leaving the Chancery a few evenings later Mr. Roy Anderson

appeared with the news that something was happening and drove me over

to the railway station. We went through the Chenmen gate. Along the

main street were many carts rapidly driven, loaded with military stores

and household goods. Automobiles were rushing by them to the station.

On the platform was a turmoil of troops busily transferring the various

military possessions to cars. In a parlour car our friends the Tuchuns

were assembling. I left Mr. Anderson there to observe and to get

information.

It appeared that the Tuchuns had all of a sudden decided to leave

Peking for their various capitals, taking their bodyguards with them.

Two or three were to remain in Tientsin a little longer to watch

developments. Their precipitous exit seemed to indicate that President

Li had at last got the upper hand.

As a farewell courtesy to Doctor Willoughby, the American legal

adviser, the President had invited him and me to luncheon on the

following day. President Li was cheerful. The discomfiture of the

Tuchuns filled him with glee. "All danger is passed," he announced; "I

will dismiss General Tuan, appoint a new cabinet, and have parliament

decide the war question without compulsion."

In order to inform myself as to what was behind the President's

confidence, I asked him what he had to put in the place of his cabinet

and General Tuan, and whether he believed that the Government could be

carried on without the concurrence of that important party.

"Oh, yes," the President assured me, "it is all arranged."

Pressing him a little further, and asking upon whom, in particular, he

was relying, to my unspeakable surprise, he said: "General Chang Hsun

will assist me."

Now General Chang Hsun was an old-time bandit and militarist. His ideas

were devoid of any understanding of representative institutions. It

passed my power of imagination to see how reliance could be placed in

this general for the vindication of parliament. As I looked dubious,

the President repeated: "Yes, you may believe me. I can rely on General

Chang Hsun."

It was not what Chang Hsun stood for that the President relied on, but

on his enmity to General Tuan. Li Yuan-hung, though quite modern in his

conception of government, in this instance followed a strong Chinese

instinct which aims to prevail by setting off strong individuals

against each other.

After I had heard that the dismissal of General Tuan had been

announced, General Chin Yun-peng called on me. He was agitated and much

worried. "Do you not think that General Tuan should leave Peking?" he

asked. "His enemies will undoubtedly wish to take his life."

I tried to cheer him up by telling him that in a modern government

such ups and downs must be expected. "Let the other side now develop

their policy, and show what they can do; let General Tuan use this time

for quiet recuperation, after the strain he has been through. Then,"

I said, "the time will come again when Tuan will be called back to

power." The eyes of the good general lit up with gratitude. General Ni

Tze-chung, most notorious and active among the military party, declared

on the 26th of May that the dismissal of General Tuan had been illegal.

His province of Anhwei disapproved; it would act independently of the

Central Government.

This was the crucial point in the development of the situation.

Expert observers said that had the President immediately dismissed

Ni and ordered his punishment, appointing a junior commander in his

place, the rest of the militarists would have fallen away from Ni, and

the President could have dealt with them individually. Instead, he was

persuaded to send a conciliatory letter to General Ni.

This, of course, confirmed the leadership of Ni over the military

party; further, it encouraged the majority of the Tuchuns to declare

their independence.

A so-called provisional government was set up at Tientsin. The older

and wiser heads of the military party, men like General Tuan Chi-jui

and Mr. Hsu Shih-chang, held themselves entirely aloof from this new

organization.

General Ni Tze-chung was the leading spirit. By dint of force the

so-called government helped itself to the deposits of the Chinese

Government in the Tientsin branch of the Bank of China. The men greatly

in evidence were the members of the pro-Japanese clique, Mr. Tsao

Ju-lin and General Hsu Shu-cheng. General Aoki, the Japanese military

adviser to the Government, was also on the ground.

In Peking a paralysis crept over the Government. The President lost his

advantage as quickly as he had gained it. On the railways all orders

of the Tuchuns for transportation were implicitly obeyed. When at this

time the question of the movement of revolutionary troops and their

stationing at Tientsin and along the railway came up, the Japanese

minister persisted in the position that it would be highly undesirable

to make any objection on the ground of any possible conflict with the

protection of the railway by foreign troops. Two months before, the

Japanese Legation had strongly objected to the stationing of a few

government troops along the same railway.

The President issued a mandate inviting Chang Hsun to Peking as

arbitrator.

When I interviewed the President, he looked disconsolate His youthful

English secretary, Mr. Kuo, tried his best to give a more cheerful

and confident note to Li's conversation, but Doctor Tenney, who was

with me, easily compared the President's doleful Chinese with the more

buoyant English translation.

The plan of the Tuchuns was directed toward isolating and strangling

Peking. They controlled the railways leading there, and were preventing

the shipment of foodstuffs. The ministry that controlled the railways,

it must be remembered, was controlled by Japanese influence.

Constitutional government in China was paralyzed through the lack of

military and financial authority.

The war issue worried the Chinese. First, they feared that the

militarist party would take advantage of it, through the support of

Japanese influence, to fasten its hold upon China; second, that China

might by the Allies be made a field in which to seek compensations.

But if local political troubles had not entirely upset the situation,

it might have been possible to arrange for a joint declaration of the

powers that would have allayed suspicion and made it feasible for China

to enter the war with a sense of security.

Dr. Wu Ting-fang, acting on the suggestion of Mr. Lenox Simpson and

liberal-minded Chinese publicists, made a move to have the American

Government do something. He sent advices to Minister Koo in Washington

telling him about General Ni and his leadership of the revolt of the

Tuchuns. The southern provinces were still loyal to the President and

parliament, and the civil and commercial population disapproved of the

rebellion. President Wilson and Secretary Lansing were asked to make

a statement in behalf of representative government in China. This was

followed by a direct appeal to President Wilson.

But the American Government had already instructed me on the 5th of

June to communicate to the Chinese Government a statement evincing

a sincere desire for internal political harmony. The question of

China's entry into the war, it said, was secondary to continuing the

political unity of China and the laying aside of factional disputes. I

accompanied it orally with a personal statement that the United States

conceived the war to be one for the principles of democracy; that it

would deplore any construction of its invitation which would lend

itself to the idea that it contemplated any coercion or restriction

upon Chinese freedom of action. I made plain that no matter how much

the United States wished the coöperation of China in the war, it did

not desire to bring this about by using the political dissensions or

working with any one faction in disregard of parliament.

General Tuan Chi-jui at once stated to Doctor Ferguson, who

unofficially informed him of the American note at Tientsin, that he

had totally withdrawn from all politics. The Chinese press gave a very

favourable reception to the note; the Chinese people welcomed America's

advice. General Feng Kuo-chang, later when he had become President,

spoke of the note to me, and remarked on the salutary influence it had

wielded upon public opinion in China.

While the political dissensions in the Chinese state were too

personal to be overcome by any friendly suggestions from the outside,

nevertheless the American note had set up a standard for all the

Chinese. It had, furthermore, given convincing proof of the fact

that the true interests of China were impartially weighed by the

American Government, and were not entirely subordinated to any war

policy which America might desire to advance. From all parts of China

came expressions of gratitude and satisfaction that the American

Government should have spoken to China so justly and truly. The Chinese

appreciated the spirit of justice of the American Government in not

desiring to have the war issue used for the purposes of enabling any

faction or party to override the free determination of the Chinese

Government and people. As America was itself at war and would therefore

have welcomed coöperation, this just policy particularly impressed the

Chinese.

The Japanese press both in Japan and China immediately launched forth

into a bitter invective against the American action. The United States

should have consulted Japan. Its action constituted interference in the

domestic affairs of China. "If China listens to advice from America,"

a Japanese major-general declared in an excited speech at a dinner in

Peking on the 7th of June, "she will have Japan to deal with."

The Japanese ambassador at Washington protested informally. Had not

Secretary Bryan, in a note dated the 13th of March, 1915, recognized

the special and close relations, political and economic, between Japan

and China? It was impossible that the American minister at Peking was

taking a part in political affairs in China, but the Japanese public

was sensitive about the note sent by the American Government to China.

Would it not be useful if the American Government would confirm Mr.

Bryan's statement?

The reply to this communication did not come until the 6th of July.

Mr. Bryan's statement, the reply said, referred only to the special

relations created by territorial contiguity in certain parts of China.

Even with respect to them it in no way admitted that the United States

might not in future be justified in expressing itself relative to

questions that might arise between China and Japan. The United States

could not be indifferent to matters affecting the welfare of the

Chinese people, such as the unrest in China.

The first detachments of Chang Hsun's troops arrived in Peking on

the 9th of June. Chang Hsun's theory was that it is the business of

a trooper to make himself terrible. These wild horsemen, wearing

loose-fitting black uniforms, with their cues rolled up on the back of

the head, rode about Peking with the air of conquerors. The "Mediator"

was coming with sufficient military force to back his judgment.

When General Chang himself arrived, the streets from the railway

station to the Mediator's house in the Manchu city were entirely shut

off. Mounted troopers blocked the way as my automobile came along a

side street to cross one of these thoroughfares. They nearly collided

with the front of my machine, drew their guns, and would not budge. To

explain to them my right to pass would have meant sending someone to

the Foreign Office; even then in order to go on I might have to run

over them, for the Foreign Office, undoubtedly, meant nothing at all to

them. I told my companion not to let them know my position. We tried to

pass through on the ground that we had business on the other side, but

they reared their horses up and down, and nearly came into the machine

with us. We were held up until the great man had arrived and had raced

from the station to his residence.

When I was with Dr. Wu Ting-fang a few days later the card of a

secretary of the cabinet was brought in. I knew that he was trying to

induce Doctor Wu to sign a decree dissolving parliament. I had heard in

the morning that President Li had finally caved in; for Chang Hsun's

first prescription for restoring China was to declare that parliament

must be dissolved. The President relied on Chang's assistance. He

could not help himself, he must accept the dictation of the man he had

summoned.

I rejoined a friend who awaited me outside in the automobile. He had

just overheard the chauffeur of the cabinet secretary and the doorman

of the Foreign Office. The chauffeur had said: "Is your old man going

to sign up? You had better see to it that he does, else something might

happen to him."

These subordinates were keeping their eyes open.

The Japanese minister, on whom I called that morning, said to me:

"General Chang's mediation is the last hope of peace. It is desirable

that parliament be gotten rid of, it is obstructive, and makes the

doing of business well-nigh impossible."

Dr. Wu Ting-fang stood out against countersigning the mandate

that would dissolve the parliament. In matters of spiritualism,

vegetarianism, and longevity, I had perhaps not always been able to

take him quite seriously. But I admired his quiet courage in not

allowing himself to be bowled over, after even President Li had given

in. Before daylight on the 13th of June Doctor Wu was roused from his

bed and now asked to countersign a Presidential mandate designating the

jovial General Chiang Chao-tsung, commander of the Peking gendarmerie,

to act as Premier, and accepting Doctor Wu's resignation. Before

daybreak General Chiang signed the mandate dissolving parliament. The

President consented to its issue, for he had been told it would be

impossible to prevent disturbances in Peking unless this were done.

So wore on the early summer of 1917. Affairs seemed to have arrived at

a stalemate.

CHAPTER XXIII

AN EMPEROR FOR A DAY

My family had gone to Peitaiho for the summer. I was staying at the

residence alone with Mr. F.L. Belin, who had recently come to Peking to

join my staff. I slept rather late on Sunday, July 1st, as the morning

was cool. When Kao, the first boy, came in to take orders he appeared

excited and cried: "Emperor has come back again!"

I did not immediately grasp the significance of this astonishing

announcement; but he went on volubly telling me that it was true, that

the Emperor had returned, that all the people were hanging out the

yellow dragon flag. I sent out for information and soon learned that

the little emperor, in some mysterious way, had been restored during

the night.

The monarchical movement came as a complete surprise to everybody,

for it was entirely the personal act of General Chang Hsun. The men

whose names were recited in his proclamations as assisting him had

known nothing about it; it was undreamed of even by those who found

themselves forced to assist, such as the Chief of Staff and the heads

of the gendarmerie and of the police.

Kang Yu-wei, the "Modern Sage" of China, arrived in Peking on June

29th, and with him the restoration was planned. Kang Yu-wei, who had

been the leader of the first reform movement in 1898, when he made a

stand against absolutism, had always remained a consistent believer in

constitutional monarchy. He encouraged Chang Hsun with philosophical

theory, and wrote all his edicts for him. The two believed that the

Imperial restoration would immediately bring to the active support of

the Government all the military governors, whose true sentiments were

notoriously imperialistic. Their consent was taken for granted, and the

edicts, as drawn up, expressly assumed that it had been given.

It became known to me that Chang Hsun had also discussed the

possibility of an Imperial restoration with the Japanese minister. The

latter expressed the opinion that the movement should not be undertaken

without first making sure of the assent of the chief military leaders.

Chang Hsun had no doubt of this support; he evidently regarded the

advice of the Japanese minister as encouraging, and believed that his

movement would have diplomatic countenance.

Chang Hsun had his intimate advisers, particularly Kang Yu-wei, draw

up the requisite Imperial edicts on the 30th of June. In these it was

stated that leading governors, like Feng Kuo-chang, Lu Yung-ting, and

others of equal prominence, had petitioned for the restoration of the

monarchy. Lists of appointments to the highest positions in the Central

Government and the provinces were prepared. The existing military

governors were in most cases reappointed. In the Central Government

the important men designated were Hsu Shih-chang as Guardian of the

Emperor, Liang Tun-yen as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Chu Chi-pao

as Minister of the Interior. Wang Shih-chen was retained as Chief of

the General Staff.

As an amazing instance of how consent was taken for granted, it was

recited in an Imperial edict that President Li Yuan-hung had himself

petitioned for the reëstablishment of the Empire; this edict appointed

Li a duke of the first class.

So soon as these edicts were prepared and ready for presentation, a

dinner was arranged for the evening of the same day, to which the heads

of the Peking military and police establishments were invited. They

met at the Kiangsu Guild Hall. After great quantities of wine had been

consumed, Chang Hsun broached his project for the salvation of China,

stating that all preparations had been made and that military and

diplomatic support was assured. Then, pointing to the Chief of Staff,

he said: "Of course, you are supporting the movement."

General Wang, completely taken aback, saw no way to refuse--since

he was in the presence of an accomplished fact. In the same way the

consent of General Chiang, head of the gendarmerie, and of General Wu,

head of the police, was obtained.

Thus the enterprise was launched. Chang Hsun directed General Wang and

four others to proceed immediately to the residence of President Li,

to wake him up, and to obtain his consent to a memorial asking for

reëstablishment of the monarchy. Chang Hsun himself proceeded to the

Imperial City. Not being able to obtain the support of the Imperial

dukes for his movement, he had lavishly bribed the eunuchs in charge of

the palace, who opened the gates for him and his retinue, and took him

to the private residence of the young Emperor. Chang Hsun prostrated

himself, and informed the Emperor that the whole nation demanded his

return to the throne. Thereupon he took the frightened boy to the great

throne room, and, in the presence of his retainers and members of the

Imperial Family, who had been summoned, formally enthroned the Emperor.

Then the edicts which had been prepared were formally sealed.

As may be imagined, there were some comic incidents. A rather

distinguished man had been summoned by the Premier to discuss with the

President his assumption of one of the cabinet portfolios. A Chinese

friend of mine who had just heard of the restoration saw him at the

hotel about ten o'clock in the morning. On being asked what was his

errand in Peking, the distinguished personage stated confidentially

that he was awaiting a carriage to take him to the President's palace.

"There is no President," he was told. "This is now an Empire; the

Emperor was enthroned at four o'clock this morning." The great man's

astonishment was amusing.

As the military chiefs were deceived on the preceding night, so Peking

was deceived for one day. As the news spread, the population showed an

almost joyous excitement. Everywhere the yellow dragon flags appeared,

soon the entire city took on a festive appearance. Revived memories

of past splendour seemingly made the population of Peking imperialist

to a man. But the height of this movement was reached as early as the

morning of the 2nd of July.

I had avoided receiving General Chang Hsun. Mr. Liang Tung-yen came to

assume office as Minister for Foreign Affairs; I also abstained from

seeing him, as well as the rest of General Chang's ministers, asking

Doctor Tenney to talk with those who presented themselves. Mr. Liang

had always been an imperialist, and was in high spirits, believing that

at last China was saved. He had been led to believe that the foreign

diplomats would readily recognize the restoration.

Strong doubts as to the character of the movement became manifest on

Monday, the 2nd of July. Tuan Chi-jui did not figure in the Imperial

official lists. When asked about this, Chang Hsun declared that

General Tuan was unimportant, having no troops under his command. But

Liang Chi-chao had been playing cards with friends at about 2 A.M. on

the fateful night, when the news was telephoned to Tientsin. Liang

immediately went to General Tuan's residence, where the latter was

similarly engaged at cards. General Tuan, who was thoroughly weary of

public affairs, was difficult to rouse; he begged to be spared the

trouble of thinking of what might be occurring in Peking. More details

came in, and it became apparent what a thoroughly one-man affair the

movement was. Then Tuan roused himself.

Tuan was at that time actually only a private citizen, without

authority or command. But I learned later that Liang Chi-chao had gone

to Japanese friends for funds to enlist the military against the

Imperial movement, and he got 1,000,000 yen as a loan to himself and

General Tuan for this purpose. It was to be treated as a government

loan upon restoration of normal conditions.

The two proceeded on Tuesday to Machang, where the Eighth Division had

been encamped since the attempt to overawe President Li Yuan-hung.

General Tuan, it was stated, felt nervous as to the outcome of his

venture, but he called the commanders, declaring that he had always

been opposed to a restoration of the monarchy, and that it was now

being attempted by a single general. To resist this act he proposed to

take command of the republican troops.

General Tuan was at once recognized as commander-in-chief. President

Li, on his part, did not yield to the importunities of Chang Hsun.

He gave out an absolute denial of the statement that he favoured the

restoration. After issuing a mandate that turned over the Presidential

powers to the Vice-President and appointed General Tuan Chi-jui Premier

and Commander-in-Chief, he took refuge in the Legation Quarter. I sent

a personal representative to General Tuan at Tientsin, who declared

that he already had complete control of the military situation and

could finish Chang Hsun inside of ten days.

As hostilities threatened in and around Peking, and as the danger of

looting was always present, I discussed the precautions to be taken

with several of my colleagues, and agreed with the Japanese minister

that we would each bring a company of reinforcements from Tientsin.

Meanwhile, the movements of Tuan's troops began. To hinder their

advance, Chang Hsun's men broke the railway at a point about one third

of the way from Peking to Tientsin.

Certain members of the diplomatic corps urged that we give notice that

no fighting should take place on or near the railways. As we had made

no objection to the bringing in of Chang Hsun's troops and to their

being stationed in Peking and along the railway, I took the position

that we were not justified in objecting to the troops of the government

to which we were accredited taking necessary action against Chang Hsun.

We might, however, insist upon the right of keeping the railway open.

This met with approval. On the 5th of July a demand was made upon the

belligerent generals that the railway must be kept open, and that at

least one train be allowed to pass in each direction every day.

The damaged line was reconstructed, and on July 6th, the American

infantry arrived in Peking; on the 7th, the first trains travelled

between Peking and Tientsin--one train actually passing between the

armies during a battle. Fighting went on during these days between the

troops of General Tuan, directly commanded by General Tuan Chi-kwei,

and Chang Hsun's forces; there was much firing but small loss of life,

and the latter's forces were finally driven back toward Peking. The

troops of General Tsao Kun also advanced upon Peking from the west.

Mr. Grant, of the National Printing Bureau, on Friday rushed into the

legation compound in his automobile, with the report that looting

was going on in the southern part of the city. We ascended the wall.

From the Chenmen Tower we saw excited groups moving up and down the

main streets, but nothing was happening save the bringing in of a few

wounded men. To investigate the cause of the excitement I went with

Mr. Belin in our private rickshaws to the Chinese city, passing to the

end of the broad Chenmen thoroughfare. The street was still crowded,

the people were excited though well behaved; the shops all had their

shutters up. Near the south end of the street some shopkeepers posted

in front of their shops told us that the return of Chang Hsun's troops

from outside the walls had been reported. Looting had been expected but

had not taken place. We proceeded to the Temple of Heaven, where great

crowds were walking about among the tents of the troops. On returning,

we entered a shop to look at some antiques, remaining half an hour.

When we came out our rickshaws had disappeared. Doctor Ferguson joined

us as we searched for our men. Suddenly, Belin shouted to a rickshaw

man, who with a dozen others was conveying some of Chang Hsun's petty

officers southward. We insisted that the non-commissioned officer

occupying the rickshaw get out, and he finally complied.

The rickshaws had been requisitioned by these bandits. Upon our

return to the Legation, my rickshaw-runner had just arrived, excited

to the point of tears. Our two coolies had drawn the men who

originally commandeered them up to the Imperial City; there they were

requisitioned again to convey other men back to the Temple of Heaven.

But my man, when opposite the entrance to Legation Street, had upset

his bandit into the road and made a quick entry into the Legation

Quarter, where the angry and sputtering trooper dared not follow him.

That the rickshaws belonging to foreigners should thus be pressed into

service shows the disregard which these troopers had for everything but

their own desires.

As we returned to the Legation we noticed a wonderful colour effect.

Coal-black clouds were banked against the western sky, above which were

lighter clouds or angry shreds of flaming colour. Against this the dark

walls and towers of Peking stood out in sharp relief. In the streets

the crowds still surged, in restless expectancy. Suddenly the sunset

light disappeared; the sky became black with clouds; a sharp gust of

wind whirled the dust of the Chinese city northward; then came a flash

of lightning, a clap of thunder, and a heavy downpour, which cooled the

excited heads and drove all to shelter. The late afternoon had been

weird and fantastic, and appeared to presage the happening of still

stranger things.

I was lunching with a friend at his race-course house on Sunday, the

8th of July, when word was brought to me that a certain Colonel Hu,

coming from Chang Hsun, had persuaded the French minister that the city

was in imminent danger of sacking, fighting, and general disturbances.

The only salvation, Colonel Hu had said, lay in asking Hsu Shi-chang to

come from Tientsin to mediate. The French minister thereupon induced

his Entente colleagues to agree to transmit a note to General Tuan

Chi-jui urging him to prevail upon Hsu Chi-Chang to come as mediator.

This seemed to me ill-advised. It meant, at a time when Chang Hsun

was already as good as defeated, that he would be solemnly treated as

entitled to dictate the terms and personnel of mediation by influential

members of the diplomatic corps. I returned to Peking and saw my

colleagues, urging my opinion strongly. The British chargé withdrew his

consent; he had just received a telegram from his consul in Tientsin

reporting that General Tuan was absolutely opposed to mediation. The

action contemplated was not taken, though Chang Hsun persisted in his

attempts to gain recognition from the diplomatic corps. The French

minister, who hated Dr. Wu Ting-fang--this would explain his support

of Chang Hsun--gradually came to see the obverse side of his policy as

certain Germanic affiliations of Chang Hsun became known.

Kang Yu-wei presented himself at my house on the 8th, seeking refuge,

and I assigned him rooms in one of our compounds. He informed me that

Chang Hsun had had full assurances of support on the part of Hsu

Chi-Chang and other important monarchists. Next day he informed me that

Prince Tsai Tze was anxious to consult me.

I arranged to have the Prince come to the house assigned to Mr. Kang,

where I had two hours' conversation with the Manchu and the sage.

Kang Yu-wei commenced with a long disquisition on the advantages of a

constitutional monarchy. He wished to explain his action and to prove

to me that he was not a reactionary, but was aiming only for progress

under the monarchical form, which he considered most suitable to China.

All this time the Prince was silent. He seemed greatly depressed, not

inclined to say anything at first. After inquiries about his health, I

asked him what he would like to say to me. With eyes of real sadness

he looked me full in the face, saying: "What shall we do? My house has

been drawn into this affair without our consent. It has been forced on

us. We did not wish to depart from the agreements we had made with the

Republic. But Chang Hsun would not listen to us. He thought he saw the

only way. Now what shall we do?"

I told him that I appreciated the difficulty in which the Imperial

Family found itself, but that I of course could not know the details

of the situation sufficiently to give any opinion. One thing, however,

seemed to me certain: if the leaders of the republican government knew

the true attitude of the Imperial Family, and if the Emperor would

formally and absolutely dissociate himself from the movement of Chang

Hsun, I believed that they would not make the Imperial Family suffer.

I asked him whether they had considered having the Emperor issue a

decree, absolutely and for all time renouncing all rights to the throne

and declaring his complete fealty to the Republic.

The Prince regarded me aghast. "Oh, _no_! No matter how desirable

that might be from many points of view, it is not in the power of the

Emperor to do it. The rights he has inherited are not his. They came

to him in trust from his ancestors. He will have to maintain them, and

hand them on to his descendants. He, and we of his family, shall not

do anything to make these rights prevail against the State, but as the

sons of our ancestors, we cannot repudiate them."

Never had I been so deeply impressed with the complexity of Chinese

affairs as by this answer--an Imperial family maintaining traditions

of empire in the midst of a republic, an emperor continuing to reside

in the Imperial Palace, a neighbour of the republican President in his

residence, and yet no desire to enter again into politics and to grasp

the sovereign power! I could now understand why the Chinese had allowed

the Emperor to remain in the palace; it was the house of his ancestors,

from which he might not be driven. That common reverence was the one

point of understanding between Chinese and Manchus.

Prince Tsai Tze evidently still hoped that Hsu Shih-Chang, the loyal

friend of the Imperial Family, might be brought to Peking to mediate,

and that he might be prevailed upon to preserve the favourable

treatment hitherto accorded the Imperial Family. I could not give

Prince Tsai Tze any encouragement on this point, on which I had very

definite opinions, but had to content myself with general expressions

of sincere sympathy with the strange fate of this family.

The question of mediation was again taken up by the diplomatic corps

on the afternoon of this day. Some of the ministers feared that the

city would suffer greatly if things should be allowed to go on. I was

strongly of the opinion that our interference in this matter could

have no good result, but would only further confuse and complicate the

situation. For once, the Chinese must settle it themselves, regardless

of any incidental inconvenience. From what I knew of the strength

of the contending forces and of the whole situation, I had no doubt

whatsoever that if left alone the republican forces would be easily

successful and that there would be no disturbances. I was on principle

against any action which would be in substance intervening in behalf of

a general who had attacked the Republic and whom nothing could now save

from overthrow except such diplomatic action.

I was approached on the 10th of July by a representative of General

Chiang, chief of the gendarmerie. He stated that it was desired to

bring Chang Hsun into the American Legation, for his own safety though

against his will, and that an agreement to this effect had been made

among the different commanders. I stated that in the circumstances it

would be better for the diplomatic corps to discuss what protection

could be extended to Chang Hsun. An informal meeting was held, at which

the British chargé agreed that he would receive Chang Hsun if he were

brought in.

The legations were notified by General Tuan, late in the afternoon of

July 11th, that during the night the troops would move against Chang

Hsun's forces in the city, and bombardment of the Temple of Heaven and

the quarters near the Imperial City held by Chang Hsun would begin at

dawn on the 12th of July. In conjunction with the commandant of the

legation guard, I sent notice to the American residents in the quarters

particularly affected, directing them to seek safety. Eighteen refugees

came to the Legation, where they were cared for during the day at the

Students' Mess. A company of the Fifteenth Infantry, which had been

brought up from Tientsin, was encamped in the compound in front of my

residence, to which their tents and military equipment imparted an

aspect of great military preparedness.

I was awakened at daybreak on July 12th by the sound of artillery and

rifle fire. As the fighting commenced people went out of curiosity

upon the city wall. But stray bullets frequently fell on the wall, and

the commandant ordered it cleared. Unfortunately, several of these

onlookers--among them three Americans--were injured. During the battle

I received word from the Imperial tutors that the Dowager Empresses

were preparing to bring the Emperor to my residence. Since the 9th of

July they had wished to remove the Emperor to this legation for safety.

While the Empresses and some of the dukes desired this, the eunuchs

under Chang Hsun's influence opposed the removal. The Prince Regent,

also influenced by Chang Hsun, took the same view. Thus on various

occasions the eunuchs, whose existence had almost been forgotten, came

out on the stage of action in this curious affair.

About eleven o'clock, while the firing was at its height and after

several bombs had been dropped from aeroplanes upon the Imperial City,

telephone messages came to the effect that several friends of the

Imperial Family and Doctor Ferguson of the Red Cross were about to

rescue the Emperor from danger and bring him to the Legation. I had the

house prepared. Half an hour later two automobiles with the Red Cross

flag flying entered the legation compound. Mr. Belin ran to the door,

expecting to see the Emperor and Empress emerging from the automobiles,

but he returned with only Mr. Sun Pao-chi, who was shivering with

excitement. I took him to the reception room and comforted him with

tea. He still expected the Emperor to come. The automobiles left again

for the Imperial Palace, but as the aeroplanes had ceased dropping

bombs and the artillery fire was decreasing in violence, the people in

the palace decided against carrying out the flight.

As I sat in the library all through the forenoon receiving reports and

giving directions, there was a constant hissing of bullets and shells

overhead. No shell dropped in our legation, although two or three fell

in the British. The Chinese artillery fire was remarkably accurate.

Sitting there and listening to the tumult of shouting and firing from

the Chenmen gate and the volleys of guns and artillery exceeding in

volume of sound any Fourth of July I had ever experienced, I felt

thankful to have seen a day when the Chinese would stand up and fight

out a big issue. I soon found that the battle was not commensurate with

its sound.

Shortly before noon Chang Hsun was brought to the Dutch Legation,

accompanied by a German employé of the Chinese police. Chang Hsun had

been persuaded to come by his generals almost with the use of force.

He was still under the illusion that he could mediate. When the Dutch

minister informed him that this was impossible, he wished to return to

his troops. This, of course, could not be permitted.

Firing was violent from dawn until nearly noon. The field guns, machine

guns, and rifles filled the air with enormous tumult, but from eleven

o'clock on the firing gradually diminished, and it entirely ceased at

four in the afternoon. Immediately thereafter I proceeded by motor car

to the various centres of fighting. I found that Chang Hsun's house had

been struck by several shells and that the indirect artillery firing

of the government troops had been managed with considerable accuracy.

The human dead had already been removed from the neighbourhood although

numerous carcasses of horses remained. Thence I proceeded to the Temple

of Heaven, where I was astonished to find Chang Hsun's troops encamped

with all their guns and artillery, eating, drinking, and talking in

the best of spirits. They told me that five of their men had been

killed, and that their bodies were still there. The absence of visible

results from the enormous expenditure of ammunition during the day was

astonishing. I found, however, that the method of fighting employed

by the troops was to creep up as closely as possible behind a high

wall, and fire into the air in the general direction where the enemy

might be. Hence, the bystanders were in rather greater danger than the

combatants themselves. In fact, the total number of killed as a result

of the fighting of July 12th was twenty-six; seventy-six were seriously

wounded, and more than half of these were civilians.

The Chang Hsun contingents in the Temple of Heaven had hoisted the

republican flag at 10 A.M. An agreement was reached by which they were

to be paid $60 per man upon the delivery of their arms. Chang Hsun's

troops about the Imperial City held out for a larger payment. To my

astonishment, as late as Saturday, the 14th of July, I saw fully armed

soldiers of Chang Hsun on guard at the central police headquarters.

Asking the reason for this--for Chang Hsun's troops were supposedly

routed in pitched battle on the 12th of July--I was told that the

commanders had not yet settled upon the sum these contingents were to

be paid. Eighty dollars per man was finally agreed upon, and by the

15th of July Chang Hsun's troops, deprived of their arms and their

pigtails, had left Peking with their money, and were on their way to

their rural homes in Shantung.

The dragon flags disappeared on the 12th of July as suddenly as they

had appeared on the 2nd. The city quickly resumed its ordinary life.

The swift failure of Chang Hsun's enterprise was due to no inherent

weakness of monarchical sentiment in north China. In fact, monarchist

leanings among the northern military party are quite well known. It

had been assumed that such a movement would be launched, and, if it

had been more prudently planned and prepared, it might easily have

succeeded, at least for a time. Its total failure was due to the fact

that Chang Hsun, counting on monarchist tendencies among the northern

military men, neglected to make those preparatory negotiations which

would have turned the potential support into real strength. While

this is true, there can be no doubt that Chang Hsun's failure gave

an enormous setback to the cause of monarchism in China. After two

failures to reëstablish the empire, ambitious men will think many times

before embarking on such a venture again. Which is to say that the

efforts to restore the Empire actually served to entrench more deeply

the republican form of government.

CHAPTER XXIV

WAR WITH GERMANY: READJUSTMENTS

"It has been decided by the Chinese Government to declare war; on this

very day the decision has been formally adopted by the cabinet."

Thus General Tuan Chi-jui, then Premier, conveyed to me on the 2nd of

August the news of China's further entrance into world politics. I

had known about this from other sources. General Tuan had announced

it as his policy when I visited him on the 14th of July. He had then

stated that Vice-President Feng Kuo-cheng would assume the functions of

President, which President Li would relinquish, and that it would be a

war government.

The American Government had held to its view that China should not be

pressed to declare war. It believed that the breaking off of diplomatic

relations, for the time being, was sufficient contribution to our

cause in the war. But the Japanese, aided especially by the French,

had strongly urged the Chinese Government to join them. Not until much

later did the Chinese learn of secret treaties made between France,

Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, giving assurance to the Japanese that

no effective resistance would be offered by those powers to anything

which Japan might desire in China at the end of the war.

In their ignorance of these secret arrangements, the Chinese thought

that association with the war powers would put them on the footing of

an ally. Also, doubtless, the militarist party surrounding Tuan hoped

to increase its power through war activities. For my part, I allowed

the Chinese to feel that the American Government, desiring them to

decide this question according to their own best judgment, hoped that a

way might be found to bring the war situation into harmony with justice

to China.

When he announced the cabinet's decision, Premier Tuan took up with

me the matter of finance. He evidently expected that the American

Government, or the Consortium, together with independent banks, would

now furnish China the money needed for her war preparations. The powers

were considering what assurances to offer. In previous discussions with

Chinese officials I had repeatedly dwelt on the fact that should China

take this step, she would be entitled to specific and strong assurances

from the powers guaranteeing her political and administrative

integrity, in terms that could not easily be evaded in future. I had

made continued efforts to effect an agreement upon a declaration

favourable to the full maintenance of the sovereign rights of China. My

conversations with the Japanese minister during 1916 and 1917 had this

in view. Now that China was considering entry into the war, I again

suggested the desirability of such a declaration, and hinted to the

Chinese officials that they might be successful upon this occasion in

obtaining a statement which would fortify the sovereign rights of China

and prevent the further growth of special privileges and spheres of

influence.

My colleagues all appeared to be favourable to the idea. It would

undoubtedly have been possible for the Chinese Government to secure

such a specific and effective declaration. Instead, however, of taking

advantage of the position which their readiness to declare war gave

them, and boldly proposing such a declaration as a necessary condition,

they became tangled up in long discussions. The substance originally

proposed was worn down to a rather empty formula.

The first proposal was that the governments should declare their

policy to "favour the independent development of China, and in no way

to seek in China, either singly or jointly, advantages of the nature

of territorial or preferential rights, whether local or general."

The Chinese had suggested, in addition, a statement that the other

governments would accord to China their full assistance, in order

to "help it obtain the enjoyment of the advantages resulting from

the equality of powers in their international relations." As finally

adopted, the declaration simply gave assurance of friendly support

in "allowing China to benefit in its international relations from

the situation, and from the regard due a great country." Vague and

unmeaning as it was, the latter term was undoubtedly flattering to

Chinese _amour propre_. These assurances were given to China on August

14th, and the United States participated in them.

China's internal political situation had not improved greatly as a

result of the overthrow of the monarchical movement. On his return

to Peking as restorer of the republican government, General Tuan had

the chance to rally all elements in Chinese politics to a policy of

constructive action. With whom would he ally himself? As his distrust

of the Kuo Min Tang was great, he constituted his new government

without regard to that party, and sought instead to govern through

a combination of the Chin Pu Tang and the so-called Communications

Party. Of the latter the real leaders, Liang Shih-yi and his immediate

associates, were still living in exile under the mandate issued

by President Li. Mr. Tsao Ju-lin controlled the new wing of the

Communications Party, and he had a disproportionate prominence through

Japanese support. Both he and Liang Chi-chao, the leader of the Chin

Pu Tang, were under the Japanese thumb. This influence could thus

act strongly and extensively on Chinese affairs. It was a Japanese

loan that had facilitated the overthrow of Chang Hsun and made the

leadership of General Tuan possible.

These two factions, while they supported General Tuan, were mutually

antagonistic. Mr. Liang Chi-chao is a literary man and a theorist.

Long befriended by the Japanese, he doubtless believed himself to be

a patriotic Chinese who was ready to use Japanese aid, but would not

surrender any essential national rights. Not being a man of affairs,

he may not always have seen the bearing upon the ultimate independence

of China of the measures which he proposed. Some Chinese as well as

foreigners thought him merely the venal instrument of Japan; others

regarded him as essentially honest, but subject to being misled because

of his theories. As Minister of Finance, his administration tended to

bring about a great increase of Japanese influence in China.

Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, cynical, practical-minded, and keen, is a different

type of man. He was closely associated with Mr. Lu Tsung-yu, himself

the most pliable instrument of Japanese policy in China. Mr. Tsao

was educated in Japan; one or more of his wives were Japanese, and

in business and pleasure he was constantly in Japanese company. He

was out-spokenly skeptical about his own country and about republican

institutions.

The Government felt dependent upon assistance from abroad, for it had

financial difficulties due to inherited burdens and present military

expenses. It was made to believe that assistance could come only from

the Japanese. The Americans had left the Consortium four years ago;

they had every opportunity to interest themselves in China, but they

had done nothing substantial beyond the loan of the Chicago bank. In

China, the margin between tolerable existence and financial stress is

so narrow that a few million dollars may wield an enormous influence

for good or bad.

These needs were accentuated because the southern republicans were

holding aloof. They felt themselves excluded from the Government; they

doubted General Tuan's honesty of purpose, and they planned to remain

independent of the central authorities. From Shanghai Mr. C.T. Wang,

the most prominent of the younger republicans, wrote that Tuan Chi-jui

and his cabinet represented the reactionary element; that they were

strongly backed by undesirable foreign influence, and that the latter

would virtually control the Government. He ascribed to General Tuan

the ambition of paving the way to make himself emperor. The opposition

to Tuan, he said, would continue the fight until the Chinese Republic

was indeed a republic. As to American action in China, he noted that

America plays the game as a gentleman, therefore it is likely to be

outmanoeuvred by another country less squeamish about its methods.

Another letter from Mr. C.C. Wu, dated July 19, 1917, I will give

textually, in part:

... When General Tuan arrived at the head of his troops in Peking, he

had a good opportunity to gain the goodwill and coöperation of the

whole country if he had proclaimed his adherence to the constitution

at present in force, and to reassemble the dissolved parliament

in order that the Permanent Constitution may be completed and the

organization of the future parliament provided for; in other words,

that the basis for a legal and constitutional government may be

found. Unfortunately, other counsels seem to have prevailed. Another

assembly, without any semblance of legality, is to be convened and

the future regulation of the Republic is to be left in its hands.

This will only mean fresh internal dissension and strife. It is to be

admitted that there is much fault to be found with the old parliament,

but as I once told General Tuan, it is the name, the signboard, of

parliament that we must respect.

Meanwhile, the papers are full of the inquiry which the Entente Powers

are alleged to have made in regard to the declaration of war against

Germany, and the reply made by the Waichiao Pu that the step will be

taken almost immediately. Now, it is unnecessary to tell you of my

opinion in regard to this question ever since the interview we had on

that fateful Sunday in February, of my firm conviction of the many

advantages, both material and moral, that such a step would confer on

China, nor of the efforts I have exerted in the cause. And my week's

stay in Shanghai has not altered my opinion. At the same time I agree

entirely with the view expressed in the note you recently presented

to the Waichiao Pu on behalf of your government to the effect that

the paramount need of the moment is the consolidation of the country

and the establishment of an effective and responsible government, and

that, compared with this, the demarche against Germany, desirable

though it is, is of secondary importance. Indeed, it is nothing short

of ridiculous to declare war against a foreign power when every man

and every resource has to be kept in hand to meet possible civil

strife and when the authority of the Central Government is effective

in only a doubtful half of the country. It is difficult to see

what benefit the Entente Powers expect to derive by urging such a

government to take such a step, a step which is detrimental to the

best interests of China and contrary to the good advice tendered by

the U.S., with whom Great Britain, at least, associated herself. It

is enough to make one almost suspect that it is for these very two

reasons that the war measure is being urged on the Government.

Quite plainly, the southern leaders believed that the party of General

Tuan was in its war policy animated with the purpose of building up

its power at the expense of the rest of the country--particularly

of subduing the southern republicans. Even less unselfish purposes

were attributed to those who based their policy on foreign financial

support. In a speech in Parliament, Senator Kuang Yen-pao makes the

officials who contract ill-advised public loans say: "We are planning

for the conservation of the property of our sons and grandsons; why

should we have compunctions about driving the whole people to the land

of death? What matters the woe of the whole nation by the side of the

joy and happiness of our own families?" But the southern leaders did

not disavow the act of the Central Government in declaring war. Their

political opposition continued; but they accepted the international

action of Peking as binding on the whole country.

In such matters China has not the hard-and-fast ideas of sovereign

authority and legality which reign in the West. It was therefore

possible for a local government to be independent in most matters,

and yet to allow itself to be guided by the central authority in

some. A declaration of independence by no means implies that there

are no relationships whatever between the recalcitrant ones and the

central authorities. For this reason, too, the visit of a foreign

representative to any one of the governors who had declared his

independence would not, as in other countries, be regarded as an

affront to the Central Government. Circumstances might occur under

which the Central Government itself might favour such a visit, as

incidentally relieving the strain. I felt quite free to send attachés

of the Legation to the governors of disaffected provinces, and should

quite freely have gone myself.

In all my interviews with high officials the prime subject was finance.

Not that China, as an associate in the war, was to get such aid--which

was taken as a matter of course--but how it was forthcoming supplied

the only question. Mr. Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, who called

on me on the 4th of August, talked in favour of a big loan by the

Consortium. With this he hoped that the United States would again

associate itself. When he spoke of independent American loans, I called

his attention to the difficulty of concluding them or of calling up

the option under the Chicago loan, unless there were a parliament

whose authority was recognized by the country. Shortly after this I

saw the Acting President, General Feng. "China," he said--undoubtedly

to tell me something pleasant, but also because all Chinese do prefer

association with America--"China has followed the United States in the

policy of declaring war upon Germany. Now will not the United States

independently finance China? Or, if that is out of the question, then,

surely America will join the Consortium since that is the only way the

Chinese Government can be safely and effectively supported."

"The republican form of government," he vowed, "is now eternally secure

in China." I could not but remember his previous monarchist leanings.

The Acting President spoke of General Tuan. "I have a very cordial

understanding with the Premier," he assured me.

I went to the Premier on the 21st of August. In this discussion the

Chinese iron industry came up. The Premier asked: "Why not go ahead

with the development of mining and iron manufacture? Create a national

Chinese iron industry, and it will form the basis of a general loan

for industrial purposes." He thought, at first, that the Chinese

Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce should summon experts and start

the enterprise. I told him about the enormous technical difficulties

of such a project. Then he seemed to recognize that a contract with an

experienced and powerful organization, which could be held responsible,

would be more effective in establishing a national iron industry for

China. "I am not sure about the ore deposits near Nanking," he added;

"they may not be included in such coöperative enterprises."

I suspected that he was trying to get financial support from another

source, and was leaving his hands free to make them a grant there. I

put in a _caveat_ against any grant of iron ores to foreign nationals.

Americans had in the past been invariably informed that iron deposits

could not be leased or granted to individuals because they had been

reserved for national uses.

I visited General Tuan on August 22nd and found him more talkative,

more anxious to discuss the general aspects of policies than ever

before. "We must first of all establish the authority of the Central

Government," he said; "this can be done only through a defeat of the

opposition. My purpose is that military organization in China be made

national and unified, in order that the peace of the country shall not

at all times be upset by local military commanders. The military power

thus unified I intend to take entirely out of politics and confine it

to its specific military purposes. At present the military is used in

factional and political disputes. When this is no longer possible, then

we shall leave the public mind in civil life entirely free to settle

all questions of the Constitution and of the public policy."

I believe the Premier was sincere in these views, and in his efforts

to vindicate the authority of the National Government, but he thought

only in terms of military authority. He did not realize what the

organization of public opinion and of a civilian administration

require. His opponents feared that a consolidated military power would

be used by him, after all, to accomplish the reëstablishment of a

military dictatorship, such as that of Yuan Shih-kai.

The personal wisdom and integrity of General Tuan commanded respect,

but he was not fortunate in selecting his assistants. Both in Peking

and in the provinces his immediate advisers gave him trouble. When he

appointed General Fu Liang-tso governor of Hunan Province, he expected

the ready settlement of all difficulties there; General Fu would know

how to handle the situation. But the people of Hunan did not welcome

General Fu. Soon his authority and that of the Central Government were

questioned throughout that province. But the Premier never disavowed or

deserted his representatives. He was loyal to them, which accounts for

the strong personal influence which Tuan enjoyed.

The country could not be unified, of course, until railways were built,

and representatives of the Chinese Government often approached me to

ascertain Whether some action could not be taken in regard to the

Hankow-Canton Railway, long delayed in construction. This trunk line

would have joined the north and south. A trip from Peking to Canton by

existing routes took from ten days to two weeks: by direct railway it

should be possible to make it in two days. Not only the movement of

passengers, but of mail and freight, would stimulate an intercourse

that would be sure to overcome separatist tendencies. But China had

entrusted the building of this railway to foreigners, who had played

with the concession, had lost it, and, after reacquiring part of it,

were now delaying its execution. Europe was preoccupied with the war.

And now that China was herself entering the war, it seemed a prime need

of national preparedness to have this comparatively short remaining

gap in the communications of China filled out. Good friends of America

among the officials--among them Mr. Pan Fu, Mr. T.C. Sun, the managing

director of the Siems-Carey railway offices, and Mr. J.C. Ho--argued

with me, as did their superiors, to have America lead in completing

this essential highway of commerce.

CHAPTER XXV

THE CHINESE GO A-BORROWING

The time was come for China to put money in her purse. She was sure she

could do it, and sure that the United States, her great, rich sponsor

and friend, would help her to the means commensurate with her needs

of development for war. A suggestion to this effect had been made to

the Chinese minister at Washington by the Department of State. It was

undreamt of that no assistance whatever could be given to China.

During the fall of 1917 all my powers were devoted to securing for our

Far Eastern associate in the war the best form of American assistance.

I wished to avoid, if possible, a loss of the chance for giving Chinese

financial affairs a sound basis. Above all, it was essential to aid

in steering China beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were

luring her upon the Japanese rocks. China invited American leadership,

relied upon it. No other nation in the circumstances could justly take

exception to it. It involved no vast enterprise of immediately raising

a huge army in China, but of preparing the way for such mobilization,

if need should arise. This could be done by facilitating works which

would endure and which would contribute to the welfare of China and

the world, war or no war. It meant building means of communication

and improving the food supply. It meant reconstruction after the war.

It meant an expenditure of money that would be infinitesimal compared

with the sums spent in Europe. America had lent billions to the Entente

Allies; the hundred millions that would have served to make China fit

were a mere trifle. Nor was it necessary to insist upon independent

American action in this matter. America's leadership in behalf of the

common interest and in coöperation with her associates could produce

the results desired of putting the situation in the Far East on a

sound basis. I had always desired American independent enterprise

in individual cases, free from all entanglements and semi-political

arrangements with other nations, whose favour, fortunately, we did

not require. But in the great task of the World War joint action with

others was natural, and action in China, given only positive American

leadership, could have produced fine results. The war powers did get

together for some action. They suspended the Boxer indemnity payments

for China, and she got the benefit of the twentieth of _ad valorem_

duty which the treaties provided; on the basis of reckonings two

decades back, the 5 per cent. had really shrunk to 3. To restore the

rate fixed by the treaties was hardly a beginning of justice.

Here was China, ready, willing to take her part in the war. What should

she do? In America the slogan: "Food Will Win the War" was in vogue,

and China could furnish food. She could supply coolies, millions if

necessary, as workmen and as soldiers. The war had proved that the

training of men as soldiers could be a matter, not of years, but of

months. Plans were drawn up, at first for hundreds of thousands of

Chinese soldiers, then for half a million.

I urged my proposals on the State Department. The Canton-Hankow

Railway needed finishing. The Chinese arsenals and shipyards could be

refitted. I asked the consular officers and attachés for a rapid survey

of China's food resources; their returns showed that a large surplus

could be produced, if steps were taken at once to assure a market.

The Chinese have a genius for growing food; among them they have the

world's most skilful gardeners. But they needed added credit if they

were to put in more seed and harvest bigger crops. In these estimates

Professor Tuck of Cornell, who was up in Manchuria, and Professor

Bailey, in Nanking, gave their expert aid.

England and her European allies, it was determined, had "gone broke";

if there was to be a Consortium of lenders to China, would America

lead the way? Liang Chi-chao, Minister of Finance, proposed it. There

was China's public credit, with such vast human and material resources

as to stagger belief, waiting to be organized. There was the supreme

opportunity to send scattering all of the promoters of the unseemly

scramble to get special advantages through Chinese financial deals. I

spared no pains--for four years, indeed, I had laboured for this very

thing--to impress upon America the new vision of a developed China. Two

things halted action. Outside influences working in America itself were

aimed to stop the free play of financial enterprise in China; next,

there was the provincialism of the New York financiers. They would only

follow where other nations led.

Then there was the alternative--coöperation between the war powers. By

hoops and barrages of steel we were bound to our brothers of Britain,

France, and Italy; Japan was an allied and associated power; at every

point our gold and war bonds were mingled with theirs. We were powerful

enough to hold our associates to a policy of developing China for the

benefit of all participants; an end might be put there to "special

interests." I suggested a new consortium on this basis.

I went to the Chinese President. "I know," he declared, "that America

will spare no means whereby China may carry out her purpose to stand by

the side of the Allies on the battlefields of Europe."

From the President I went to the Premier. By this time he was not so

friendly. Time had elapsed; the glitter of Japanese money had been made

to catch his eye. I inquired concerning the Japanese loan of 20,000,000

yen, and incidental arrangements connected therewith. "Does not China

need to keep a credit balance in a foreign country," he asked; "and

would not the same arrangements be made with the United States if a

loan were made there?" Curiously, he added, "There is no need, yet,

of convoking parliament; no time has been set for it." A militarist

leader, he was being comforted by hopes of Japanese backing. But he was

quite willing to send a big army to Europe.