SECTION XVII

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_, and small caps

are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.

* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected.

* Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made

consistent when a predominant usage was found.

* Errata and Notes on illustrations have been inserted into their

proper places in the text.

* To aid referencing places and names in present-day maps and

documents, outdated and current spellings of some proper names

follow:

Albaracin, now Albarracín,

Albondonates, now Algodonales,

Albuquerque, now Alburquerque,

Alcanizas, now Alcañices,

Alemtejo, now Alentejo,

Almanza, now Almansa,

Almunecar, now Almuñecar,

Araçena, now Aracena,

Arzobispo, now El Puente del Arzobispo,

Baccelar (Manuel), now Manuel Pinto de Morais Bacelar,

Ballasteros, now Ballesteros,

Barcellos, now Barcelos,

Baylen, now Bailén,

Boçaco, now Buçaco,

Bussaco, now Buçaco,

Cacabellos, now Cacabelos,

Caçeres, now Cáceres,

Calandriz, now Calhandriz,

Campredon, now Camprodón,

Cardadeu, now Cardedeu,

Compostella, now Compostela,

Cordova, now Córdoba,

Corunna, now La Coruña,

Dao, now Dão,

Daymiel, now Daimiel,

Deleytosa, now Deleitosa,

Despeña-Perros, now Despeñaperros,

Douro, now Duero (in Spain),

Douro (in Portugal),

El Moral, now Moral de Calatrava,

Estremadura, now Extremadura (in Spain),

Estremadura (in Portugal),

Golegão, now Golegã,

Guadalaviar (river), now Turia (río),

Guimaraens, now Guimarães,

La Baneza, now La Bañeza

La Bispal, now La Bisbal,

Loxa, now Loja,

Majorca, now Mallorca,

Meza, now Mesas de Ibor,

Momblanch, now Montblanch,

Nabao (river), now Nabão (río),

Ona (river), now Güeña (río),

Oña (river), now Oñar (río),

Palleresa, now Pallaresa,

Pampeluna, now Pamplona,

Ripol, now Ripoll,

Sabugoça, now Sabugosa

Santona, now Santoña,

Saragossa, now Zaragoza,

Senabria, now Sanabria,

Tagus (river), now Tajo (Spanish), Tejo (Portuguese),

Tajuna, now Tajuña,

Tondella, now Tondela,

Truxillo, now Trujillo,

Vierzo, now El Bierzo,

Villaharta, now Villarta de San Juan,

Vincente, now Vicente,

Vittoria, now Vitoria,

Xeres, now Jerez,

* Chapter headers and Table of contents have been made consistent.

* Footnotes have been renumbered into a single series. Each footnote

is placed at the end of the paragraph that includes its anchor.

* In p. 49, the anchor placement for footnote 52 is conjectured; no

anchor was found in the printed original.

* In pp. 202, 398 and 428, paragraphs have been broken at “(1)” for

a more natural presentation and an easier reading.

[Illustration:_Duke of Wellington_

_From a portrait in the Hope Collection_

(_1813_)]

A HISTORY OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR

BY

CHARLES OMAN, M.A.

FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE

AND CHICHELE PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

AND CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA

DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID

VOL. III

SEPT. 1809-DEC. 1810

OCAÑA CADIZ BUSSACO TORRES VEDRAS

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1908

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH

NEW YORK AND TORONTO

PREFACE

This, the third volume of the History of the Peninsular War, covers

a longer period than either of its predecessors, extending over the

sixteen months from Wellington’s arrival at Badajoz on his retreat

from Talavera (Sept. 3, 1809) to the deadlock in front of Santarem

(Dec. 1810), which marked the end of Masséna’s offensive campaign

in Portugal. It thus embraces the central crisis of the whole war,

the arrival of the French in front of the Lines of Torres Vedras and

their first short retreat, after they had realized the impossibility

of forcing that impregnable barrier to their advance. The retreat

that began at Sobral on the night of Nov. 14, 1810, was to end at

Toulouse on April 11, 1814. The armies of the Emperor were never

able to repeat the experiment of 1810, and to assume a general and

vigorous offensive against Wellington and Portugal. In 1811 they

were on the defensive, despite of certain local and partial attempts

to recover their lost initiative. In 1812 they had to abandon

half Spain--Andalusia, Estremadura, Asturias, La Mancha, and much

more,--despite of Wellington’s temporary check before Burgos. In

1813 they were swept across the Pyrenees and the Bidassoa; in 1814

they were fighting a losing game in their own land. Rightly then

may Masséna’s retreat to Santarem be called the beginning of the

end--though it was not for a full year more that Wellington’s final

offensive commenced, with the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo on Jan. 8,

1812.

The campaign of Bussaco and Torres Vedras, therefore, marked the

turning-point of the whole war, and I have endeavoured to set forth

its meaning in full detail, devoting special care to the explanation

of Wellington’s triple device for arresting the French advance--his

combination of the system of devastation, of the raising of the

_levée en masse_ in Portugal, and of the construction of great

defensive lines in front of Lisbon. Each of these three measures

would have been incomplete without the other two. For the Lines of

Torres Vedras might not have saved Portugal and Europe from the

domination of Napoleon, if the invading army had not been surrounded

on all sides by the light screen of irregular troops, which cut

its communications, and prevented it from foraging far afield. Nor

would Masséna have been turned back, if the land through which he

had advanced had been left unravaged, and if every large village had

contained enough food to subsist a brigade for a day or a battalion

for a week.

The preparations, the advance, and the retreat of Masséna cover about

half of this volume. The rest of it is occupied with the operations

of the French in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Spain--operations

which seemed decisive at the moment, but which turned out to be

mere side-issues in the great contest. For Soult’s conquest of

Andalusia, and Suchet’s victories in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia

only distracted the imperial generals from their central task--the

expulsion of Wellington and his army from the Peninsula. Most

readers will, I think, find a good deal of new information in the

accounts of the siege of Gerona and the battle of Ocaña. The credit

due to Alvarez for the defence of the Catalonian city has never

been properly set forth before in any English history, nor have the

details of Areizaga’s miserable campaign in La Mancha been fully

studied. In particular, the composition and strength of his army have

never before been elucidated, and Appendices V, VI of this volume

consist of absolutely unpublished documents.

I have to offer my grateful thanks to those who have been good

enough to assist me in the writing of this book, by furnishing me

with stores of private papers, or hitherto unknown official reports.

Two of the kind helpers who put me on the track of new information

for the compiling of Volume II have passed away while Volume III

was in progress. I bitterly regret the loss of my friends General

Arteche and Colonel F. A. Whinyates. The former, with his unrivalled

knowledge of the contents of the historical department of the Madrid

War Office, had enabled me to discover many a lost document of

importance. The latter had placed at my disposal his copious store

of papers, letters, and diaries relating to his old corps, the Royal

Artillery. In this present section of the history of the war I am

still using much of the material which he lent me.

But new helpers have come to my aid while this volume was being

written. To three of them I must express my special gratitude.

The first is Mr. W. S. M. D’Urban, of Newport House, near Exeter,

who has furnished me with copies of a collection of papers of

unique interest, the diary and correspondence of his grandfather,

Sir Benjamin D’Urban, who served as the Quarter-Master-General

of the Portuguese army, under Marshal Beresford, during the two

years covered by this section of my history. Thanks to the mass of

documents furnished by Mr. D’Urban’s kindness, I am now in a position

to follow the details of the organization, movements, and exploits

of the Portuguese army in a way that had hitherto been impossible to

me. Moreover, Sir Benjamin’s day by day criticisms on the strategy

and tactics both of Masséna and of Wellington have the highest

interest, as reflecting the opinions of the more intelligent section

of the head-quarters staff. It is noteworthy to find that, while

many of Wellington’s chief subordinates despaired of the situation

in 1810, there were some who already felt an enthusiastic confidence

in the plans of their leader, so much so that their criticisms

were reserved for the occasions when, in their opinion, he showed

himself over-cautious, and refused to take full advantage of the

uncomfortable positions into which he had lured his enemy.

The second mass of interesting private papers placed in my hands

of late is the personal correspondence of Nicholas Trant and John

Wilson, the two enterprising leaders of Portuguese militia forces,

to whom Wellington had entrusted the cutting off of Masséna’s

communication with Spain, and the restriction of his raids for

sustenance to feed his army. These letters have been lent me by

Commander Bertram Chambers of H.M.S. _Resolution_, a collateral

relative of Wilson. They fill up a gap in the military history of

1810, for no one hitherto had the opportunity of following out in

detail the doings of these two adventurous soldiers and trusty

friends, while they were engaged in the difficult task that was set

them. For a sample of Trant’s breezy style of correspondence, I may

refer the reader to pages 399-400 of this volume. Unfortunately, when

the two militia generals were in actual contact, their correspondence

naturally ceased, so that the series of letters has many _lacunae_.

But they are nevertheless of the highest value.

Thirdly, I have to thank Sir Henry Le Marchant for a sight of the

private papers of his grandfather, the well-known cavalry brigadier,

General John Gaspar Le Marchant, who fell at Salamanca. He did not

land in the Peninsula till 1811, but during the preceding year he was

receiving many letters of interest, some from his own contemporaries,

officers of high rank in Wellington’s army, others from younger men,

who had been his pupils while he was in command of the Military

College at High Wycombe. Some of the seniors, and one especially,

were among those down-hearted men--of the opposite type to Benjamin

D’Urban--who were consistently expecting disaster, and looked for a

hasty embarkation at Lisbon as the natural end of the campaign of

1810. The younger men took a very different view of affairs, and

invariably sent cheerful accounts of the doings of the army.

I must mention, once more, kind assistance from the officials of the

Historical sections of the War Ministries at Paris and at Madrid.

My friend Commandant Balagny, who gave me so much help during the

compilation of my second volume, has unfortunately been absent on a

military mission to Brazil during the last three years. But the kind

offices of M. Martinien have continually aided me in getting access

to the particular sections of the Paris archives with which I was

from time to time concerned. I must here take the opportunity of

expressing once more my admiration for his colossal work, the _Liste

des officiers tués et blessés pendant les Guerres de l’Empire_,

which, on the numberless occasions when no casualty-return appears

in the Paris archives, enables one to determine what regiments

were present at any action, and in what proportion they suffered.

At Madrid Captain Emilio Figueras has continued his kind services,

offered during the compilation of my second volume, and was

indefatigable in going through the papers of 1810 with me, during my

two visits to the Spanish capital.

Among my English helpers I must cite with special gratitude four

names. The first is that of Mr. C. T. Atkinson, Fellow of Exeter

College, Oxford, who has read the proofs of the greater part of

this volume, and given me many valuable corrections and pieces of

information, from his wide knowledge of British regimental history.

The second is that of Major John H. Leslie, R.A., who has compiled

the Artillery Appendix to this section, corresponding to that which

Colonel Whinyates compiled for the last. I am also most grateful to

him for an early view of the useful ‘Dickson Papers,’ which he is

publishing for the Royal Artillery Institution. The third is that

of the Rev. Alexander Craufurd, who has continued to give me notes

on the history of the Light Division, while it was commanded by his

grandfather, the famous Robert Craufurd. The fourth is that of Mr. C.

E. Doble of the Clarendon Press, who has again read for errors every

page of a long volume.

Lastly, the indefatigable compiler of the Index must receive once

more my heartfelt thanks for a labour of love.

The reader will find several topographical notes appended at the

end of chapters, the results of my first and second tours along the

borderland of Spain and Portugal. Two long visits to the battlefield

of Bussaco, and some days spent between the Coa and the Agueda, and

behind the Lines of Torres Vedras, gave me many new topographical

facts of importance. Drives and walks in the Badajoz-Elvas country,

and about Coimbra, also turned out most profitable. But my notes on

the battlefields of Fuentes d’Oñoro and Albuera can only be utilized

in my next volume, which I trust may not be long in following its

predecessor into print.

The spelling of many of the Spanish, and more especially the

Portuguese, names may appear unfamiliar to some readers. But I

believe that correctness should be studied above all things, even

though the results in cases like Bussaco with the double s, Golegão,

or Santa Comba Dao, may produce a momentary shock to the eye.

Portuguese spelling, both in personal names and in topography, was

in a state of flux in 1810. For example, the General commanding the

Artillery always appears as da Rosa in the official army lists, yet

signed his name da Roza; countless other instances could be produced.

Where it was possible I have followed the individual’s own version

of his name: he ought to have known best. There are still, no doubt,

errors of spelling surviving: no man is infallible, but I have done

my best to reduce them to a minimum.

C. OMAN.

OXFORD:

_March 1, 1908_.

CONTENTS

SECTION XVII

FROM TALAVERA TO OCAÑA

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Introductory. The Central Junta. Wellesley and

Wellington 1

II. Events in Eastern Spain during the Summer and Autumn

of 1809: the Siege of Gerona begins 9

III. The Fall of Gerona (Aug.-Dec. 1809) 37

IV. The Autumn Campaign of 1809: Tamames, Ocaña, and Alba

de Tormes 67

A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 · 第 1 / 16 章