END OF THE ANTAGONISM: A CENTURY OF PEACE
When the American war began, the English showed a tendency to blame the
Tory administration for permitting it to take place; but the chief
feeling, after all, was one of annoyance at Madison and his party for
having decided to give their assistance to Napoleon at the crisis of
his career. The intercourse between Englishmen and New England
Federalists had given British society its understanding of American
politics and coloured its natural irritation toward the Republican
administration with something of the deeper venom of the outraged New
Englanders, who saw in Jefferson and his successors a race of
half-Jacobins. During 1812 and 1813, accordingly, newspapers and
ministerial speakers, when they referred to the contest, generally
spoke of the necessity of {237} chastising an impudent and presumptuous
antagonist. A friendly party such as had defended the colonists during
the Revolution no longer existed, for the Whigs, however antagonistic
to the Liverpool Ministry, were fully as firmly committed to
maintaining British naval and commercial supremacy.
England's chief continental ally, however, the Tsar Alexander,
considered the American war an unfortunate blunder; and, as early as
September, 1812, he offered his mediation through young John Quincy
Adams, Minister at St. Petersburg. The news reached America in March,
1813, and Madison revealed his willingness to withdraw from a contest
already shown to be unprofitable by immediately accepting and
nominating Adams, with Bayard and Gallatin, to serve as peace
commissioners. Without waiting to hear from England, these envoys
started for Russia, but reached there only to meet an official refusal
on the part of England, dated July 5, 1813. The Liverpool Ministry did
not wish to have the American war brought within the range of European
consideration, since its settlement under such circumstances might
raise questions of neutral rights which would be safer out of the hands
of a Tsar whose predecessors had framed armed neutralities in 1780 and
1801. Accordingly, the British government intimated politely that
{238} it would be willing to deal directly with the United States, and
thus waved the unwelcome Russian mediation aside. Madison accepted
this offer in March, 1814; but, although the American commissioners
endeavoured through Alexander Baring, their friend and defender in
Parliament, to get the British government to appoint a time and place
for meeting, they encountered continued delays.
A considerable element in the Tory party felt that the time had come to
inflict a severe punishment upon the United States, and newspapers and
speakers of that connection announced freely that only by large
concessions of territory could the contemptible republic purchase
peace. When the Ministry finally sent commissioners to Ghent, on
August 8, 1814, it was not with any expectation of coming to a prompt
agreement, but merely to engage the Americans while the various
expeditions then under way took Washington and Baltimore, occupied
northern New York, and captured New Orleans. It was generally expected
that a few months would find large portions of the United States in
British possession, as was in fact the sea-coast of Maine, east of
Penobscot Bay, after September first.
The instructions to the British peace commissioners were based on the
_uti possedetis_, {239} as the British government intended it to be by
the end of the year, when they expected to hold half of Maine, the
northern parts of New York, New Hampshire and Vermont, the
north-western post of Mackinnac, and possibly New Orleans and Mobile.
In addition, there was to be an Indian territory established under
British guarantee west of the old treaty line of 1795, and all American
fishing rights were to be terminated. On the other side, the American
instructions, while hinting that England would do well to cede Canada,
made the abandonment of the alleged right of impressments by England a
_sine quâ non_. Clearly no agreement between such points of view was
possible; and the outcome of the negotiation was bound to depend on the
course of events in the United States. The first interviews resulted
in revealing that part of the British instructions related to the
Indian territory with intimations of coming demands for territorial
cessions. This the Americans instantly rejected on August 25, and the
negotiation came to a standstill for several weeks.
The three British negotiators, Admiral Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and
Doctor Adams were men of slight political or personal authority, and
their part consisted chiefly in repeating their instructions and
referring American replies back to Lord Castlereagh, {240} the Foreign
Secretary, or to Lord Bathurst, who acted as his substitute while he
attended the Congress of Vienna. The American commissioners, including
the three original ones, Adams, Bayard, and Gallatin, to whom Clay and
Russell of Massachusetts were now added, clearly understood the
situation, and had already warned Madison that an insistence on the
abandonment of impressments would result in the failure to secure any
treaty. In October, 1814, a despatch yielded this point and left the
negotiators to make the best fight they could, unhampered by positive
instructions. Undoubtedly they would have been compelled to submit to
hard terms, in spite of their personal ability, which stood exceedingly
high, had not news of the repulse at Baltimore, of the treaty of July,
1814, by which the north-western Indians agreed to fight the English,
and, on October 17, of the retreat of Sir George Prevost after the
defeat of Plattsburg, come in to change the situation.
Between August and October little had been accomplished, during a slow
interchange of notes, beyond a withdrawal by the British of their
demand for an Indian territory, and an acceptance in its place of an
agreement to include the Indians in a general peace. Then the Cabinet,
seeing that after Prevost's retreat they could no longer claim the
{241} territory outlined in the first instructions, authorized the
negotiators to demand only Mackinac and Niagara, with a right of way
across Maine. The Americans, encouraged by the news from Plattsburg,
replied on October 23, refusing to treat on the _uti possedetis_, or on
any terms but the _status quo ante_. This brought the Tory government
face to face with the question whether the war was to be continued for
another year for the purpose of conquering a frontier for Canada; and,
before the prospect of continued war taxation, annoyance from
privateers, and a doubtful outcome, they hesitated. Turning to
Wellington for a decision, they asked him whether he would accept the
command in America for the purpose of conquering a peace. His reply
showed little interest or desire to go, although he seemed confident of
success; but he observed that, on the basis of the military situation,
they had no right to demand any territorial cession.
The Ministry then, on November 18, definitely abandoned the claim for
compensation, and accepted as a basis for discussion a plan submitted
by the American commissioners. In the preparation of this a sharp
quarrel had broken out between Clay, who insisted on terminating the
British right to navigate the Mississippi, and Adams, who {242}
demanded the retention of the American right to fish in Canadian
waters. Gallatin pointed out that the two privileges stood together,
and with great difficulty he induced the two men to agree to the
omission of both matters from the treaty, although Clay refused until
the last to sign. So the commission presented a united front in
offering to renew both rights or postpone them for discussion; and the
British commissioners finally accepted the latter alternative. The
treaty was then signed in the old Carthusian Convent at Ghent, on
December 24, 1814, as a simple cessation of hostilities and return to
the _status quo ante_ as regards conquests. Not a word related to any
of the numerous causes of the war. Impressments, blockades, Orders in
Council, the Indian relations, the West Indian trade rights,--all were
abandoned. So far as the United States was concerned the treaty was an
acknowledgment of defeat, a recognition that the war was a failure.
In view of the hopes of Canadian gains, the treaty was denounced in
England by the Opposition journals and many of those most antagonistic
to America as a cowardly surrender. But it was none the less heartily
accepted by both peoples and both governments. It reached the United
States on February 11, was sent to the Senate on February 15, and
ratified unanimously the next day. There {243} still remained various
vessels at sea, and so the winter of 1815 saw not only the amazing
victory of Jackson at New Orleans, but also several naval actions, in
which the United States frigate _President_ was taken by a squadron of
British blockades, two American sloops in duels took two British
smaller vessels, and the American _Constitution_, in a night action,
captured, together, two British sloops. Then the news spread, and
peace finally arrived in fact.
In England, the whole affair was quickly forgotten in the tremendous
excitement caused by the return of Napoleon from Elba, the uprising of
Europe, and the dramatic meeting of the two great captains, Wellington
and Napoleon, in the Waterloo campaign. By the time the Napoleonic
Empire had finally collapsed, the story of the American war, with its
maritime losses and scanty land triumphs, was an old one, and the
British exporters, rushing to regain their former markets, were happy
in the prospect of the reopening of American ports. By October, trade
relations were re-established and the solid intercourse of the two
countries was under way.
In America all disgraces and defeats were forgotten in the memories of
New Orleans, Plattsburg, and Chippawa, and the people at large, willing
to forgive all its failures to the {244} Republican administration,
resumed with entire contentment the occupations of peace. The war
fabric melted like a cloud; armies were disbanded, vessels were called
home, credit rose, prices sprang upward, importations swelled,
exportation began.
In truth, the time of antagonism was at an end, for, with the European
peace of 1814, the immediate cause for irritation was removed, never to
return. The whole structure of blockades, Orders in Council, seizures,
and restrictions upon neutrals vanished; the necessity for British
impressments ceased to exist; and, since France never again came into
hostility with England, none of these grievances were revived. But in
a broader way the year 1815 and the decades following marked the end of
national hostility, for the fundamental antagonisms which, since 1763,
had repeatedly brought about irritation and conflict, began after this
time to die out.
In the first place, the defeat of the Indians in the war allowed the
people of the United States to advance unchecked into the north-west
and south-west, filling the old Indian lands, and rendering any
continuation of the restrictive diplomacy on the part of England for
the benefit of Canadian fur traders patently futile. The war was no
sooner ended than roads, trails, and rivers swarmed {245} with
westward-moving emigrants; and within a year the territory of Indiana,
which the British commissioners at Ghent had wished to establish as an
Indian reserve, was framing a State constitution. In 1819 Illinois
followed.
The revulsion of temper was illustrated in the commencement at this
time of the organized movement for settled international peace, which
may be dated from the establishment of the New York and Massachusetts
Peace Societies in 1815, and the London Peace Society in the following
year. But its most signal expression came in the remarkable agreement
by which the Canadian-American frontier has been, for nearly a century,
unfortified, and yet completely peaceful. On November 16, 1815, State
Secretary Monroe instructed Adams to propose to the British Government
that--as, "if each party augments its force there with a view to
obtaining the ascendancy over the other, vast expense will be incurred
and the danger of collision augmented in like degree"--such military
preparations should be suspended on both sides. The smaller the number
of the armed forces agreed upon, he said, the better; "or to abstain
altogether from an armed force beyond that used for the revenue."
After some suspicious hesitation, Lord Castlereagh accepted this novel
proposal; and it was {246} given effect to by an exchange of notes,
signed by Mr. Bagot, British Minister at Washington, and Mr. Rush
(Monroe's successor) on April 28 and 29, 1817, approved by the Senate a
year later, and proclaimed by the President on April 28, 1818. By
Rush-Bagot Agreement, the naval force of each Government was limited to
one small gun-boat of each power on Champlain and Ontario, and two on
the upper lakes, an arrangement of immense value to both Canada and the
United States.
The old-time commercial antagonism was also destined to disappear in a
few years after the close of the war. At first England clung to the
time-honoured West Indian policy, and, when in 1815 the two countries
adjusted their commercial relations, American vessels were still
excluded, although given the right to trade directly with the East
Indies. But already the new economic thought, which regarded
competition and reciprocal trade as the ideal, instead of legal
discriminations and universal protectionism, was gaining ground, as
England became more and more the manufacturing centre of the world.
Under Huskisson, in 1825, reciprocity was definitely substituted for
exclusion; and a few years later, under Peel and Russell, and within
the lifetime of men who had maintained the Orders in Council, the whole
{247} elaborate system of laws backed by the logic of Lord Sheffield
and James Stephen was cast away and fell into disrepute and oblivion.
In America, it should be added, the rush of settlers into the West and
the starting of manufactures served, within a few years from the end of
the War of 1812, to alter largely the former dependence of the United
States upon foreign commerce. By the time that England was ready to
abandon its restrictive policy, the United States was beginning to be a
manufacturing nation with its chief wealth in its great internal trade,
and the ancient interest in the West Indies was fast falling into
insignificance. The same men who raged against the Jay treaty and the
Orders in Council lived to forget that they had ever considered the
West India trade important. So, on both sides, the end of commercial
antagonism was soon to follow on the Treaty of Ghent.
Finally, and more slowly, the original political and social antagonism
ceased to be active, and ultimately died out. So far as the United
States was concerned, the change was scarcely visible until
three-quarters of a century after the Treaty of Ghent. The temper of
the American people, formed by Revolutionary traditions and nourished
on memories of battle and injuries, remained {248} steadily
antagonistic toward England; and the triumph of western social ideals
served to emphasize the distinction between the American democrat and
the British aristocrat, until dislike became a tradition and a
political and literary convention. But the emptiness of this normal
national hatred of John Bull was shown in 1898, when, at the first
distinct sign of friendliness on the part of the British government and
people, the whole American anglophobia vanished, and the people of the
continent realized that the time had come for a recognition of the
essential and normal harmony of the ancient enemies.
In England, the change began somewhat earlier, for within less than a
generation after the Treaty of Ghent the exclusive Tory control
collapsed, and the Revolution of 1832 gave the middle classes a share
of political power. A few years later the Radicals, representing the
working-men, became a distinct force in Parliament, and to middle class
and Radicals there was nothing abhorrent in the American Republic.
Aristocratic society continued, of course, as in the eighteenth
century, to regard the United States with scant respect, and those
members of the upper middle classes who took their social tone from the
aristocracy commonly reflected their prejudices. But the masses of
{249} the British people--whose relatives emigrated steadily to the
western land of promise--felt a genuine sympathy and interest in the
success of the great democratic experiment, a sympathy which was far
deeper and more effective than had been that of the eighteenth-century
Whigs. From the moment that these classes made their weight felt in
government, the time was at hand when the old social antagonism was to
die out, and with it the deep political antipathy which, since the days
of 1793, had tinged the official British opinion of a democratic state.
The last evidence of the Tory point of view came when, in 1861, the
American Civil War brought out the unconcealed aversion of the British
nobility and aristocracy for the northern democracy; but on the
occasion the equally unconcealed sense of political and social sympathy
manifested by the British middle and working classes served to prevent
any danger to the United States, and to keep England from aiding in the
disruption of the Union.
Thus the Treaty of Ghent, marking the removal of immediate causes of
irritation, was the beginning of a period in which the under-lying
elements of antagonism between England and the United States were
definitely to cease. When every discount is made, the celebration,
heartily supported by the national leaders on {250} both sides, of a
century of peace between the British, Canadian, and American peoples,
does exhibit, in Sir Wilfred Laurier's words, "a spectacle to astound
the world by its novelty and grandeur."
{251}
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The references to the epoch covered in this volume may be rather
sharply divided into those which deal with the years before 1783, and
those which relate to the subsequent period. In the first group, there
are both British and American works of high excellence, but in the
second there are practically none but American authorities, owing to
the preoccupation of British writers with the more dramatic and
important French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, of the events of
parliamentary politics.
For the years 1763-1783 the best American history is E. CHANNING,
_History of the United States_, vol. iii (1912), distinctly
independent, thorough, and impartial. S. G. FISHER, _The Struggle for
American Independence_, 2 vols. (1908), is cynically critical and
unconventional. Three volumes of the _American Nation_ series,--G. E.
HOWARD, _Preliminaries of the Revolution_; C. H. VAN TYNE, _The
American Revolution_; and A. C. McLAUGHLIN, _The Confederation and the
Constitution_ (1905), are equally scholarly and less detailed. The
older American works, exhibiting the traditional "patriotic" view, are
best represented by J. FISKE, _American Revolution_, 2 vols. (1891);
and G. BANCROFT, _History of the United States_, 6 vols. (ed.
1883-1885).
On the English side the most valuable study is in W. E. H. LECKY,
_England in the Eighteenth Century_, vols. iii, iv (1878), a
penetrating and impartial analysis. The Whig view appears in SIR G. O.
TREVELYAN, _The American Revolution_, 3 vols. (1899-1907); LORD MAHON,
_England in the Eighteenth Century_, vols. v-vii (1853-1854); and M.
MARKS, _England and America_, 2 vols. (1907), while W. HUNT, _Political
History_, 1760-1801 (1905), alone of recent writers, presents a Tory
version of events.
Special works of value are C. STEDMAN, _The American War_, 2 vols.
(1794), the authoritative English contemporary account of military
events, and, among recent studies, J. W. FORTESCUE, _History of the
British Army_, vol. iii (1902), which should be compared with H. B.
CARRINGTON, _Battles of the Revolution_ (1876); E. MCCRADY, _South
Carolina in the Revolution_, 2 vols. (1901-2); E. J. LOWELL, _The
Hessians in the {252} Revolution_ (1884); J. B. PERKINS, _France in the
American Revolution_ (1911); C. H. VAN TYNE, _The Loyalists_ (1902),
and W. HERTZ, _The Old Colonial System_ (1905). Of especial value are
the destructive criticisms in C. F. ADAMS, _Studies Military and
Diplomatic_ (1911). The authoritative treatment of naval history is
found in A. T. MAHAN, _Influence of Sea Power_ (1890), and in the
chapter by the same writer in W. L. CLOWES, _History of the Royal
Navy_, vols. iii, iv (1898-1899).
Among leading biographies are those of Washington by H. C. LODGE (2
vols. 1890), by W. C. FORD (2 vols. 1900), and by GEN. B. T. JOHNSON
(1894); of Franklin by J. PARTON (2 vols. 1864), by J. BIGELOW (3 vols.
1874), and by J. T. MORSE (1889); of Henry by M. C. TYLER (1887); of
Samuel Adams by J. K. HOSMER (1885); of Robert Morris by E. P.
OBERHOLZER (1903), and of Steuben by F. KAPP (1869). On the English
side the _Memoirs of Horace Walpole_ (1848); the _Correspondence of
George III with Lord North_, ed. by W. B. DONNE (1867), are valuable
and interesting, and some material may be found in the lives of Burke
by T. McNIGHT (2 vols. 1858); of Shelburne by E. G. FITZMAURICE (2
vols. 1875); of Chatham by F. HARRISON (1905) and A. VON RUVILLE (3
vols. 1907); and of Fox by LORD JOHN RUSSELL (3 vols. 1859). The
biographies of two governors of Massachusetts, C. A. POWNALL, _Thomas
Pownall_ (1908), and J. K. HOSMER, _Thomas Hutchinson_ (1896), are of
value as presenting the colonial Tory point of view.
For the period after 1783, the best reference book and the only one
which attempts to trace in detail the motives of British as well as
American statesmen is HENRY ADAMS, _History of the United States_, 9
vols. (1891). It is impartially critical, in a style of sustained and
caustic vivacity. Almost equally valuable is A. T. MAHAN, _Sea Power
in Relation to the War of 1812_, 2 vols. (1905), which contains the
only sympathetic analysis of British naval and commercial policy,
1783-1812, beside being the authoritative work on naval events. The
standard American works are J. SCHOULER, _History of the United
States_, vols. i, ii (1882); J. B. MCMASTER, _History of the People of
the United States_, vols. i-iv (1883-1895); R. HILDRETH, _History of
the United States_, vols. ii-vi (1849-1862), and three volumes of the
_American Nation Series_, J. S. BASSETT, _The Federalist System_; E.
CHANNING, _The Jeffersonian System_, and K. C. BABCOCK, _Rise of
American Nationality_ (1906). On the English side there is little in
the general histories beyond a chapter on American relations in A.
ALISON, _Modern Europe_, vol. iv (1848), which accurately represents
the extreme Tory contempt for the United States, but has no other
merit. Works on Canadian history fill this {253} gap to a certain
extent, such as W. KINGSFORD, _History of Canada_, vol. viii (1895).
Beside the work of Mahan (as above) the War of 1812 is dealt with by W.
JAMES, _Naval History of Great Britain_, vols. v-vi (1823), a work of
accuracy as to British facts, but of violent anti-American temper; and
on the other side by J. F. COOPER, _Naval History_ (1856), and T.
ROOSEVELT, _Naval War of 1812_ (1883). Sundry special works dealing
with economic and social questions involved in international relations
are T. ROOSEVELT, _Winning of the West_, 4 vols. (1899-1902); W.
CUNNINGHAM, _Growth of English Industry and Commerce_, vol. iii (1893),
and W. SMART, _Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century_ (1910).
Biographical material is to be found, in the lives of Washington (as
above); of Jefferson by J. SCHOULER, (1897), and by J. T. MORSE (1883);
of Hamilton by J. T. MORSE (1882), and F. S. OLIVER (1907); of Gallatin
by H. ADAMS (1879); of Madison by G. HUNT (1903); of Josiah Quincy by
E. QUINCY (1869). There is some biographical material to be found in
BROUGHAM'S _Life and Times of Lord Brougham_, vol. iii (1872), and in
S. WALPOLE, _Life of Spencer Perceval_, 2 vols. (1874), but for the
most part the British version of relations with America after 1783 is
still to be discovered only in the contemporary sources such as the
_Parliamentary History_ and _Debates_, the _Annual Register_, and the
partly published papers of such leaders as Pitt, Fox, Grenville,
Canning, Castlereagh and Perceval.
A useful sketch, giving prominence to the Treaty of Ghent and the
Rush-Bagot Agreement, and summarizing earlier and later events, is _A
Short History of Anglo-American Relations and of the Hundred Years'
Peace_, by H. S. PERRIS.
Documents and other contemporary material for the whole period may be
conveniently found in W. MACDONALD, _Select Charters_ (1904) and
_Select Documents_ (1898); in G. CALLENDER, _Economic History of the
United States_ (1909), and A. B. HART, _American History told by
Contemporaries_, vols. ii, iii (1898, 1901).
{254}
INDEX
Adams, John, in Revolution, 48, 57, 63, 71, 118-125;
after 1783, 142, 147, 155, 173-180
Adams, John Quincy, 237-241
Adams, Samuel, 32, 42, 50, 57, 63, 78, 131, 144
Adet, P. A., 172, 173
Alexander I, 190, 237
Alien and Sedition Acts, 176-180
Anti-Federalists, 143, 147
Armstrong, John, 223-230
Arnold, Benedict, 67, 81, 85, 104
Baltimore, 84, 230, 238, 240
Bank of the United States, 145, 146, 183, 218
Banks, State, 218, 233
Baring, Alexander, 212, 238
Bayard, James A., 237, 240
Beaumarchais, Caron de, 94
Bedford, Duke of, 40
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 179, 184-186, 189-198, 202-208, 213-216,
227, 236, 243
Brock, General Isaac, 220, 221
Brougham, Henry, 212
Brown, General Jacob, 228, 229
Bunker Hill, Battle of, 65, 66, 78, 83
Burgoyne, General John, 89-95, 113, 114
Burke, Edmund, 52, 60, 68, 73, 74, 96, 115, 116, 161, 165
Burr, Aaron, 179, 180
Camden, Battle of, 103
Canada, British policy in, 29, 54, 67, 73, 81, 85, 100,
119, 122, 127, 155, 158, 200, 210, 211;
defence of, 214-229, 239, 241, 244, 245
Canning, George, 197, 202, 204, 205, 207, 212
Carleton, General Guy, 81, 85, 158
Chauncey, Commodore Isaac, 225, 228
Clark, George Rogers, 101, 105
Clay, Henry, 211, 214, 240, 241
Clinton, De Witt, 214
Clinton, George, 147, 169
Clinton, Sir Henry, 82, 100-103, 109-113
Concord, Battle of, 62, 78
Confederation, Articles of, 105, 129-136
Congress, Continental, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 71, 79, 80, 84,
88-93, 98, 105, 118, 130
Congress of the Confederation,
107, 124, 125, 127, 130-138, 142, 157
Congress, United States, under Federalists, 140-146, 155, 164,
173, 175, 177; under Republicans, 182, 186, 187, 195,
199-209, 211, 213, 220, 223, 228, 233, 234
Constitution, United States, 139-141, 159, 180, 183, 234
Cornwallis, Lord, 86, 103-114
Dartmouth, Earl of, 47, 50
Declaration of Independence, 71, 98
De Grasse, Admiral, 110-112, 125
D'Estaing, Admiral, 100-102
Dickinson, John, 42, 50, 57, 64, 105
Elections, Presidential, 142, 147, 178, 178-180, 187, 201, 214
Erie, Lake, Battle of, 225
Erskine, David M., 204, 205
Fauchet, J. A., 163, 172
Finances, of Revolution, 16, 64, 106, 123, 124, 133-135,
144-146, 182, 191, 218-220, 228, 233
Fox, Charles James, 96, 115-121, 152, 153, 165, 193
Franklin, Benjamin, in England, 38, 44, 51, 52, 64;
in France, 71, 83, 93-95, 107, 118-124
Cage, General Thomas, 58, 61, 65
Gallatin, Albert, 182, 237, 240, 242
Gates, General Horatio, 79, 90, 91, 93, 103
Genet, Edmond C., 161-163
Germaine, Lord George, 53, 76, 77, 88, 115
Governors, Colonial, 15-17, 26, 27, 44, 62, 72
Grafton, Duke of, 39, 40, 47
Greene, General Nathaniel, 79, 84, 104, 109
Grenville, George, 28, 30, 31, 35, 45, 53
Grenville, William, Lord, 165, 166, 171, 193, 194, 198, 203
Hamilton, Alexander, 132, 135, 144-148, 162, 164, 168, 177,
179, 180, 188
Harrison, General W. H., 210, 211, 221-225
Hartford Convention, 234
Henry, Patrick, 32, 42, 50, 57, 78, 131, 144
Hillsborough, Lord, 43-53
Howe, Admiral, 82, 83, 100, 114
Howe, General Sir William, 82-92, 95, 113, 114
Hull, General William, 220
Hutchinson, Governor Thomas, 49, 52
Indians, of Northwest, 29, 100, 157-159, 164, 168, 209-213,
218-225, 239, 244, 245
Indians, Southwestern, 157, 210, 224, 229
Jackson, Andrew, 224, 228, 229, 231, 243
Jay, John, 42, 57, 118, 120-125, 156, 157, 165-167, 171
Jefferson, Thomas, 71, 78, 144, 146, 147, 156, 161, 169,
172, 178, 180, 181-188, 193-196, 199-203, 209, 213, 215,
217, 235, 236
King's Mountain, Battle of, 104
Lafayette, Marquis de, 102
Lee, General Charles, 79, 84, 99
Lee, Richard Henry, 57, 144
Livingston, Robert R., 125, 186
Long Island, Battle of, 83
Louis XVI, 93, 95, 156
Madison, James, 132, 135, 142, 144, 146, 147, 163, 164, 172,
178, 193, 201-208, 213-215, 230, 233-238, 240
Ministries, British, Bute, 35, 40;
Grenville, 28, 35, 43;
First Rockingham, 36, 39;
Grafton, 39-45,
North, 47-56, 60, 68-77, 88, 95-98, 114-117, 151;
Second Rockingham, 117, 120;
Shelburne, 120-123, 126, 152-154;
Coalition, 126, 153, 154;
Pitt, 152-154, 159, 162-167, 171;
Addington, 171;
Second Pitt, 171, 192, 193;
Lord Grenville, 193, 196, 197;
Portland, 197, 202, 207;
Perceval, 207, 211-215;
Liverpool, 212, 213, 237-241
Monroe, James, 172, 173, 186, 196
Montgomery, General Richard, 67, 79
Morgan, Daniel, 67, 68, 90, 104
Morris, Robert, 78, 107, 134
Navigation Acts, 22-25, 29, 38, 55, 72, 132, 150, 155
Non-importation Act, 196-200
Non-intercourse Act, 202, 206, 213
North, Lord, Tory leader, 43-56, 60, 61, 73-76;
in Revolutionary war, 77, 97, 115-117, 153
Oswald, Richard, 119-121
Otis, James, 27, 32
Perceval, Spencer, 197, 207, 212
Perry, Commander O. H., 225
Pinckney, C. C., 173, 174
Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 9, 36, 38-40, 53, 60, 96-98
Pitt, William, 144, 148, 152-154, 171, 176, 189, 192
Pownall, Thomas, 41, 47, 53
Prevost, Sir George, 230, 231, 234
Proclamation of 1763, 29, 122
Proctor, Colonel Henry, 221, 225
Quebec Act, 54, 56
Randolph, Edmund, 163, 164, 172
Representatives, House of, 164, 180, 211
Rochambeau, Comte de, 102, 110, 113
Rockingham, Marquis of, 117, 120
Rutledge, John, 57, 78, 83
St. Clair, General Arthur, 159
St. Leger, Colonel B., 90
Sandwich, Earl of, 53, 68, 76, 77, 99, 115
Saratoga, Surrender at, 92
Scott, Sir William, 193
Secession, 188, 201, 234, 235
Sedition Act, 176-178, 180
Shays' Rebellion, 137
Sheffield, Lord, 150, 151, 154, 192, 197, 247
Shelburne, Earl of, 117, 119-123, 152-154
Sherman, Roger, 78, 135
Stamp Act, 30-33, 200
States Rights, 146, 178, 234
Stephen, James, 192, 197, 207, 247
Sugar Act, 25, 29, 31
Talleyrand, 175, 177
Tarleton, Colonel B., 103, 110
Tecumseh, 210, 211, 220, 221, 224, 225
Townshend, Charles, 40-43
Townshend Duties, 40-47, 210
Treaties, 1763, 9, 28;
1778, 95, 98;
1783, 117-127, 149-152, 158;
1794, 165-172, 193, 196;
1795, 168, 184; 1803, 186;
1814, 242;
1818, 244
Trenton, Battle of, 86, 112
Vergennes, Comte de, 93-96, 119-125
Washington, George, Commander,
42, 57, 64, 66, 79, 83-93, 99, 100, 107-112, 126;
in retirement, 132, 134;
President, 142, 144, 146, 147, 159, 162, 164, 167,
172-174, 178
Wayne, General Anthony, 79, 159, 164
Wellington, Duke of, 241, 243
West Indies, British, before 1783, 9, 21-27, 99, 102, 108,
110, 112, 125;
after 1783, 132, 149-151, 166, 167, 246, 247
West Indies, French, trade with, 25, 27, 31, 156, 163,
167, 191-193, 196
Wilkes, John, 44, 45
Wilkinson, General James, 226
X. Y. Z. affair, 174, 175
Yorktown, Surrender at, 112, 160, 160