OF NATURAL AND MORAL NECESSITY.
I HAVE already said many things bearing upon the famous distinction
between natural and moral necessity; but this distinction is regarded as
so important by its advocates, that it deserves a separate notice. This
I shall proceed to give it.
The distinction in question is treated with no great reverence by the
advocates of free-agency. It is denounced by them as a distinction
without a difference; and, though this may be true in the main, yet this
is not the way to settle any thing. There is, indeed, a real difference
between natural and moral necessity, as they are held and described by
necessitarians; and if we pay no attention to it, our declarations about
its futility will be apt to produce more heat than light. I fully
recognize the justness of the demand made by Dr. Edwards, that those who
insist that natural and moral necessity are the same, should tell us in
what respects they are so. "We have informed them," says he, "in what
respects we hold them to be different. We wish them to be equally
explicit and candid," p. 19. I intend to be equally explicit and candid.
I admit, then, that there is a real difference between natural and moral
necessity; they differ, as the Edwardses say, in the nature of the terms
connected. In the one case, there is a natural cause and its effect,
such as force and the motion produced by it, connected together; and in
the other, there is a motive and a volition. In this respect, I believe
that there is a greater difference between them than does the
necessitarian himself; for he considers volition to be of the same
nature with an effect, whereas I regard it as essentially different in
nature and in kind from an effect.
There is another difference between natural and moral necessity. Natural
necessity admits of an opposition of the will; whereas it is absurd to
suppose any such opposition in the case of moral necessity. A man may be
so bound that his utmost efforts to move may prove unavailing: in such a
case, he is said to labour under a natural necessity. This always
implies and presupposes an opposition of will. But not so in regard to
moral necessity. It is absurd to suppose, that our wills can ever be in
opposition to moral necessity; for this would be to suppose that we are
made willing by the influence of motives, and yet are not willing.
Now, I fully recognize these differences between natural and moral
necessity, as they are viewed by the necessitarian. Whether they are not
inconsistent with their ideas of moral necessity, is another question.
But as I am not concerned with that question at present, I am willing to
take these differences without the least abatement. Admitting, then,
that these distinctions are well-founded, and that they are perfectly
consistent with the idea of moral necessity, let us see in what respects
there is an agreement between the things under consideration. The
difference does not lie, says Edwards, _so much in the nature of the
connexion_, as in the two terms connected. Moral necessity is "a sure
and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects." It is "as
absolute as natural necessity." The influence of motives is not a
condition of volition, which the will may or may not follow; it is the
_cause_ thereof; and it is absurd to suppose that the effect, the
volition, can be loose from the influence of its cause, p. 77-8. Yes,
volition is just as absolutely and unconditionally controlled by motive,
as the inanimate objects of nature are controlled by the power of the
Almighty. The connexion, the necessary connexion, which subsists between
motion and the force by which it is produced, is the same in nature and
in kind as that which subsists between the "action or influence of
motive" and volition. Herein, then, is the agreement, that in moral
necessity, as well as in natural, the effect is produced by the
influence of its cause. The nature of the connexion is the same in both;
and in both it is equally absolute.
Now we have seen the differences, and we have also seen the points of
agreement; and the question is, not whether this famous distinction be
well-founded, but whether it will serve the purpose for which it is
employed. In the full light, and in the perfect recognition of this
distinction, we deny that it will serve the purpose of the
necessitarian.
It is supposed, that natural necessity alone interferes with the
free-agency of man, while moral necessity is perfectly consistent with
it. But, in reality, moral necessity is more utterly subversive of all
free-agency and accountability than natural necessity itself. Think not
that this is a mere hasty and idle assertion. Let us look at it, and see
if it is not true.
We have already seen, that a caused volition is no volition at
all;--that a necessary agent is a contradiction in terms. In other
words, a power to act must itself act, and not be made to act by the
action of any other power, or else it does not act at all. And if it
must be caused to act, before it can act, then, as we have already seen,
there must be an infinite series of acts. These things have been fully
illustrated, and defended against the false analogies, by which they
have been assailed; and they are here mentioned only for the sake of
greater clearness and distinctness.
If the scheme of moral necessity be true, then, according to which our
volitions are absolutely caused by the "action or influence of motive,"
it is idle to talk about free acts of the will; for there are no acts of
the will at all. If our wills are caused to put forth volitions, and are
turned to one side or the other, by the controlling influence of
motives, it is idle to talk about a free-will; for we have no will at
all. I know full well, that President Edwards admits that we have a
will; and that the will does really act; but this admission is
contradicted by bringing the will and all its exercises under the
domination and absolute control of motives. He obliterates the
distinction between cause and effect, between action and passion,
between mental activity and bodily motion; and thereby draws the
phenomena of will, the volitions of all intelligent creatures, under the
iron scheme of necessity. We are eternally reminded that Edwards
believes in the existence of a will, and in the reality of its acts. We
know it; but let us not be accused of misrepresenting him, unless it can
be shown that one part of his system does not contradict
another,--unless it can be shown, not by false analogies and an abuse of
words, but by valid evidence, that _an act of the mind may be
necessarily caused_. This never has been shown; and the attempts of the
necessitarian to show it, as we have seen, are among the most signal
failures in the whole range of human philosophy. Until this be shown, we
must contend that there is nothing in the universe so diametrically
opposed to all free-agency--to all liberty of the will, as the scheme of
moral necessity; which so clearly overthrows and, demolishes the very
idea of a will and all its volitions.
Indeed, what is called natural necessity does not properly interfere
with the liberty of _the will_ at all; it merely restrains the freedom
of _motion_. It is moral necessity that reaches the seat of the mind,
and takes away all the freedom thereof; even denying to us the
possession of a will itself. When my hand is bound, I may strive to move
it in vain; in this case, my _will_ is free, because I may strive, or I
may not; but the hand is not free, because it cannot move. But if
motives cause the mind to follow their influence, so that it may not
possibly depart or be loose from that influence; then we have no will at
all; and it is idle and a mockery to talk about freedom of the will. And
yet, although Edwards would have us to believe that no system is
consistent with free-agency but his own; he occupies the position, that
it is absurd to suppose, that a volition may possibly be loose from the
influence of motive; that this is to suppose that it is the effect of
motive, and at the same time that it is not the effect of motive!
"All agree," says Day, "that a necessity which is opposed to our choice,
is inconsistent with liberty," p. 91. That is to say, a necessity which
cuts off or prevents the external consequence of our choice, is
inconsistent with liberty of the will; but that which takes away one
choice, and sets up another, is perfectly consistent with it! If the arm
is held, so that the free choice cannot move it, then is the liberty of
the will interfered with; but, though the will may be absolutely swayed
and controlled, by the influence of motives, or by the sovereign power
of God himself, yet is it perfectly free! If such be the liberty of the
will, what is it worth?
There are many things, which it is beyond the power of the human mind to
accomplish. Even in such cases, the natural necessity under which we are
said to labour, does not interfere with the liberty of the will. If we
cannot do such things, it is not because our will is not free in regard
to them, but because its power is limited. We might very well attempt
them, and put forth volitions in order to accomplish them, as in our
ignorance we often do; and if we abstain from so doing in other cases,
wherein we might wish to act, it is because we know they are beyond our
power, and, as rational creatures, do not choose to make fools of
ourselves. To say that we are under a natural necessity, then, is only
to say that our power is limited, and not that it is not free. It is
reserved for moral necessity--shall I say to enslave?--no, but to
annihilate the will.
It is true, if we will to do a thing, and are restrained from doing it
by a superior force, we are not to blame for not doing it; or if we
refuse to do it, and are constrained to do it, we are equally blameless.
In such cases, natural necessity, although it does not reach the will,
is an excuse for external conduct. If the question were, is a man
accountable for his external actions? for the movements of his body?
then we might talk about natural necessity. But as the question, in the
present controversy, is, whether a man is accountable for his internal
acts, for the volitions of his mind? to talk about natural necessity is
wholly irrelevant. It has nothing to do with such a controversy; and
hence, Edwards is entirely mistaken when he supposes that it is natural
necessity, and that alone, which is opposed to the freedom of the will.
It is in fact opposed to nothing but the freedom of the body; and by
lugging it into the present controversy, it can only serve to make
confusion the worse confounded.
It is the general sentiment of mankind, that moral necessity is
inconsistent with free-agency and accountability. Edwards has taken
great pains to explain this fact. His great reason for it is, that men
are in the habit of excusing themselves for their outward conduct, on
the ground of natural necessity. In this way, by early and constant
association, the idea of blamelessness becomes firmly attached to the
term necessity, as well as those terms, such as must, cannot, &c., in
which the same thing is implied. Hence, we naturally suppose that we are
excusable for those things which are necessary with a moral necessity.
Thus, the fact that men generally regard moral necessity and free-agency
as incompatible with each other, is supposed by Edwards to arise from
the ambiguity of language; and that if we will only shake off this
influence, we shall see a perfect agreement and harmony between them.
But is this so? Let any man fix his mind upon the very idea of moral
necessity itself, and then answer this question. Let him lay aside the
term necessity, and all kindred words; let him simply and abstractedly
consider a volition as being produced by the "action or influence of
motives;" and then ask himself, if the subject in which this effect is
produced is accountable for it? If it can be his virtue or his vice? Let
him conceive of a volition, or anything else, as being produced in the
human mind, by an extraneous cause; and then ask himself if the mind in
which it is thus produced can be to praise or to blame for it? Let any
man do this, and I think he will see a better reason for the common
sentiment of mankind than any which Edwards has assigned for it; he will
see that men have generally regarded moral necessity as incompatible
with free-agency and accountability, just because it is utterly
irreconcilable with them.
Indeed, however liable "the common people," and philosophers too, may be
to be deceived and misled by the ambiguities of language, there is no
such deception in the present case. The common people, as they are
called, do not always say, my actions are "necessary," "I cannot help
them," and therefore I am not accountable for them. They as frequently
say, that if my actions, if my volitions, are brought to pass by the
strength and influence of motives, I am not responsible for them. This
common sentiment and conviction of mankind, therefore, does not blindly
aim merely at the name, while it misses the thing; it does indeed bear
with all its force directly upon the scheme of moral necessity itself.
And its power is sought to be evaded, as we have seen, and as we shall
still further see, not by explaining the ambiguities of language, so as
to enlighten mankind, but by confounding the most opposite natures, such
as action and passion, volition and local motion, through the
ambiguities of language. It is the necessitarian, who is always talking
about the ambiguities of language, that is continually building upon
them. Indeed, it is hard to conceive why he has so often been supposed
to use language with such wonderful precision, if it be not because he
is eternally complaining of the want of it in others.
Just let the common people, or those of them who may desire an opiate
for their consciences, see the scheme of moral necessity as it is in
itself, stripped of all the disguises of an ambiguous phraseology, and
it will satisfy them. It will be the one thing needful to their craving
and hungering appetites. Let them be made to believe that all our
volitions are produced by the action and influence of motives, so that
they may not be otherwise than they are; and a sense of moral obligation
and responsibility will be extinguished in their breasts, unless nature
should prove too strong for sophistry. Indeed, if we may believe the
most authentic accounts, this doctrine has done its strange and fearful
work among the common people, both in this country and in Europe. It is
a philosophy which is within the reach of the most ordinary minds, as
well as the most agreeable to the most abandoned hearts; and hence its
awfully desolating power. And if its ravages and devastations have not
extended wider and deeper than they have, it is because they have been
checked by the combined powers of nature and of religion, rather than by
logic; by the happy inconsistency, rather than by the superior
metaphysical acumen, of its advocates and admirers.