CHAPTER XXX.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.--THE EXODUS OF THE TURKS.

It is impossible to be in Constantinople without having forced upon us

the Eastern Question, which is just now occupying so much of the

attention of Europe. A child can ask questions which a philosopher

cannot answer, and a traveller can see dangers and difficulties which

all the wisdom of statesmen cannot resolve.

Twenty years ago France and England went to war with Russia for the

maintenance of Turkey, and they are now beginning to ask, whether in

this they did not make a great mistake; whether Turkey was worth

saving? If the same circumstances were to arise again, it is doubtful

whether they would be so ready to rush into the field. All over Europe

there has been a great revulsion of feeling caused by the recent

financial breakdown of Turkey. Within a few weeks she has virtually

repudiated half the interest on her national debt; that is, she pays

one-half, and _funds_ the other half, promising to pay it five years

hence. But few believe it will then be paid. This has excited great

indignation in France and England and Italy,[10] where millions of

Turkish bonds are held, and they ask, have we spent our treasure and

shed our blood to bolster up a rotten state, a state that is utterly

faithless to its engagements, and thus turns upon its benefactors?

To tell the whole truth, these powers have themselves partly to blame

for having led the Turkish government into the easy and slippery ways

of borrowing money. _Before the Crimean war Turkey had no national

debt._ Whatever she spent she wrung out of the sweat and blood of her

wretched people, and left no burden of hopeless indebtedness to curse

its successors.

But the war brought great expenses, and having rich allies, what so

natural as to borrow a few of their superfluous millions? Once begun,

the operation had to be repeated year after year. Nothing is so

seductive as the habit of borrowing money. It is such an easy way to

pay one's debts and to gratify one's love of spending; and as long as

one's credit lasts, he may indulge his dreams to the very limit of

Oriental magnificence. So the Sultan found it. He had but to contract

a loan in London or Paris, and he had millions of pounds sterling to

build palaces, and to carry out every Imperial desire.

But borrowing money is like taking opium, the dose must be constantly

increased, till finally the system gives way, and death ends the

scene. Every year the Sultan had to borrow more money to pay the

interest on his debts, and to borrow at ever increasing rates; and so

at last came, what always comes as the result of a long course of

extravagance, a complete collapse of money and credit together.

The indignation felt at this would not have been so great, if the

money borrowed had been spent for legitimate objects--to construct

public works; to build railroads (which are greatly needed to open

communications with the interior of the empire); and to create new

branches of industry and new sources of wealth. Turkey is a very rich

country in its natural resources, rich in a fertile soil, rich in

mines, with an immense line of sea-coast, and great harbors, offering

every facility for commerce; and it needs only a very little political

economy to turn all these resources to account. If the money borrowed

in England and France had been spent in building railroads all over

European Turkey, in opening mines, and in promoting agriculture and

commerce, the country to-day, instead of being bankrupt, would be rich

and independent, and not compelled to ask the help or the compassion

of Europe.

But instead of applying his borrowed money to developing the resources

of his empire, there has not been a freak of folly that the Sultan did

not gratify. He has literally thrown his money into the Bosphorus,

spending it chiefly for ships on the water, or palaces on the shore. I

have already spoken of his passion for building new palaces. Next to

this, his caprice has been the buying of ironclads. A few years since,

when Russia, taking advantage of the Franco-German war, which rendered

France powerless to resist, nullified the clause in the treaty made

after the Crimean war, which forbade her keeping a navy in the Black

Sea, and began to show her armed ships again in those waters, the

Sultan seems to have taken it into his wise head that she was about to

attack Constantinople, and immediately began preparations for defence

on land and sea. He bought a million or so of the best rifles that

could be found in Europe or America; and cannon enough to furnish the

Grand Army of Napoleon; and some fifteen tremendous ships of war,

which have cost nearly two millions of dollars apiece. The enormous

folly of this expense appears in this, that, in case of war, these

ships would be almost useless. The safety of Turkey is not in such

defences, but in the fact that it is for the interest of Europe to

hold her up awhile longer. If once France and England were to leave

her to her fate, all these ships would not save her against Russia

coming from the Black Sea--or marching an army overland and attacking

Constantinople in the rear. But the Sultan would have these ships, and

here they are. They have been lying idle in the Bosphorus all summer,

their only use being to fire salutes every Friday when the Sultan goes

to mosque. They never go to sea; if they did they would probably not

return, for they are very unwieldy, and the Turks are no sailors, and

do not know how to manage them; and they would be likely to sink in

the first gale. The only voyage they make is twice in the year: once

in the spring, when they are taken out of the Golden Horn to be

anchored in the Bosphorus, a mile or two distant--about as far as from

the Battery to the Navy Yard in Brooklyn--and again in the autumn,

when they are taken back again to be laid up for the winter. They have

just made their annual voyage back to their winter quarters, and are

now lying quietly in the Golden Horn--not doing any harm, _nor any

good_ to anybody.

Then not only must the Sultan have a great navy, but a great army.

Poor as Turkey is, she has one of the largest armies in Europe. I have

found it difficult to obtain exact statistics. A gentleman who has

lived long in Constantinople tells me that they claim to be able, in

case of war, to put seven hundred thousand men under arms, but this

includes the reserves--there are perhaps half that number now in

barracks or in camp. A hundred thousand men have been sent to

Herzegovina to suppress the insurrection there. So much does it cost

to extinguish a rising among a few mountaineers in a distant province,

a mere strip of territory lying far off on the borders of the

Adriatic. What a fearful drain must the support of all these troops be

upon the resources of an exhausted empire!

While thus bleeding at every pore, Turkey takes no course to keep up a

supply of fresh life-blood. England spends freely, but, she _makes_

freely also, and so has always an abundant revenue for her vast

empire. So might Turkey, if she had but a grain of financial or

political wisdom. But her policy is suicidal in the management of all

the great industries of the country. For example, the first great

interest is _agriculture_, and this the government, so far from

encouraging, seems to set itself to _ruin_. Of course the people must

till the ground to get food to live. Of all the produce of the earth

the government takes _one-tenth_. Even this might be borne, if it

would only take it and have done with it, and let the poor peasants

gather in the rest. But no; after a farmer has reaped his grain, he

cannot store it in his barn until the tax-gatherer has surveyed it and

taken out his share. Perhaps the official is busy elsewhere, or he is

waiting for a bribe; and so it may lie on the ground for days or

weeks, exposed to the rains till the whole crop is spoiled. Such is

the beautiful system of political economy practised in administering

the internal affairs of this country, which nature has made so rich,

and man has made so poor.

So as to the _fisheries_ by which the people on the sea-coast live.

All along the Bosphorus we saw them drawing their nets. But we were

told that not a single fish could be sold until the whole were taken

down to Constantinople, a distance of some miles, and the government

had taken its share, and then the rest could be brought back again.

Another great source of wealth to Turkey--or which might prove so--is

its _mines_. The country is very rich in mineral resources. If it were

only farmed out to English or Welsh miners, they would bring treasures

out of the earth. The hills would be found to be of brass, and the

mountains of iron. But the Turkish government does nothing. It keeps a

few men at work, just enough to scratch the surface here and there,

but leaving the vast wealth that is in the bowels of the earth

untouched.

And not only will it do nothing itself, but it will not allow anybody

else to do anything. Never did a great government play more completely

the part of the dog in the manger. For years English capitalists have

been trying to get permission to work certain mines, offering to pay

millions of pounds for the concession. If once opportunity were given,

and they were sure of protection, that their property would not be

confiscated, English wealth would flow into Turkey in a constant

stream. But on the contrary the government puts every obstacle in

their way. With the bigotry and stupidity of its race, it is intensely

jealous of foreigners, even while it exists only by foreign

protection--and its policy is, not only _not_ one of progress--it is

absolutely one of obstruction. If it would only get out of the way and

let foreign enterprise and capital come in, it might reap the benefit.

But it opposes everything. Only a few days since a meeting was held

here of foreign capitalists, who were ready and anxious to put their

money into Turkish mines to an almost unlimited extent, but they all

declared that the restrictions were so many, and the requirements so

complicated and vexatious, and so evidently intended to prevent

anything being done, that it was quite hopeless to attempt it.

But, although this is very bad political economy, yet it is not in

itself alone a reason why a nation should be given up as beyond

saving, if it were capable of learning wisdom by experience. Merely

getting in debt, though it is always a bad business, is not in itself

a sign of hopeless decay. Many a young and vigorous state has at the

beginning spent all its substance, like the prodigal son, in riotous

living, but after "sowing its wild oats," has learned wisdom by

experience, and settled down to a course of hard labor, and so come up

again. But Turkey is the prodigal son without his repentance. It is

continually wasting its substance, and, although it may have now and

then fitful spasms of repentance as it feels the pangs of hunger, it

gives not one sign of a change of heart, a real internal reform, and a

return to a clean, pure, healthy and wholesome life.

Is there any hope of anything better? Not the least. Just now there is

some feeling in official circles of the degradation and weakness shown

in the late bankruptcy, and there are loud professions that they are

going to "reform." But everybody who has lived in Turkey knows what

these professions mean. It is a little spasm of virtue, which will

soon be forgotten. The Sultan may not indeed throw away money quite

so recklessly as before, but only because he cannot get it. He is at

the end of his rope. His credit is gone in all the markets of Europe,

and nobody will lend him a dollar. Yet he is at this very moment

building a mosque that is to cost two millions sterling, and if there

were the least let-up in the pressure on him, he would resume the same

course of folly and extravagance as ever. No one is so lavish with

money as the man who does not pretend to pay his debts. He cannot

change his nature. "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard

his spots?" The Turk, like the Pope, _never changes_. It is

constitutionally impossible for him to reform, or to "go ahead" in

anything. His ideas are against it; his very physical habits are

against it. A man who is always squatting on his legs, and smoking a

long pipe, cannot run very fast; and the only thing for him to do,

when the pressure of modern civilization becomes too great for him, is

to "bundle up" and get out of the way.

Thus there is in Turkey not a single element of hope; there is no

internal force which may be a cause of political regeneration. It is

as impossible to infuse life into this moribund state as it would be

to raise the dead. I have met a great many Europeans in

Constantinople--some of whom have lived here ten, twenty, thirty, or

even forty years--and have not found _one_ who did not consider the

condition of Turkey absolutely hopeless, and its disappearance from

the map of Europe only a question of time.

But if for purely economical reasons Turkey has to be given up as

utterly rotten and going to decay, how much darker does the picture

appear when we consider the tyranny and corruption, the impossibility

of obtaining justice, and the oppression of the Christian populations.

A horde of officials is quartered on the country, that eat out the

substance of the land, and set no bounds to their rapacity; who

plunder the people so that they are reduced to the extreme point of

misery. The taxation is so heavy that it drains the very life-blood

out of a poor and wretched people--and this is often aggravated by the

most wanton oppression and cruelty. Such stories have moved, as they

justly may, the indignation of Europe.

Such is the present state of Turkey--universal corruption and

oppression, and things going all the time from bad to worse.

And yet this wretched Government rules over the fairest portion of the

globe. The Turkish Empire is territorially the finest in the world.

Half in Europe and half in Asia, it extends over many degrees of

latitude and longitude, including many countries and many climates,

"spanning the vast arch from Bagdad to Belgrade."

Can such things continue, and such a power be allowed to hold the

fairest portion of the earth's surface, for all time to come?

It seems impossible. The position of Turkey is certainly an anomaly.

It is an Asiatic power planted in Europe. It is a Mohammedan power

ruling over millions of Christians. It is a government of Turks--that

is of Tartars--over men of a better race as well as a purer religion.

It is a government of a minority over a majority. The Mohammedans, the

ruling caste, are only about one-quarter of the population of European

Turkey--some estimates make it much less, but where there is no

accurate census, it must be a matter of conjecture. It is a power

occupying the finest situation in the world, where two continents

touch, and two great seas mingle their waters, yet sitting there on

the Bosphorus only to hold the gates of Europe and Asia, and oppose a

fixed and immovable barrier to the progress of the nations.

What then shall be done with the Grand Turk? The feeling is becoming

universal that he must be driven out of Europe, back into Asia from

which he came. This would solve the Eastern Question _in part_, but

only in part, for _after_ he is gone what power is to take his place?

The solution would be comparatively easy, if there were any

independent State near at hand to succeed to the vacant sceptre. When

a rich man dies, there are always plenty of heirs ready to step in and

take possession of the property. The Greeks would willingly transfer

their capital from Athena to Constantinople. The Armenians think

themselves numerous enough to form a State, but the Greeks and the

Armenians hate each other more even than their common oppressor.

Russia has not a doubt on the subject, that _she_ is the proper and

rightful heir to the throne of the Sultan. The possession of European

Turkey would just "round out" her territory, so that her Empire should

be bounded only by the seas--the Baltic and the White Sea on the

North, and the Black Sea and the Mediterranean on the South. But that

is just the solution of the question which all the rest of Europe is

determined to prevent. Austria, driven out of Germany, thinks it would

be highly proper that she should be indemnified by an addition to her

territory on the south; while the Danubian principalities, Moldavia

and Wallachia (now united under the title of Roumania) and Servia,

which are taking their first lessons in independence, think that they

will soon be sufficiently educated in the difficult art of government

to take possession of the whole Ottoman Empire. Among so many rival

claimants who shall decide? Perhaps if it were put to vote, they would

all prefer to remain under the Turk, rather than that the coveted

prize should go to a rival.

Herein lies the difficulty of the Eastern Question, which no European

statesman is wise enough to resolve. There is still another solution

possible: that Turkey should be divided as Poland was, giving a

province or two on the Danube to Austria; and another on the Black Sea

to Russia; and Syria to Egypt; while the Sultan took up his residence

in Asia Minor; and making Constantinople a free city (as Hamburg

was), under the protection of all Europe, which should hold the

position simply to protect the passage of the Bosphorus and the

Dardanelles, and thus keep open the Black Sea to the commerce of the

world.

But however these remoter questions may perplex the minds of

statesmen, they cannot prevent, nor long delay, the first necessity,

viz., that the Turk should retire from Europe. It cannot be permitted

in the interests of civilization, that a half-barbarous power should

keep forever the finest position in the world, the point of contact

between Europe and Asia, only to be a barrier between them--an

obstacle to commerce and to civilization. This obstruction must be

removed. The Turks themselves may remain, but they will no longer be

the governing race, but subject, like other races, to whatever power

may succeed; the Sultan may transfer his capital to Brousa, the

ancient capital of the Ottoman Empire; but _Turkey will thenceforth be

wholly an Asiatic, and no longer an European power_.

And this will be the end of a dominion that for centuries was the

terror of Europe. It is four hundred and twenty years since the Turks

crossed the Bosphorus and took Constantinople. Since then they have

risen to such power that at one time they threatened to overrun

Europe. It is not two hundred years since they laid siege to Vienna.

But within two centuries Turkey has greatly declined. The rise of a

colossal power in the North has completely overshadowed her, till now

she is kept from becoming the easy prey of Russia only by the

protection of those Christian powers to which the Turk was once, like

Attila, the Scourge of God.

From the moment that the Turks ceased to conquer, they began to

decline. They came into Europe as a race of warriors, and have never

made any progress except by the sword. And so they have really never

taken root as one of the family of civilized nations, but have always

lived as in a camp, a vast Asiatic horde, that, while conquering

civilized countries, retained the habits and instincts of nomadic

tribes, that were only living in tents, and might at any time recross

the Bosphorus and return to their native deserts.

That their exodus is approaching, is felt by the more sagacious Turks

themselves. The government is taking every precaution against its

overthrow. Dreading the least popular movement, it does not dare to

trust its Christian populations. It will not permit them to bear arms,

lest the weapons might be turned against itself. _No one but a

Mohammedan is allowed to enter the army._ There may be some European

officers left from the time of the Crimean war, whose services are too

valuable to be spared, but in the ranks not a man is received who is

not a "true believer." This conscription weighs very heavily on the

Mussulmans, who are but a small minority in European Turkey, and who

are thus decimated from year to year. It is a terrible blood-tax which

they have to pay as the price of continued dominion. But even this the

government is willing to pay rather than that arms should be in the

hands of those who, as the subject races, are their traditional

enemies, and who, in the event of what might become a religious war,

would turn upon them, and seek a bloody revenge for ages of oppression

and cruelty.

Seeing these things, many even of the Turks themselves anticipate

their speedy departure from the Promised Land which they have so long

occupied, and are beginning to set their houses in order for it. Aged

Turks in dying often leave this last request, that they may be buried

at Scutari, on the other side of the Bosphorus, so that if their

people are driven across into Asia, their bodies at least may rest in

peace under the cypress groves which darken the Asiatic shore.

With such fears and forebodings on one side, and such hopes and

expectations on the other, we leave this Eastern Question just where

we found it. Anybody can state it; nobody can resolve it. It is the

great political problem in Europe at this hour, which no statesman,

however sagacious--not Bismarck, nor Thiers, nor Andrassy, nor

Gortchakoff--has yet been able to resolve. But man proposes and God

disposes. This is one of those mysteries of the future which Divine

intelligence alone can penetrate, and Divine Providence alone can

reveal. We must not assume to be over-wise--although there are some

signs which we see clearly written on the face of the sky--but "watch

and wait," which we do in the full confidence that we shall not have

to wait long, but that the curtain will rise on great events in the

East before the close of the present century.

FOOTNOTE:

[10] Italy, it will be remembered, joined the Allies against Russia in

the latter part of the Crimean war.

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