CHAPTER X

FOLK WAYS AND OFFICIALS

Several voices whispered: "It's Prince Pu Lun."

It was at President Yuan Shih-kai's reception, New Year's Day, 1914;

the diplomatic corps and high officials were there. The Empress

Dowager's residence, now occupied by the President, was the scene.

From the side rooms, whither we had withdrawn for refreshments after

exchanging greetings with the President, we looked out into the main

hall and saw that its floor had been entirely cleared, and a solitary

figure in a general's uniform was proceeding across the floor toward

the President. Walking alone and unattended, the representative of the

Chinese Imperial Family had come to bring its felicitations to the

President of the Republic. For the first time since the abdication, the

Imperial Family was publicly taking notice of him who had displaced it

in power.

When the guests began to depart I gathered up my party and left the

hall, together with Admiral Tsai Ting-kan. Outside was Prince Pu Lun,

still solitary, walking with sad and pensive regard. We overtook him.

I talked pleasantly with him on such non-committal matters as the

Imperial collection of art, which was at this time being brought from

Mukden. He seemed quite appreciative of this attention. I took him with

me to the outer palace gate where his own carriage met him.

Except the automobiles used inside of the palace enclosure, few were

then to be found in Peking; soon, with improved roads, many hundreds

came. The Empress Dowager before her death had acquired a large

collection of these foreign vehicles, which interested her greatly;

but up to the time of her death the Board of Ceremonies had not

succeeded in solving the problem how she might ride in an automobile

in which there would also be, in sitting posture, one of her servants,

the chauffeur. If they had had more time, I imagine that they might

have found some way by which the chauffeur could kneel in driving the

Imperial car, but, as it was, the poor Empress Dowager never had the

pleasure of the swift rides she so much coveted.

* * * * *

Many popular superstitions still prevailed in parts of the provinces.

The military attaché of the American Legation, Major Bowley, who later

did distinguished service in the Great War as general of artillery,

was active in visiting the military commanders in different parts of

China and in observing their actions and getting their views. He had

just returned from such a trip to Kiangsi Province, and related how

one of the generals there strove to improve his morale by drinking the

blood of enemies who had been killed. He spared Major Bowley a cupful

of this precious liquid, which was to be taken before breakfast. It is

startling to discover among the people so highly civilized as are the

Chinese occasional remnants of barbarous doctrines and practices. There

is an inverted homoeopathy in Chinese popular belief--to the effect

that "equals strengthen equals"; thus, to eat muscle develops strength,

to eat tripe aids the digestion, to eat heart or drink blood develops

courage, and so on.

* * * * *

One evening, at a dinner at Mr. Liang Shih-yi's house a spirited

discussion developed between the host and Mr. Anderson. The latter had

related a local custom of the Soochow region according to which it was

permissible for a community or a crowd of people to bite to death any

person who was thoroughly disapproved of by all. Apparently the method

of execution was in itself a guaranty of universal condemnation, as a

great many people would have to coöperate to effect the desired result

by this method. Mr. Liang protested that the expression "bite to death"

was in this case used only metaphorically, and there followed a long

debate on Chinese folk customs.

* * * * *

A dinner with General Kiang, Commander of the Peking Gendarmerie,

afforded another sidelight on Chinese character. We had already

been seated, when an unusually tall Chinese entered, wearing

Chinese civilian dress. He was introduced as Tutuh Yin (General Yin

Chang-heng), and I learned that he had just returned from Szechuan,

where he had become governor during the revolution, after putting to

death the Imperial Governor-General, Chao Er-feng. General Yin was of

striking appearance, with strong features, and vigorous in gesture.

Now, it is the custom at Chinese dinners, particularly when military

are present, to engage in extensive drinkings of health. The Chinese,

who are usually very abstemious, drink wine that resembles sherry, and

also a liqueur-like rice wine, which latter is potent. The proposer

of the toast raises his little cup and drains it in one draught; the

guest to whom he addresses himself is expected to do likewise; both say

"Gambey" (a challenge to empty the cup). General Yin, who seemed in

high spirits, was on his legs half the time "gambeying" to the other

guests, especially to myself and the other Americans, the military

attaché, the Chinese secretary, the commandant of the guard, and other

officers. General Yin must have performed this courtesy at least forty

times in the course of the evening, which with the attentions paid us

by the other members of the table round, amounted to a considerable

challenge of one's capacity. It must, however, be confessed that I

largely shirked this test, in company with the amiable General Yin

Chang, my Manchu neighbour, by irrigating a large plant in front of us

with the liquid dedicated to friendship.

I saw General Yin Chang next morning. He asked whether I knew what

had been the matter with Tutuh Yin the night before. I said that he

seemed very animated and carried his liquor very well. General Yin

then told me that after I had left, the Tutuh Yin had sat down with

him and talked seriously and intently, revealing his deep worry lest

Yuan Shih-kai should have him executed. He stated that Chao Er-hsun,

the brother of the murdered Viceroy, was in Peking, and with other men

using every influence to destroy him. "So," the Manchu general said,

"his bravado was just a cover for his worries."

Next day Yin Tutuh called on me at my residence. He expressed deep

regret for having taken so much wine on the evening of the dinner. He

said: "It is not my custom, but I was excited and worried because of

the uncertainty of my affairs." He then launched forth into a literary

discussion of Confucianism in its bearing upon modern thought. Not

knowing that he was a student of the classics, I was surprised when

he revealed this side of his nature. As a matter of fact, he greatly

resembled the men of the Renaissance who combined harsh and cruel

qualities with a deep love of literature. The last time I saw the Tutuh

Yin, more than five years later, he presented me with his written

works. There were gathered about twenty members of the Confucian

Society, and the conversation again turned around the permanent

qualities of Confucianism. When the concept of the "unknowable" was

referred to, General Yin cited at length Herbert Spencer's views

thereon. He said: "The greatness of Confucius lies in the fact that he

centred his attention on those things which we know and can control,

and that he aimed at the highest development of human action on this

common-sense basis. He leaves the dreams about the unknowable to

others."

Among our guests at a dinner was Dr. King Ya-mei, a Chinese lady

noted for her wide information and cleverness. We spoke about the

recent advance of Russia in Mongolia. "Who can resist Russia!" she

exclaimed. Like all thinking Chinese, she was deeply worried about the

difficulties confronting her nation on all sides. Dr. C.C. Wang, who

was also present, spoke of the lack of continuity in developing expert

knowledge, because of the frequent shifts which are made in the public

service.

Dr. King Ya-mei then told an amusing incident, which shows how natural

community action and passive resistance are to the Chinese. In an

orphan asylum at Tientsin a new set of regulations had been issued, but

the orphans had paid no attention to them. After a good many children

had been called to order without result, a meeting was convoked by

the principal. When the orphans were asked why they did not obey

the regulations, their spokesman said: "We are perfectly satisfied

with the old regulations, and have no desire to change them."--"But

the new regulations have been made by your teachers," rejoined the

superintendent, "and they must be obeyed."--"We do not think," the

spokesman replied, "that they are an improvement, and we propose to

obey the old rules."--"But, then you shall be punished severely."--"If

you try to punish us, we shall all go away; and then what will become

of the orphan asylum?"

They had reasoned it out that they were an important part of the

institution. That orphans should conceive the idea to go on strike

shows how normal and self-evident that mode of social action seems in

China.

* * * * *

I was visited by the newly appointed Chinese minister to Japan, Mr. Lu

Tsung-yu, who later became quite notorious in China in connection with

the loans of 1918. He was accompanied by Doctor Tsur, the president

of Tsing Hua College and a leading American-returned student.

Mr. Lu is a slight man of suave manners, keen intelligence, and a

love of manipulation. On this occasion he developed the idea that

coöperation between the United States, China, and Japan was possible

and desirable, as these three countries had many parallel interests.

It was his opinion that Japan could not create an extensive settlement

in Manchuria. He had been stationed in that region several years

when Hsu Hsi-chang was viceroy; and he told me that he had observed

that the Japanese came as officials, soldiers, or railway employees,

or in connection with mining enterprises: but they did not seem to

have any impulse to settle in the country as farmers, and as small

merchants they could scarcely compete with the Chinese. Mr. Lu had been

educated in Japan, being one of the first batch of Chinese students

at Waseda University; together with Tsao Ju-lin, at this time Vice

Minister of Foreign Affairs, who also later played an important part

in Chino-Japanese affairs; and Chang Chung-hsiang, the Chief Justice

of China at that time, a man who exercised considerable influence in

introducing into China the Japanese idea of judicial procedure and

organization and who became Chinese minister in Tokyo in 1916. This

trio of associates was popularly known as "the Three Diamonds."

* * * * *

An important meeting of the diplomatic corps dealt with the procedure

in the matter of claims against the Chinese Government on account of

damage suffered during the revolution. The Japanese, French, and German

representatives were inclined to insist that the Chinese Government

be held responsible for all losses which could in any way be said to

have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the revolution. In line

with the traditional policy of fairness and moderation followed by the

United States I strongly urged that only losses directly and physically

traceable to violent action should be paid, eliminating such uncertain

and contingent matters as anticipated profits. The British minister

gave support to this view; his legation, too, had not encouraged the

filing of indirect claims. After much discussion, the suggestion was

accepted in the form proposed. By this action were ruled out indirect

claims to the amount of nearly four million dollars, which had already

been listed and included by some of the legations in their totals.

* * * * *

The British Legation, in which diplomatic meetings are held, is an old

palace, formerly the residence of a Manchu prince, which was purchased

by the British Government at the time when legations were first

established at Peking. Fortunately, the fine architectural forms of

the old structure had been retained sufficiently to leave this group

of buildings justly proportioned, beautifully decorated, and free from

jarring foreign notes. One passes to the minister's residence through

two lofty, open halls, with tiled roofs and richly coloured eaves. The

residential buildings are Chinese without and semi-European within,

Chinese decorative elements having been allowed to remain in the inner

spaces. The diplomatic meetings always took place in the dining room,

where a huge portrait of Queen Victoria, from the middle period of her

reign, impassively--not without symbolic significance--looked down upon

the company.

There were at this time about sixteen legations in Peking, so that

the meetings were not too large for intimate conversation. The

proceedings were usually carried on in the English language, partly out

of deference to the Dean, and partly because English has come quite

naturally to be the international language of the Far East.

The diplomatic corps in Peking meets frequently, and it has more

comprehensive and complicated business than falls to such a body in any

other capital. Matters of diplomatic routine occupy only a subsidiary

place. Because of the system of extra-territoriality under which

foreign residents remain exempt from Chinese law and subject only

to that of their own respective nation, the foreign representatives

in China are constantly concerned with the internal affairs of that

country. The effects of any legislation by the Chinese Government upon

foreign residents have to be considered by the diplomatic corps: if

the most punctilious minister discovers that the measure in question

in any way transgresses that absolute immunity from local law which is

claimed, then objection will be made, and the unanimous consent, which

is necessary to approve of such matters, is difficult or impossible to

obtain.

Questions of taxation are constantly before the diplomatic corps, as

the Chinese local officials quite naturally attempt to find some way to

make the foreigners bear at least part of the taxation of a government

whose general protection they demand. The methods of proving claims and

collecting indemnities give rise to much discussion, whenever there has

been some outbreak of revolutionary activity. As certain revenues have

been pledged for international loans, the diplomatic corps will object

to the Chinese Government using these revenues at all before they have

been released as not needed for defraying the debt charges. One of the

most fruitful causes of irritation comes from attempts frequently made

by one or the other minister to "hold up" the funds belonging to the

Chinese until they have fulfilled some particular demand which he had

made. The fact that it may be an entirely extraneous and irrelevant

matter, such as the appointment of a national of the minister to a

Chinese government job, does not seem to disturb the man who thinks

he has found a clever way to achieve his purpose. The international

settlement at Shanghai and the régime of foreign troops in Peking

and along the Mukden Railway also give rise to a great many problems

which are referred to the diplomatic corps. From questions involving

the recognition of the Government itself to such matters as the

advisability of bambooing prisoners at Shanghai, no question seems to

be too big or little to come before this body.

The discussions tend rather to avoid general issues and to confine

themselves to a statement and explanation of the position taken by each

government. Occasionally the stubborn and unreasonable adherence of one

or two representatives to what is considered by others as an unduly

severe and exacting position, leads to joint efforts in an attempt to

make a more fair and liberal policy prevail. The discussions are not

infrequently longer than is necessary; the main points are lost sight

of, and discussion becomes entangled, because one side may be talking

of one thing, whereas the other has quite a different matter in view.

Until it is discovered that there is no real difference or only a

difference in form, much valuable time may be consumed. At times, these

conferences remind one of a university faculty meeting.

* * * * *

Weeks were filled with innumerable conferences on matters of business.

In China it rarely happens that the decision lies with only one

official. In order to have a proposal accepted, a great many men

have to be consulted and won over. Impatient representatives, backed

by strong national force, have frequently tried to cut short this

procedure, and, planting themselves before the official whose assent

they needed, have "pounded the table" until a promise was obtained.

They sometimes succeeded by so powerfully getting on the nerves of the

Chinese official that he saw no way to save his peace of mind but by

giving in. At one time I expressed great surprise to the Minister of

Finance, because, instead of insisting that reasonable arrangements for

the renewal of a certain short-term loan should be made, he had given

the representative in question--the agent of a munition company--a

large order for additional materials which were not needed, only to

secure an extension of time. He said, in self-defence: "The manners of

the man were so abominable that I could not stand it any longer."

However, the method of the strong arm and mailed fist, while it has

produced results in China, has also carried in itself the elements

of its own defeat. The Chinese may make a concession under such

circumstances, but they will thereafter have no interest whatsoever in

facilitating the business in question; on the contrary, it is likely

to be delayed and obstructed at every point, so that it can be carried

out only through constant pressure and show of force. The people of

China have a strong and widespread sense of equity. He who proposes a

reasonable arrangement and gives himself the trouble to talk it over

with officials and other men concerned, in the spirit of arriving at

a solution fair to all, will build on a sound foundation. Whenever

foreign interests have acted on this principle, the results have been

far more fruitful of good than where things have been carried through

with a high hand by demand and threat, without reasoning or give and

take. But to sit in conference with various people on all the phases

of any proposal is a great consumer of time. One is kept busy day and

night in following the roads and trails that lead to the final meeting

of minds from which action is to result.

* * * * *

I had a visit from the Tuchun Tien, of Kalgan, after my return from

America in the fall of 1918. I found that the Tuchun was in very bad

grace at the American Legation. He had interfered with an automobile

service which an American had tried to establish between Kalgan and

Urga, in Mongolia, and had in other ways shown an apparent hostility to

legitimate American enterprise. As the writing of notes had not secured

any satisfactory results, I began to probe into the situation to find

what lay back of the attitude of the general.

I found that he was "blood-brother" of Mr. Pan Fu, whom in turn I

numbered among my friends. I therefore consulted Mr. Pan Fu about

the situation. He said that there must be some misunderstanding, as

the General was certainly not animated by any feeling of hostility

to America; but that it was possible that the particular American

in Kalgan had rubbed him the wrong way. So he promised to write the

General a long letter.

A short time later he called on me and reported that General Tien

had written him that he was soon coming to Peking and would be very

glad to meet me. The Tuchun soon called on me, with Mr. Chow Tsu-chi,

and we had a most friendly talk. Very little was said about any past

difficulties in Kalgan, but a great deal about future prospects of

goodwill and mutual help. In fact, our friendship was quite firmly

established, and there was no further room for misunderstanding.

Tuchun Tien was an open-faced, friendly looking person who, though he

had straggling side whiskers unusual with the Chinese, had nothing of

the berserker in his bearing. Our conversation was long and cordial.

When it had already lasted more than an hour, Mr. Chow looked at me

apologetically and said, in English: "We had better let him talk, it

does him good." As for myself, I was glad to hear his views.

* * * * *

Mrs. Reinsch and I gave a dinner to Mr. Robert Gailey of the Y.M.C.A.

on the eve of his departure for America. About thirty guests were

present, all members of the American mission societies in Peking. I had

just entered the reception room to be ready to welcome our guests when

much to my surprise Prince Pu Lun was ushered in. It was evident that

there had been some mistake about invitations, but as there appeared

to be no other dinner given at the Legation, I made no effort to clear

up the error and tried to make him thoroughly welcome. I had the table

rearranged so as to seat the Prince between two ladies both of whom

spoke Chinese very well. He appeared to be surprised at the composition

of the company and the absence of wines, but was apparently well

entertained by his neighbours. When the dinner was about half through,

Kao, the head boy, came to the back of my chair and whispered to me:

"Mrs. Lee's boy outside. Say Prince belong Mrs. Lee dinner." So after

dinner I felt in duty bound to tell the Prince that Mrs. Lee had sent

word that she would be very happy if he could come to her house in the

course of the evening.

After a short conversation, in which he told me about his children

of whom he is very fond, the Prince departed, to recoup himself at

the house of the navy doctor for the abstinences laid upon him at the

minister's dinner.

PART II

THE PASSING OF YUAN SHIH-KAI

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR: JAPAN IN SHANTUNG

On August 8, 1914, Japanese war vessels appeared near Tsingtau. Japan

suggested on August 10th that the British Government might call for

the coöperation of Japan under the terms of the Alliance. In view of

possible consequences the British Government hesitated to make the

call; the British in China considered it important that independent

action by Japan in that country should be precluded.

Acting on its own account on August 15th, the Japanese Government sent

the Shantung ultimatum to Germany. The British Government was then

informed of the action taken. The German representative at Peking

had discussed informally with the Foreign Office the possibility of

immediately returning Kiaochow directly to China; but the Chinese

Government was now pointedly warned by the Japanese that no such action

would be permitted.

The Chinese Government then also seriously considered the policy of

declaring war on Germany. It would have been as easy for the Chinese,

as for any one else, to take Kiaochow from the Germans, but Japan was

ready and anticipated them. In fact, the Japanese minister stated to

the Chinese Foreign Office on August 20th that the Kiaochow matter

no longer concerned the Chinese Government, which, he trusted, would

remain absolutely passive in regard to it. The ultimatum to Germany,

limited to August 23rd, demanded the delivery, at a date not later than

September 15th of the leased territory of Kiaochow to the Japanese

Government, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to

China."

Basing its action upon the language of this ultimatum, the American

Government on August 19th made a communication to the Japanese Foreign

Office, noting with satisfaction that Japan demanded the surrender of

Kiaochow with the purpose of restoring that tract to China, and that it

was seeking no territorial aggrandizement in China.

On my return to Peking on September 30th, I found the Chinese in a

state of natural excitement over the action taken by Japan. By this

time the Japanese had invested Tsingtau; the British, who had also

sent a contingent of troops, were kept by the Japanese in a very

subsidiary position. The scope of Japan's plans was more fully revealed

on September 29th, when the Chinese Government was informed that

"military necessity" required the Japanese Government to place troops

along the entire railway in Shantung Province. As this railway had

never had German military guards, and as the portion near Tsingtau was

already held by Japanese troops, the military necessity of such further

occupation was by no means apparent.

Mr. Liang Tun-yen, Minister of Communications, called on me on

October 1st, expressing deep concern over the action of the Japanese

in Shantung. He stated his conviction that, in departing from the

necessary military operations around Tsingtau, it was Japan's plan

to stir up trouble in the interior of China with a view to more

extensive occupation of Chinese territory. From Japanese sources he

had information to the effect that the Japanese militarists were

not satisfied with the reduction of Tsingtau, but wished to take

advantage of this opportunity to secure a solid footing--political

and military--within the interior of China. He was further informed

that they were ready to let loose large numbers of bandits and other

irresponsible persons to coöperate with revolutionary elements in an

attempt to create widespread uprisings, in order to furnish a pretext

for military interference. When I called attention to the declarations

regarding Kiaochow in Japan's ultimatum to Germany, the minister shook

his head and said: "Unfortunately, Japanese policy cannot be judged

by such professions, but only by the acts of the last twenty years,

which make up a series of broken pledges and attacks upon the rights of

China."

President Yuan Shih-kai had wished to see me; so I called on him

informally on October 2nd. In stronger terms than Minister Liang he

set forth his apprehensions. "From information in my possession,"

he stated, "I am convinced that the Japanese have a definite and

far-reaching plan for using the European crisis to further an attempt

to lap the foundations of control over China. In this, the control of

Shantung through the possession of the port and the railway is to be

the foundation stone. Their policy was made quite apparent through the

threatened occupation of the entire Shantung Railway, which goes far

beyond anything the Germans ever attempted in Shantung Province. It

will bring the Japanese military forces to the very heart of China."

Thereupon Yuan Shih-kai requested that I ask President Wilson to use

his good offices in conferring with the British Government, in order to

prevail upon Japan to restrict her action in Shantung to the military

necessities involved in the capture of Tsingtau, according to the

original assurances given the Chinese Government. I communicated this

request to the President through the Department of State.

With great promptness, however, the Japanese executed the plan they

had adopted. They informed the Chinese that, being judges of their own

military necessities, they would occupy the railway by _force majeure_

immediately, but would leave its administration in Chinese hands--with

the stipulation that Japanese conductors be placed on the trains. The

Chinese found no means to resist this arrangement.

Mr. Eki Hioki, successor of Minister Yamaza, had arrived during the

summer. He had for many years been minister in Chile, where I had met

him in 1910; remembering his genial and sociable qualities, I was happy

to renew this acquaintance. Mr. Hioki differed from his predecessor in

his readiness to talk freely and abundantly. In our first conversation,

when the relations between the United States and Japan came up, he

adduced the customary argument that as the United States was preventing

the Japanese from settling in America, we could not in fairness

object if Japan tried to develop her activities and influence on the

Asian continent. I could honestly assure him that American goodwill

did go out in full measure to any legitimate development of Japanese

enterprise and prosperity, but we also had duties toward our own

citizens, who had been active in Chinese trade for more than 130 years,

as well as toward China herself. We could not be expected to approve

any action which would not respect the rights of these.

The Chinese people were becoming more and more alarmed about Japan in

Shantung. The large number of petitions and manifestoes which came to

me, as the representative of a friendly nation, from various parts of

China, gave me an idea of how widespread was this anxiety. Some of

these protests were written with the blood of the petitioner.

Count Okuma's declaration, that a large increase in the military forces

of Japan was needed to preserve peace in the Far East, was interpreted

as meaning that Japan would take the present opportunity to make

good her actual domination throughout eastern Asia. The Chinese felt

that any understanding with Japan would inevitably lead to the total

subjection of China to the political dominance of her neighbour. They

distrust all professions of Japanese friendship. Whenever I tried to

argue that a frank understanding between China and Japan was desirable,

I was told that China could not trust Japan; that Japan must not

be judged by her professions, but by her past acts, all of which

show a determined policy of political advance veiled by reassuring

declarations.

Thus the Chinese feared Japanese intrigue at every point. They

believed that revolutionary activities, as in the past, were getting

encouragement from Japan. The Japanese were ready to take advantage

of and to aggravate any weakness which might exist in Chinese social

and political life. They would fasten like leeches upon any sore spot.

The tendency toward rebellion and brigandage, the counterfeiting of

banknotes, the corruption of officials, the undermining of the credit

of important private and public enterprises, the furnishing of more

dangerous drugs when opium was forbidden--in connection with such

mischiefs individual Japanese had been active to the great damage of

the Chinese. But though it would be unjust, of course, to charge up

this meddling to the Japanese nation as a whole the connivance of their

militarist government was a fact.

The British looked upon the new adventure of Japan with a decided lack

of enthusiasm. While welcoming the losses inflicted on their enemy in

war, they were evidently fearful of the results which might come from

Shantung.

It was plain that the Russians, too, while allied with Japan, were

quite aware of the dangers inherent in the Chinese situation. Taken

with recent Japanese advances in Inner Mongolia, a situation was

created in northern China which would be regarded as dangerous by the

Russians. Discussing the unrest in China, the Russian minister said to

me significantly: "The situation itself does not impress me as serious;

the only serious thing about it is that the Japanese say it is serious."

In fine, the general temper and direction of Japanese action was

not relished by the allies of Japan. Japan had taken advantage of a

conflict which was primarily European, into the rigour of which she did

not enter, for the purpose of gathering up the possessions of Germany

in the Far East and the Pacific at a time when they could be but

weakly defended.

This policy of Japan deeply affected American prospects and enterprise

in China, as, also, that of the other leading nations. Since the

American attitude of goodwill toward China had in the past been

understood by the Chinese to imply a readiness to give them a certain

support in times of need, large hopes were entertained as to what the

United States would do. Rich and powerful beyond measure, she would,

in the minds of the Chinese, help China to maintain her integrity,

independence, and sovereignty. Other nations, not a little jealous of

the past goodwill of the Chinese toward us, were not slow to point

out that American friendship was a bubble which vanished before such

concrete difficulties as the violation of China's neutrality. But

the Chinese, after all, saw that it did not lie within the sphere of

its action for the United States to come to the rescue with direct

political and military support. True, the Chinese had encouraged

American activities in China. They had looked upon them as a safeguard

to their own national life. Since they were conducted in a fair spirit

and without political afterthought, the Chinese did hope and expect

as a minimum that Americans would stand by their guns and not let

themselves be excluded by political intrigue or other means from their

share in the development and activities of China.

CHAPTER XII

THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 1915

"Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control of China."

In these words President Yuan Shih-kai summed up the situation when I

made my first call on him after returning from Europe in September.

Many Chinese friends came to see me and tell me their fears. Admiral

Tsai said: "Here are the beginnings of another Manchuria. Aggressive

Japan in Shantung is different from any European tenant."

Events had moved rapidly. Tsingtau had been taken, German control had

been wholly eliminated from the leasehold and the railway. The Chinese

Government notified Japan that permission to use part of the Province

of Shantung for military operations would be withdrawn, since occasion

for it had disappeared. This the Japanese seized upon as a calculated

and malignant insult; it was made the excuse for presentation of the

demands.

The blow fell on January 18th. The Japanese minister sought a private

interview with Yuan Shih-kai. This meeting took place at night.

With a mien of great mystery and importance the minister opened

the discussion. He enjoined absolute secrecy on pain of serious

consequences before handing Yuan the text of the demands. He made

therewith an oral statement of the considerations which favoured the

granting of them.

The Chinese, fearing greater evils, did their best to guard the secret.

They could not, however, keep in complete ignorance those whose

interests would have been vitally affected; also memoranda of important

conversations had to be set down. As soon as I received the first

inkling of what was going on, I impressed it on the Chinese that, since

the subjects under discussion intimately affected American rights in

China, I should be kept fully informed in order that my government,

relying on the treaties and understandings concerning Chinese

independence, could take necessary steps to safeguard its interests.

The Chinese were of course ready to comply with my request. My

intercourse with Chinese cabinet ministers and Foreign Office members

was not confined to formal interviews and dinners. We exchanged many

visits during which we conversed far into the night, without wasting

time over formalities or official camouflage.

In the conversation in which he presented the twenty-one demands, the

Japanese minister dropped several significant hints.

The minister then spoke of the Chinese revolutionists "who have very

close relations with many Japanese outside of the Government, and

have means and influence"; further, "it may not be possible for the

Japanese Government to restrain such people from stirring up trouble

in China unless the Chinese Government shall give some positive proof

of friendship." The majority of the Japanese people, he continued,

were opposed to President Yuan Shih-kai. "They believe," he went on,

"that the President is strongly anti-Japanese, and that his government

befriends the distant countries (Europe and America) and antagonizes

the neighbour. If the President will now grant these demands, the

Japanese people will be convinced that his feeling is friendly, and it

will then be possible for the Japanese Government to give assistance to

President Yuan." Yuan sat silent throughout this ominous conversation.

The blow stunned him. He could only say: "You cannot expect me to say

anything to-night."

Quite aside from the substance of the twenty-one demands, the threats

and promises implied in this statement convinced the Chinese leaders

that Japan was contemplating a policy of extensive interference in the

domestic affairs and political controversies in China, making use of

these as a leverage to attain its own desires. The Chinese considered

it an ominous fact that the paper on which the demands were written was

watermarked with dreadnoughts and machine guns. They believed that the

use of this particular paper was not purely accidental. Such details

mean a good deal with people who are accustomed to say unpleasant

things by hints or suggestions rather than by direct statements.

A Japanese press reporter called at the Legation on January 19th, and

related his troubles to one of the secretaries. The Japanese minister

refused absolutely, he said, to say anything about what passed between

him and the President; therefore he had sought the American Legation,

which might have knowledge which could help him. With his assumed

naïveté the man possibly hoped to get a hint as to whether a "leak"

had occurred between the Chinese and the American minister. But it was

not until January 22nd that I learned the astonishing nature of the

Japanese proposals. Calling on one of the Chinese ministers on current

business, I found him perturbed. He finally confided to me, almost with

tears, that Japan had made categorical demands which, if conceded,

would destroy the independence of his country and reduce her to a

servile state. He then told me in general terms their nature, saying:

"Control of natural resources, finances, army! What will be left to

China! Our people are being punished for their peacefulness and sense

of justice." The blow evidently had come with stunning force, and the

counsellors of the President had not been able to overcome the first

terrified surprise, or to develop any idea as to how the crisis might

be met.

An ice festival was being given on the next evening at the American

guard skating rink. Mr. B. Lenox Simpson sought me out and accosted me

quite dramatically, with the words: "While we are gambolling here,

the sovereignty of the country is passing like a cloud to the east. It

is Korea over again." He had received accurate information as to the

general character of the demands. Two days later the representative of

the London _Times_, who had been out of town, asked me casually: "Has

anything happened?" "You may discover that something has happened," I

replied, "if you look about." That evening he returned to me with all

that he could gather.

Although these correspondents, as well as the Associated Press

representative, telegraphed the astounding news to their papers,

nothing was published for two weeks either in America or in England.

The Associated Press withheld the report because its truth was

categorically denied by the Japanese ambassador at Washington. Its

Peking representative was directed to send "facts, not rumours." On

January 27th it was given out "on the highest authority" both at Tokyo

and at Washington that information purporting to outline the basis of

negotiations was "absolutely without foundation." Only gradually the

truth dawned on the British and American press. The British censor had

held up the reports for a fortnight, but on February 5th Mr. Simpson

wrote me in a hasty note: "My editors are in communication with me, and

we have beaten the censors." From 25th January on, the demands began

to be discussed confidentially among members of the diplomatic corps

but publicly by the press in Peking. As the impossibility of keeping

the matter secret locally was now universally granted from this time

high Chinese officials consulted with me almost daily about their

difficulties. The acceptance of these demands, of course, would have

effectively put an end to the equal opportunities hitherto enjoyed in

China by American citizens; I therefore made it my duty to watch the

negotiations with great care.

The Japanese were avoiding any interference with the formal

"integrity, sovereignty, and independence" of China; they were

developing special interests, similar to those enjoyed by Japan in

Manchuria, in other parts of China as well, particularly in the

provinces of Shantung and Fukien. They could place the Chinese state

as a whole in vassalage, through exercising control over its military

establishment and over the most important parts of its administration.

There would be three centres from which Japanese influence would be

exercised--Manchuria, Shantung, and Fukien. Manchuria was to be made

more completely a reserved area for Japanese capital and colonization,

but with administrative control wielded through advisers and through

priority in the matter of loans. In Shantung, the interest formerly

belonging to Germany was to be taken over and expanded. A priority

of right in Fukien was demanded, both in investment and development;

this would effectively bar other nations and would assimilate this

province to Manchuria. The northern sphere of Japan was to be expanded

by including Inner Mongolia. From the Shantung sphere influence could

be made to radiate to the interior by means of railway extensions

to Honan and Shansi. Similarly, from the Fukien sphere, railway

concessions would carry Japanese influence into the provinces of

Kiangsi, Hupei, and Kwangtung. The Japanese interest already existing

in the Hanyehping iron and coal enterprise, which was a mortgage with

right to purchase pig iron at certain rates, was to be consolidated

into a Japanese-controlled company. Added to these was the significant

demand that outsiders be denied the right to work any mines in the

neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping company without its

consent; nor were they to be permitted, lacking such consent, to carry

out any undertaking that might directly or indirectly affect the

interests of that company. This astonishing proposal sought to make the

Japanese concern the arbiter of industrial enterprise in the middle

Yangtse Valley.

Group V consisted of the sweeping demands which would have virtually

deprived the Chinese Government of the substance of control over

its own affairs. The employment of effective Japanese advisers in

political, financial, and military affairs; the joint Chino-Japanese

organization of the police forces in important places; the purchase

from Japan of a fixed amount of munitions of war--50 per cent. or more;

and the establishment of Chino-Japanese jointly worked arsenals, were

embraced in these demands. The latter involved effective control over

the armament and military organization of China.

So stunned was the Chinese Government by the Japanese stroke that it

missed its first opportunity. It might have immediately given notice to

the friendly Treaty Powers of the demands, which affected their equal

rights in China, as well as the administrative independence of the

Chinese Government.

A member of the Foreign Office consulted me about the best method

of dealing with the demands; I expressed the opinion--which was not

given by way of advice--that the detailed negotiation of individual

demands, with a view of granting only the least objectionable, would be

likely to give most force to considerations of equity. Time would be

gained; the other nations interested would come to realize what was at

stake. If certain liberal grants and concessions should be made, China

could then with greater force refuse to create rights and privileges

incompatible with her sovereignty. The situation would then be more

fully and clearly understood by foreign nations.

As the negotiations proceeded the Japanese minister hinted to the

Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese public looked askance

at the present Chinese administration, because of the hostility

often demonstrated by Yuan Shih-kai; still, this feeling might be

conciliated. It might even be possible for the Japanese Government to

give President Yuan assistance against rebel activities. The sinister

quality of this hint was fully appreciated. It was at this point that

the Japanese minister used the simile which promptly became famous

throughout the Far East. He employed this picturesque language: "The

present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my government to

take far-reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweller's shop,

the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves."

Notwithstanding powerful efforts on the part of Japan to enforce

silence by menacing China and by muzzling the press in Japan, accurate

information got abroad; whereupon the Japanese Government presented to

the powers an expurgated version of its demands, from which the more

objectionable articles were omitted. Later on, it was admitted that

the demands of Group V had been "discussed," and statements were again

issued on "the highest authority" that these so-called demands were

merely overtures or suggestions, which violated no treaty and involved

no infringement of Chinese territory and sovereignty. The Japanese

Legation in Peking asked local correspondents to send out a similar

statement, which, however, was refused by them, as the true nature of

the demands was already known.

The British, who had more extensive interests at stake than any other

foreign nation, had shown agitation. British residents and officials

expressed deep concern because their government, being necessarily

preoccupied with events in Europe, could not give full attention to

the Far East. As the action of Japan had been taken under the ægis

of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it seemed to the British that this

was being used to nullify any influence which Great Britain might

exercise, as against a plan on the part of Japan to seize control of

the immense resources of China and of her military establishment.[2]

It was believed that some sort of communication relating to the demands

had been made to the British Foreign Office before January 18th. When

the expurgated summary came out, the _Times_ of London on February

12th published an editorial article describing Japan's proposals as

reasonable and worthy of acceptance; it was understood in Peking that

this approval related to the summary, not to the demands as actually

made. But the Chinese officials were apprehensive lest a ready

acquiescence of public opinion in the less obnoxious demands might

encourage Japan to press the more strongly for the whole list. As late

as February 19th, the State Department informed me that it inferred

that the demands under Group V were not being urged. The full text of

the actual demands as originally made had now been communicated to the

various foreign offices; but because of the discrepancy between the two

statements, they were inclined to believe that Japan was not really

urging the articles of Group V.

The Japanese minister had at first demanded the acceptance in

principle of the entire twenty-one proposals. This was declined by

the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. When the Japanese asked

that Mr. Lu express a general opinion on each proposal, he readily

indicated which of them the Chinese Government considered as possible

subjects for negotiation. Forthwith the Japanese minister replied that

the expression of opinion by Minister Lu was unsatisfactory; that

negotiations could not continue unless it were radically modified. Mr.

Lu was evasive and Mr. Hioki on February 18th became more peremptory;

he informed Mr. Lu that the negotiations might not be confined to the

first four groups--that the whole twenty-one demands must be negotiated

upon.

Thereupon I telegraphed inviting President Wilson's personal attention

to the proposals which affected the rights and legitimate prospects of

Americans in China. The President had already written me in a letter of

February 8th: "I have had the feeling that any direct advice to China,

or direct intervention on her behalf in the present negotiations, would

really do her more harm than good, inasmuch as it would very likely

provoke the jealousy and excite the hostility of Japan, which would

first be manifested against China herself.... For the present I am

watching the situation very carefully indeed, ready to step in at any

point where it is wise to do so."

Shantung was first taken up in the negotiations. The negotiators

were: the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang;

the vice-minister, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin; the Japanese minister, Mr. Eki

Hioki; and Mr. Obata, Counsellor of Legation. Vice-Minister Tsao had

been educated in Japan, and was generally considered as friendly to

that country. The Japanese minister, genial in manner and insistent

in business, was aided by a counsellor noted for tenacity of purpose

and for a grim dourness. Point by point the demands on Shantung and

Manchuria were sifted. By the preamble to Group II, in the original

version, Japan claimed a "special position" in south Manchuria and

in eastern Inner Mongolia. The Chinese took decided objection. The

Japanese minister complained on March 6th of slow progress, giving

thenceforward frequent hints that force might be resorted to. Finally,

on March 11th, the Chinese were informed that a Japanese fleet had

sailed for ports in China under sealed orders.

After agreeing to important concessions in Manchuria and Shantung,

the Chinese determined to resist further demands. Just here the

American Government gave the Japanese ambassador at Washington its

opinion that certain clauses in the demands contravened existing treaty

provisions. For the Japanese ambassador had offered a supplementary

memorandum which substantially gave the proposals of Group V as

"requests for friendly consideration." They were "mere suggestions" to

the Chinese! This method of disarming foreign opposition imposed one

disadvantage--it would hereafter hardly do actually to use military

force to coerce China into accepting the "friendly suggestions"

contained in Group V. The only chance of getting these concessions

was to keep the other governments in uncertainty as to the actual

demands, that they might not take them seriously, and meanwhile to

bring pressure to bear in order to force Peking to accept these very

proposals. The Chinese would feel themselves abandoned by the public

opinion of the world.

The Japanese increased their military forces in Manchuria and Shantung

during the second half of March; for a time the movement stopped the

ordinary traffic on the Shantung Railway.

The new troops were "merely to relieve those now stationed in

Chinese territory," it was stated. Military compulsion was clearly

foreshadowed; and thus beset, the Chinese had by the end of March

almost entirely accepted the Japanese demands in Shantung and

Manchuria. I had a long interview with President Yuan Shih-kai on March

23rd. He seemed greatly worried but was still good-humoured. He said:

"The buzzing gnats disturb my sleep, but they have not yet carried

off my rice. So I can live." Then growing serious he went on: "I am

prepared to make all possible concessions. But they must not diminish

Chinese independence. Japan's acts may force upon me a different

policy."

I wondered whether he was actually contemplating armed resistance.

"Against any action taken by Japan, America will not protest, so

the Japanese officials tell us. But the Japanese have often tried

to discourage the Chinese by such statements," he added. "They say:

'America has no interest in the Chinese'; or, 'America cannot help you

even if she wishes to.'"

Yuan felt that if America could only say, gently but firmly: "Such

matters concerning foreign rights in China, in which we have an

interest by treaties, policy, and traditions, cannot be discussed

without our participation," the danger would largely dissolve.

Certain possible solutions were now suggested by the Department of

State. They aimed to bestow desired benefits on Japan, but also to

protect China and the interests of other nations in China. Personally,

I felt that the demands of Group V should be wholly eliminated. Any

version of them would tangle, would more inextricably snarl, the

already complicated relationships of foreign powers in China, and choke

all constructive American action.

The Japanese demands respecting Manchuria were substantially complied

with during early April; and the Chinese thought this part of the

negotiations closed. Not so the Japanese; they manoeuvred to keep

open the Manchurian question on points of detail. Meanwhile, they

persistently injected Group V into the negotiations.

For over two months the negotiations had now gone on with two or three

long conferences every week. The furnishing of war materials, Fukien

Province, and pointed references to a "certain power"--meaning the

United States--occupied the Japanese part of the discussion on April

6th. The Japanese minister was strikingly peremptory in manner. Because

of the pretensions of this "certain power" he must insist on the

demands regarding harbours and dockyards. Control, direct or indirect,

of any naval base in Fukien must be frustrated, for the sake both of

China and of Japan. The present American administration might withdraw

its "pretensions"; but what if they should be resumed in future? The

only safe course was to exclude this power from any possibility of

getting such a foothold. Meanwhile, local Japanese-edited papers harped

upon the great influence which Ambassador Chinda was alleged to wield

over Secretary Bryan. It would be futile to hope, they insisted, that

America might in any way assert herself in support of China.

At this time I informed the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs that

should the attitude or policy of the United States be mentioned by any

foreign representative, and should statements be made as to what the

American Government would or would not admit, demand, or insist upon,

the Chinese Government would be more than justified in taking up such a

matter directly with the representative of the United States, through

whom alone authoritative statements as to the action of his government

could be made.

The American Government had filed with the Japanese strong objections

to the granting of any special preference to any one nation in Fukien.

It had also emphasized the right of its citizens to make contracts with

the central and provincial Chinese governments, without interference

and without being regarded as unfriendly by a third power. So far as

harbours and naval bases were concerned, as stated previously, the

American Government did not object to any arrangement whereby China

would withhold such concessions _from any and all_ foreign powers. But

Japan needed to allege some reason for making special demands with

respect to Fukien; therefore it alleged the machinations of a "certain

power."

No cause for apprehension existed. The talk of "pretensions" related to

the Bethlehem Steel Company's contract, made five years earlier, which

did not, however, touch Fukien, although a spurious version of the

contract, circulated in Peking shortly before, gave this impression.

An unfounded report spread by interested parties was thus made the

basis for a demand against the Chinese Government.

Meanwhile, what the Japanese had put forth for foreign consumption

in the way of news was being compared with what was actually done

in Peking. This annoyed the Japanese press, not so much because its

government had been caught in the act of trying to mislead its own

allies, as because timely publicity and strong public opinion abroad

were defeating the attempt to impose its demands on the Chinese. The

Chinese relied on public opinion. It was their great desire, as they

often said to me, that although the American people and its government

might not furnish material assistance it should at least know the

facts about the attack made on Chinese liberty; for they saw in the

public opinion of the world, and especially of the United States, the

force which would ultimately prevail. Even with Yuan Shih-kai, man of

authority though he was, this hope existed. Mr. Lu, the Minister for

Foreign Affairs, said to me: "All that China hopes is that America and

the world may know and judge."

Finally the _Japan Mail_, a semi-official Tokyo paper, published on

April 1st the full text of the Japanese demands in English. Thus was

admitted as a matter of course what had been categorically denied upon

"the highest authority." While the secret negotiations were going

on there was a byplay on the part of many official and non-official

Japanese, who were evidently trying to create an atmosphere of

antagonism to the Western nations. I received daily reports of

conversations in private interviews, at dinners, and on semi-public

occasions, in which Japanese were reminding the Chinese of all possible

grievances against the West, and picturing to them the strength and

importance that a Chino-Japanese alliance would have. Thus it was said

many times: "Think of all the places from which we are at present

excluded. Should we stand together, who could close the door in our

face?" Or again: "Are you not weary of the domineering attitude of the

foreign ministers in Peking? They do not pound the table in Tokyo. They

would be sent home if they did." It was constantly repeated that all

would be well if only China would let Japan reorganize her material and

military resources. Visions of millions under arms, splendidly drilled

and equipped--an invincible Chinese army officered by Japanese--were

conjured up. To all such siren songs, however, the Chinese remained

deaf.

A complete deadlock developed toward the end of April. The Chinese

desired to dispose of the grants concerning Manchuria. The Japanese

would not agree to anything definite without including the demands

under Group V. As a prelude to an ultimatum, the Japanese minister on

April 26th presented "demands" with respect to Shantung and Mongolia,

unchanged except for the wording of the preamble; this substituted

the term "economic relations" for "special position." With respect to

Hanyehping, they were softened to provide that the Chinese might not

convert the company into a state-owned concern, nor cause it to borrow

foreign capital other than Japanese. Certain railway concessions were

to be granted, and the most important demands under Group V were to be

embodied into a protocol statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Lu pointed out that the railway grants sought conflicted with the

concessions already given to British interests; Mr. Hioki then proposed

that China grant these same concessions to Japan, letting Japan "fight

it out" with Great Britain. With respect to Fukien, China was to state,

in an exchange of notes, that no foreign nation might build dockyards

or naval bases there, nor should foreign capital be borrowed for that

purpose. Japan, therefore, abandoned her attempt to secure preferential

rights in Fukien Province.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs handed his answer to the Japanese

minister on May 1st. The demands under Group V, Mr. Hioki was

informed, could not possibly be accepted by a sovereign power. With

respect to the other demands, a specific answer was given very closely

approaching acceptance of the demands as revised by Japan. No railway

concessions were made, however, and it included certain technical

modifications with respect to the Manchurian demands. Everything asked

with respect to Shantung was granted, with the counter-proposal that

China take part in the negotiations between Japan and Germany.

This was conciliatory; nevertheless, the Japanese were moving their

troops. Everything indicated extreme measures. Japan's reservists in

Mukden had been ordered to their station, Japanese residents in Peking

were warned to hold themselves ready. At Tsinanfu, new entrenchments

were being built. When it was known that an ultimatum would be

delivered, the Chinese officials were perplexed and undecided. Should

they await its delivery, or try to placate the Japanese by further

concessions? The Chinese find it hard to obey a demand backed by

force; they are used to arrangements based on persuasion, reason, and

custom. To submit to positive foreign dictation would be the greatest

conceivable _diminutio capitis_ for the Government. Chinese officials

visited me frequently. They seemed comforted in discussing their

difficulties and fears. I could not, of course, give them advice, but

I expressed my personal conviction that Japan could hardly find it

feasible to include Group V--which she had explained to the powers as

suggestions of friendship--in an ultimatum.

The position of the American minister throughout these negotiations had

not been easy. The United States was the only power that had its hands

free. The Chinese expected its resentment and strong opposition to any

arrangements conflicting with Chinese independence and the equal rights

of Americans in China. I could reiterate our repeated declarations of

policy and allow the Chinese to draw their own conclusions as to how

far our national interests were involved. But when the minister I saw

most frequently would ask: "But what will you do to maintain these

rights you have so often asserted?" I had to be particularly careful

not to express my own judgment as to what our course of action should

be, in order not to arouse any hopes among the Chinese as to what my

government would do. Instructions had been slow in coming.

It was my personal opinion that America had a sufficiently vital

interest to insist on being consulted on every phase of these

negotiations. The Chinese had hoped that America might lead Great

Britain and France in a united, friendly, but positive insistence

that the demands be settled only by common consent of all the powers

concerned. But the situation was complex. The state of Europe was

critical. The most I could do, and the least I owed the Chinese, was

to give a sympathetic hearing to whatever they wished to discuss with

me, and to give them my carefully weighed opinion. Our own national

interests were closely involved. It was my positive duty to keep close

watch of what was going on. While not taking the responsibility of

giving advice to the Chinese, I could give them an idea as to how the

tactical situation, as it developed from week to week, impressed me.

Dr. Wellington Koo all through this time acted as liaison officer

between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, although I also

saw many other members of the Ministry. In discussing the consecutive

phases of the negotiations, as they developed, Doctor Koo and I had

many interesting hours over diplomatic tactics and analysis, in which

I admired his keenness of perception. Some objection was hinted by the

Japanese Legation to Doctor Koo's frequent visits to my office and

house, but his coming and going continued, as was proper.

Councils were held daily at the President's residence from May 1st on.

Informally, the ministers of the Entente Powers advised the Chinese

not to attempt armed resistance to Japan; I believe the Government

never seriously contemplated this, although some military leaders

talked about it. Indeed, violent scenes took place in the Council;

it was urged that submission would mean national disintegration. It

would rob the Government of all authority and public support, while

resistance would rally the nation. The advance of Japan might be

obstructed until the end of the Great War; then European help would

come. They pressed the President with arguments that Japan might,

indeed, occupy larger parts of China; but this would not create rights,

it would expose Japan to universal condemnation. However, in the

existing circumstances of World War, the Government feared that to defy

Japan would mean dismemberment for China.

Then President Yuan Shih-kai and the Foreign Office made their mistake.

They were panic-stricken at thought of an ultimatum. They were ready to

throw tactical advantage to the winds. Losing sight of the advantage

held by China in opposing the demands of Group V, they offered

concessions on points contained therein, particularly in connection

with the employment of advisers.

But when the Foreign Office emissary came to the Japanese Legation with

these additional proposals and the Japanese minister saw how far the

Chinese could be driven, he stated calmly that the last instructions

of his government left no alternative; the ultimatum would have to be

presented. This was done on May 7th at three o'clock in the afternoon.

The Chinese might have foreseen that the demands of Group V would not

be included in the ultimatum. Nevertheless, they were astonished at

their omission, and annoyed at unnecessarily committing themselves

the day before. At first sight, the terms of the ultimatum seemed to

dispose of these ominous demands. In the first sense of their relief

from a long strain, the Chinese understood the stipulation of the

ultimatum that "the demands of Group V will be detached from the

present negotiations, and discussed separately in the future," as an

adroit way of abandoning these troublesome questions. They were soon

to learn that their hopes were not in accord with the ideas of the

Japanese.

Why, when the Chinese were virtually ready to agree to all the demands

actually included in the ultimatum, should the Japanese not have

accepted the concessions, even if they fell slightly short of what

was asked? Thus they would avoid the odium of having threatened a

friendly government with force; a matter which, furthermore, would in

its nature tend to weaken the legal and equitable force of the rights

to be acquired. The Japanese made two fundamental mistakes. The first

was in their disingenuous denials and misrepresentation of the true

character of the demands; the second, in the actual use of an ultimatum

threatening force. That these mistakes were serious is now quite

generally recognized in Japan. Why they were made in the first place is

more difficult to explain.

Possibly, in the light of subsequent events, when Yuan Shih-kai

realized that he must unavoidably make extensive concessions, he may

have sought a certain _quid pro quo_ in the form of Japanese support

for his personal ambitions. This would accord with the hint dropped by

the Japanese minister at the beginning of the negotiations. If this

explanation be correct, one might possibly understand that Yuan himself

in his inmost thought preferred that he should be forced to accept

these demands through an ultimatum. The possibility of such motives may

have to be considered, yet from my knowledge of the negotiations from

beginning to end, I must consider utterly fanciful the charge made by

Yuan's enemies that it was he who originally conceived the idea of the

twenty-one demands, in order that he might secure Japanese support for

his subsequent policies and ambitions.

A reason for the harsh measure of the Japanese Government is

admissible. The Japanese may have feared that public opinion throughout

the world, which was disapproving the character and scope of these

negotiations, would encourage the Chinese to hold out in matters of

detail and gradually to raise new difficulties. Moreover, the men who

wielded the power of Japan were believers in military prestige and

may have expected good results from basing their new rights in China

directly on military power.

The ultimatum gave the Chinese Government a little over forty-eight

hours, that is, until 6 P.M. on May 9th, for an answer. On May 8th, the

cabinet and Council of State met in a session which lasted nearly all

day, finally deciding that the ultimatum must be accepted in view of

the military threats of Japan.

In their reply to the ultimatum a serious tactical mistake was made.

I had been informed that it would be accepted in simple and brief

language; that the Chinese Government would say it had made certain

grants to the Japanese, which would be enumerated, making no mention

of Group V. Toward evening of the 9th a member of the Foreign Office

came to me, quite agitated, saying that the Japanese Legation insisted

that the demands of Group V be specifically reserved for future

discussion. "What form," I asked, "has the Chinese answer taken?"

"This," he replied: "'The Chinese Government, etc., hereby accepts,

with the exception of the five articles of Group V, all the articles

of Group I, etc.' But," he added, "when the draft was submitted to the

Japanese Legation, they insisted that after the words 'Group V' there

be added the clause 'which are postponed for later negotiation.'" It

had been thought necessary, my visitor explained, to state in the

reply that something had been refused, in order to save the face of

the Government. But it is perfectly plain that if Group V had not been

mentioned at all, the Japanese would have found it hard to insist upon

its being kept open; for it could not be avowed before other nations as

part of the matter covered by the ultimatum. As it was, the demands in

Group V were given the character of unfinished business, to be taken up

at a future date. Thus portentously, they continued to hang over the

heads of the Chinese.

Partly in an exchange of notes, partly in a convention, the concessions

exacted through the ultimatum were granted. None of these was ever

ratified by the parliamentary body, as the Constitution requires.

Because of their origin and of this lack of proper ratification, the

Chinese people have looked upon the agreements of 1915 as invalid.

The State Department had cabled on May 6th counselling patience and

mutual forbearance to both governments. The advice was needed by Japan,

but the instructions came too late; the ultimatum had been presented. I

should have found that its delivery would have seemed like whispering a

gentle admonition through the keyhole after the door had been slammed

to.

The Department cabled on May 11th an identical note to both

governments, which I delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on

the 13th. It was published in the Peking papers on the 24th, together

with a telegram from Tokyo asserting "on the highest authority" that

the report of the existence of such a note was only another instance of

machinations designed to cause political friction.

When he received the note Minister Lu said that he had tried throughout

to safeguard the treaty rights of other nations, with which China's

own rights were bound up. To a question from him I replied that

the American Government was not now protesting against any special

proposal, but insisted that the rights referred to in the note be given

complete protection in the definitive provisions of the Treaty. The

newly acquired privileges of the Japanese in Manchuria were touched on

in the conversation; I pointed out that any rights of residence granted

to the Japanese, by operation of the most-favoured-nation clause, would

accrue in like terms to all other nations having treaties with China;

they ought to be informed, therefore, of all the terms of the agreement

affecting such rights. On May 15th the Department confirmed this view

by cabled instructions, which I followed with a formal note to the

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It appeared that the Chinese Government was comforted by an expression

in which the United States in clear terms reasserted its adhesion to

the fundamental principles of American policy in the Far East.

So ended the famous negotiations of the Twenty-one Demands. Japan

had gained from the unrepresentative authorities at Peking certain

far-reaching concessions. But in China the people, as an anciently

organized society, are vastly more important than any political

government. The people of China had not consented.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: For instance, Putnam Weale wrote: "Though Englishmen

believe that the gallant Japanese are entitled to a recompense just

as much now as they were in 1905 for what they have done, Englishmen

do not and cannot subscribe to the doctrine that Japan is to dominate

China by extorting a whole ring-fence of industrial concessions and

administrative privileges which will ultimately shut out even allies

from obtaining equal opportunities.... In China, though they are

willing to be reduced to second place and even driven out by fair

competition, they will fight in a way your correspondents do not yet

dream of to secure that no diplomacy of the jiujitsu order injures them

or their Chinese friends."]

CHAPTER XIII

GETTING TOGETHER

There arrived in Peking in the fall of 1915 the members of a commission

sent by the Rockefeller Foundation, to formulate definite plans for a

great scientific and educational enterprise in China. They were Dr.

Simon Flexner, of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, of

New York; Dr. George A. Welch, of Johns Hopkins University; and Doctor

Buttrick, the secretary of the Foundation. By early September, 1919,

the cornerstone of the Rockefeller Hospital and Medical School in

Peking had been laid.

The China Medical Board had acquired the palace of a Manchu prince.

When their plans were first being formulated, the owner had just died,

and this magnificent property could have been bought for $75,000 Mex.

I cabled to New York at the time, advising quick action, but the

organization had not been sufficiently completed to make the purchase.

When, four months later, they were ready to buy, the price had risen

to $250,000. The fact that a rich institution desired to acquire the

property had undoubtedly helped to enhance the price; but real property

was then so rapidly rising in value all over Peking, especially in

central locations, that the price asked, as a matter of fact, was not

excessive, and a similar site could not have been secured for less.

A still further increase of values throughout the central portion of

the city was soon recorded; in fact, in many localities of China land

values have risen after the manner of an American boom town.

The stately halls of the palace had been dismantled and torn down

because they did not suit the uses of the hospital. The materials

recovered, however, were in themselves of great value. The Board had

decided, in consonance with the judgment of the architects, that

the Chinese style of architecture should be used, modified only

sufficiently to answer the modern purpose of the buildings.

We gathered on a sunny day of early September, when the air of Peking

has the fresh balminess of spring, to dedicate the cornerstone of the

first building to be erected. Admiral Knight, who was visiting us at

the time, accompanied me. Mr. Alston, the British chargé; Dr. Frank

Billings, who had just returned from Russia where he had been chairman

of the American Red Cross; and other representatives of the American

and British community were present, together with many Chinese. Mr. Fan

Yuen-lin, Minister of Education, represented the Chinese Government,

and Bishop Norris, of the Anglican Church, offered prayer. I made a

brief address in which I paid tribute to the achievements of American

and British medical missionaries, and expressed my high idea of the

value and significance, for science and human welfare, of the great

institution here to be established.

Incidentally, it had seemed to me--and I so expressed to Doctors Welch

and Flexner during their visit--that much of value might be found in

the Chinese _materia medica_. In my own experience there had been so

many instances where relief had been afforded in apparently hopeless

cases that I thought it worthy of special study. For example, a new

chauffeur whom I had engaged accompanied my old chauffeur in the

machine one day; as he jumped out, his arm was caught between the door

and a telegraph pole and crushed. We immediately had him taken to the

hospital, where the doctors decided that only an immediate operation

afforded any prospect of saving his arm, and that even a successful

operation was doubtful. I was told that evening that his mother had

taken the young man away, notwithstanding the entreaties of our Chinese

legation personnel. We gave him up for lost. But within six weeks he

reported for his position, only admitting: "My arm is still a little

weak." A Chinese doctor had cured him with poultices.

Similar cases often came to my attention. Mr. Chow Tzu-chi had

frequently suffered severely from rheumatism. He had tried every

scientific remedy without avail. One day I was glad to find him chipper

and in fine spirits. He said, "I am cured"; and he told me that a

Chinese doctor had fixed golden needles in different parts of his

body. Within a day his pains had disappeared. The empirical knowledge

accumulated by Chinese doctors through thousands of years may be worth

something.

In their hours of leisure from the scientific tasks of their mission,

the members of the Rockefeller board saw much of Chinese life on

the lighter as well as its more serious side. One evening we went

together to a Chinese restaurant where we met some native friends and

had an excellent dinner, of the best that Peking cooking affords. The

American guests were delighted with the turmoil in the courts of a

Peking restaurant. We were entertained after dinner by a well-known

prestidigitator. This man often performs in Peking, where he is

known among foreigners by the name of Ega Lang Tang. These words

mean nothing, being only an arbitrary formula which he uses in his

incantations. His tricks, many and astounding, culminate when, after

turning a somersault, he suddenly produces out of nothing a glass bowl

as large as a washtub two feet in diameter filled with water in which

shoals of fish are gaily swimming about.

In another way American initiative of an educational nature was

welcomed in Peking. Among officials and literary men were many who were

interested in the scientific study of economic and political subjects.

With them and with American and European friends I had often discussed

the desirability of establishing an association devoted to such work.

The old literary learning which had up to a very recent time organized

and given cohesion to Chinese intellectual life had largely lost its

power to satisfy men, whereas the scientific learning of the West

had not yet become sufficiently strong to act as the chief bond of

intellectual fellowship.

As all political and social action, and all systematic effort in

industry and commerce, depend on intellectual forces, it is evident

that disorganization and confusion would soon threaten Chinese life

unless centres were formed in which the old could be brought into

harmonious and organic relationship with the new, so as to focus

intellectual effort. Such centres would wield great influence.

With the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lu Tsen-tsiang, and a number

of other friends who were equally impressed with the need for such a

centre of thought and discussion, we decided in November, 1917, to take

steps toward forming a Chinese Social and Political Science Association.

The first meeting was held at the residence of the Minister for Foreign

Affairs on December 5, 1915, when plans were discussed. In an address

which I made on this occasion I expressed my idea of the significance

of the society as follows:

"The founding of the Society is an indication of the entry of China

into full coöperation in modern scientific work. This initial step

foreshadows a continuous effort through which the experience and

knowledge of China will be made scientifically available to the world

at large. The voice of China will be heard, her experience considered,

and her institutions understood by the world at large; she will be

represented in the scientific councils. At home the work of such an

association, if successful, should result in a clearer conception of

national character and destiny. The knowledge gained by its work would

be of great value in constructive administrative reform. But its

greatest service would lie in the manner in which it would contribute

to a more deep and more definite national self-consciousness...."

Virtually all the Chinese officials, of modern education, as well as

many teachers and publicists, interested themselves in the new society.

The idea was supported by men of all nations; alongside of Americans

like Doctor Goodnow, Doctors W.W. and W.F. Willoughby, and Dr. Henry

C. Adams, were the British, Dr. George Morrison, Sir Robert Bredon,

Professor Bevan, and Mr. B. Lenox Simpson; the French, M. Mazot and

M. Padoux; the Russians, M. Konovalov and Baron Staël-Holstein; and

the Japanese, Professor Ariga. The society thereafter held regular

meetings, at which valuable addresses and discussions were given; it

published a quarterly review, and it established the first library in

Peking for the use of officials, students, and the public in general.

Through the assistance of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hsu Hsi-chang, a

portion of the Imperial City was set aside for use by the library--a

centrally situated enclosure, called the Court of the Guardian

Gods. This had been used as a depository for all the paraphernalia

of Imperial ceremonies, such as lanterns, banners, emblems, state

carriages, and catafalques. When I first visited it, large stores of

these objects still remained. They were not of a substantial kind, but

such as are constructed or made over specially for each occasion; and,

while they were quite interesting, they had no intrinsic value. That

the officials and the Imperial Family should combine to set aside so

valuable an area for a modern scientific purpose was an indication that

China is moving.

Attached to the French Legation was the brilliant sinologist Paul

Pelliot, whose explorations in Turkestan had secured such great

treasures for the French museums and the Bibliothèque Nationale.

Though he acted officially as military attaché, M. Pelliot really had a

far broader function, being liaison officer between French and Chinese

culture.

Before the war the Germans had an educational attaché. On account of

the close relationship between Chinese and American education through

the thousands of American returned students, I strongly urged the

appointment of an attaché who could give his attention to educational

affairs. I was so pressed with other business that hundreds of

invitations to address educational bodies throughout China had to go

unaccepted. If there had been an assistant who could have met the

Chinese on these occasions, he could have been exceedingly helpful to

them. But I was told from Washington that there was no provision for an

attaché with such functions.

The intimate feeling of coöperation between the British and American

communities expressed itself in many meetings, in some of which the

Chinese, too, participated. Thus, on December 8, 1917, there was held a

reception of the English-speaking returned students. The Minister for

Foreign Affairs; a number of his counsellors; the British minister, Sir

John Jordan, and his staff; the American Legation; the missionaries;

all who had received their education in the United States or Great

Britain, were here present. It was a large company that gathered in the

hall of the Y.M.C.A., including a great many Chinese women.

The hum of the preliminary conversation was suddenly interrupted by

a loud voice issuing from a young man who had hoisted himself on a

chair in the centre of the room. He proceeded to give directions for

the systematic promotion of sociability and conversation. The Chinese

guests were to join hands and form a circle around the room, facing

inward; within that circle the British and American guests were to

join hands, forming a circle facing outward. At the given word the

outer circle was to revolve to the right, the inner circle to the

left. At the word "halt," everyone was to engage his or her vis-à-vis

in conversation. To eliminate every risk of stalemate, the topics for

conversation were given out, one for each stop of the revolving line,

the last being: "My Greatest Secret."

The young man who proposed this thoroughly American system of breaking

the ice had just come out from Wisconsin, and it was his business to

secure the proper mixing in miscellaneous gatherings. The British

seemed at first somewhat aghast at the prospect of this rotary and

perambulatory conversation; yet they quite readily fell in with the

idea, and when the first word of halt was given, I noticed Sir John

duly making conversation with a simpering little Chinese girl opposite

him.

A little later, in December, there was formed an Anglo-American

Club, which celebrated its début with a dinner at the Hotel of Four

Nations. This was the beginning of the closest relationship that has

ever existed between the Americans and British in the Far East. In my

brief speech I expressed my genuine feeling of satisfaction that this

coöperation should have come about.

My relations with educational authorities and activities in Peking were

most pleasant. When Commencement was celebrated at Peking University

I had the distinction of an honorary LL.D. conferred upon me. This

courtesy was performed in a very graceful manner by Doctor Lowry, my

wise and experienced friend, under whose presidency this institution

had been built up from small beginnings. I was so interested in the

promise of this American university in the capital of China that

I consented to act as a member of the Board, and I had interested

myself in its development as far as my official duties would permit.

To my great satisfaction, the university had at this time become

interdenominational, representing four of the Christian mission

societies active in China. A liberal spirit pervaded the university,

inspiring its members with a desire to serve China by spreading the

light of learning, without narrow denominational limitations, relying

on Christian spirit and character to exert its influence without undue

insistence on dogma. By a pleasant coincidence, I on that very date

received a cablegram telling me that my alma mater, the University of

Wisconsin, had also given me the honorary LL.D.

An opportunity for general meetings of Americans and British,

including, also, other residents of Peking, interested in things of the

mind, was afforded by a lecture course arranged by the Peking Language

School. I opened the course with an address on the conservation of

the artistic past of China, which was given at the residence of the

British minister. Sir John Jordan in his introductory remarks said

that the time was at hand when foreigners residing in China would take

a far deeper and more intimate interest in Chinese civilization than

they had done before. I spoke of the danger of losing the expertness

and the creative impulse of Chinese art and of the readiness it had

always shown in the past to develop new forms, methods, and beauties.

Subsequent lectures were given alternately at my residence and at the

theatre of the British Legation, and the entire course emphasized our

common interest in Chinese civilization.

During the height of the student movement in 1919 the Peking police

closed the offices of the _Yi Shih Pao_ (Social Welfare), a liberal

paper in Peking. The paper had made itself disliked by publishing news

of the Japanese negotiations and criticizing the militarist faction.

A number of Americans had previously interested themselves in the

paper, because of its liberal tendencies and because of its devotion to

social welfare work; they proposed to take it over, but the transfer

had not yet been carried out. The Chinese editor of the paper appealed

to me to assist him in the liberation of an associate who had been

imprisoned. As no legal American interest at the time existed in the

paper, however, it was not possible to use my good offices in its

behalf, although I had at all times made the Chinese officials know

that the suppression of free speech in the press was a very undesirable

procedure. The suppression of the _Yi Shih Pao_ was a result of the

desire of the reactionary faction in Peking to choke every expression

favourable to the national movement; they had been encouraged to

imitate the stringent press regulations of Japan.

Later on the Americans completed their purchase of the _Yi Shih Pao_.

The question as to how far American protection should be extended over

newspapers printed in Chinese, but owned by Americans, then came up

for decision. As Americans had become interested in the _bona fide_

enterprise of publishing newspapers in Chinese, it was not apparent

how such protection as is given to others for their legitimate

interests could be refused in this case. I therefore recommended to

the Department of State that no distinction be made against such

enterprises, and several vernacular papers were subsequently registered

in American consulates.

When I told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that American

registry had been given the _Yi Shih Pao_, I informed him of the

character of the American press laws, under which newspapers are in

normal times entirely free from censorship, but are responsible in

law for any misstatements of fact injurious to individuals. Many of

the reactionary officials had persistently opposed the idea of having

American-registered vernacular papers in China. But, manifestly, they

could not make any valid protest against such an arrangement. In fact,

we never had any expression of official displeasure; on the contrary,

nothing could have been more welcome to the people of China and to the

great majority of officials than to know that vernacular papers were to

be published in China by Americans.

The publication in Peking of news from abroad was much facilitated

by wireless. Early in 1919 I entertained at lunch several American

newspapermen, with whom I had a conference on the press and news

situation in the Far East. They were Mr. Fleisher, of the _Japan

Advertiser_; Mr. McClatchey, of the _Sacramento Bee_; Mr. Sharkey, of

the Associated Press; and Mr. Carl Crow, representative of the American

Committee on Public Information. Mr. Walter Rogers, an expert in this

matter, had been in Peking shortly before.

The great difficulty with which we were confronted in any attempt to

develop the news service between China and the United States was the

expense of telegraphing by cable, which made it impossible to transmit

an adequate news service. We were therefore all agreed that it was

essential to use the wireless and that every effort should be made for

arrangements whereby the wireless system of the American Government

would carry news messages at a reasonable rate.

The importance of a direct news service was demonstrated during the

war, when under an arrangement by the Committee on Public Information

a budget of news was sent by wireless daily to the Far East. For

the first time in history had there been anything approaching a

fairly complete statement of what was going on in the United States.

The service of news of the Peace Conference was also particularly

appreciated by everybody in China. China had never been so close to

Europe before.

The only agency supplying news in China is Reuter's. Its news budget

is made up in London. It proceeds to Spain, Morocco, and down the west

coast of Africa to the Cape; thence up the east coast of Egypt, Persia,

India, and Ceylon. At each of the main stations on the way items of

only local interest there are withdrawn. What is left at Ceylon as of

interest to the Far East is sent on to Singapore and Hong-Kong, as well

as by another route to Australia. It is quite natural that with such

a source and such a routing, this service should carry next to nothing

about America. I once had it observed for a whole month in June, 1916,

when the only American item carried was that Mr. Bryan had shed tears

at the National Democratic Convention!

CHAPTER XIV

WAR DAYS IN PEKING

During my first absence in America Mr. Peck had been appointed consul

at Tsingtau, and Dr. Charles D. Tenney had been sent as his successor.

My predecessor, Mr. W.J. Calhoun, in a letter concerning Doctor

Tenney, bore witness to his unusual acquaintanceship with the Chinese

and knowledge of Chinese affairs. Speaking of Doctor Tenney's joy in

returning to China, Mr. Calhoun remarked: "There is a strange thing

about foreigners who have lived very long in China: they never seem to

be contented anywhere else. They are apparently bitten by some kind

of bug which infuses a virus into their blood, and makes life in that

country the only thing endurable."

Existence of a state of war deeply affected social life in Peking.

The mutual enemies could, of course, not see each other. Their social

movements, therefore, were considerably restricted. The neutrals,

however, having relations with both sides, were if anything more

busy socially than at other times. Dinners had to be given in sets,

one for the Entente Allies, the other for the Central Powers. The

Austrian minister decided that as his country was at war and his

people were suffering, he would not accept any dinner invitations at

all, except for small parties _en famille_. The other representatives

of belligerent powers kept up their social life on a reduced scale.

Dancing was gradually restricted, and finally passed out almost

entirely.

Mr. Rockhill had died at Honolulu in December, 1914. He had been

retained by President Yuan as his personal adviser, and was returning

to China from a brief visit to the United States. I felt the loss of a

man of such unusual ability and experience, to whom China had been the

most interesting country in the world. In all the difficulties which

followed, his advice would have been of great value to the Chinese

President and Government.

The report of the Engineers' Commission which investigated the

Hwai River Conservancy project made that enterprise look even more

attractive than I had anticipated. The value of the redeemed land alone

would be more than enough to pay the cost of the improvements. I felt

that the work would give great credit to the American name. Not only

would it assure the livelihood of multitudes through the redemption

of millions of the most fertile acres in China, but it would give

to the Chinese a living example of how, by scientific methods, the

very foundations of their life could be improved. During the winter

of 1914-15 a terrible famine was again devastating that region,

threatening hundreds of thousands of peasants with extinction. Never

had the sum of twenty millions of dollars produced such benefits as

would be assured here. But after urgent appeals to the Department in

Washington, the National Red Cross, and the Rockefeller Foundation, it

was found impossible to secure the necessary capital during the year of

the option. The best I could do was to ask for an extension, which was

granted, although the Chinese themselves were impatient to see the work

begun.

We received reports during the first winter of the war about the

suffering endured by German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia. They

had been captured during the summer and early autumn, and transported

to Siberia in their summer uniforms. Subjected to the intense cold

of a Siberian winter, they were herded in barracks unprovided with

ordinary necessities; these were sealed to exclude the cold and all

kinds of disease were soon rampant. The Legation at Peking, being

nearest to Siberia, superintended the relief work there of the

American Red Cross; there was also a German relief organization (called

_Hilfsaktion_), of which a capable and enterprising woman of Austrian

descent, Madame Von Hanneken, was the moving spirit. The Legation's

work increased; innumerable appeals came to it directly, and in lending

its good offices to the German association care had to be taken that

no use of it be made that could be properly objected to. Madame Von

Hanneken was on friendly terms with the Russian Legation, which gave

her society needed facilities. Its direct representatives were European

neutrals, chiefly Danes and Swedes. The work of the American Red Cross

among the war prisoners in Siberia, as well as the efforts of the

Y.M.C.A. to introduce among them industrial and artistic activities to

alleviate their lot, make a story of unselfish effort.

I tried to encourage the Chinese to build good roads. The Imperial

roads around Peking were surfaced with huge flagstones which, through

rain and climate, had lost alignment; they tilted and sloped at angles

like the logs of a corduroy road. Vehicles might not pass them, while

the Chinese carts picked their way as best they could over low-lying

dirt tracks by the side of these magnificent causeways. The Chinese

proverbial description of them is: "Ten years of heaven and a thousand

years of hell." The country thoroughfares have worn deep; it is a

Chinese paradox that the rivers usually flow above and the highways lie

below the surface of the land. In the _loess_ regions the roads are

often cut thirty or forty feet deep into the soil.

I first suggested the building of a road from Tientsin to Peking, but

the railways did not encourage this enterprise, and it was delayed

several years. Mr. E.W. Frazar, an American merchant from Japan who

accompanied me to Tokyo in 1915, had successfully established motor-car

services in Japan. He had come to north China to establish a branch

of his firm there; he was willing to get American capital for road

building and to make a contract therefor with the Chinese Government.

This particular contract was not concluded, but an impetus had been

given to the idea among the Chinese, and the building of roads was

gradually taken up, beginning with highways around Peking. The leading

men became interested when they began to realize its effect on real

estate values.

Governor-General Harrison of the Philippine Islands spent a week in

Peking, sightseeing, making many purchases of antiques and Peking

products. He was much taken with the Chinese rugs and ordered a number

of huge carpets to be made for the Malacañan Palace. We both strongly

felt that something should be done to prevent the total disappearance

of the American flag from the Pacific, and this we knew would occur

if the existing companies carried out their threats of retrenchment

and withdrawal. Had one been able to foresee the enormous demand for

shipping which was soon to arise, he might have outdistanced the

richest of existing millionaires. The Chinese Government did give to

an American a contract to establish a Chino-American steamship line,

with a government guarantee of $3,000,000; unfortunately, it shared

the all-too-common fate of American undertakings in China and was not

carried out.

The lunar New Year of the Chinese Calendar was changed to the

Republican (Min Kuo) New Year. On January 1st Peking was given a festal

aspect. The Central Park, a part of the old Imperial City, had been

opened to the public, and under innumerable flags crowds streamed along

the pathways, stopping at booths to buy souvenirs and toys, or entering

the always popular eating places where both foreign and Chinese music

is played by bands large and small. On various public places fairs were

held; extensive settlements of booths built of bamboo poles and matting

sprang up overnight. There, curios, pictures, brass utensils, wood

carvings, gold fishes, ming eggs, birdcages, and other objects useful

and ornamental were on sale. Wandering troops of actors and acrobats

performed in enclosures to which the public was admitted for a small

fee. Before one of these stockades I saw a large sign reading: "Chow

and Chang--champion magicians educated _from_ America." So, even here,

American education was valued. The art collection in the Imperial City

was open at half the usual admission fee; the grounds of the Temple

of Agriculture and of the Temple of Heaven were crowded with holiday

visitors, and at all theatres were special performances. For three or

four days the city wore a holiday aspect.

But the old New Year was not abandoned. On the days before the lunar

year ended the streets became alive with shoppers preparing for the

grand annual feasting. Quantities of fattened ducks, pigs, chickens,

and fishes, loads of baked things and sweets were transported in

carts, rickshaws, and all sorts of vehicles or by hand, everyone

chattering and smiling in happy anticipation. The Chinese New Year is

the traditional time for settling all outstanding accounts. Slates

are wiped clean, partnerships are wound up, and all balances settled.

When New Year's eve comes, having strained themselves to meet their

obligations, all cast dull care aside. Families and clans gather for a

gargantuan feasting, the abundance and duration of which outdistances

anything seen in the West.

The official celebration of the Republican New Year at the President's

Palace had to be modified. Because of the war the diplomatic corps

could not be received as a unit. It was therefore arranged that the

President receive the foreign representatives in three groups: the

Allies, the Neutrals, and the Central Powers. High Chinese officials

and picturesque Mongolian dignitaries were received on the first day,

the diplomatic representatives on the second. As the President chatted

informally with each minister, Madam Yuan received in an adjoining

apartment, talking quite naturally with the ladies of the party about

such feminine matters as the size of families and the choice of dress

materials.

A short time ago a young American teacher, Hicks, was murdered and

his two companions seriously wounded while they were ascending the

Yangtse River in a boat. The attack was at the dead of night; the

survivors recalled only flaring torches and swarthy faces, although

they believed that their assailants wore some sort of uniform. The

Chinese Government disavowed responsibility, considering it an ordinary

robbery, and asserting that if the assailants wore uniforms they must

have been insurgents, as no regular troops were near that place. The

crime was revolting, destructive of the sense of security of foreign

travellers, and I insisted absolutely on payment of an indemnity.

Money payment is by no means satisfactory; it does give the injured

parties redress and testifies to the desire of the Central Government

to protect foreigners, but does not bring the consequences of the crime

home to the really guilty parties. I therefore always tried to have the

personal responsibility in such matters followed up and specifically

determined; in this case it was impossible. The Chinese Government

finally agreed to the very handsome indemnity of $25,000 for the death

of young Hicks, the largest pecuniary award for loss of life ever made

in China. It was an ironical circumstance that just after this had been

settled, an American driving his automobile at excessive speed in the

Peking streets struck and killed an old Chinese woman. When I stated to

the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would ask this man to pay $300

to the relatives, he replied with a twinkle: "How much was it we paid

you for the last American who was killed?"

However, he did not really intend to dispute the reasonableness of

even so enormous a difference. Foreigners in China, on account of

their employment as managers or head teachers, necessarily have to be

considered, from a purely pecuniary point of view, to have a value far

above the average. Moreover, should large indemnities be paid for

the death of poor people among the Chinese, they would be constantly

tempted to let themselves be injured or even killed, in order to

provide for their families.

Among the Chinese who visited me during the first year of the war were

the military and civil governors of Chekiang Province. Contrary to

tradition, both were natives of the province they governed, and good

governors, too. The civil governor, Mr. Chu Ying-kuang, who was under

forty, was a man of great public spirit and wisdom, eager to discuss

constructive ideas and effective methods in government and industry.

Governor Chu wrote me a letter of thanks, which may be considered an

example of Chinese epistolary style. It ran:

During my short stay in the Capital I hurriedly visited your

Excellency and was so fortunate as to draw upon the stores of

your magnificence and gain the advantage of your instruction. My

appreciation cannot be expressed in words. You also treated me with

extraordinary kindness in preparing for me an elaborate banquet.

Your kindness and courtesy were heaped high and your treasures were

lavishly displayed. My gratitude is graven on my heart and my hope and

prayer is that the splendour of your merit may daily grow brighter and

that your prosperity may mount as high as the clouds.

I, your younger brother, left Peking on the 29th of last month for the

South, and on February 2nd arrived at Hangchou. The whole journey was

peaceful so that your embroidered thoughts need not be exercised. I

reflect fondly on your refined conversation and cannot forget it for

an instant. I respectfully offer this inch-long casket to express my

sincere gratitude and hope that you will favour it with a glance.

Respectfully wishing you daily blessings,

Your younger brother.

The new German minister, Admiral von Hintze, arrived shortly after

the New Year. I saw him frequently after his first visit, as he had

few colleagues with whom, under the conditions of war, he could meet.

In order to avoid capture as an enemy, Admiral von Hintze had come

from the United States incognito, as a supercargo on a Norwegian

vessel. He had been minister in Mexico, and before that the Emperor's

representative at the court of the Czar, and was a man of wide

knowledge of European affairs and of diplomatic intrigue. For a man

of his intelligence, he was inclined to give undue weight to rumours.

Peking was amused shortly after his arrival when he sent orders to the

Germans resident in all parts of the capital to hold themselves ready

to come into the Legation Quarter immediately upon notice being given.

He had read books on the troubles of 1900 and on the assassination of

his predecessor, Baron Kettler; he therefore saw dire menaces where

everything seemed quite normal to older residents. Especially, he

imagined himself surrounded by emissaries and retainers of the enemy.

Several times he would say to me: "My first 'boy' is excellent. He

could not be better. The Japanese pay him well, so he has to do his

best to hold his job."

Being himself a clever man and familiar with opinion outside of

Germany, Admiral Hintze thoroughly disapproved of the acts of

unnecessary violence by which the Germans had forfeited the good

opinion of the world, especially the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and the

execution of Edith Cavell. "What a mistake," he exclaimed, "for the

sake of one woman! Why not hold her in a prison somewhere in Germany

until the war is over?" The stupidity of such acts deeply offended him.

Had he become Minister for Foreign Affairs at an earlier date, some

bad mistakes might have been avoided. When the first reports of the

resumption of exacerbated submarine warfare were received, he remarked

to me: "Do not believe these reports that Germany will resume unlimited

submarine warfare. I can assure you that they will not be foolish

enough to do such a thing."

I noticed soon after Admiral Hintze's arrival that his relations with

his Austrian colleague were not the most cordial; these two seemed

to coöperate with difficulty. They were men entirely different in

temperament. The German was a man of the world, inspired with the

ideal of German military power and looking on international politics

as a keen and clever intellectual game. Concerning Hindenburg, he said

to me: "There is a man who makes no excuses for his existence." The

Austrian minister was a man of scholarly impulse, with a broad sympathy

for humankind, deploring the shallow game of politics, and hoping for

a more humane and reasonable system of government than that of the

political state.

Mr. Sun Pao-chi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on January 28th

to head the Audit Board, and was succeeded by Mr. Lu Tseng-tsiang.

Mr. Lu had enjoyed an extensive experience in Europe. He had acquired

a thorough mastery of French and married a Belgian lady, to whom he

was deeply devoted. Like his predecessor, he abstained from internal

politics. He was called to office when the exceedingly difficult

negotiations with Japan concerning the twenty-one demands were begun,

and it became his duty to carry through a very painful and ungrateful

task. Mr. Lu was interested in general political affairs in their

broader aspects, and gave special attention to international law.

I was frequently a guest at the house of Mr. Liang Tun-yen, the

Minister of Communications. He was easy-going, prepared to talk

business there rather than at the Ministry, where I would see him

frequently also, about the Hukuang railways. The engineer of the

British section was steadfastly trying to secure standards of British

engineering and manufacture, to which it would be difficult for

American manufacturers to conform. The Legation was beset with protests

concerning orders for materials which Americans did not like, since

they embodied the special practice of one partner to the contract. Thus

matters of a technical nature had to be argued between the Legation and

the Ministry of Communications. Mr. Liang himself was not a railway

expert. For example, he once spoke enthusiastically about clearing up

the Grand Canal, exclaiming: "then you could go from Peking to Shanghai

in a houseboat." We often fell back on the more general features

of the political situation in China, concerning which Mr. Liang

displayed a gentle skepticism for all proposed reforms. With respect

to railroad concessions, he was hostile to the idea of percentage

construction contracts, believing it dangerous to measure the returns

of an engineering firm by the sum expended on the works. I argued that

since the professional standing of such a firm was involved it could

not afford to run up the cost of the works merely to increase its own

commission. But I did not overcome his skepticism.

CHAPTER XV

EMPEROR YUAN SHIH-KAI

"Yuan Shih-kai is trying to make himself emperor, we hear from Peking,"

Mr. E.T. Williams remarked to me at the Department of State when I saw

him there in July, 1915. The report said that an imperialist movement

in behalf of Yuan Shih-kai had been launched in Peking. As there had

been frequent reports during the year of such attempts to set up an

empire, I was not at first inclined to give much credence to the

rumours.

Upon my return to San Francisco in September, this time to take steamer

for China, I met Dr. Wellington Koo, who had just come on a special

mission. I had been confidentially informed that he would probably be

designated as minister to the United States, to take the place of Mr.

Shah. The Department of State had directed me to delay my departure in

order to confer with Doctor Koo upon recent developments in China. On

the day we spent together we went over all that had happened since my

absence. The reports which had already been received that a movement

had been started to make Yuan Shih-kai emperor I then considered

improbable, in view of all the difficulties which the enterprise must

encounter, both internationally and from the Chinese opposition. Doctor

Koo confirmed this feeling and said that Yuan Shih-kai himself was very

doubtful. He mentioned the Goodnow memorandum, however, as a possible

factor. I was considerably surprised later to discover that the main

object of Doctor Koo's mission was to sound public opinion in America

and Europe concerning the assumption of the imperial dignity by Yuan

Shih-kai, and to prepare the ground for it. During my return voyage

to China the matter quickly came to a head, so that when I arrived in

Peking on October 1st I was confronted with an entirely new situation.

To understand the movement it is necessary to review briefly the

significant facts of Peking politics during the summer of 1915. A

concerted effort had been made to combat the Liang Shih-yi faction.

The opposition centred in the so-called Anhui Party, which was largely

militaristic, but in which civilian leaders like the Premier, Hsu

Shih-chang, the Chief Secretary of the cabinet, Yang Shih-chi, the

Minister of Finance, as well as the Minister of Communications, were

prominent.

Charges of corruption were lodged against Chang Hu, Vice-Minister

of Finance; Yeh Kung-cho, Vice-Minister of Communications; and the

Director of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. Including these, twenty-two

high officials were impeached during July, besides several provincial

governors. The Anhui Party was trying to eliminate radically the

influence of the so-called Communications Party, which had tried to

maintain itself through the vice-ministers and counsellors of several

important ministries, the chiefs of which were Anhui men.

It appears that several Anhui leaders were involved in a movement to

establish a monarchy, with Yuan Shih-kai as emperor. Care was exercised

in picking the Committee of Ten to make a preliminary draft of the

Permanent Constitution; it was believed by many that influences were

at work for putting into that instrument provisions for reëstablishing

the monarchy. Report had it that on July 7th General Feng Kuo-chang,

military governor at Nanking, had urged that the President assume the

throne, for which he was rebuked by Yuan in severe terms. Dr. Frank

J. Goodnow, the American constitutional adviser, returned to Peking

in mid-July for a short stay; he was asked on behalf of the President

to prepare a memorandum on the comparative adaptability of the

republican and monarchical forms of government to Chinese conditions.

Doctor Goodnow complied. As a matter of general theory, he took the

view that the monarchical form might be considered better suited to

the traditions and the actual political development of the Chinese. He

saw special merit in the fact that under the monarchical system, the

succession to power would be regulated so that it could not be made an

ever-recurring object of contention. On the expediency of an actual

return at the time from the republic to the monarchy Doctor Goodnow

expressly refrained from pronouncing a judgment. The memorandum was

prepared simply for the personal information of the President. Advisers

had been so generally treated as academic ornaments that Doctor Goodnow

did not suspect that in this case his memorandum would be made the

starting point and basis of positive action.

Meanwhile, Mr. Liang Shih-yi and his group, seeing their power

threatened, decided to do something extreme to recover the lead. They

concluded that the monarchical movement was inevitable; thereupon

they seem to have persuaded Yuan Shih-kai that the movement could be

properly handled and brought to early and successful issue only through

their superior experience and knowledge. It was they who arranged for

the memorandum of Doctor Goodnow. They had remained in the background

until the middle of August, when an open monarchical propaganda began,

based avowedly on the opinions expressed by the American adviser and

thus given a very respectable and impartial appearance.

They formed the Peace Planning Society (Chou An Hui). Its aim was

to investigate the advantages and disadvantages accruing from the

republican form of government. Doctor Goodnow's views were widely

heralded as categorically giving preference to monarchy for China,

notwithstanding disclaimers which he now issued. The fact that an

American expert should pronounce this judgment was cited as especially

strong evidence in favour of the monarchical form, since it came from a

citizen of the foremost republic in the world.