PROMPT PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN ACTION
The Chinese were not slow in showing what conclusions they deduced
from the withdrawal of the American Government from the Six-Power
Consortium. On November 27th, two cabinet ministers called on me for
a private conversation. Following this interview Mr. Chang Chien,
recognized master of antique Chinese learning, but also Minister of
Industries and Commerce, came to me. I will relate the substance of
what passed on these two occasions, beginning with Mr. Chang.
Chang Chien carried off first honours in the great metropolitan
examinations of Peking under the old régime in 1899. He is a scholar
_par excellence_ of the Chinese classics, and his chirography is so
famous that he has been able to support a college out of the proceeds
of a sale of examples of his writing. But he has not rested satisfied
with the ancient learning. In the region of his home, Nan Tung-chow, on
the banks of the Yangtse, he has established schools, factories, and
experiment stations for the improvement of agriculture and industry.
He had financial reverses. People at this time still doubted whether
he would be permanently successful, although they admitted that he
had given impetus to many improvements. Since then his enterprises
have flourished and multiplied. He has become a great national figure,
whose words, spoken from an honest desire for right public action,
have decisive weight with the nation. While he still represents the
old belief that the superior man of perfect literary training should
be able successfully to undertake any enterprise and to solve any
practical difficulty--which belief is contrary to the demands of our
complex modern life for specialization--yet he has succeeded in bending
his intelligence to thoroughly modern tasks.
As would be expected from his high culture as a Chinese scholar,
Mr. Chang Chien is a man of refinement and distinction of manners,
than which nothing could be more considerate and more dignified. The
Chinese are exceedingly sensitive to the thought and feeling of any
one in whose company they happen to be; if their host is busy or
preoccupied, no matter how politely he may receive them, they will
nevertheless sense his difficulty and will cut their visit short. They
also have great tact in turning a conversation or avoiding discussions
they are not ready for, and they can do this in a manner which makes
it impossible to force a discussion without impolite insistence.
The smoothness and velvetiness of Chinese manners, together with
the absence of all servile assent and the maintenance of complete
independence of discussion, are marvellous and bear evidence to
thousands of years of social training.
Mr. Chang Chien was particularly interested in river and harbour
development, and in plans for the drainage of those regions of
China which are subject to periodical floods. It was contemplated
to establish a special conservancy bureau under whose care surveys
for important projects were to be undertaken. I questioned Mr. Chang
concerning the status of the Hwai River conservancy scheme for the
prevention of floods in the northern portion of the provinces of
Kiangsu and Anhui, the region from which he came.
"I have already established a special engineering school," he replied,
"in order to train men for this work. A large part of the survey has
been made, and it can be entirely completed by a further expenditure of
35,000 taels.
"Besides the enormous benefit of such a work to all the adjoining
agricultural lands," he continued, "there would be reclaimed nearly
3,000,000 acres which could now not be used at all, although their soil
is inexhaustibly fertile. The land thus reclaimed would be salable
immediately for at least $40 an acre. Would not this alone be ample
security for a large conservancy loan? $25,000,000 would do the work."
Mr. Chang was also interested in the establishment of a commercial and
industrial bank, in copartnership with American capitalists. "Such a
bank," he said, "would assist in furnishing the capital for the works
of internal improvement."
It was quite plain that Mr. Chang looked upon a bank as an institution
which would invest its capital in such enterprises--a conception which
was then quite current among the Chinese. They had not yet fully
realized that in the modern organization of credit a bank may act as a
depository and may make temporary loans, but more permanent investments
must ultimately be placed with individual capitalists, with banks
acting only as underwriting and selling agencies.
As we talked about the execution of these large and useful projects,
Mr. Chang repeatedly made expressions such as this: "I prefer American
coöperation. I am ready to employ American experts to work out the
plans and to act as supervisors. But please to bear in mind, these
works may not be undertaken without raising a large part of the needed
funds in the United States or in other countries."
When the two cabinet ministers called they brought no interpreter. "The
matters about which we wish to talk," they said, "are so important that
we wish to keep the discussion confined to as few persons as possible.
We bring the ideas of President Yuan Shih-kai and his government with
respect to what Americans might do in China."
They first gave me a review of the recent development of the
Russo-Japanese entente with respect to Manchuria and Mongolia. They
expressed their belief that an understanding existed between these
powers to treat outer Mongolia as a region within which Russian
control should not be obstructed, and, _vice versa_, to allow a free
hand to Japan, not only in southern Manchuria, but also in eastern
Mongolia. Continuous activity of the Japanese in south China, in
stirring up opposition to the Central Government, indicated a desire
to weaken China, and, if possible, to divide it against itself. The
extraordinary efforts made by Japan to increase her naval establishment
were also particularly mentioned. The impression their discourse
conveyed was that Japan was engaged in a strong forward policy in
China, and that in this she had the countenance and support of Russia.
My visitors then passed on to the reasons why the Chinese entertained
the hope that America would give them its moral support to the extent
of opposing the inroads made by Japan and Russia, and of coöperating
with Great Britain and other powers favourable to the Open Door policy
in preventing attempts to break up the Chinese Republic. They fully
realized the improbability of an alliance between China and the United
States, but laid stress on the parallel interests of the two countries,
and particularly on the sympathy engendered through following the
principles of democratic government. Having become a republic, the
Chinese Government is brought into peculiarly close relationship to
the United States; it sees in the United States its most sincere and
unselfish friend, and realizes the importance of American moral support.
Descending to particulars, the ministers pointed out that while China
appreciated and valued the friendly interest and counsel of the United
States, it was disappointing that so very little had been done by
America, while the European Powers and Japan should have taken such a
very important part in the development of the resources of China. They
said that the Chinese Government and people were desirous of affording
the Americans unusual opportunities, should they be ready to coöperate.
Taking up specific enterprises, they stated that the Government was
quite willing to ratify and carry out the contract made in 1910 by
the Imperial Government with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Under
this contract they intended to build vessels adapted for commercial
purposes, but convertible into warships somewhat like the vessels of
the Russian Volunteer Fleet. The establishment of a steamship line to
the United States, directly or by way of the Panama Canal, was greatly
desired by the Government.
It was recalled that at the time the naval mission of Prince Tsao
visited the United States, the matter of lending American experts
as instructors for the Chinese navy came up for discussion, and
such assistance was promised by the American Administration under
President Taft. The assistance contemplated was to be instructional and
technical, not involving matters of policy or suggesting a political
alliance, and of a nature such as had been in the past given by other
nations, particularly Great Britain. The ministers stated that the
Chinese Government still intended to avail itself of this assistance
should the need for it arise, and that American coöperation in a matter
like this was preferred because of the political disinterestedness of
the American Government.
The ministers then took up more purely industrial enterprises, and
dwelt particularly on plans for river and harbour improvement,
mentioning the Hwai River region and other districts where agricultural
pursuits are interrupted by destructive floods. As the Central
Government contemplated the establishment of a national bureau to
provide for these matters, the ministers suggested that the American
Government would be invited to give its assistance by lending experts
to plan and conduct the proposed works. They expressed their belief
that the experience of Americans in such enterprises had qualified them
above any other nation for coping with these problems of China.
Other matters were taken up, such as the possible creation of a
tobacco monopoly, from which the ministers expected both increased
revenue and a more effective organization of tobacco production
throughout China. It was not their desire to oust the British-American
Tobacco Company, but they suggested that an arrangement would be made
whereby this company might act as the selling agent of the Chinese
Government.
Another subject was the exploration of China for petroleum. They stated
that the Government wished that the development of oil fields should
be undertaken. On account of the manner in which some other nations
were wont to extend the scope of any concessions of this kind so as
to establish general claims of preference, particularly as to railway
rights, the Government much preferred to take up this matter with
Americans.
It was apparent that these men entertained high hopes of American
activity in China, and that they were ready to do their part in making
the conditions favourable. Their minds were alive with plans of
development. Both because of American experience with similar problems
and of the American spirit of fairness, they believed that great
benefit would result if Americans were to become prominently active
in the vast industrial transformation which they anticipated in the
immediate future.
As this conversation passed from topic to topic, touching on proposals
of moment, I could not but feel that a new spirit had surely arisen
in China. It would have been inconceivable under the old régime for
high officials, trained in the traditional formalism and reticent
with inherited distrust of the foreigner, to approach a foreign
representative thus frankly, laying before him concrete proposals for
joint action. In the past, as we know, it was the foreigners who had
desired changes and new enterprises and who had in and out of season
pressed them upon the reluctant and inert Chinese officials. But here
were men who realized that it is the function of the Government to
plan and to initiate; and they were ready to go to any length in making
advances to a country in whose motives they had full confidence.
It was impossible not to be fascinated by the prospects that were here
unfolded. A country of vast resources in natural wealth, labour, power,
and even in capital, was turning toward a new form of organization in
which all these forces were to be made to work in larger units, over
greater areas and with more intensive methods than ever before. The
merely local point of view was giving way to the national outlook.
National resources and industries were looked at not from the point of
view alone of any local group interested but of the unity of national
life and effort. To know that in this great task of reorganization,
Americans would be most welcome as associates and directors; that
they were spontaneously and sincerely desired in order that all these
materials and resources might the more readily be built into a great
and effective unity of national life--that, indeed, could not fail
to be a cause for pride and gratification to an American. The only
disturbing thought was the question whether Americans were ready to
appreciate the importance of the opportunity here offered. Yet there
could be no doubt that every energy must be applied in order to make
them realize the unprecedented nature of the opportunities and the
importance to America herself of the manner in which these materials
were to be organized so as to promote general human welfare rather than
selfish exploitation and political ambition.
The Russian efforts to strengthen their position in Mongolia, to which
these two visitors had alluded, had at this time brought fruit in the
form of an agreement with China to have the "autonomy" of Mongolia
recognized. A result and byplay of these negotiations came to the
notice of the foreign representatives in Peking at a meeting of the
diplomatic corps on December 11th. The meeting was at the British
Legation, to which Sir John Jordan had by this time returned.
The head of the large establishment of the Russian Legation was a
young man, Mr. Krupenski. Trained under some of the ablest diplomats
of Russia and having spent many years in Peking as secretary, he had
manifestly not been selected by chance. With his English secretary
he occupied his vast house alone, being unmarried. He entertained
brilliantly, ably seconded therein by the Russo-Asiatic Bank across the
way. Besides his thorough understanding of the Chinese, Mr. Krupenski
had a valuable quality in his ability to shed all the odium that
might attach to the policy of his government, as a duck sheds water.
He appeared at times greatly to enjoy mystifying his colleagues, to
judge by his amused and unconcerned expression when he knew they were
guessing as to what his last move might mean. Mr. Krupenski is tall,
florid, unmistakably Russian. During my first visit with him he plunged
_in medias res_ concerning China. Though he probably wondered what move
I might contemplate after the Manchurian proposals of Mr. Knox and
America's withdrawal from the Six-Power Group, he gave no hint of his
feelings, which undoubtedly did not contemplate me as likely to become
an intimate associate in policies. When I left him I knew that here
was a man, surrounded by competent experts in finance, language, and
law, who could play with the intricacies of Chinese affairs and take
advantage of opportunities and situations of which others would not
even have an inkling.
At the meeting of December 11th the Russian minister stated that he
desired to make an announcement, and proceeded to tell his colleagues
quite blandly that his government had decided to withdraw the legation
guards and other Russian troops from north China, and that they
suggested to the other governments to take similar action.
This announcement caused surprise all around the table. Questions came
from all directions: "Is this action to be immediate?" "What is the
purpose of your government?" "What substitute for this protection do
you suggest?" These and many more. The Russian minister seemed amused
by the excitement he had caused. He allowed none of the questioners
to worry him in the least, or to draw him out. With a quizzical and
non-committal smile he let the anxious surmises of his colleagues
run off his back. He shrugged his shoulders and said: "These are the
instructions of my government. Their purpose--I do not know." When the
meeting adjourned, small groups walked off in different directions, all
still intently discussing the meaning of this move. So, the legation
guards were really very important! The first question put to me in
Shanghai had related to them, and here I found the diplomatic corps
thrown into excitement by the announcement that Russia was withdrawing
her guard.
When I arrived at the Legation, where Mrs. Reinsch was receiving and
where visitors in large numbers were taking tea and dancing to the
music of the marine band, the news had evidently already preceded me,
for several people asked me what had happened; and Putnam Weale and
W.C. Donald, the British press representatives, were full of surmises.
The interpretation generally accepted was that the Russians, and
possibly the Japanese, were trying to put the other powers in a hole;
if they did not withdraw their legation guards they might displease the
Chinese Government, after what Russia had done; if they did withdraw
them, they would give an advantage to Russia and Japan, powers who, on
account of their proximity to China, could send large bodies of troops
upon short notice.
From the attitude of the diplomats it had been apparent that the
proposal of the Russians would not prove acceptable. For weeks the
press was filled with attempts to gauge the true bearing of the
Russian proposal. Looked at from this distance after the Great War,
it is hard to imagine how so relatively unimportant a matter could
cause excitement. Of course, the removal of the legation guard was
not considered so important in itself, but it was of moment as an
indication of what Russia might plan with respect to the further
advance of her influence in China.
Probably Russia's action did not really contemplate any far-reaching
consequences. The Russians were urging the Chinese Government to
make an arrangement for Mongolian "autonomy," which could not but
be intensely distasteful to the Chinese. The Russians had to offer
something in return; with thorough knowledge of the old type of the
Chinese official mind, they selected something which would not cost
them anything, but which would be most gratifying to the Chinese
Government. The Government looked upon the presence of foreign troops
in Peking and in Chihli Province as incompatible with its dignity.
Therefore, the Russian Government knew that through withdrawing its
troops and calling upon the other governments to do likewise, an
opportunity would be given the Chinese Government to claim an important
victory, and the bitterness of renunciation with respect to Mongolia
would thus be somewhat tempered. Yuan Shih-kai and the Government as
such would probably take that view; but the Chinese as individuals were
not likely thus to consider the presence of foreign troops an unmixed
evil. These guards tended to stabilize the situation, also to prevent
unconscionable acts or high-handed inroads by any individual powers. So
far as the people of China were concerned, Russia might not gather much
credit through this move.