OF EDWARDS' IDEA OF VIRTUE.
IN order to reconcile his scheme of necessity with the existence and
reality of virtue, it appears that Edwards has adopted a false notion of
virtue. This is the course he has taken, as I have already shown, in
regard to the doctrine of liberty or free-agency, in order to reconcile
it with necessity; and if I mistake not, it may be shown, that he has
been able to reconcile necessity and virtue only by transforming the
nature of virtue to make it suit his system.
I do not intend, at present, to enter into a full discussion of the
author's views in relation to the nature of virtue. I shall content
myself with a brief consideration of his notion of virtue, as it stands
more immediately and directly connected with the subject of the Inquiry.
It is a fundamental principle with him, that "the essence of the virtue
and viciousness of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies
not in their cause, but their nature." In what precise sense the author
would have us to understand this proposition, I shall not now stop to
inquire. It is sufficient for my present purpose, that he attaches such
a sense to it, as to make the idea of virtue it is intended to define,
to agree not only with his doctrine of necessity, but also with any
other kind of necessity or fatality whatever. For he maintains, that as
the essence of virtue does not consist in its cause, but in its nature,
so a man by the mere act of creation may, in the proper sense of the
word, be endowed with virtuous and holy dispositions. It is true, the
man himself has had no share in the production of his dispositions, they
are exclusively the work of his Creator; but yet they are virtuous, they
are the objects of moral approbation, because the virtuousness of
dispositions has nothing at all to do with their cause or origin. It
depends wholly on their nature, and having this nature, (as he supposes
they may have by creation alone,) he concludes that they are properly
and truly virtuous, although the person in whom they exist has in no
manner whatever contributed to their production; neither in whole nor in
part, neither exclusively nor concurrently with his Maker. Now, it is
evident, I think, that if virtue may be made to exist in this way, by a
power wholly extraneous to the being in whom it exists, and wholly
independent of all his own thoughts and reflections and doings, then it
may be easily reconciled with the most absolute scheme of fatality that
has ever been advocated. For it may exist without any agency or
concurrence or consent on the part of the person in whom it exists; and
hence, there would be no difficulty in reconciling it with any scheme of
necessity that any fatalist may be pleased to advance.
To show that I have not misrepresented the author, I shall select from
many passages of similar import, the following from his work on
"Original Sin:"--"Human nature must be created with some dispositions; a
disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse
to other things as odious and disagreeable: otherwise it must be without
any such thing as inclination or will, perfectly indifferent, without
preference, without choice or aversion towards any thing as agreeable or
disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they
must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the
nature of things. If man had at first the highest relish of things
excellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest
delight in those things which are most worthy of it, then his
dispositions were morally right and amiable, and _never can be excellent
in a higher sense_. But if he had a disposition to love most those
things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were
vicious. And it is evident there can be no medium between these."
Now, this principle, that a man may be to praise or to blame, that he
may be esteemed virtuous or vicious, on account of what he has wholly
and exclusively received from another, appears to me to be utterly
irreconcilable with one of the clearest and most unequivocal dictates of
reason and conscience.
According to the above passage, there can be no medium between virtuous
and vicious dispositions. This sentiment is still more explicitly
declared in the following words; "In a moral agent, subject to moral
obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly _innocent_, as to be
perfectly _righteous_. It must be the same, because there can no more be
any medium between sin and righteousness, or between being right and
being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be between being straight
and crooked, in a natural sense." Now, all this is very true, in regard
to a moral being who has been called upon to act; for he must either
live up to the rule of duty, or he must fall short of it. If he does the
former, he becomes righteous in the true and proper sense of the term;
and if he does the latter, he loses his original innocence, and becomes
a transgressor. But before he has any opportunity of acting, at the
instant of his creation, I humbly conceive that no moral agent is either
to be praised or blamed for any disposition with which he may have been
endowed by his Maker. He is neither virtuous nor vicious, neither
righteous nor sinful. This was the condition of Adam, as it very clearly
appears to me, at the instant of his creation. He was in a state of
perfect _innocency_; having neither transgressed the law of God, nor
attained to true holiness. And if this be the case, then in regard to
such a moral agent, before he has an opportunity to act, or to think, or
to feel, it is not "the same thing to be perfectly innocent, as to be,
perfectly righteous;" nor the same thing to be destitute of true
righteousness, as to be sinful.
It strikes my mind with the force of a self-evident truth, that nothing
can be our virtue, unless we are in some sense the author of it; and to
affirm that a man may be justly praised or blamed, that he may be
esteemed virtuous or vicious, on account of what he has wholly and
exclusively received from another, appears to me to contradict one of
the clearest and most unequivocal dictates of reason, one of the most
universal and irreversible laws of human belief.
Though the Almighty endowed Adam with all that is lovely in human
nature, the recipient of such noble qualities certainly deserved no
credit for them, as he had no agency in their production. All the praise
and glory belonged to God. Such dispositions are no doubt the objects of
our admiration and love, but they are no more the objects of our _moral
approbation_ than is the beauty of a flower. Both are the work of the
same creative energy which hath diffused so much of loveliness and
beauty over every part of the creation.
Hence, I deny that Adam was "created or brought into existence
righteous." I am willing to admit, that he "was brought into existence
capable of acting immediately as a moral agent; and, therefore, he was
immediately under a rule of _right_ action. He was obliged as soon as he
existed, to _act right_." But I deny that until he did begin to act, he
could possess the character of true holiness or virtue. That President
Edwards thought otherwise, is evident, not only from the passage already
quoted, but also from many others, as well as from the fact, that he
argues if Adam had not possessed virtuous dispositions before he began
to act,--if he had not derived them directly from his Creator, then the
existence of virtue would have been impossible.
On this subject, his argument is ingenious and plausible. It is as
follows: "It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages,
not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that
the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds, is so; yea,
also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from
whence proceeds that _good_ choice, is virtuous. This is the general
notion--not that principles derive their goodness from actions,
but--that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they
proceed; so that the act of choosing what is good, is no further
virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous
disposition of mind. Which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind,
may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that, therefore, it is not
necessary there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before
there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before
the existence of a good disposition of heart, what is the character of
that choice? There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue
in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere
self-love, ambition, or some animal appetite: therefore, a virtuous
temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be
before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from
it," p. 407.
It is true, that actions derive their good or evil quality, as the case
may be, from the principles whence they proceed. This accords, as the
author truly says, with the universal sentiment of mankind. But this
proposition, plain and simple as it appears to be at first sight, may be
misunderstood. The term "principle" is ambiguous; and, according to the
idea attached to it, the above proposition may be true or false. When it
is said, for example, that a vicious or sinful action derives its evil
quality from the principle or motive whence it proceeds, I apprehend
that no one pretends to fix the brand of condemnation on the implanted
principle, or the natural spring of action, from which it is supposed to
proceed. To take the very case in question; our first parents, in eating
the forbidden fruit, acted partly from a desire of food and partly from
a desire of knowledge. Now, this was a sinful action, because forbidden,
and consequently, according to the sense of men in all ages and nations,
it must have proceeded from a sinful inclination or principle. But yet
no one, I presume, will contend that either the desire of food or the
desire of knowledge, from which it is supposed to have proceeded, is in
itself sinful. They were implanted in our nature by the finger of God,
for wise and beneficent purposes; and to assert that they are sinful, is
to make God the author of sin. Our first parents were not to blame
because they were endowed with these principles. Hence, when it is said,
that a sinful action must proceed from a sinful principle, we are not to
understand the proposition as meaning that the inherent constitutional
principle of action from which it is supposed to proceed is sinful. Our
first parents sinned, not in possessing an appetite for food, or a
desire for knowledge, but in indulging these contrary to the will of
God. It was their _intention_ and _design_ to do that which God had
commanded them not to do, and which they knew it was wrong for them to
do. It was this intention and design, which was certainly not an
implanted principle, or any part of the work of the Creator, which
constituted their sin; and it is this intention and design that is
pointed at, when it is said, that the principle or motive from which
their transgression proceeded, was a sinful principle or motive. And
hence, we very clearly perceive, that a sinful action may result from
those principles of our constitution, which are in themselves neither
virtuous nor vicious, which are wholly destitute of any moral character
whatever. So, in like manner, a virtuous action may result from a
principle of our nature, implanted in the human breast by the Author of
our being, although such principle may not, properly speaking, be called
a virtuous principle, or an object of moral approbation.
The fallacy of the author's argument, I conceive, has arisen from the
ambiguity of the term principle. As it is truly said, that a holy action
can proceed only from a holy principle or disposition, he concluded,
that if man had not been created with a principle of virtue or holiness
in his heart, then no such thing as virtue or holiness could ever have
found its way into the world. Supposing, all the time, that it is
universally considered that a virtuous act could proceed only from an
implanted principle of virtue, of which God alone is the author;
whereas, in fact, the virtuous principle from which the virtuous act is
supposed to derive its character, is not an implanted principle at all,
but the design, or intention, or motive with which the act is done; and
of which the created agent is himself the author.
There is one thing well worthy of remark in this connexion. President
Edwards contends, as we have seen, that Adam must have been created with
a principle of virtue, of which his Maker was the sole author, or else
the existence of virtue would have been impossible, And yet, he contends
that Adam was created perfectly free from sin;--that as he came from the
hand of his Maker, he was perfectly pure and holy, without the least
stain or blemish of any wrong or vicious principle upon his nature. Is
it not wonderful, that it did not occur to so acute a reasoner as the
author of the "Inquiry," that if his own argument was sound, it would,
according to his own principle, prove the introduction of sin into the
world to be utterly impossible? That he did not see, if it is impossible
to account for the existence of holiness, except on the supposition that
man was created or brought into the world with a principle of holiness
implanted in his heart; so, for the same reason, it is equally
impossible to account for the existence of sin, except on the
supposition that a sinful principle was implanted in the breast of man
by the hand of his Maker?
The above extract, by which Edwards endeavours to prove that Adam could
not have performed a virtuous act, unless a virtuous principle had been
planted in his nature by the Creator, would be just as correct and
conclusive, if we were to read vicious instead of virtuous. By the very
same argument, we might prove that he could not have sinned, and so sin
would have been impossible, unless God had planted a sinful principle or
disposition in his nature.
It is sufficiently evident, that President Edwards' idea of the essence
of virtue, was not altogether correct, and that he was led to adopt it
by the necessities of a false system. For if we admit that the essence
of virtue or of sin consists in its nature, and not in its cause or
origin, it must be conceded, on the other hand, that the nature of those
principles, or dispositions, or volitions, or habits, (call them what we
may,) which are termed virtuous or vicious, depend in a very important
sense upon their cause or origin. It must be conceded, that no
disposition or principle whatever which has derived its origin wholly
from any cause or power extraneous to the moral agent in which it
exists, can be properly denominated virtuous or vicious. It cannot
partake of the nature of virtue or of vice, unless it owes its origin to
the agent whose virtue or whose vice it is supposed to be. If it
proceeds wholly from the "power, influence, or action," of motives, or
from the hand of the Creator, it is not the act of the agent in whom it
exists, and consequently he is not accountable for it. Or, in other
words, the nature of virtue and vice is such, that they cannot possibly
be produced by any "cause, or power, or influence," which is wholly
extraneous to the mind in which they exist. Virtue and vice, in the
strict and proper sense of the words, must have the concurrence and
consent of the mind in which they exist, or they cannot possibly exist
at all. To speak of virtue,--of that which deserves our moral
approbation, as being wholly derived from another--as being exclusively
the work of God in the soul, is to be guilty of a contradiction, as
plain and palpable as the light of heaven. It is to be regretted, it is
to be deeply lamented, that Edwards did not try to bring his doctrine of
the will into harmony with the common sentiments of mankind with respect
to the nature of virtue and free-agency, instead of exerting his
matchless powers to make virtue and free-agency agree with his scheme of
necessity, by explaining away and transforming their natures. It is to
be lamented; because in attempting to uphold and support the distinctive
peculiarities of his own system of theology, he has unintentionally
struck a deadly blow at the vital and fundamental principles of all
religion, both natural and revealed. The infidel and the atheist are
much indebted to him for such an exertion of his immortal powers.