CHAPTER III.

CONSEQUENCES.

The first consequence of these principles is, that the laws alone can

decree punishments for crimes, and this authority can only rest with

the legislator, who represents collective society as united by a social

contract. No magistrate (who is part of society) can justly inflict

punishments upon another member of the same society. But since a

punishment that exceeds the legally fixed limit is the lawful punishment

_plus_ another one, a magistrate can, under no pretext of zeal or the

public good, add to the penalty already decreed against a delinquent

citizen.

The second consequence is, that the sovereign, who represents society

itself, can only form general laws, obligatory on all; he cannot judge

whether any one in particular has broken the social compact, for in

that case the nation would be divided into two parties, one represented

by the sovereign, asserting the violation of such contract; the other by

the accused, denying the same. Hence the necessity of a third person to

judge of the fact; in other words, of a magistrate, whose decisions shall

simply consist of affirmations or denials of particular facts, and shall

also be subject to no appeal.

The third consequence is this: if it were proved that the severity of

punishments were simply useless (to say nothing of being directly opposed

to the public good and to the very object of preventing crimes), even

in that case it would be contrary not only to those beneficent virtues

that flow from an enlightened reason, which prefers to rule over happy

human beings than over a flock of slaves, the constant victims of timid

cruelty, but it would be also contrary to justice and to the nature of

the social contract itself.

Crimes and Punishments Including a New Translation of Beccaria's 'Dei Delitti e delle Pene' · 第 3 / 42 章