THE CIVIL WAR IN THE EMPIRE, 1776-1778
In the war which now began, the military situation was such that
neither side could look forward to an easy victory. Great Britain
outweighed the colonies in population by three or four to one, and in
every element of military strength to a much greater degree. There was
a standing army, an ample sufficiency of professional officers, the
most powerful navy in the world, the full machinery of financial
administration, abundant credit, and wealthy manufacturing and
agricultural classes which has already shown their power to carry the
burdens of a world contest without flinching. With a powerful party
Ministry endowed with full discretion in the ordering of military
affairs, there was little danger of divided {76} councils or of
inability to secure responsible direction. North, Sandwich at the
Admiralty, Barrington as Secretary at War, Germaine as Secretary for
the Colonies, could command the active support of the King, the
Parliament, and, it appeared, of the people.
On the other hand, it was necessary to carry on war at 3,000 miles
distance from the base of supplies, and to feed and clothe the armies
entirely from home. The cost was certain to be extremely heavy, and
the practical difficulties of management arising from the distance were
sure to be great, unless a competent commander were to be given
complete authority in the colonies. Then, too, the problem was not one
of conquering cities or single strategic points, or of defeating a
rival state, but of so thoroughly beating down resistance as to lead
the Americans to abandon their revolution and submit to the extinction
of their new-formed confederation. Armies must operate inland from a
seacoast where landing was easy in hundreds of places, but where almost
every step took them into a rough country, ill-provided with roads and
lacking in easily collected supplies. In spite of all advantages of
military power, the problem before the British government was one
calling for the highest forms of military capacity, and this, by an
unexplained ill-fortune, was conspicuously {77} lacking. Not a British
general who commanded in America failed to show fighting ability and
tactical sense, but not one of them possessed the kind of genius which
grasps the true military ends of any campaign and ignores minor points
for the sake of winning decisive advantages. Perhaps it would be
unjust to apply to the British forces in this war the designation won
in 1774--"armies of lions led by asses"; but the analogy is at least
suggested.
Still more serious was the fact that the North Ministry was chosen
mainly on the basis of the willingness of its members to execute the
King's orders and use their influence and parliamentary power and
connections in his behalf. North himself, able as a parliamentarian,
was irresolute in policy, ignorant of war, and careless in
administration; Weymouth and Suffolk, the Secretaries, were of slight
ability; Lord George Germaine, Secretary for the Colonies, was
arrogant, careless, and lacking in military insight; Barrington,
Secretary at War, possessed administrative ability, but was without
personal weight in the cabinet; Sandwich at the Admiralty was grossly
inefficient. There was not a single member of the Cabinet fitted to
carry on war, or able to influence George III. For such a body of men
to undertake to direct the operations in America {78} at the distance
of 3,000 miles was a worse blunder than it would have been to commit
the conduct of the war to any one of the generals in the field, however
commonplace his abilities.
On the side of the colonists, the problem of fighting the full power of
England was apparently a desperate one. The militia, with superior
numbers, had chased the British from Concord, and had made a stubborn
defence at Bunker Hill; but the British were about to move with
overwhelming strength. To raise, equip, clothe, and feed armies was
the task of a strong administration, and there was nothing of the kind
in America. The ex-colonists not only had never known efficient
administration; they had fought against any and all administration for
generations, and their leaders had won their fame as opponents of all
executive power. To thunder against royal oppression won applause, but
indicated no ability at raising money and organizing such things as
commissariat, artillery, or a navy; and it may be said of such men as
Samuel Adams, Robert Morris, Roger Sherman, John Rutledge, Patrick
Henry, and Thomas Jefferson that their administrative training was as
far below that of their enemies in the North Ministry as their
political capacity was, in general, superior.
{79}
The Continental Congress, moreover, which assumed responsibility for
the army, could only recommend measures to the States, and call upon
them to furnish troops and money. In contrast to the States, which
derived their powers unquestionably from the voters within their
boundaries and could command their obedience, the Congress had no legal
or constitutional basis, and was nothing more than the meeting place of
delegates from voluntary allies. Such military authority as it
exercised rested entirely upon the general agreement of the States.
National government, in short, did not exist. Still more serious was
the fact that there were very few trained officers in America. The
American military leaders, such as Washington, Greene, Wayne, Sullivan,
were distinctly inferior in soldiership to their antagonists, although
Washington and Greene developed greater strategic ability after many
blunders. It was only through sundry military adventurers, some
English--such as Montgomery, Gates, Lee, Conway,--others European--such
as De Kalb, Steuben, Pulaski--that something of the military art could
be acquired.
Most serious of all, there were no troops in America who comprehended
the nature of military discipline. The conception of obedience to
orders, of military duty, of the {80} absolute necessity of holding
steady, was beyond the range of most Americans. They regarded war as
something to be carried on in their own neighbourhoods, and resisted
obstinately being drawn outside their own States. They refused to
enlist for longer than a few months, since they felt it imperative to
return to look after their farms. They had little regard for men from
different districts, distrusted commanders from any State but their
own, and had no loyalty of any description to the Continental Congress.
They were, in short, still colonists, such as generations of training
had made them; very angry with Great Britain, infuriated at Tories, and
glad to be independent, but unable to realize the meaning of it all
even under the terrible stress of war.
Under the circumstances, the task of the men to whose lot it fell to
lead the American forces was such as to tax to the utmost not only
their military skill, but their ability to control, inspire, and
persuade the most refractory and unreliable of material. When to this
were added the facts that the colonies were almost wholly lacking in
manufactures except of the most rudimentary sort, that they had little
capital except in the form of land, buildings, vessels, and crops, and
that whatever revenue they had been in the habit of deriving from
commerce was {81} liable to be destroyed by the British naval
supremacy, it is easily seen that the disadvantages of the home country
were actually counterbalanced by the still more crushing disadvantages
of the revolting colonies.
In the summer of 1776, the British advanced from two quarters. In the
north, as soon as navigation opened, men-of-war sailed up the St.
Lawrence and brought reinforcements to Quebec. The relics of the
American force, unable to maintain themselves in Canada, abandoned
their conquests without a blow, and retreated into the Lake Champlain
region, there intending to hold the forts at Crown Point and
Ticonderoga. Col. Guy Carleton, the new commander, was soon able to
move southward with overwhelming numbers; but, after reaching the
northern end of Lake Champlain, he found that body of water commanded
by a small squadron of gunboats under Benedict Arnold, and, deeming it
impossible to advance, delayed all summer in order to construct a rival
fleet. Meanwhile, all operations came to a standstill in that region.
Eleven thousand men, chiefly regular troops, were thus kept inactive
for months.
The principal British force gathered at Halifax, and sailed directly
against New York. It was there joined by the remains of a naval
expedition which had endeavoured in June, {82} 1776, to capture
Charleston, South Carolina, but had suffered severely in an attempt to
bombard Fort Moultrie and been compelled to withdraw. This success,
which raised the spirits of the rebels, was, however, the last they
were to enjoy for many months. The main British expedition was
expected to overpower all colonial resistance, for it comprised a fleet
of men-of-war, and an army of no less than 81,000 men, including German
mercenaries, fully equipped, drilled, and provisioned. The admiral in
command, Lord Howe, a Whig, was authorized to issue pardons in return
for submission, and evidently expected the mere presence of so powerful
an armament to cause the collapse of all resistance. His brother, Sir
William Howe, who commanded the army, was a good officer in actual
fighting, but a man of little energy or activity, and unwilling,
apparently, to cause the revolted colonies any more suffering than was
necessary. He was, moreover, quite without military insight of the
larger kind, failing to recognize the peculiar character of the war
upon which he was entering and acting, when pushing on a campaign,
precisely as though he were operating against a European army in west
Germany.
In spite of all deficiencies, it seemed as though Howe could not fail
to crush the {83} undisciplined collection of 17,000 militia and minute
men with which Washington endeavoured to meet him at New York.
Controlling the harbour and the rivers with his fleet, he could move
anywhere and direct superior numbers against any American position.
The first blow, struck after futile efforts at negotiation, was aimed
at an American force which held Brooklyn Heights on Long Island. About
20,000 British and Hessian troops were landed on August 22; and five
days later they outflanked and crushed a body of Americans placed to
obstruct their advance. There remained the American intrenchments,
which were weak and ill-defended; but Howe refused to attack, probably
with memories of Bunker Hill in his mind. Washington managed, owing to
favourable rainy weather, to remove his beaten force by night on August
29, but only the inaction of Howe enabled them to escape capture.
There followed a delay of two weeks, during which Admiral Howe
tried to secure an interview with American leaders, in hopes of
inducing the rebels to submit; but, finding Franklin, Adams and
Rutledge--commissioners named by Congress--immovably committed to
independence, he was compelled to renew hostilities. There ensued a
slow campaign in which General Howe easily {84} forced Washington to
evacuate New York, to retreat northward, and after various skirmishes
to withdraw over the Hudson River into New Jersey. At no time did
Washington risk a general engagement; at no time did he inflict any
significant loss upon his antagonist or hinder his advance. The
militia were, in fact, almost useless in the open field, and only dared
linger before the oncoming redcoats when intrenched or when behind
walls and fences. Many of them from New England grew discouraged and
homesick, and left the moment their short enlistments expired; so that
without any serious battles Washington's so-called army dwindled week
by week. On November 16, a severe loss was incurred through the effort
of General Greene to hold Fort Washington, which commanded the Hudson
River from the heights at the northern end of Manhattan Island. This
stronghold, besieged by Howe, made a fair defence, but was taken by
storm, and the whole garrison captured. The American army then, in two
detachments under Washington and Lee respectively, was obliged to
retreat across New Jersey, followed by the British under Cornwallis,
until, by December 8, the remnant was at Philadelphia in a state of
great discouragement and demoralization. The Continental Congress,
fearing capture, fled to Baltimore and, moved to {85} desperate
measures, passed a resolution, giving Washington for six months
unlimited authority to raise recruits, appoint and dismiss officers,
impress provisions, and arrest loyalists. Howe felt that the rebellion
was at an end. On November 30 he issued a proclamation offering pardon
to all who would take the oath of allegiance within sixty days; and
farmers in New Jersey took it by hundreds, securing in return a
certificate of loyalty. The rebels' cause seemed lost. But at the
moment when, if ever, it was worth while to push pursuit to the
uttermost, with the prospect of reducing three colonies and breaking up
all show of resistance, Howe, satisfied with his campaign, began to
prepare winter quarters.
To the northward, a similar fatality seemed to prevent full British
success. During the summer, General Guy Carleton waited at the
northern end of Lake Champlain while his carpenters built gunboats.
Month after month went by until, on October 11, the British vessels
engaged Arnold's inferior flotilla. Two days of hot fighting with
musketry and cannon resulted in the destruction of the American
squadron, so that the way seemed clear for Carleton to advance; but the
season was late, the difficulties of getting provisions from Canada
seemed excessive, and on November 2 the British {86} withdrew. Here
again only extreme caution and slowness permitted the colonial army to
hold its ground. Yet it seemed doubtful whether the American cause
might not collapse even without further pressure, for the "armies" were
almost gone by sheer disintegration. General Schuyler had a scanty
3,000 near Lake Champlain; Washington could not muster over 6,000 at
Philadelphia, and these were on the points of going home. The attempt
to carry on the war by voluntary militia fighting was a visible failure.
At this stage, the darkest hour, Washington, who had never dared to
risk a battle, took the bold step of re-crossing the Delaware with part
of his half-starved and shivering troops, and captured nearly all of a
Hessian encampment at Trenton on December 25. Further, he drew on
Cornwallis to advance against him, skirmished successfully on January
2, and then, moving by a night march to the British rear, defeated a
regiment at Princeton. Cornwallis, with 7,000 men, was out-generalled
by Washington in this affair, which was the first really aggressive
blow struck by the Americans. The result was to lead Howe to abandon
the effort to hold all of New Jersey; while Washington was able to post
his men in winter quarters at Morristown, where he could watch every
British move. This masterly {87} little campaign, carried on under
every disadvantage, made Washington's fame secure, and undoubtedly
saved the American revolution from breaking down. It revived the
fighting spirit, encouraged the Congress and the people, and created a
faith in Washington on the part of the soldiers and farmers which was
destined to grow steadily into love and veneration. With no particular
military insight beyond common sense and the comprehension of military
virtues, he was a man of iron will, extreme personal courage, and a
patience and tenacity which had no limit.
Congress now showed that its members realized in part the military
lesson, for it authorized a standing regular army, and gave Washington
power to establish it and appoint lower officers. It was a hard task
to induce any Americans to enlist in such an organization; but little
by little there were collected "Continental troops" who did not rush
back to their family duties at the end of three months, but stayed and
grew in discipline and steadiness. Yet Washington could never count on
more than a few thousand such; Americans in general simply would not
fight except under pressure of invasion and in defence of their homes.
During 1776-7, the revolted communities assumed something of the
appearance of settled governments. The States replaced {88} their
revolutionary conventions with constitutions closely modelled upon
their provincial institutions, but with elective governors, and, to
safeguard liberty, full control over legislation, taxation, and most
offices placed in the hands of the legislatures. Executive power was
confined mainly to military matters. The Continental Congress
continued to act as a grand committee of safety, framing
recommendations and requests to the States, and issuing paper money on
the credit of its constituents. Military administration proved a task
beyond the capacity of the new governments, even for such diminutive
armies as those which guarded the northern frontier and New Jersey, and
the forces suffered from lack of food, covering, and powder. The
country had few sources of supplies and wretched roads.
In 1777, when spring opened, the British armies slowly prepared to push
matters to a definite conclusion. The North Cabinet, especially Lord
George Germaine, had no single coherent plan of operations beyond
continuing the lines laid down in 1776. It was early planned to have
the Canadian force march southward and join Howe, collecting supplies
and gathering recruits as it traversed New York. Howe was told that he
was expected to co-operate, but was not prevented from substituting a
plan of his {89} own which involved capturing Philadelphia, the chief
American town and, as the seat of the Continental Congress, the "rebel
capital." Germaine merely intimated that Howe ought to make such
speedy work as to return in time to meet the Canadian force, but did
not give him any positive order, so Howe considered his plan approved.
In leisurely fashion he tried twice to march across New Jersey in June;
but, although he had 17,000 to Washington's 8,000, he would not risk
leaving the latter in his rear and withdrew. He next determined to
move by water, and began the sea journey on July 5. This process
occupied not less than six weeks, since he first tried to sail up the
Delaware, only to withdraw from before the American forts; and it was
not until August 22 that he finally landed his men at the head of
Chesapeake Bay.
Meanwhile, General Burgoyne, a man of fashion as well as an officer,
had begun his march southward from Lake Champlain with 7,500 men and
some Indian allies, forced the Americans to evacuate Fort Ticonderoga
without a blow, and chased the garrison to the southward and eastward.
Pushing forward in spite of blocked roads and burned bridges, he
reached the Hudson River on August 1 without mishap, and there halted
to collect provisions and await {90} reinforcements from Tories and
from a converging expedition under St. Leger, which was to join him by
way of Lake Ontario and the Mohawk Valley. Up to this time the
American defence had been futile. It seemed as though nothing could
stop Burgoyne's advance. Congress now appointed a new general, Gates,
to whom Washington sent General Morgan with some of his best troops.
While Burgoyne waited, the militia of New England began collecting, and
presently, on August 15 and 16, two detachments of the British sent to
seize stores at Bennington were surrounded and captured. St. Leger,
unable to manage his Indian allies, or force the surrender of the
American Fort Stanwix, was obliged, on August 22, to retreat.
Burgoyne, with diminishing numbers and no hope of reinforcement, found
himself confronted by rapidly growing swarms of enemies. At the moment
when his need of co-operation from Howe became acute, the latter
general was two hundred miles away in Pennsylvania.
Under the circumstances, the two campaigns worked themselves out to
independent conclusions. In Pennsylvania, Washington boldly marched
his summer army with its nucleous of veterans out to meet the British,
and challenged a battle along the banks of the Brandywine creek. On
September 11, Howe, with 18,000 men, methodically attacked {91}
Washington, who had not over 11,000, sent a flanking column around his
right wing, and after a stiff resistance pushed the Americans from the
field. There was no pursuit; and four days later Washington was
prevented only by bad weather from risking another fight. He did not
feel able to prevent Howe from entering Philadelphia on September 27;
but on October 3, taking advantage of a division of the British army,
he assumed the offensive at Germantown and brought his unsteady forces
into action, only to suffer another defeat. With this Washington was
forced to abandon operations in the field and to go into winter
quarters at Valley Forge, not far from the city; while Howe besieged
and on November 2 took the American forts on the Delaware. The British
campaign was successful; Philadelphia was theirs, and they had won
every engagement. But nothing shows more clearly Washington's ability
as a fighter and leader than his stubborn contest against odds in this
summer.
Meanwhile, the Northern campaign came to its conclusion. By September,
Gates, the new commander, found himself at the head of nearly 20,000
men, and Burgoyne's case grew desperate. He made two efforts to break
through to the southward, at Freeman's Farm, and again at Bemis
Heights, but was {92} met by superior numbers and overwhelmed, in spite
of the gallantry of his troops. Forced back to Saratoga on the Hudson
River, he was surrounded and at length compelled to surrender, on
October 17. Sir Henry Clinton, who commanded the British garrison of
New York in Howe's absence, sent a small expedition up the Hudson; but
it did not penetrate nearer than sixty miles from the spot where
Burgoyne stood at bay, and it achieved nothing more than a raid. So
the northern British force, sent to perform an impossible task, was
destroyed solely because neither Howe nor his superiors realized the
necessity of providing for certain co-operation from the southward.
The prisoners, according to the terms of the surrender, were to be
returned to England; but Congress, owing in part to some complaints of
Burgoyne, chose to violate the agreement, and the captive British and
Hessians were retained. Burgoyne himself returned to England, burning
with anger against Howe and the North Ministry.
The winter of 1777-8 found the two British armies comfortably housed in
New York and Philadelphia, and Washington, with his handful of
miserably equipped men, presenting the skeleton of an army at Valley
Forge. Congress, now manned by less able leaders than at first, was
almost won over to {93} displacing the unsuccessful commander by Gates,
the victor of Saratoga; and it did go so far as to commit the
administration of the army to a cabal of Gates's friends, who carried
on a campaign of depreciation and backbiting against Washington. But
the whole unworthy plot broke down under a few vigorous words from the
latter, the would-be rival quailing before the Virginian's personal
authority. He was not a safe man to bait. The military headship
remained securely with the one general capable of holding things
together.
In the winter of 1778, however, a new element entered the game, namely,
the possibility of French intervention. From the outbreak of the
Revolution, very many Americans saw that their former deadly enemy,
France, would be likely to prove an ally against England; and as early
as 1776 American emissaries began to sound the court of Versailles. In
March, 1776, Silas Deane was regularly commissioned by the Continental
Congress, and in the autumn he was followed by no less a person than
Benjamin Franklin. It was the duty of these men to get whatever aid
they could, especially to seek an alliance. The young king, Louis XVI,
was not a man of any independent statecraft; but his ministers, above
all Vergennes, in charge of foreign affairs, were anxious to secure
revenge {94} upon England for the damage done by Pitt, and the tone of
the French court was emphatically warlike. The financial weakness of
the French government, destined shortly to pave the way for the
Revolution, was clearly visible to Turgot, the Minister of Finances,
and he with a few others protested against the expense of a foreign
war; but Vergennes carried the day.
As early as the summer of 1776, French arms and munitions were being
secretly supplied, while the Foreign Minister solemnly assured the
watchful Lord Stormont, the English Ambassador, of his government's
perfect neutrality. Thousands of muskets, hundreds of cannon, and
quantities of clothes were thus shipped, and sums of money were also
turned over to Franklin. Beaumarchais, the playwright and adventurer,
acted with gusto the part of intermediary; and the lords and ladies of
the French court, amusing themselves with "philosophy" and speculative
liberalism, made a pet of the witty and sagacious Franklin. His
popularity actually rivalled that of Voltaire when the latter, in 1778,
returned to see Paris and die. But not until the colonies had proved
that they could meet the English in battle with some prospect of
success would the French commit themselves openly; and during 1776 and
1777 the tide ran too steadily against {95} the insurgents. Finally,
in December, when the anxieties of Franklin and his associates were
almost unendurable, the news of Burgoyne's surrender was brought to
Paris. The turning-point was reached. Vergennes immediately led the
French King to make two treaties, one for commercial reciprocity, the
other a treaty of military alliance, recognizing the independence of
the United States, and pledging the countries to make no separate
peace. In the spring of 1778 the news reached America; and the war now
entered upon a second stage.
There can be little doubt that under abler commanders the British
armies might have crushed out all armed resistance in the middle
colonies. In spite of all drawbacks, the trained British soldiers and
officers were so superior in the field to the American levies on every
occasion where the forces were not overwhelmingly unequal that it is
impossible for any but the most bigoted American partisan to deny this
possibility. Had there been a blockade, so that French and Dutch goods
would have been excluded; had General Howe possessed the faintest spark
of energy in following up his successes; had the North Cabinet not
failed to compel Howe to co-operate with Burgoyne, the condition of
things in 1778 might well have been so serious for the colonists' cause
that {96} Vergennes would have felt a French intervention to be
fruitless. In that case, it is hard to see how the rebellion could
have failed to be crushed in the next year. As it was, the Americans,
by luck and by the tenacity of Washington and a few other leaders, had
won the first victory.