HON. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_.
Information was received on the evening of May 23d, that the enemy, in
very large force, had descended on the guard at Front Royal, Colonel
Kenly, first Maryland regiment, commanding, burning the bridges and
driving our troops toward Strasburg with great loss. Owing to what
was deemed an extravagant statement of the enemy’s strength, these
reports were received with some distrust; but a regiment of infantry,
with a strong detachment of cavalry and a section of artillery, were
immediately sent to reinforce Colonel Kenly. Later in the evening
despatches from fugitives who had escaped to Winchester informed
us that Colonel Kenly’s force had been destroyed, with but few
exceptions, and the enemy, 15,000 or 20,000 strong, were advancing by
rapid marches on Winchester.
Orders were immediately given to halt the reinforcements sent to Front
Royal, which had moved by different routes, and detachments of troops,
under experienced officers, were sent in every direction to explore
the roads leading from Front Royal to Strasburg, Middletown, Newtown
and Winchester, to ascertain the force, position and purpose of this
sudden movement of the enemy. It was soon found that his pickets were
in possession of every road, and rumors from every quarter represented
him in movement, in the rear of his pickets, in the direction of our
camp.
The extraordinary force of the enemy could no longer be doubted. It
was apparent, also, that they had a more extended purpose than the
capture of the brave little band at Front Royal.
This purpose could be nothing less than the defeat of my own command,
or its possible capture by occupying Winchester, and by this movement
intercepting supplies or reinforcements, and cutting off all
possibility of retreat.
It was also apparent, from the reports of fugitives, prisoners, Union
men, and our own reconnoitering parties, that the three divisions of
the enemy’s troops, known to be in the valley, and embracing at least
25,000 men, were united and close upon us, in some enterprise not yet
developed.
The suggestion, that had their object been a surprise, they would not
have given notice of their approach by an attack on Front Royal, was
answered by the fact, that on the only remaining point of attack—the
Staunton road—our outposts were five miles in advance, and daily
reconnaissances made for a distance of twelve hides towards Woodstock.
Under this interposition of the enemy’s plans, our position demanded
instant decision and action. Three courses were open to us: First,
a retreat across Little North Mountain to the Potomac river, on the
west. Second, an attack upon the enemy’s flank on the Front Royal
road. Third, a rapid movement direct upon Winchester, with a view
to anticipate his occupation of the town by seizing it ourselves,
thus placing my command in communication with its original base of
operations, in the line of reinforcements by Harper’s Ferry and
Martinsburg, and securing a safe retreat in case of disaster.
To remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded; to move over the
mountains was to abandon our train at the outset, and to subject my
command to flank attacks, without possibility of succor; and to attack
the enemy in such overwhelming force could only result in certain
destruction. It was, therefore, determined to enter the lists with the
enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the possession
of Winchester, the key of the valley, and for us the position of
safety.