The strength and purpose of the enemy were to us unknown when we
reached Winchester, except upon surmise and vague rumors from Front
Royal. These rumors were strengthened by the vigor with which the
enemy had pressed our main column, and defeated at every point efforts
of detachments to effect a junction with the main column.
At Winchester, however, all suspicion was relieved on that subject,
all classes—Secessionists, Unionists, Refugees and Prisoners—agreed
that the enemy’s force at or near Winchester was overwhelming, ranging
from 25,000 to 30,000. Rebel officers, who came into our camp with
entire unconcern, supposing that their own troops occupied the town,
as a matter of course, and were captured, confirmed these statements,
and added that an attack would be made on us at daybreak. I determined
to test the substance and strength of the enemy by actual collision,
and measures were promptly taken to prepare our troops to meet them.
They had taken up their positions on entering the town after dark,
without expectation of a battle, and were at disadvantage, as compared
with the enemy.
The rolling of musketry was heard during the latter part of the
night, and before the break of day a sharp engagement occurred at the
outposts. Soon after four o’clock the artillery opened its fire, which
continued without cessation till the close of the engagement.
The right of our line was occupied by the third brigade, Colonel
George H. Gordon commanding. The regiments were strongly posted, and
near the centre covered by stone walls from the fire of the enemy.
Their infantry opened on the right, and soon both lines were under
heavy fire.
The left was occupied by the third brigade, Colonel Dudley Donnelly
commanding.
The line was weak, compared with that of the enemy, but the troops
were posted, and patiently awaited, as they nobly improved their
coming opportunity. The earliest movements of the enemy were on
our left, two regiments being sent to move, as with the purpose of
occupying a position in flank or rear. General Hatch sent a detachment
of cavalry to intercept this movement, when it was apparently
abandoned. The enemy suffered very serious loss from the fire of
our infantry on the left. One regiment is represented by persons
present during the action and after the field was evacuated as nearly
destroyed.
The main body of the enemy was hidden during the early part of the
action by the crest of the hill and the woods in the rear.
Their force was massed apparently upon our right, and their manœuvres
indicated a purpose to turn us upon the Berryville road, where it
appeared subsequently they had placed a considerable force, with a
view of preventing reinforcements from Harper’s Ferry. But the steady
fire of our lines held them in check, until a small portion of the
troops, on the right of our line, made a movement to the rear. It is
but just to add that this was done under the erroneous impression
that an order to withdraw had been given. No sooner was this observed
by the enemy, than its regiments swarmed upon the crest of the hill,
advancing from the woods upon our right, which, still continuing its
fire steadily, withdrew towards the town.
The overwhelming force of the enemy, now suddenly showing itself,
making further resistance unwise, orders were sent to the left by
Captain De Hauteville to withdraw, which was done reluctantly, but in
order, the enemy having greatly suffered in the wing. A portion of the
troops passed through the town in some confusion, but the column was
soon reformed, and continued its march in order. This engagement held
the enemy in check five hours.
The forces engaged were greatly unequal. Indisposed to accept the
early rumors concerning the enemy’s strength, I reported to the
department that it was about 15,000. It is now conclusively shown that
not less than 25,000 men were in position, and could have been brought
into action. On the right and left their great superiority of numbers
was plainly felt and seen, and the signal officers, from elevated
positions, were enabled to count regimental standards, indicating a
strength equal to that above stated.
My own command consisted of two brigades of less than four thousand
men, all told, with nine hundred cavalry, ten Parrott guns, and one
battery of six-pounders, smooth bore cannon. To this should be added
the tenth Maine regiment of infantry, and five companies of Maryland
cavalry, stationed at Winchester, which were engaged in the action.
The loss of the enemy was treble that of ours in killed and wounded.
In prisoners ours greatly exceeded theirs.
Officers, whose word I cannot doubt, have stated, as the result of
their own observation, that our men were fired upon from private
dwellings in passing through Winchester; but I am credibly informed,
and gladly believe, that the atrocities said to have been perpetrated
upon our wounded soldiers by the rebels are greatly exaggerated, or
entirely untrue.
Our march was turned in the direction of Martinsburg, hoping there to
meet with reinforcements—the troops moving in three parallel columns,
each protected by an efficient rear guard. Pursuit by the enemy was
prompt and vigorous, but our movements were rapid, and without loss.
A few miles from Winchester the sound of a steam whistle, heard in the
direction of Martinsburg, strengthened the hope of reinforcements,
and stirred the blood of the men like a trumpet. Soon after two
squadrons of cavalry came dashing down the road with wild hurrahs.
They were thought to be the advance of the anticipated support, and
were received with deafening cheers. Every man felt like turning back
upon the enemy. It proved to be the first Maryland cavalry, Lieutenant
Colonel Metschky, sent out in the morning as a train guard. Hearing
the guns, they had returned to participate in the fight.
Advantage was taken of this stirring incident to reorganize our
column, and the march was continued with renewed spirit and order. At
Martinsburg the column halted two and a half hours, the rear guard
remaining until seven in the evening in rear of the town, and arrived
at the river at sundown, forty-eight hours after the first news of
the attack on Front Royal. It was a march of fifty-three miles,
thirty-five of which were performed in one day. The scene at the river
when the rear guard arrived was of the most animating and exciting
description. A thousand camp fires were burning on the hill side; a
thousand carriages of every description were crowded upon the banks of
the broad river between the exhausted troops and their coveted rest.
The ford was too deep for the teams to cross in regular succession;
only the strongest horses, after a few experiments, were allowed
to essay the passage of the river before morning. The single ferry
was occupied by the ammunition trains, the ford by the wagons. The
cavalry was secure in its form of crossing. The troops only had no
transportation. Fortunately the train we had so sedulously guarded
served us in turn. Several boats belonging to the pontoon train, which
we had brought from Strasburg, were launched, and devoted exclusively
to their service. It is seldom that a river crossing of such magnitude
is achieved with greater success. There never were more grateful
hearts in the same number of men then when at midday on the 20th we
stood on the opposite shore.
My command had not suffered an attack and rout, but accomplished a
premeditated march of nearly sixty miles in the face of the enemy,
defeating his plans and giving him battle wherever he was found.
Our loss is stated in detail, with the names of the killed, wounded
and missing, in the full report of Brigadier General A. S. Williams,
commanding division, to which reference is made. The whole number in
killed is 38, wounded 155, missing 711. Total loss 905.
It is undoubtedly true that many of the missing will yet return, and
the entire loss may be assumed as not exceeding seven hundred. It is
also probable that the number of killed and wounded may be larger than
that above stated, but the aggregate loss will not be changed thereby.
All our guns were saved.
Our wagon train consisted of nearly five hundred wagons. Of this
number fifty-five were lost. They were not, with a few exceptions,
abandoned to the enemy, but were burned upon the road. Nearly all of
our supplies were thus saved. The stores at Front Royal, of which I
had no knowledge until my visit to that position on the 21st instant,
and those at Winchester, of which a considerable portion was destroyed
by our troops, are not embraced in this statement.
The number of sick men in the hospital at Strasburg, belonging to
General Williams’s division, was 189, 125 of whom were left in the
hospital at Winchester, under charge of surgeon Lincoln R. Stone,
second Massachusetts, or were left in hospital at Strasburg, including
attendants, under charge of surgeon Gillespie, seventh Indiana, and
assistant surgeon Porter, United States army.
Eight of the surgeons of this division voluntarily surrendered
themselves to the enemy, in the hospitals and on the field, for
the care of the sick and wounded placed under their charge. They
include, in addition to those above named, brigade surgeon Peale, at
Winchester; surgeon Mitchell, first Maryland, at Front Royal; surgeon
Adolphus, Bests’s battery, United States army; surgeon Johnson,
sixteenth Indiana; and surgeon Francis Leland, second Massachusetts,
on the field.
It is seldom that men are called upon to make a greater sacrifice of
comfort, health and liberty, for the benefit of those entrusted to
their charge. Services and sacrifices like these ought to entitle them
to some more important recognition of their devotion to public duty
than the mere historical record of the fact.
The report of the medical director, surgeon W. S. King, exhibits the
disposition of nearly one thousand sick and disabled men left at
Strasburg by Shields’s division upon its removal to the Rappahannock
valley.
My warmest thanks are due to the officers and men of my command for
their unflinching courage and unyielding spirit exhibited on the
march and its attendant combats. Especially to Brigadier General
A. S. Williams, commanding the division, General George S. Greene,
and General L. W. Crawford, who had reported for duty, but were
yet unassigned to separate commands. They accompanied the column
throughout the march, and rendered me most valuable assistance.
My thanks are also due to the gentlemen of my staff—Major D. D.
Perkins, chief of staff; Captain James W. Albert, of the Topographical
Engineers; Captain Wm. Sheffler, Captain Frederick Munther, and
Captain Frederick De Hauteville—for their arduous labors.
It gives me pleasure also to commend the conduct of Colonel Donnelly
and Colonel Gordon, commanding the two brigades. I would also
respectfully ask the attention of the department to the reports of the
several officers commanding detachments separate from the main column,
and to the officers named in the report of General Williams, as worthy
of commendation for meritorious conduct.
The signal corps, Lieutenant W. W. Rowley commanding, rendered most
valuable service on the field and in the march. There should be some
provision for the prompt promotion of officers and men so brave and
useful as those composing this corps. The safety of the train and
supplies is, in a great degree, due to the discretion, experience, and
unfailing energy of Captain S. B. Holabird and Captain E. G. Beckwith,
United States army.
I have the honor to be, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
N. P. BANKS,
_Major General Commanding_.
_June 24th, 1862._ Subjoined is a letter from that Southern traitor
and unscrupulous scoundrel, “Parson Brownlow,” to the “Philadelphia
Enquirer:”
_Extracts from Northern papers._