EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN HERDER’S CONCEPTION OF _DAS VOLK_
Herder, by numerous references and discussions, in which he is definite
and explicit as to name and theories, shows a thorough acquaintance with
the various schools of philosophy which were influential throughout the
century in which he lived. Among those whose names occur many times in
his works are:
Roger Bacon
Francis Bacon
Baumgarten
Berkeley
Boileau
Bolingbroke
Condillac
Descartes
Diderot
Hume
Kant
Leibniz
Locke
Montaigne
Montesquieu
Newton
Rousseau
Shaftesbury
Spinoza
Voltaire
Wolf
These are philosophers whose expressions of thought left their traces
either vaguely or deeply upon the enlightenment period and, as already
said, whom Herder knew well. But the doctrines of many of these men
converged. Of others, the principles were developed and amplified by
successors. The main ideas of the period which enter into Herder’s
conception of _Volk_ are found in three great exponents: Leibniz,
Shaftesbury, and Rousseau. The influence of each upon Herder will be
examined here.
LEIBNIZ AND HERDER
IV, 224: Herder calls Leibniz the greatest man that Germany has produced
in later times.
IV, 361: Herder calls Leibniz and Plato the two greatest heads for
hypotheses.
VIII, 178: Herder says that no one says it better than Leibniz, that
bodies as such are only phenomena of substances, as the Milky Way is of
stars and the clouds of drops.
IX, 493: Herder regrets that Leibniz was not sufficiently appreciated by
the Germans; most of them in the city in which he lies did not even know
where his grave was.
IX, 534: Herder cites Leibniz as saying that human wit and humor are
never more effective than in play, and uses this in support of his own
belief that the human heart expresses itself most effectively in the
nature songs of primitive people.
X, 305: Herder sees the flower of Leibniz in Shaftesbury.
XIII, 199: Herder agrees with Leibniz that the soul is a mirror of the
“world-all” and he believes there is a deeper truth in Leibniz’ statement
than is usually recognized; i.e., all the forces of a “world-all” lie
hidden in the soul, and they need only an organization or a succession of
organizations to set them into activity.
XIV, 417: Herder finds support in Leibniz for the statement that the
Catholic Church considered the king a protective magistrate under the
supremacy of the Pope.
XV, 180: Herder says Leibniz pointed out weak sides of Locke’s philosophy.
XVI, 450: Herder makes the following statements:
1. In Leibniz’ mind were associated fruitful conceptions of all
sciences and of all the realms of nature.
2. Leibniz said that one must finally, so far as conceptions of
bodies are concerned, come to simple substances, which he calls
“Monads.”
3. I (Herder) am convinced that among the three ingenious
hypotheses with which he has enriched metaphysics the monad is
the most fundamental, and will sometime win a place.
4. Without this indivisible working element, the nature of
physical bodies cannot be explained.
XVI, 458: Herder calls Leibniz a “Proteus of Science,” who has done much
to unify philosophical truths.
XVI, 606: Herder calls Leibniz, “our immortal Leibniz.”
XVII, 331 ff.: Herder eulogizes Leibniz, emphasizing his theories of
play, his mildness and sympathy in criticizing others his youthful,
impartial soul.
XVIII, 126: Herder says that Leibniz was the most modest among all the
reformers of philosophical thought; he thought that all systems of the
ancients could be united because each held something good.
XXI, 19: Herder quotes Leibniz as saying that language is the mirror of
human understanding.
XXI, 70 ff.: Herder translates Leibniz’ _Ueber Philosophie in der
Deutschen Sprache_.
XXI, 145: Herder mentions Leibniz’ principles of _Identity and
Causality_.
XXI, 319: Herder translates Leibniz’ _Vom philosophischen Vortrag_.
XXII, 190: Herder translates Leibniz’ _Ueber Macht und Anwendung der
Musik_.
XXIII, 132: Herder recommends Leibniz’ _Neue Versuche über den
menschlichen Verstand_ to young men.
XXIII, 479: Herder says, Leibniz, had he lived to see his original
plans revived in the Scientific Society in Berlin, probably would have
arranged a _System der Völker nach Sprachen und Bildungen_. This method
of studying history by going to natural environments and to the sources
is sufficiently in accord with Herder’s ideas to call forth the prophecy
that what the past century had omitted in this respect the future would
do.
XXIII, 483: Herder, referring to Leibniz’ system of _Monaden,
prästabilirten Harmonie u. f._, says that no one doubts that there is
much that is true and beautiful in it; no one dares deny a world of souls
and a harmony between mind and body; there is no doubt that there are
pure conceptions in which thoughts are considered only as workings or
developments of the soul, and, on the other hand, the laws of the world
of bodies are considered as mechanical and artificial.
XXIV, 267: Herder notes Leibniz’ romantic attitude, observing that
Leibniz regretted the decline in the feeling of courage and honor and
that he counseled a return to the deeds and voices and models of the past
to reawaken these.
XXV, 88: Herder says if Leibniz found human wit and humor most real and
effective in play, certainly he (Herder) is justified, in finding the
most faithful reproductions of traditions, language, and customs at the
point where truth and delight meet; i.e., in song.
XXX, 135: Herder calls Leibniz the greatest man that Germany has had.
XXX, 258: Herder has remarked frequently upon Leibniz’ theory that the
human mind is never more clear-sighted and disposed to activity than in
play. He analyzes the thought here, and it is worth considering because
it hinges closely upon Herder’s philosophy which causes him to seek
genuine _Volk_ character in methods of expression which are natural
rather than artificial.
He asks, Why is it that there is this connection between our innermost
selves and pleasure and joy? Many forms of play are so difficult and
fatiguing, others are subject to such strict rules; just because they
demand this is the form of play interesting for those who like it.
It becomes pleasant because it keeps both soul and body constantly
and interchangeably busied. In the progress of being occupied lies an
indefinable pleasure; we feel the happy progressiveness by which our
forces are strengthened and grow. The more frequently this interchange
takes place, the more do we realize our forces enriched.
XXIII, 154: Herder says Shaftesbury sent to Leibniz the former’s works
and that Leibniz found in them his own system.
XXIII, 461: Herder praises Leibniz’ efforts in behalf of the Royal
Scientific Society in Berlin.
XXIII, 468 ff.: Herder has written an essay on Leibniz in which he
reviews the work of the latter under the following heads: _Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz_: (1) _Theologie und Religion_; (2) _Rechtsgelehrsamkeit
und Politik_; (3) _Geschichte, Alterthümer, Sprachen_; (4) _Mathematik
und Physik_; and (5) _Die erste Philosophie_.
Herder’s own comments in certain parts of this series of expositions are
important in this connection.
1. _Theology and religion._—Leibniz’ proof of Christianity Herder
finds was based upon natural religion; after firmly laying the
foundation of this natural religion, one should show the necessity of a
revealed religion, then the superior beauty of the Christian religion,
surpassing as it does all other religions. Leibniz sees atheism as
well as materialism, to say nothing of the disparagement or mockery
of Christendom, as the herald of a barbarism with which is bound up
the decay of honor and morality. Herder’s comment upon this is: How
faithfully have succeeding times proved this to be true! Leibniz,
he continues, would rejoice if he could see the Bible so clarified,
every one of its books interpreted in the light and spirit of its own
time and above all the subtleties foreign to the sense and content of
Christianity removed—all this, such as it was in his own day, is Herder’s
idea. Important to note here is the return to nature as a foundation
for Christianity, and to natural environment for the interpretation of
Christian teachings.
2. _Jurisprudence and statesmanship._—Here Herder finds that Leibniz
became a real teacher _der Völker_ through his work, _Codex des
allgemeinen Völkerrechts_. Just as Leibniz in his opposition to
Puffendorf founds man’s natural rights upon eternal principles of right
and reason, so he carries these on into the so-called “voluntary rights
of peoples” to which he adds in the Christian Republic a divine, positive
right.
This divine, positive right Herder admits was, in the beginnings of the
Christian republic, conceived of as being embodied in the emperor as head
of the state. But, says he, Leibniz’ great thought was true; true in the
sense that this divine, positive right is that which made itself evident
long before the French Revolution.
He asks, Does Christendom teach anything other than pure humanity?
It must be founded upon humanity which is also Leibniz’ _Codex des
Völkerrechts_.
It is clear, continues the commentator, that what a nation demands or
wishes from another it must also offer; force, faithlessness, and bold
arrogance of one toward the other enrage all nations. This _Codex des
Völkerrechts_ is written in the breasts of all human beings. Wherever
his view was unobstructed, he saw clearly the political relationships of
Europe, and prophesied much that followed.
The natural rights of mankind to be applied to humanity through states
and nations, then, is what Herder notes at this point in Leibniz.
3. _History, antiquities, languages._—Herder notes here that Leibniz
liked above everything else in History the origins of races, _Uranfänge
der Völker_, which led to their antiquities and language stocks. This
accounts for his diligence in comparison and derivation of languages
and in etymologies. Herder reminds us that a family tree of languages
has been established since Leibniz’ time through the Russian journeys
in Northern Asia, continuous news from China, the investigations of the
English in India, and other studies made in Tibet, Persia, Arabia, Egypt,
Africa, America, and the Southern world.
XXXII, 226: Herder’s discussion of Leibniz’ monad:
A monad is said to be able to change its representations
(_Vorstellungen_) and it must change them in accordance with
its fundamental force; now if these representations are nothing
but external rapports, must there not lie in the fundamental
force also the foundation of perceptibility of the external and
the foundation of the constantly changing perceptibility?... If
therefore, the soul is a living mirror of the universe then it
must not reflect this universe from within itself outward....
But there must be an internal cause in every soul which
accounts for the part of the universe which the soul looks upon
and which cannot be sought in a third being, the cause of both.
Everywhere there is life; everywhere life is connected with
organs, and where would the cause of the connection lie? Not
in the life; not in the organ. Where then? A _Deus ex machina_
must be called which contains the cause of the connection of
both so that neither of these (life, organ) contain anything
of this cause, and that is contradiction. One monad is said
to rule over the others and over many others without there
being in any one the cause of change which is in the other. A
monad is said to heighten its forces just so much as its body
heightens its own organization.
Now still this interconnected increase is to contain nothing
in the one for the other; not _causa efficiens_, not _conditio
sine qua non_, only simultaneousness. How unbelieveable! If the
adjustment of the organs extends to the making of a certain
relief or difference, then such a relief or difference in
the perceptions and all the connecting comes about without
internal cause, only one cause to explain so many effects which
are scarcely covered by it. It seems to me the world would be
incomparably simpler and more manifold if in every monad were
the cause for its connection and all of its changes.
It seems evident that Herder accepts much of Leibniz’ theory of the
monad. The important point of departure is expressed in the two sentences:
1. But there must be _an internal cause in every soul_ which
accounts for the part of the universe which that soul looks
over and which cannot be sought in a third being, the cause of
both.
2. The world would be simpler and more manifold if _in every
monad were the cause for its connection and all its changes_.
It is at this point of departure that we see Herder’s emphasis
on innate potentialities, which are fundamentally different,
taking shape. Here are individuality and spontaneity in
incipiency.
REFERENCES TO LEIBNIZ
I: 116, 142, 166, 233, 415.
II: 50, 96, 300.
IV: 15, 224, 248, 361.
V: 57, 316, 318, 410, 412, 459, 461, 504, 512, 532.
VIII: 112, 170, 178, 226, 247, 266, 272, 319.
IX: 493, 500, 534.
X: 305, 346.
XI: 90.
XIII: 199, 364.
XIV: 417.
XV: Note to page 33; 35, 71, 180, 320.
XVI: 450, 458, 504, 292, 606.
XVII: 158, 210, 265, 267, 274, 326, 331, 334, 336, 338.
XVIII: 126, 323.
XX: 358.
XXI: 17, 19, 49, 70, 71, 145, 185, 319.
XXII: 67, 190.
XXIII: 67, 88, 132, 154, 461, 468, 472.
XXIV: 9, 92, 267, 315.
XXV: 88.
XXVIII: 232, 353.
XXIX: 581.
XXX: 64, 135, 403, 258, 407.
XXXII: 32, 221, 225.
SHAFTESBURY AND HERDER
I, 182: Herder says Shaftesbury knows how to use the dialogue
excellently; he had learned it from Plato and taught Diderot.
V, 490: Herder calls Shaftesbury the amiable Plato of Europe.
X, 232: Herder mentions Shaftesbury’s _philosophischen Lobgesang auf die
Natur in seinen “Moralists”_.
X, 305: Herder concedes to Shaftesbury a refined, beautiful,
philosophical intellect. He is impressed with the “Characteristics” and
the “Moralists.” The latter, says he, can be put side by side with the
writings of the Ancients. Herder finds in Shaftesbury the flower of
Leibniz’ philosophy and the teachings of new platonism. He sees traces of
Shaftesbury in Mendelsohn’s _Letters concerning Feeling_.
Herder’s tone defends Shaftesbury in the statement that one should love
virtue for her own sake, on the ground that many religious enthusiasts,
including Fénélon, have maintained the same thing. Nor is he either
atheist or pantheist in his _Song of Praise to Nature_. He further
mentions the following works in German translations: _The Moralists;
Investigations Concerning Virtue_, Berlin, 1745; _Shaftesbury’s
Philosophical Works_, translated by Voss, Leipzig, 1776.
XI, 123: Herder finds Shaftesbury’s _Ten Letters to a Student of
Theology_ excellent in the following points: (1) What he says of real
philosophy, of empty speculation, of academic _polyhistorie_, of
intellectual ambition and the real freedom of thought, of the writings
of the Greek, and of the beautiful and pure toward which one must aim in
studies of all kinds; (2) what he says of the spirit of endurance and
Christian simplicity.
XI, 220: Herder admires _die Grazien des Platonish-Shaftesbury_ dialogue.
XVI, 407: Herder expresses himself by quoting in translation a stanza
from Shaftesbury’s _Moralists_.
XVI, 158, 159: Article on Shaftesbury; holds him in high esteem, calls
him _Virtuoso der Humanität_. Herder declares that Shaftesbury has
influenced the best minds of the eighteenth century.
XXIII, 143 ff.: Herder shows an intimate acquaintance with the life and
works of Shaftesbury as well as the sources of his philosophy. He reminds
that Shaftesbury influenced both Diderot and Leibniz. Herder reveals his
own inclination to take nature and the feelings as standards: (1) By
criticizing Shaftesbury for overlooking an important principle in Greek
philosophy in one of his discussions; namely, the principle _der Natur zu
folgen_. (2) By saying an honorable feeling for truth and justice is a
law of our nature.
XXX, 321: Herder calls Shaftesbury the high priest of the temple of
_Grazie_.
Shaftesbury’s _Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Time_ will
be used as a reference book.
SHAFTESBURY AND HERDER
The elevation of human nature, as found in the individual, to something
which has a universal value, to something higher and nobler than the
interests of self alone was one of the prominent tenets of Shaftesbury’s
philosophy. This implied a moral and social system composed of parts
nicely adjusted in each single entity, which in turn was a component part
of a larger whole; the parts of this greater system were likewise in
constant proportion to one another, and so finely and fitly adjusted that
any disarrangement could not fail to effect the harmonious blending and
the unity of the entire design. Out of this, it follows that man can come
to his truest and most natural development in community life only.
And thus, if there be found in any creature a more than
ordinary self-concernment or regard to private good, which
is inconsistent with the interest of the species or public,
this must in every respect be esteemed an ill and vicious
affection. And this is what we commonly call selfishness, and
disapprove so much, in whatever creature we happen to discover
it.—_Inquiry_, Book I.
When we reflect on any ordinary frame or constitution either of
art or nature, and consider how hard it is to give the least
account of a particular part without a competent knowledge of
the whole, we need not wonder to find ourselves at a loss in
many things relating to the constitution and frame of nature
herself.—_Inquiry_, Book I.
To love the public, to study universal good, and to promote the
interest of the whole world, as far as lies within our power,
is surely the height of goodness, and makes that temper which
we call divine.—_Letter Concerning Enthusiasm_, section 4.
The harmonious man is to be the product of a natural unfolding of
innate human nature. The potentialities within are to be allowed to
develop unwarped and unimpeded and to express themselves completely
and symmetrically. There must be no subordination of personality or
individuality to artificial standards, for nature is the sovereign. If
no powers, inclinations, or impulses are thwarted in their trend and
activity, they will, in all their manifold variety, flower into the
perfectly beautiful and therefore the perfectly good.
Now the variety of nature is such as to distinguish everything
she forms by a peculiar, original character, which, if strictly
observed, will make the subject appear unlike to anything
extant in the world besides.
For all beauty is truth. True features make the beauty of a
face, and true proportions the beauty of architecture—_Essay on
the Freedom of Wit and Humor_, Part IV.
That faculty by which the good and the beautiful are to be recognized and
approved is indeed little different if different at all from an emotion.
The principle of feeling really becomes the criterion of right and wrong.
It is the principle of feeling which forms the essence of Shaftesbury’s
_Moral Sense_. He admits that this sense may be improved by cultivation,
but its essential part is innate. “Sense of right and wrong” is as
natural to us as natural affection itself, and a first principle in our
constitution.
The two ideas which we are considering here as a part of Shaftesbury’s
philosophy are the development of the individual and his harmonious
relation to the whole of mankind.
These ideas are made the nucleus of a collection of writings and reviews
by Herder which he calls _Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität_. These
have been considered to some extent in a preceding chapter as a part of
Herder’s system of thought, but the purpose here is to connect the same
with that of Shaftesbury.—_Dritte Sammlung_, Brief 27 ff.
At the outset in this letter the author is concerned with the distinction
between the following:
1. Menschheit: Menschen sind wir allesamt ... wir gehören zur
Menschheit.
2. Mensch, Menschlichkeit: Leider hat man in unserer Sprache
dem Wort Mensch, und noch mehr dem barmherzigen Wort
Menschlichkeit so oft eine Nebenbedeutung von Niedrigkeit,
Schwäche und falschem Mitleid angehängt.
3. Menschenrechte: Kann ohne Menschenpflichten nicht genannt
werden.
4. Menschenwürde: Das Menschengeschlecht ... hat seinem
grössesten Theil nach keine Würde.... Es soll aber zum
Charakter seines Geschlechtes, mithin auch zu dessen Werth und
Würde gebildet werden.
5. Menschenliebe: Das schöne Wort Menschenliebe is so trivial
worden, dass man meistens die Menschen liebt um keinen unter
den Menschen wirksam zu lieben.
He concludes that the word _Humanität_ will best suit, because among
both ancients and moderns it connotes worthy ideas. The reference to
the ancients reminds us of the common source from which both Herder and
Shaftesbury drew inspiration. Both were schooled in the literature of the
ancients.
As Herder lingers on the philological discussion, he gives us the
philosophical reason why the conception of frailty attaches to the idea
expressed in the word for man, _Mensch_.
The word “humanity,” he says, not only connotes the thought which he
desires to express, but it suits his purpose also on account of its
history. Among the upper classes of the Romans were some who were wont
to temper the execution of justice with mercy when exercising power
over their subjects; such a Roman citizen, Patrician, was _humanus_,
_humanissimus_. Now, he thinks, that since with the Romans the word
connoted the idea of mildness in the exercises of citizenship and law,
that it would be well to take over the word and the idea. He makes
reference also to the Greeks whose word, ἂνθρωπος, looking upward, he
clothes in Plato’s words: “As he looks he reasons.” Therefore, says
Herder, he does not fail to notice the human failings that lead to
sympathy, consequently to humanity. The knowledge of our powers and
inborn potentialities, of our calling and our duty arises from an intense
study of mankind. He repeats that the Greeks and Romans led the way in
this _studium humanitatis_. The only limit which Herder sets to what we
shall be is to be found in the highest possible formation and completion
of whatever belongs to the character of our race.
Many of the telling thoughts in these letters are scattered in isolated
paragraphs running something like the following: Truth is the bond of
humanity between friends. The purer the thoughts of men are, the more
they agree. The true invisible church is one in all times, in all lands.
Franklin had a wonderful sense of humanity. He proceeds from the simple
eternal laws of nature, from the most infallible practical rules—the
needs and interests of mankind. Franklin recognized the value of the
common people and thought to teach them by clothing his ideas in
simplicity.
Companionship is the foundation of humanity and the communion of human
souls, a mutual interchange of acquired ideas (thoughts) and of traits
of understanding which increases the mass of human knowledge and skill
infinitely. If humanity is no empty name, suffering mankind must rejoice
at the advance in medical science. Human society founded on virtue must
stand. The highest and most fruitful wisdom arises from the (common)
people because they have felt need and suffering, they have been driven
here and there, they have tasted the sweet fruit of trouble and they know
how to care for others.
The kinship to the spirit and philosophy pervading Shaftesbury is here
quite evident.
REFERENCES TO SHAFTESBURY
I: 182, 303, 305, 307, 524.
IV: 367.
V: 284, 316, 388, 390, 396, 490.
VII: 113, 236.
VIII: 218, 311, 461.
IX: 306.
X: Note to page 232; 305.
XI: 123, 205; note to page 220.
XV: 199
XVI: 26, 403, 407.
XVII: 154, 249, 274, 326.
XX: 308.
XXII: Note to page 210; note to page 334.
XXIII: 132_d_, 132, 136, 144, 151; note to page 155; 396.
XXIV: 219.
XXVII: 397.
XXX: 17, 32, 407.
XXXII: 33, 199.
ROUSSEAU AND HERDER
IV, 369: In discussing his ideal book for the development of humanity,
Herder finds that important points would be rules and exhortations for
the development of body and soul; in this he says: _ist Rousseau ein
grosser Lehrer_.
IV, 371: He will imitate Rousseau zealously; will read him, contemplate
him, nationalize him.
V, 37: Herder agrees with Rousseau in that language is not the result of
convention and agreement.
VI, 250: Reference is made to Rousseau’s _Pygmalion_.
VII, 65: Herder in his discussion concerning the fall of man quotes
Rousseau with reference to the tree of knowledge and the fall of man.
VII, 74: Herder calls Rousseau one of the greatest lights of his times.
X, 298: Herder says Rousseau’s _Confessions_ and other writings contain
excellent passages for philosophy and natural theology. Many of these
writings have suffered evil repute (_übel berüchtigt_.)
XV, 248: Herder calls Rousseau a great, wonderful man.
XVI, 26: Herder calls Rousseau a teacher of wisdom and morals.
XVII, 190: Herder speaks of Rousseau as a good man who exaggerates and
who in his phantasy is an idealist for the good.
XVII, 326: Herder says in his own day (_bis in unsern Tagen_) Rousseau’s
_Social Contract_ has had an effect that its author had scarcely expected.
XVIII, 359 and 371: Herder says that in his own time (_in unserer Zeit_),
Rousseau’s _Confessions_ have aroused a great sensation. He quotes from
them.
XVIII, 372: _Sein Geist war stolz, seine Grundsätze waren edel_, p. 374,
he speaks of Rousseau as a tree having brought forth beautiful fruit and
blossoms.
XXII, 151: Herder approves Rousseau’s views in the introduction to
_Nouvelle Héloise_, views on poetic language as a natural human art.
XXII, 161: He calls Rousseau one with great ability to express the
thoughts of his heart, and Herder considers this ability peculiar to
_Naturmenschen_.
XXIII, 272: Herder says much that Rousseau has said in _Emile_ against
the use of _La Fontaine’s Fables_ for youth is right.
XXV, 601: Herder translates from Rousseau’s _Consolations_.
XXV, 631: Herder has a translation of Rousseau’s “Shepherd Song,”
_Consolations_, p. 97, No. 53.
XXV, 632: Translation of “Song of Desdemona,” _Consolations_, p. 125, No.
65.
XXIX, 256: Herder eulogizes Rousseau in the poem _Der Mensch_.
XXIX, 265: Herder calls upon Rousseau to help him know himself.
XXX, 30: In regretting the fact that the taste and desire for
overrefinement was causing wholesome simplicity to be displaced in
educational methods and life in general, Herder calls attention to
Rousseau and interprets him thus:
Rousseau ruft also ein philosophisches Wehe über unser
Geschlecht, das die Tugend, Menschlichkeit und Wahrheit
vom Altar gestürzt hat, und statt dessen eine lächerlich
verkleidete Puppe des Wohlstandes anbetet. Dieser falsche
Anstand hat die Schöpfung verdorben; denn was sind seine
Vasallen?
XXXII, 41: Herder calls Rousseau “our patriotic friend of mankind.”
XXXII, 147: Herder says only Rousseau could dig to the knowledge of the
human heart.
“DER MENSCH”
Line 45 ff.: Herder shows that he is influenced by the eighteenth-century
demand for a return to nature in general and by Rousseau’s philosophy in
particular in a portion of this poem:
1. He prizes the universal and fundamental instincts and longings of man
which show him to be a simple product of nature:
Den Menschen der Natur den keiner je gesehen und jeder in sich
fühlt und jeder wünscht zu sehen ... den sing’ ich.
2. The primitivism of this nature-man is eulogized:
den Menschen ohne Kunst
voll Seele ohne Witz, gut ohne Göttergunst,
voll Menschheit ohne Scham, voll Wahrheit ohne Lügen
ohn’ alle Tugend fromm und glücklich ohn’ Vergnügen—
Den sing’ ich.
Sohn der Natur o Mensch—blühst du in Edens Flur?
halb Pflanze und halb Thier.
3. The feelings are set up as a standard:
blos durch Empfindung wahr, schön durch die Wahrheit nur.
Nicht weniger nicht mehr als Mensch! so ist dein Leben
dir zum Gefühl, zur Ruh, zur Wirksamkeit gegeben.
4. Physical environment is to have free sway in shaping this ideal man:
wie zeigt sich deine Spur?
im Schnee der Eskimaux wo edelfrei die Wilden
Empfindung und Gesezz nach Jagd und Eis sich bilden.
5. Rousseau is eulogized:
gebar dich Rousseaus Geist? sahn dich verblichne Zeiten?
...
O Rousseau! den die Welt im Vorurtheil verkandt,
das wahre grosse Maas des Menschen in der Hand
wägst du was edel sey wenns gleich das Volk verdammet
The eulogy continues by praising Rousseau’s condemnation of wealth and
pomp and false glory and, finally:
Du Prediger in der Wüste, fühlst dass du edel bist wenn niemand
dich auch grüsste.
ROUSSEAU AND HERDER
_Discourses._—In his _Discourse concerning the Arts and Sciences_
Rousseau insists that our outward lives should be true expressions of
our inner feelings. This harmony between expression and feeling began
its decline under the influences of overrefinement and of tastes that
had been distorted by excessive civilization. Therefore, he argues,
it is the common man, the crude rustic, rather than the polished and
elegant courtier who reveals his heart in all purity; we may deal with
this common man without suspicions, fears, reserves, and treacheries.
It was the simplicity of ancient times when men lived in a primitive
state that bred innocence and virtue, courage and genuine humanity. In
this discourse there is in general a pointed attack upon literary and
scientific training and polish.
The discourse which deals with the inequality of man is based in general
upon the same doctrine which furnishes the ground for the attack on the
sciences and the arts. It attempts to show us what men would have been
had they remained in their original state. This original state was one in
which man lived much like the dumb animals; forests and rocks, running
brooks and springs, furnished abode by day and bed and shelter for the
night, and among these were to be found the meat and drink which produced
strong healthy bodies; bodies robust because their nourishment was
simple. This was a primitive state which had remained true to nature by
not advancing at all or at least not more than a single degree beyond the
original. In such a state man by reason of both his physical hardiness
and his native animal instincts and alertness has all his faculties,
these operating with a force and fineness unknown to the highly civilized
man. Here, as in the essay on the social contract, the philosopher is
opposed to a superior ruling power and arbitrary establishment of laws.
_Social contract._—In the _Social Contract_ in which Rousseau’s social
state is presented as the superior form of government, men had been
brought to realize their dependence upon one another and to know that
co-operation was the true basis of welfare. The doctrine of individuality
which made of man a self-centered unit was weak in that it offered little
protection for the individual. For this individual, born with natural
freedom, was in danger of exercising this freedom to the detriment of the
rights of others.
In giving up himself and his rights to the group, the individual became
subject to no one person, but gained certain rights over each member of
the community. In this compact there is a union of individuals, each
working for the good of the body politic, each a sovereign with civil
liberty and moral freedom.
Thus the restrictions which would be imposed upon members of society by
one supreme authority were avoided. By this means the general will worked
for the general good of humanity.
But the idea of progress implied not only the teaching that the good
of one must be the good of all, but meant also: (1) That man was not
self-sufficient and therefore could come to fullest development only
in the group. (2) That the seeds of individuality lay within man as a
universal element and were nurtured and brought to flower by the peculiar
touch of him who was expressed in their flowering. The fundamental
tendencies in mankind being allowed to unfold, the man will be good; this
goodness is the essential thing in his manhood, and it is natural.
_Emile._—The keynote of Rousseau’s doctrine here is that of absolute
reliance upon nature without impeding or diverting her progress at
any point. He is in accord with the epistemological side of Locke’s
philosophy, and therefore demands that Emile shall have his senses well
developed. He is to have a strong vigorous body, full of courage and
hardihood. Moral education is to be the result of natural discipline
carried on in a sort of laissez-faire way. In general, Emile gets his
education by being thrown into contact with nature and being allowed to
observe and feel the phenomena of a crude environment, and by expressing
directly what he has learned at first hand from this teacher. Emile,
then, is shaped by primitive forces just as the simple, common man in the
_Social Contract_ and the _Inequality_. These made the simple, common man
the epitome of that which was of greatest worth to humanity.
_Origin of language._—In fixing the beginnings of speech, Rousseau says
we can believe that necessities dictated the first movements, and that
passions called forth the first voices. The genius of oriental languages,
the most ancient known to us, have nothing in them that is methodical or
reasoned out; they are vivacious and figurative. It is evident that the
origin of languages is not at all due to the primary needs of man. The
origin is due to the moral needs, to the passions. It is neither hunger
nor thirst, but love, hate, pity, or anger which have called forth from
men the first voices. Fruits do not steal away from our hands at all;
one may nourish one’s self with them without talking; we may follow in
silence the prey of which we wish to make a repast; but to move a young
heart, to repel an unjust aggressor, nature dictates accents, cries, and
tones of resentment. It was for this reason that the oldest words were
invented.
The following quotations affirm in a general way the preceding statements
of Rousseau’s philosophy:
L’astronomie est née de la superstition, de la haine,
de la flatterie, du mensonge;
la géométrie, de l’avarice;
la physique, d’une vaine curiosité;
toute et la morale même de l’orgueil humain.
Les sciences et les arts doivent donc leur naissance à nos vices.
Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, Part. II:
O vertu! science sublime des âmes simples, faut-il donc tant
de peines et d’appareil pour te connaître? Tes principes ne
sont-ils pas graves dans tous les coeurs? et ne suffit-il pas
pour apprendre tes lois de rentrer en soi-même et d’écouter la
voix de sa conscience dans le silence des passions?
Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes:
Il suit de cet exposé que l’inégalité, étant presque nulle
dans l’état de nature tire sa force et son accroissement du
developpement de nos facultés et des progrès de l’esprit
humain, et devient enfin stable et légitime par l’établissement
de la propriété et des lois.
Il suit encore que l’inégalité morale autorisée par le seul
droit positif, est contraire au droit naturel toutes les fois
qu’elle ne concourt pas en même proportion avec l’inégalité
physique; distinction qui détermine suffisamment ce qu’on doit
penser à cet égard de la sorte d’inégalité qui règne parmi tous
les peuples policés, puis-qu’il est manifestement contre la loi
de nature.
The primitivism which stands out in Rousseau’s two discourses is to
be seen in a general way in Herder’s dislike for the higher culture
that would discourage spontaneous outbursts of human feelings as they
appear in the so-called cruder forms of literature; a culture that would
displace these by a smoother product born of reflection and regulated by
set rules and formulas.
He has an admiration for the instinct which to him is always to be found
in women, children, and fools, and which he sees as the foundation of a
naïveté more valuable as a part of mental equipment than anything which
could be substituted by processes of training and culture.
Rousseau’s attempt to return to nature for concrete everyday life finds
its approval with Herder, but the general idea takes a new turn. He finds
in it the inspiration for scientific methods of studying art, history,
and philosophy. His line of investigation in these will be by way of
nature; i.e., man in his primitive abode; man in the hands of nature; man
as the product of his environment.
The opposition to a central and superior governing power, which is
found in the _Social Contract_, to be opposed to the natural method of
community life, finds its echo in Herder in frequent tirades against the
_policirte Nationen_. It is the _unpolicirte Nationen_ to whom nature
has given a certain solace that can scarcely be found in _Menschliche
Künsteleien_.
The _Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität_ carry a constant strain,
which makes the interdependence between the individual and the group a
requisite for well-being. This theory, we have seen, finds a distinct
place in Shaftesbury’s philosophy before Rousseau had voiced it as his
own.
Emile’s senses have been highly developed by his contact with nature,
and it is this sharpness and exactness of the senses that Herder extols
so much in primitive peoples. They are both cause and effect of the work
which nature achieves by her most trusted handmaiden; namely, environment.
In discussing the origin of language, even though Herder at certain
points takes issue with Rousseau, it is very clear that he is influenced
by the latter and is in agreement with him to considerable extent.
Rousseau has pursued the question of the origin of language, not only in
his essay bearing this title, but also in the _Discourse on Inequality_.
The first sentences of Herder’s essay _Abhandlung über den Ursprung der
Sprache_ run not unlike a passage in Rousseau’s _Discours_ just mentioned:
Schon als Thier, hat der Mensch Sprache. Alle heftigen, und die
heftigsten unter den heftigen, die schmerzhaften Empfindungen
seines Körpers, alle starken Leidenschaften seiner Seele
äussern sich unmittelbar in Geschrei, in Töne, in wilde,
unartikulirte Laute.
Le premier langage de l’homme, le langage le plus universel, le
plus énergique et le seul dont il eut besoin avant qu’il fallût
persuader des hommes assemblés est le cri de la nature. Comme
ce cri n’était arraché que par une sorte d’instinct dans les
occasions pressantes, pour implorer du secours dans les grands
dangers ou du soulagement dans les maux violents, il n’était
pas d’un grand usage dans le cours ordinaire de la vie, où
règnent des sentiments plus modérés.
Further, in his own essay, Herder says, that as our tones of nature are
for the purpose of expressing passion, it is natural that they should
become also the elements of all that which is emotional, and if we call
this immediate sound of feeling speech, then, says he, it is easy to find
the origin of speech natural.
But although all animals have a speech by which they sound forth their
feelings, such speech will never become human language until reason,
understanding (_Verstand_), arises to use these tones with direct
intention.
In so far, then, as the very beginnings of language are cries of passion,
Herder is in accord with Rousseau in both essays in which the latter
discusses the question.
REFERENCES TO ROUSSEAU, JEAN JACQUES
I: 22, 47, 96, 484.
II: 229, 269, 276, 313.
III: 279.
IV: 52, 145, 369, 371.
V: 20, 21, 33, 37, 44, 58, 85, 114, 117, 120, 147, 168, 314, 394,
452, 583, 640, 643.
IV: 163; note to page 250.
VII: 65, 74.
VIII: 328.
IX: 354, 474.
X: 298, 306, 307, 352.
XII: Note to page 198.
XIII: 265.
XV: 35, 248, 495.
XVI: 26.
XVII: 8, 97, 190, 309, 326.
XVIII: 91, 359, 371.
XX: 288, 293.
XXII: 151, 161.
XXIII: 231, 272.
XXV: Note to page 601; 631, 632.
XXIX: 256, 265.
XXX: 30.
XXXII: 17, 33, 41, 75, 147, 185, 233.
CONCLUSION
The character and frequency of the references which Herder makes in his
writings to the philosophers of the eighteenth century show that he knew
the predominant lines of thought which characterized the entire period of
the enlightenment. The outstanding eighteenth-century theories which seem
to have a place in Herder’s conception of _das Volk_ are well epitomized
in the teachings of Leibniz, Shaftesbury, and Rousseau.
Herder’s own exposition of a part of Leibniz’ contribution to thought
shows how he found here some things which were in agreement with his own
fundamental ideas concerning innate potentialities.
The praise given to Shaftesbury’s principal ideas of the harmonious
development of the individual and of humanity lead us to believe that
Shaftesbury had exercised an influence on the German writer.
The numerous eulogistic outbursts over Rousseau, the coinciding in many
writings by both men of details concerning the essential elements in
man’s nature, concerning primitivism, liberty, and the ideal state, show
that Herder was fully imbued with the spirit of Rousseau, expressed in
the cry, “back to nature.”