DIO'S ROME
AN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ORIGINALLY COMPOSED IN GREEK DURING THE REIGNS
OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS, GETA AND CARACALLA, MACRINUS, ELAGABALUS AND
ALEXANDER SEVERUS:
AND
NOW PRESENTED IN ENGLISH FORM
BY
HERBERT BALDWIN FOSTER, A.B. (Harvard), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins), Acting
Professor of Greek in Lehigh University
SECOND VOLUME _Extant Books 36-44 (B.C. 69-44)_.
1905
PAFRAETS BOOK COMPANY TROY NEW YORK
VOLUME CONTENTS
Book Thirty-six
Book Thirty-seven
Book Thirty-eight
Book Thirty-nine
Book Forty
Book Forty-one
Book Forty-two
Book Forty-three
Book Forty-four
DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY
36
Metellus subdues Crete by force (chapters 1, 2)[1]
Mithridates and Tigranes renew the war (chapter 3).
Lucullus does not take advantage of his victory: a successor is
appointed: he captures Tigranocerta (chapter 4).
Arsaces, the Parthian, lends aid to neither party (chapter 5).
Lucullus, after a rather disastrous conflict, besieges and captures
Nisibis (chapters 6-8).
Meanwhile he loses the Armenias: Fabius is conquered (chapters 10, 11).
Triarius follows Mithridates to Comana: is afterwards overcome by him
(chapters 12-15).
Uprising in Lucullus's army: Mithridates regains everything (chapters
16-19).
Insolence of the pirates (chapters 20-23).
The consequent war, in spite of opposition on the part of many, is by
the Gabinian law entrusted to Pompey and is very quickly brought to an
end (chapters 23-37).
Cornelian laws in regard to canvassing for office and edicts of praetors:
the Roscian in regard to seats for the knights: the Manilian in regard
to the voting of freedmen (chapters 38-42).
The Mithridatic war by the Manilian law is given in charge of Pompey
(chapters 43, 44).
Pompey vanquishes Mithridates in a night battle (chapters 45-50).
Tigranes, the father, surrenders himself: his son is put in chains
(chapters 51-53).
An attack of the Albani is repulsed (chapter 54).
DURATION OF TIME.
Q. Hortensius, Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Coss. (B.C. 69 = a.u. 685.)
L. Caecilius Metellus (dies,[2] then) Q. Marcius Rex alone.(B.C. 68 =
a.u. 686.)
M. Acilius Glabrio, C. Calpurnius Piso. (B.C. 67 = a.u. 687.)
L. Volcatius Tullus, M. Aemilius Lepidus. (B.C. 66 = a.u. 688.)
(_BOOK 36, BOISSEVAIN_.)
The beginning of this book is missing in the MSS. The gist of the lost
portion may in all probability be gathered from the following sentences
of Xiphilinus (p. 3, R. Steph.):
"When the consuls drew lots, Hortensius obtained the war against the
Cretans. Because of his fondness, however, for residence in the capital,
and because of the courts (in which his influence was only second to
Cicero's) he voluntarily relinquished the campaign in favor of his
colleague and himself remained at home. Metellus accordingly started for
Crete ...
"Lucius Lucullus at about this period worsted the lords of
Asia,--Mithridates and Tigranes the Armenian,--in the war, and having
compelled them, to avoid a pitched battle proceeded to besiege
Tigranocerta. The barbarians did him serious injury by means of their
archery as well as by the naphtha which they poured over his engines.
This chemical is full of bitumen and is so fiery that whatever it
touches it is sure to burn to a cinder, and it can not be extinguished
by any liquid. As a consequence Tigranes recovered courage and marched
forth with an army of such huge proportions that he actually laughed
heartily at the appearance of the Romans present there. He is said to
have remarked that in cases where they came to make war only a few
presented themselves, but when it was an embassy, many came. However,
his amusement was of short duration, and he forthwith discovered how far
courage and skill surpass any mere numbers. Relics of his subsequent
flight were found by the soldiers in the shape of his tiara and the band
that goes around it; and they gave them to Lucullus. In his fear that
these marks might lead to his recognition and capture he had pulled them
off and thrown them away."
[B.C. 69 (_a.u._ 685)]
[-1-] ... and because he had enjoyed the extremes of fortune in both
respects, he allowed it. For after his many defeats and victories no
fewer, he had a firm belief that he had in consequence become more
versed in generalship. His foes accordingly busied themselves as if they
were then for the first time beginning war, sending an embassy to their
various neighbors, including among others Arsaces the Parthian, although
he was hostile to Tigranes on account of some disputed territory. This
they offered to vacate for him, and proceeded to malign the Romans,
saying that the latter, should they conquer them while isolated, would
immediately make a campaign against him. Every victorious force was
inherently insatiable of success and put no bound to acquisition, and
the Romans, who had won the mastery over many, would not choose to leave
him alone.
[-2-] While they were so engaged, Lucullus did not follow up Tigranes,
but allowed him to reach safety quite at leisure. Because of this he was
charged by the citizens, as well as others, with refusing to end the
war, in order that he might retain his command a longer time. Therefore
they then restored the province of Asia to the praetors, and later, when
he apparently acted in this way again, sent to him the consul of that
year, to relieve him. Tigranocerta he did seize when the foreigners that
dwelt with the natives revolted to the side of the Armenians. The most
of these were Cilicians who had once been deported, and they let in the
Romans during the night. Thereupon everything was laid waste except what
belonged to the Cilicians; and many wives of the principal chiefs
Lucullus held, when captured, free from outrage: by this action he won
over their husbands also. He received further Antiochus, king of
Commagene (the Syrian country near the Euphrates and the Taurus), and
Alchaudonius, an Arabian chieftain, and others who had made proposals
for peace.
[-3-] From them he learned of the embassy sent by Tigranes and
Mithridates to Arsaces, and despatched to him, on his part, some of the
allies with threats, in case he should aid the foe, and promises, if he
should espouse the Roman cause. Arsaces at that time (for he still
nourished anger against Tigranes and felt no suspicion toward the
Romans) sent a counter-embassy to Lucullus, and established friendship
and alliance. Later, at sight of Secilius,[3] who had come to him, he
began to suspect that the emissary was there to spy out the country and
his power. It was for this cause, he thought, and not for the sake of
the agreement which had already been made that a man distinguished in
warfare had been sent. Hence he no longer rendered them any help. On the
other hand, he made no opposition, but stood aloof from both parties,
naturally wishing neither to grow strong. He decided that an evenly
balanced contest between them would bring him the greatest safety.
[B.C. 68 (_a.u._ 686)]
[-4-] Besides these transactions Lucullus this year subdued many parts
of Armenia. In the year of Quintus Marcius (Note by the author.--By this
I mean that although he was not the only consul appointed, he was the
only one that held office. Lucius Metellus, elected with him, died in
the early part of the year, and the man chosen in his stead resigned
before entering upon office, wherefore no one else was appointed.),--in
this year, then, when summer was half way through (in the spring it was
impossible to invade hostile territory by reason of the cold), Lucullus
entered upon a campaign and devastated some land purposing to draw the
barbarians, while defending it, imperceptibly into battle. As he could
not rouse them for all that, he attacked. [-5-]In this engagement the
opposing cavalry gave the Roman cavalry hard work, but none of the foe
approached the infantry; indeed, whenever the foot-soldiers of Lucullus
assisted the horse, the adversaries of the Romans would turn to flight.
Far from suffering harm, however, they shot backward at those pursuing
them, killing some instantly and wounding great numbers. Such wounds
were dangerous and hard to heal. This was because they used double
arrow-points and furthermore poisoned them, so that the missiles,
whether they stuck fast anywhere in the body or were drawn out, would
quickly destroy it, since the second iron point, having no attachment,
would be left within.
[-6-] Lucullus, since many were being wounded, some were dying, and some
were being maimed, and provisions at the same time were failing them,
retired from that place and marched against Nisibis. This city is built
in the region called Mesopotamia (Author's note.--Mesopotamia is the
name given to all the country between the Tigris and Euphrates.) and now
belongs to us, being considered a colony of ours. But at that time
Tigranes, who had seized it from the Parthians, had deposited in it his
treasuries and most of his other possessions, and had stationed his
brother as guard over it. Lucullus reached this city in summer time, and
although he directed his attacks upon it in no half-hearted fashion, he
effected nothing. For the walls being of brick, double and of great
thickness, with a deep moat intervening, could be neither shaken down
nor dug through and consequently Tigranes was not lending them
assistance.[-7-] When winter set in, and the barbarians were behaving
rather carelessly, inasmuch as they had the upper hand and were all but
expecting to drive out the Romans, Lucullus waited for a night without a
moon, when there was a violent storm of thunder and rain, so that the
foe, not being able to see ahead or hear a sound, left the outer city
(all but a few of them) and the intervening moat. He then assailed the
wall at many points, ascending it without difficulty from the mounds,
and easily slew the guards, not many in number, who had been left behind
upon it. In this way he filled up a part of the moat--the barbarians had
broken down the bridges in advance--and got across, since in the
downpour neither archery nor fire could harm him. Immediately he
captured nearly everything, for the inner circle was not very strong by
reason of the confidence felt in the outer works beyond it. Among those
that fled to the acropolis, whom he subsequently caused to capitulate,
was the brother of Tigranes. He also obtained considerable money and
passed the winter there.
[-8-] Nisibis, then, he overpowered as described, but many localities of
Armenia and the other countries around Pontus he lost. Tigranes had not
aided the town in question through the idea that it could not be
captured, but had hurried to the aforementioned places to see if he
could acquire them before Lucullus, while the latter was occupied near
the other city. Despatching Mithridates to his native land, Tigranes
himself entered his own district of Armenia. There he was opposed by
Lucius Fannius, whom he cut off and besieged, however, until Lucullus
ascertaining it sent assistance. [-9-]Meanwhile Mithridates had invaded
the other Armenia and surrounding neighborhood, where he fell upon and
destroyed many of the Romans to whom he appeared unexpectedly as they
were wandering about the country. Others he annihilated in battle, and
thereby won back speedily most of the positions. For the men of that
land were well disposed toward him because of kinship and because of his
being hereditary monarch: they hated the Romans because the latter were
foreigners and because they had been ill treated by those set over them.
Consequently they sided with Mithridates and afterward conquered Marcus
Fabius, leader of the Romans in that place. The Thracians, who had
formerly been mercenaries under Mithridates, but were then with Fabius,
and the slaves present in the Roman camp gave them vigorous assistance.
Thracians sent ahead by Fabius to reconnoitre brought back to him no
reliable report, and later, when Mithridates suddenly fell upon him as
he was proceeding along in a rather unguarded fashion, they joined in
the attack on the Romans. At the same instant the slaves (to whom the
barbarians had proclaimed freedom) took a hand in the work. They would
have crushed their adversaries, had not Mithridates while occupied with
the enemy--although over seventy years old he was in the battle--been
hit with a stone. This caused the barbarians to fear that he might die;
and while they halted battle on this account, Fabius and the others were
able to escape to safety.[-10-] The Roman general was subsequently shut
up and besieged in Cabira, but was rescued by Triarius. The latter was
in that vicinity on his way from Asia to Lucullus. Having learned what
had happened he collected as large a force as was possible with the
resources at hand and in his advance so alarmed Mithridates (probably by
the size of the Roman detachment) as to make him withdraw before
Triarius came in view. At this the Romans took courage, and pursuing the
enemy as far as Comana, whither he had retired, won a victory over him.
Mithridates was in camp on the opposite side of the river from the point
where the Romans approached, and was anxious to join battle while they
were worn out from the march. Accordingly he himself met them first, and
directed that at the crisis of the battle others should cross from
another direction, by a bridge, to take part in the attack. But whereas
he fought an equal conflict a long time he was deprived of
reinforcements by the confusion on the bridge across which many were
pushing at one time, crowded all, together.
[-11-] Thereafter they both retreated to their own fortifications and
rested, for it was now winter. Comana belongs to the present territory
of Cappadocia and was reported to have preserved right through to that
time the Tauric statue of Artemis and the race of Agamemnon. As to how
these reached them or how remained there I can find no certain account,
since there are various stories. But what I understand accurately I will
state. There are two cities in Cappadocia not far apart and of the same
name which contend for the same honors. Their myths and the relics they
exhibit are alike, and both treasure a sword, which is supposedly the
very one connected with the story of Iphigenia.
[B.C. 67 (_a.u._ 687)]
[-12-] To resume our narrative. The following year, in the consulship of
Manius Acilius and Gaius Piso, Mithridates encamped against Triarius
near Gaziura, trying to challenge and provoke him to battle; for
incidentally he himself practiced watching the Romans and trained his
army to do so. His hope was to engage and vanquish Triarius before
Lucullus came up and thus get back the rest of the province. As he could
not arouse him, he sent some men to Dadasa, a garrison where the Romans'
baggage was deposited, in order that his opponent by defending it might
be drawn into conflict. And so it was. Triarius for a time fearing the
numbers of Mithridates and expecting Lucullus, whom he had sent for,[4]
remained quiet. But when news came of the siege of Dadasa, and the
soldiers in fear for the place got disturbed and kept threatening that
if no one would lead them out they would go to the rescue at their own
bidding, he reluctantly left his position. As he was now moving forward
the barbarians fell upon him, surrounded and overwhelmed by their
numbers those near at hand, and encompassed with cavalry and killed
those who, not knowing that the river had been directed into the plain,
had fled thither.[-13-] They would have destroyed them utterly, had not
one of the Romans, pretending to come from the allies of Mithridates--no
few of whom, as I have said, were along with the expedition on an equal
footing with the Romans,--approached the leader, as if wishing to make
some communication, and wounded him. To be sure, the fellow was
immediately seized and put to death, but the barbarians were so
disheartened in view of the occurrence that many of the Romans escaped.
When Mithridates had had his wound cured, he suspected that there were
some others, too, of the enemy in the camp. So he held a review of the
soldiers as if with a different purpose, and gave the order that they
should retire singly to their tents with speed. Then he despatched the
Romans, who were thus left alone. [-14-] At this juncture the arrival of
Lucullus gave the idea to some that he would conquer Mithridates easily,
and soon recover all that had been let slip: however, he effected
nothing. For his antagonist, entrenched on the high ground near Talaura,
would not come out against him, and the other Mithridates from Media,
son-in-law of Tigranes, fell upon the Romans while scattered, and killed
many of them. Likewise the approach of Tigranes himself was announced.
Then there was mutiny in the army; for the Valerians,[5] who had been
exempted from military service and afterward had started on a campaign
again, had been restless even at Nisibis on account of the victory and
ensuing idleness, and also because they had had provisions in abundance
and the bulk of the management, Lucullus being absent on many errands.
But it was chiefly because a certain Publius Clodius (whom some called
Claudius) under the influence of an innate love of revolution solidified
the seditious element among them, though his sister was united in
wedlock to Lucullus. They were especially wrought up at that time,
moreover, through hearing that Acilius the consul, who had been sent out
to relieve Lucullus for reasons mentioned, was drawing near. They held
him in slight repute, regarding him as a mere private citizen.
[-15-]Lucullus was in a dilemma both for these reasons and because
Marcius[6] (consul the year before Acilius), who was en route to
Cilicia, the province he was destined to govern, had refused a request
of his for aid. He hesitated to depart through a barren country and
feared to stand his ground: hence he set out against Tigranes, to see if
he could repulse the latter while off his guard and tired from the
march, and thus put a stop, to a certain extent, to the mutiny of the
soldiers. He attained neither object. The army accompanied him to a
certain spot from which it was possible to turn aside into Cappadocia,
and all with one consent without a word turned off in that direction.
The Valerians, indeed, learning that they had been exempted from the
campaign by the authorities at home, withdrew altogether.
[-16-] Let no one wonder that Lucullus, who had proved himself of all
men most versed in warfare, and was the first Roman to cross the Taurus
with an army and for hostile operations, who had vanquished two powerful
kings and would have captured them if he had chosen to end the war
quickly, was unable to rule his fellow-soldiers, and that they were
always revolting and finally left him in the lurch. He required a great
deal of them, was difficult of access, strict in his demands for labor,
and inexorable in his punishments: he did not understand how to win over
a man by argument, or to attach him to himself by kindliness, or to make
a comrade of him by sharing honors or wealth,--all of which means are
necessary, especially in a large body, and most of all in a body of
soldiers. Hence the soldiers, as long as they prospered and got booty
that was a fair return for their dangers, obeyed him: but when they
encountered trouble and fell into fear instead of hopes, they no longer
heeded him at all. The proof of this is that Pompey took these same men
(he enrolled the Valerians again) and kept them without the slightest
show of revolt. So much does man differ from man.
[-17-] After this action of the soldiers Mithridates won back almost all
his domain and wrought dire devastation in Cappadocia, since neither
Lucullus defended it, under the excuse that Acilius was near, nor
Acilius himself. For the latter, who in the first place was hurrying on
to rob Lucullus of the fruits of victory, now, when he learned what had
taken place, did not come to the camp, but delayed in Bithynia. As for
Marcius, the pretext which he gave for not assisting Lucullus was that
his soldiers refused to follow him. When he reached Cilicia he received
one Menemachus, a deserter from Tigranes, and Clodius who had revolted
under Lucullus, and, fearing a repetition of the doings at Nisibis, he
put him in command of the fleet; for Marcius, too, had one of his
sisters as wife. Now Clodius, after being captured by the pirates and
released by them in consequence of their fear of Pompey, came to Antioch
in Syria, declaring that he would be their ally against the Arabians,
with whom the people were then at variance. There, likewise, he caused
some to revolt, and his activity nearly cost him his life.
[-18-] ... he spares.[7] In his eagerness for supremacy he assailed even
the Cretans who had come to terms with him, and not heeding their
objection that there was a state of truce he hastened to do them harm
before Pompey came up. Octavius, who was there, had no troops and so
kept quiet: in fact, he had not been sent to do any fighting, but to
take charge of the cities. Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece,
did, to be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise
Metellus to spare the villages, but on failing to persuade him made no
active opposition. Metellus, after many other outrages, captured by
treachery the city Eleuthera and extorted money from it. The traitors
had repeatedly at night saturated with vinegar a very large brick tower,
most difficult of capture, so that it became brittle. Next he took by
storm Lappa, in spite of Octavius's occupancy, and did the latter no
harm, but put to death the Cilicians, his followers. [-19-]Octavius,
incensed at this, no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of
Sisenna (that general had fallen sick and died) to aid here and there
the victims of oppression, and then, when the detachment of Metellus had
retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hieropydna, by whose side he fought.
Aristion, on the retreat from Cydonia about that time, had conquered one
Lucius Bassus who sailed out to oppose him, and had gained possession of
Hieropydna. They held out for a while, but at the approach of Metellus
left the fortification and put to sea. There they encountered a storm,
and were driven ashore, losing many men. Henceforth Metellus was master
of the entire island.
In this way the Cretans, who had been free through all preceding ages
and had never owned a foreign lord, were enslaved; and from their
subjugation Metellus obtained his title. He was, however, unable to have
Panares and Lasthenes (whom he had also captured) march in his triumph.
For Pompey had got them away beforehand by persuading one of the
tribunes that it was to him they had submitted and not to Metellus.
[-20-] I will now relate the progress of Pompey's career. The pirates,
occupied in plundering, kept troubling continually those who sailed as
well as the dwellers on land. There was never a time when piracy was not
practiced, nor may it cease so long as the nature of mankind remains the
same. But formerly plundering was limited to certain localities and
small bands operating only during the regular season on sea and on land;
whereas at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in
many different places, and many cities had been uprooted, while
sentences hung over the heads of all the fugitives even, and fear
confronted men in everything, large numbers turned to plundering. Now
the bandit organizations on the mainland, being rather in sight of
towns, which could thus perceive a source of injury close by, proved not
so very difficult to overwhelm and were somehow broken up with a fair
degree of ease; but those on the sea had grown to the greatest
proportions. While the Romans were busy with antagonists they
flourished. They sailed about to many quarters, adding to their band all
of like condition, and some of these, after the fashion of allies,
assisted many others.[-21-] How much they accomplished with the help of
the outsiders has been told. When those nations were overthrown, instead
of ceasing they did much serious damage alone by themselves to the
Romans and Roman allies. They were no longer in small force, but were
accustomed to sail in great expeditions; and they had generals, so that
they had acquired a great reputation. They robbed and harried first and
foremost sailors: for such not even the winter season was any longer
safe; the pirates through daring and through practice and through
success were now showing absolute fearlessness in their seamanship.
Second, they pillaged even craft lying in harbors. If any one ventured
to put out against them, usually he was defeated and perished; but even
if he conquered he would be unable to capture any of the enemy by reason
of the speed of their ships. Accordingly, they would return after a
little, as if victors, to ravage and set in flames not only farms and
country districts, but also whole cities. But other places they
conciliated, so as to gain apparently friendly naval stations and winter
quarters.
[-22-] As they progressed by these means it became customary for them to
go into the interior, and they did much mischief even among those who
had no sea-traffic. This is the way they treated not only those outside
of their body of allies, but the land of Italy itself. Believing that
they would obtain greater gains from that quarter and that they would
terrify all others still more, if they refused to hold their hands even
from that country, they sailed into the very harbor of Ostia, and also
of other cities in the vicinity, burned the ships and ravaged
everything. Finally, as no setback occurred, they took up their abode on
the land, disposing of whatever men they did not kill, and of the spoils
they took quite fearlessly, as if in their own territory. And though
some plundered in one region and others elsewhere,--it not being
possible for the same persons to do harm the whole length of the
sea,--they nevertheless showed such friendship one for another that they
sent money and assistance even to those entirely unknown, as if to
nearest kin. One of the largest elements in their strength was that
those who helped any of them all would honor, and those who came into
collision with any of them all would despoil.
[-23-] To such an extent did the supremacy of the pirates grow that
their hostility became a matter of moment, constant, admitting no
precaution, implacable. The Romans, of course, from time to time heard
and saw a little of what was going on, inasmuch as imports in general
ceased coming in and the corn supply was shut off entirely; but they
gave no serious attention to it when they ought. On the contrary, they
would send out fleets and generals, according as they were stirred by
individual reports, but effected nothing; instead, they caused their
allies all the greater distress by these very means, until they were
finally reduced to extremities. Then at last they came together and
deliberated many days as to what steps must be taken. Wearied by the
continued dangers and noting how great and far reaching was the war
raised against them, and believing, too, that it was impossible to
assail the pirates all at once or individually, because the latter gave
mutual assistance and it was impracticable to drive them back everywhere
at once, the people fell into a dilemma and into great despair of making
any successful stroke. In the end one Aulus Gabinius, a tribune, set
forth his plan: he was either prompted by Pompey or wished to do him
some favor; certainly he was not impelled by any love of the common
welfare, for he was the vilest of men: his plan was that they should
choose from among the ex-consuls one general with full powers over all,
who should command for three years and have the use of a huge force,
with many lieutenants. He did not actually utter the name of Pompey, but
it was easy to see that if once the multitude should hear of any such
proposition, they would choose him. [-24-] So it turned out. His motion
was carried and immediately all save the senate began to favor Pompey.
That body was in favor of enduring anything whatever at the hands of the
freebooters rather than to put so great command into Pompey's hands. In
fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very halls of the senate,
but he eluded them somehow. When the people learned the intention of the
senators they raised an uproar, going to the point of making a rush at
them as they sat assembled: and if the elders had not gotten out of the
way, the populace would without doubt have killed them. They all
scattered and secreted themselves except Gaius Piso the consul (it was
in his year and Acilius's that these events took place), who was
arrested and condemned to perish for the others; but Gabinius begged him
off. After this the leading men themselves gladly held their peace on
condition of being allowed to live, but used influence on the nine
tribunes, to have them oppose Gabinius. All of the latter, however,
except a Lucius Trebellius and Lucius Roscius, out of fear of the
multitude would not say a word in opposition; and those two men, who had
the courage, were unable to redeem any of their promises by either word
or deed. For when the appointed day came on which the motion was to be
ratified, things went as follows.
Pompey, who was thoroughly anxious to command, and already by reason of
his own ambition and the zeal of the populace no longer so much regarded
this commission as an honor as the failure to win it a disgrace, seeing
the opposition of those in power had a wish to appear as if compulsion
were being used. In general he was as little as possible in the habit of
revealing his real desires, but still more on this occasion did he feign
reluctance, because of the ensuing jealousy, should he of his own accord
lay claim to the leadership, and because of the glory if he should be
appointed unwillingly as the one most worthy to command.
[-25-] He now came forward and said: "Quirites, I rejoice at the honor
laid upon me by you. All men naturally take pride in benefits conferred
upon them by the citizens, and I, who have often enjoyed honors at your
hands, scarcely know how to be worthily pleased at the present
contingency. However, I do not think that you should be so insatiable
with regard to my services, nor that I should incessantly be in some
position of command. For I have labored since childhood, and as you
know, you should be promoting others as well. Do you not recall how many
toils I underwent in the war against Cinna, though I was the veriest
youth, or how many labors in Sicily and in Africa before I had quite
reached the age of iuvenis, or how many dangers I encountered in Spain,
while I was not as yet a senator? I shall not say that you have shown
yourselves ungrateful toward me for all these labors. How could I? Quite
the reverse, in addition to the many other important favors of which you
have deemed me worthy, the very fact that I was trusted to undertake the
post of general against Sertorius, when no one else was either willing
or able, and that I held a triumph, contrary to custom, after resigning
it, brought me the greatest honor. I only say that I have undergone many
anxieties and many dangers, that I am worn out in body and wearied in
soul. Do not keep reckoning that I am still young, nor calculate that I
have lived just so many years. For if you count up the campaigns that I
have made and the dangers I have faced, you will find them far more in
number than my years, and by this means you will more readily believe
that I can no longer withstand the anxieties and the hardships."
[-26-] "Some one might possibly reply: 'But you see that all such
opportunities for toil are causes of jealousy and hatred.' This feature
you hold in no account--you ought not properly even to pretend to regard
it--but to me it would prove most grievous. And I must admit that I am
not so much disturbed or troubled by any danger to be encountered in the
midst of wars as by such exhibitions. For what person in his right mind
could take pleasure in living among men who are jealous of him, and who
would feel the heart to carry out any public enterprise, if destined in
case of failure to submit to punishment and if successful to be the
object of rancorous envy? In view of these and other considerations
allow me to remain at peace and attend to my own business, so that now
at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs and not perish
from exhaustion. Against the pirates elect somebody else. There are many
who are both willing and able to serve as admirals, both younger and
older men, so that your choice from so numerous a company becomes easy.
Of course I am not the only one who loves you, nor am I alone skilled in
warfare, but--not seeming to favor any by mentioning names--equally so
is A or B."
[-27-] At this point in his harangue Gabinius, interrupting, cried:
"Pompey's behavior in this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his
character. He does not seek the leadership, nor does he accept it
without thought when granted him. An upright man has no business,
generally speaking, to desire the annoyances incident to office, and it
is Pompey's way to undertake all tasks imposed upon him only with due
consideration, in order that he may accomplish them with corresponding
safety. Precipitation in promises and in action, more hasty than the
occasion demands, causes the downfall of many; but exactitude at the
start as well as in execution possesses a constant value and is to the
advantage of all. You must choose not what would satisfy Pompey, but
what is of benefit to the state. Not office seekers, but those who have
capacity should be appointed to the business in hand; the former exist
in very large numbers, but any other such man as my candidate you will
not find. You recall, further, how many reverses of a serious nature we
endured in the war against Sertorius through lack of a general, and that
we found no one else among young or old adapted to it except the man
before you; and that we sent him to the field in place of both consuls,
although at that time he had not yet reached a mature age and was not a
member of the senate. I should be glad if we did have many able men, and
if I ought to pray for such, I would so pray: since, however, this
ability does not depend on prayer or come of its own accord to any one,
but a man has to be born with a natural bent for it, to learn what is
pertinent and practice what is fitting and beyond everything to enjoy
good fortune, which would very rarely fall to the lot of the same man,
you must all unanimously, whenever such an one is found, both support
him and make the fullest use of him even if he does not wish it. Such
violence proves most noble both to him who exerts it and to him who
suffers it,--to the former because he would be preserved by it, and to
the latter because it would preserve the citizens, in whose behalf the
excellent and patriotic man would most readily give up both body and
soul.
[-28-] "Do you think that whereas this Pompey when a youth could conduct
campaigns, be general, increase our possessions, preserve those of our
allies, and acquire those of our adversaries, now, in the prime of life,
when every man fairly surpasses himself, with a mass of additional
experience gained from wars he could not prove most useful to you? Will
you reject, now that he has reached man's estate, him whom while iuvenis
you chose to lead? Will you not confide this campaign to the man, now
become a member of the senate, to whom while still a knight you
committed those wars? Will you not, now that you have most amply tested
his mettle, commit the present emergency, no less pressing than former
ones, to him for whom alone you asked in the face of those urgent
dangers ere you had applied any accurate test at all? Will you not send
out against the pirates one, now an ex-consul, whom before he could yet
properly hold office you elected against Sertorius? Rather, do not for a
moment adopt any other course; and Pompey, do you heed your country, and
me. By her you were borne, by her you were reared. You must be a slave
to whatever is for her advantage, not shrinking from any hardship or
danger to secure it. And should it become necessary for you to lose your
life, you must in that case not await your fated day but embrace
whatever death meets you. [-29-] But truly I am ridiculous to give you
this advice,--you who in so many great conflicts have exhibited both
your bravery and your love for your country. Heed me, therefore, and
these citizens here; do not fear because some are envious. Rather press
on all the more for this very reason to a goal which is the friendship
of the majority and the common advantage of us all, and scorn your
traducers. Or, if you are willing to grieve them a little, take command
for this very reason, that you may distress them by serving and winning
glory contrary to their expectations, and that you may in person set an
ending worthy of yourself beside your former accomplishments, by ridding
us of many great evils."
[-30-] When Gabinius had thus expressed himself, Trebellius strove to
make a dissenting speech; but as he did not receive leave to speak he
proceeded to oppose the casting of a vote. Gabinius was incensed, and
delayed the balloting regarding Pompey, but introduced a new motion
concerning the same man. The first seventeen tribes to register an
opinion decided that Trebellius was at fault and might be no longer
tribune. And not until the eighteenth was on the point of voting the
same way, was he barely induced to maintain silence. Roscius, seeing
this, did not dare utter a word, but by a gesture of his raised hand
urged them to choose two men, so that he might by so doing cut off a
little of Pompey's supremacy. At this gesticulation of his the crowd
gave a great threatening shout, whereat a crow flying above their heads
was so startled that it fell as if smitten by lightning. After that
Roscius kept not only his tongue but his hand still. Catulus was for
remaining silent, but Gabinius urged him to make some speech, inasmuch
as he ranked among the foremost in the senate and it seemed likely that
through his agency the rest might reach a harmonious decision; it was
Gabinius's hope, likewise, that he would join in approving the general
desire from the fact that he saw the tribunes in bad straits.
Accordingly Catulus received permission to speak, since all respected
and honored him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their
advantage, and delivered an address about as follows:
[-31-] "That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, in behalf of
your body, all of you, doubtless, clearly understand. This being so, it
is requisite for me to set forth in simple fashion and quite frankly
what I know to be for the good of the State; and it is only fair for you
to listen to it calmly and afterward to deliberate. For, if you raise an
uproar, you will fail of obtaining some perhaps very useful suggestion
which you might have heard, but if you pay attention to what is said you
will be sure to discover definitely something to your advantage. I for
my part assert in the first place most emphatically that it is not
proper to confide to any one man so many positions of command, one after
another. This has been forbidden by law, and by test has been found to
be most perilous. What made Marius such a monster was practically
nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the briefest
space of time and being made consul six times as rapidly as possible:
and similarly the cause of Sulla's frenzy was that he held command of
the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed
dictator, then consul. It does not lie in man's nature for a person, not
necessarily young but mature quite as often, after exercise in authority
for a considerable period to be willing to abide by ancestral
customs.[-32-] I do not say this in any spirit of condemnation of
Pompey, but because it does not appear at all advantageous to you on
general grounds, and further it is not permitted according to the laws.
For if an enterprise brings honor to those deemed worthy of it, all whom
that enterprise concerns ought to obtain honor; this is the principle of
democracy: and if it brings labor, all ought to share that labor
proportionately; this is mere equity.
"Again, in such an affair it is to your advantage for many individuals
to have practice in exploits, so that as a result of trial your choice
may be an easy one from among those who can be trusted for any urgent
business; but if you take that other course it is quite inevitable that
the scarcity should be great of those who will practice what they
should, and to whom interests can be trusted. This is the chief reason
why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; previous
to that time you were accustomed to employ the same men for a long
period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to
be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen
contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down
by experience, it behooves both you and him most strongly that it be not
done.
[-33-] "This is the first and most important point I have to mention.
Second arises the consideration, that when consuls and praetors and those
serving in their place can take offices and leaderships in a way
prescribed by the laws it is neither decent nor advantageous for you to
overlook them and introduce some new office. To what end do you elect
the annual officials, if you are going to make no use of them for such
businesses? Not, presumably, that they may stalk about in
purple-bordered togas, nor that endued with the name alone of the office
they may be deprived of its duties. How can you fail to alienate these
and all the rest who have a purpose to enter politics at all, if you
break down the ancient offices, and entrust nothing to those elected by
law, but assign a strange and previously non-existent position of
command to a private individual? [-34-] If there should be any necessity
of choosing, in addition to the annual officials, still another, there
is for this, too, an ancient precedent,--I mean the dictator. However,
because he held such power, our fathers did not appoint him on all
occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you
need any such person, you may, without transgressing the laws or making
light of the common welfare, designate either Pompey or any one else
dictator,--on condition that he shall sway for not more than the time
ordained, nor outside of Italy. You doubtless are not ignorant that this
latter limitation, too, our fathers guarded scrupulously, and no
instance would be found of a dictator chosen for any other country,
except one sent to Sicily, and that without accomplishing anything. But
if Italy needs no such person and you would no longer endure, apart from
the functions of dictator, even the name (this is clear from your anger
against Sulla), how would it be right for a new position of command to
be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing practically all
interests both in Italy and without? What disasters come to cities from
such a course, and how many men on account of lawless lust for rule have
often disturbed our populace and done themselves countless evils, you
all alike understand.
[-35-] "About this, then, I shall say no more. Who can fail to know that
on general principles it is neither decent nor advantageous to commit
matters to any one man, or for any one man to be put in charge of all
the blessings we own, even if he be the best man conceivable? Great
honors and excessive powers excite and ruin even such persons. I ask
you, however, to consider my next assertion,--that it is not possible
for one man to preside over the entire sea and to manage the entire war
properly. You must, if you shall in the least do what is needful, make
war on them everywhere at once, so that they may neither unite, nor by
finding a refuge among those not attacked, become hard to capture. Any
one man who might be in command could by no manner of means accomplish
this. For how on about the same days could he fight in Italy and in
Cilicia, Egypt and Syria, Greece and Spain, in the Ionian Sea and the
islands? Consequently you need many soldiers and generals both, to take
matters in hand, if they are going to be of any use to you. [-36-] In
case any one declares that even if you confide the entire war to some
one person he will most certainly have plenty of admirals and
lieutenants, my reply would be: 'Would it not be much juster and more
advantageous for these men destined to serve under him to be chosen by
you beforehand for the very purpose and to receive an independent
command from you? What prevents such a course?' By this plan they will
pay more heed to the war, since each of them is entrusted with his own
particular share and cannot lay upon any one else the responsibility for
neglect of it, and there will be keener rivalry among them because they
are independent and will themselves get the glory for whatever they
effect. By the other plan what man do you think, subordinate to some one
else, will with equal readiness perform any duty, when the credit for
his victory will belong not to himself but to another?
"Accordingly, that one man could not at one time carry on so great a war
has been admitted on the part of Gabinius himself, in that he asks for
many helpers to be given to whomever is elected. Our final consideration
is whether actual commanders or assistants should be sent, and whether
they should be despatched by the entire populace, or by the commandant
alone for his assistance. Every one of you would agree that my
proposition is more law-abiding in all respects, and not merely in
reference to the case of the freebooters. Aside from that, notice how it
looks for all our offices to be overthrown on the pretext of 'pirates'
and for no one of them either in Italy or in subject territory during
this time ..." [8]
[-37-] ... and of Italy in place of consul for three years, they
assigned to him fifteen lieutenants and voted all the ships, money and
armaments that he might wish to take. These measures as well as the
others which the senate decided to be necessary to their effectiveness
in any given case that body ratified even against its will. Its action
was prompted more particularly by the fact that when Piso refused to
allow the subordinate officers to hold enlistments in Gallia
Narbonensis, of which he was governor, the populace was furiously
enraged and would straightway have cast him out of office, had not
Pompey begged him off. So after making preparations as the business and
his judgment demanded he patrolled at one time the whole stretch of sea
that the pirates were troubling, partly himself and partly through the
agency of his under officers, and subdued the greater part of it that
very year. For whereas the force that he directed was vast both in point
of fleet and in point of heavy-armed infantry, so that he was
irresistible both on sea and on land, his kindness to those who made
terms with him was equally vast, so that he won over great numbers by
such procedure. Persons defeated by his troops who made trial of his
clemency went over to his side very readily. For besides other ways in
which he took care of them he would give them any lands he saw vacant
and cities that needed inhabitants, in order that they might never again
through poverty fall into need of criminal exertions. Among the other
cities settled in this way was the one called in commemoration
Pompeiopolis. It is in the coast region of Cilicia and had been sacked
by Tigranes. Soli was its original name.