[1808-1809.]
The Second Mission to Persia—Malcolm’s Visit to Bushire—Failure of
the Embassy—His Return to Calcutta—Mission of Sir Harford Jones—His
Progress and Success.
When, in the spring of 1808, Colonel Malcolm a second time steered
his course towards the Persian Gulf, another British diplomatist had
started, from another point, upon the same mission. Moved as it were
by one common impulse, the Cabinet of England and the Supreme Council
of India had determined each to despatch an embassy to the Court of
Teheran. A curious and unseemly spectacle was then presented to the
eyes of the world. Two missions, in spirit scarcely less antagonistic
than if they had been despatched by contending powers, started for the
Persian Court; the one from London—the other from Calcutta. The Court
of St. James’s had proposed to assist Persia by mediating with St.
Petersburgh, and Mr. Harford Jones, a civil servant of the Company,
who was made a baronet for the occasion, was deputed to Teheran to
negotiate with the ministers of the Shah. It was originally intended
that he should proceed to Persia, taking the Russian capital in his
route; but the pacification of Tilsit caused a departure from this
design, and Sir Harford Jones sailed for Bombay with the mission on
board one of his Majesty’s ships. He reached that port in the month
of April, 1808, just as the embassy under Brigadier-General Malcolm,
despatched by the Governor-General to the Court of Teheran, was
putting out to sea on its way to the Persian Gulf.[32]
Sir Harford Jones, therefore, rested at Bombay, awaiting the result
of Malcolm’s proceedings. On the 10th of May, the latter reached
Bushire, and on the 18th wrote to Sir George Barlow, who had succeeded
to the governorship of Madras, “I have not only received the most
uncommon attention from all here, but learnt from the best authority
that the accounts of my mission have been received with the greatest
satisfaction at Court. The great progress which the French have made
and are daily making here satisfied me of the necessity of bringing
matters to an early issue. I have a chance of complete victory. I
shall, at all events, ascertain exactly how we stand, and know what
we ought to do; and if I do not awaken the Persian Court from their
delusion, I shall at least excite the jealousy of their new friends. I
send Captain Pasley off to-morrow for Court—ostensibly, with a letter
for the king; but he has secret instructions, and will be able to
make important observations. He is charged with a full declaration of
my sentiments and instructions in an official form, and you will, I
think, when you see that declaration of the whole proceeding, think it
calculated for the object. I have endeavoured to combine moderation
with spirit, and to inform the Persian Court, in language that cannot
irritate, of all the danger of their French connexion. Captain
Pasley will reach Court on the 20th of June, and on the 15th of July
I may expect to be able to give you some satisfactory account of his
success.”[33]
But in this he was over-sanguine. The French envoy had established
himself too securely at Teheran to be driven thence by the appearance
of Malcolm at Bushire. A little too impetuous, perhaps—a little too
dictatorial, that energetic military diplomatist commenced at the
wrong end of his work. He erred in dictating to the Persian Court
the dismissal of the French embassy as a preliminary to further
negotiations, when in reality it was the end and object of his
negotiations. He erred in blurting out all his designs, in unfolding
the scheme of policy he intended to adopt, and so committing himself to
a line of conduct which after-events might have rendered it expedient
to modify or reject. He erred in using the language of intimidation at
a time when he should have sought to inspire confidence and diffuse
good-will among the officers of the Persian Court. These may not have
been the causes of his want of success; but it is certain that he was
completely unsuccessful. The large promises and the prompt movements of
the French contrasted favourably with our more scanty offers and more
dilatory action; and although Malcolm now came laden with presents, and
intending to pave his way to the Persian capital with gold, the British
mission was received with frigid indifference, if not with absolute
disrespect. The despatch of Captain Pasley to the capital was negatived
by the Persian Government. His progress was arrested at Shiraz; and
there, at that provincial town, whilst a French and a Russian agent
were basking in the royal sunshine at Teheran, and were entertained as
guests of the prime minister, the representative of Great Britain was
told that he must conduct his negotiations and content himself with
the countenance of lesser dignitaries of state. Persian officers were
instructed to amuse the British envoys, and to gain time. “The earnest
desire of the king,” wrote the prime minister to Nussur-ood-Dowlah, at
Shiraz, “is to procrastinate, and to avoid all decided measures. You
must, therefore, amuse General Malcolm by offering your assistance;”
and in this and other letters the local officers at Shiraz were
instructed by every means in their power to detain Captain Pasley at
that place; but he had departed before they were received, or it is
difficult to say in what manner the imperial mandate might not have
been obeyed.[34] “A consideration of all these things,” wrote Captain
Pasley to Government, “induces me to conclude that the subsisting
alliance between the Government of France and Persia is more intimate
than we have yet imagined—that its nature is more actively and
decidedly hostile to our interests than has hitherto been suspected,
and that the reliance of the king on the promises and assurances of the
French agents must be founded on better grounds than have yet come to
our knowledge.”[35]
Chafed and indignant at the conduct of the Persian Court, General
Malcolm at once came to the determination to return immediately to
Calcutta, and to report to the Supreme Government the mortifying result
of his mission. On the 12th of July he sailed from Bushire, leaving
the charge of the embassy in the hands of Captain Pasley, who remained
at his post only to be insulted, and at last narrowly escaped being
made prisoner by a precipitate retreat from the Persian dominions.[36]
The failure of the mission, indeed, was complete. Persia continued to
make professions of friendship to the British Government; but it was
obvious that at that moment neither British diplomacy nor British gold,
which was liberally offered, could make any way against the dominant
influence of the French mission. Napoleon’s officers were drilling the
Persian army, casting cannon, and strengthening the Persian fortresses
by the application, for the first time, to their barbaric defences, of
that science which the French engineers had learnt in such perfection
from the lessons of Vauban and Cormontagne.
Of the wisdom of Malcolm’s abrupt departure from Bushire, different
opinions may be entertained. On the day after he embarked for
Calcutta, one of the most sagacious men then in India was seated at
his writing-table discoursing, for Malcolm’s especial benefit, on
the advantages of delay. “As to the real question,” wrote Sir James
Mackintosh to the Brigadier-General, “which you have to decide in the
cabinet council of your own understanding, whether delay in Persia be
necessarily and universally against the interests of Great Britain, it
is a question on which you have infinitely greater means of correct
decision than I can pretend to, even if I were foolish enough, on such
matters, to aspire to any rivalship with a man of your tried and
exercised sagacity. I should just venture in general to observe, that
delay is commonly the interest of the power which is on the defensive.
As long as the delay lasts, it answers the purpose of victory, which,
in that case, is only preservation. It wears out the spirit of
enterprise necessary for assailants, especially such as embark in very
distant and perilous attempts. It familiarises those who are to be
attacked with the danger, and allows the first panic time to subside.
It affords a chance that circumstances may become more favourable; and
to those who have nothing else in their favour, it leaves at least the
‘chapter of accidents.’”[37] The ‘chapter of accidents’ is everything
in Oriental diplomacy. Malcolm, too impetuous to profit by it, left his
successor to reap the harvest of altered circumstances. Sir Harford
Jones, who had been waiting his opportunity at Bombay, entered the
arena of diplomacy a few months later than Malcolm, and his progress
was a long ovation. It was the ‘chapter of accidents’ that secured his
success.
On the first receipt of intelligence of General Malcolm’s withdrawal,
Lord Minto despatched a letter to Sir Harford Jones, urging him to
proceed to Persia with the least possible delay. But he very soon
revoked those orders, and addressed to the English envoy stringent
communications, desiring him to remain at Bombay.[38] Malcolm had
reached Calcutta in the interval; and set forth, in strong colours,
the nature of the influence that had been opposed to his advance, and
mapped out a plan of action which, in his estimation, it would now be
expedient to adopt. Lord Minto appears to have fallen readily into the
views of the military diplomatist; but he failed altogether to cut
short the career of Sir Harford Jones. Letters travelled slowly in
those days; and before the missive of the Governor-General, ordering
his detention, had reached Bombay, the vessel which was to bear the
representative of the Court of London to the Persian Gulf had shaken
out its sails to the wind.
On the 14th of October the Mission reached Bushire. Sir Harford Jones
set about his work earnestly and conscientiously. He had difficulties
to contend against of no common order, and it must be admitted that
he faced them manfully. He found the Persian authorities but too
well disposed to arrogance and insolence; and he met their pompous
impertinence with a blustering bravery, which may have been wanting
in dignity, but was not without effect. He bullied and blasphemed,
and, after a series of not very becoming scenes, made his way to
Teheran, where he was graciously received by the Shah. The ‘chapter
of accidents’ had worked mightily in his favour. The reign of Gallic
influence was at an end. Our enemies had overreached themselves, and
been caught in their own toils. Before Napoleon and the Czar had thrown
themselves into each other’s arms at Tilsit, it had been the policy of
the French to persuade the Persian Court that the aggressive designs
of Russia could be successfully counteracted only by a power at enmity
with that state; and now Napoleon boasted that he and the Emperor were
“invariablement unis pour la paix comme pour la guerre.”
Skilfully taking advantage of this, Sir Harford Jones ever as he
advanced inculcated the doctrine which had emanated in the first
instance from the French embassy, and found every one he addressed most
willing to accept it. There was, fortunately for us, a galling fact
ever present to the minds of the Persian ministers to convince them
of the truth of the assertion that it was not by the friends, but by
the enemies of Russia that their interests were to be best promoted.
The French had undertaken to secure the evacuation of Georgia; but
still the Russian eagles were planted on Georgian soil. The star
of Napoleon’s destiny was no longer on the ascendant. The “Sepoy
General,” whom he had once derided, was tearing his battalions to
pieces in the Spanish peninsula. Moreover, the French had lost ground
at Teheran, in their personal as in their political relations. They had
not accommodated themselves to the manners of the Persian Court, nor
conciliated, by a courteous and considerate demeanour, the good-will
of their new allies. They were many degrees less popular than the
English, and their influence melted away at the approach of the
British envoy. The Shah, too, had by this time, not improbably, become
suspicious of the designs of the French. It was urged with some force
that if the French invaded India they would not leave Persia alone.
Mahomed Shereef Khan, who was sent by Nussur-oolah-Khan to General
Malcolm just before his departure from Bushire, to repeat the friendly
assurances of the Persian Government, very sagaciously observed, “If
the French march an army to India, will they not make themselves
masters of Persia as a necessary prelude to further conquests, and who
is to oppose them after they have been received as friends? But our
king,” continued the old man, “dreams of the Russians. He sees them in
Aderbijan, and within a short distance of the capital, and, despairing
of his own strength, he is ready to make any sacrifice to obtain a
temporary relief from his excessive fear. In short,” he concluded,
whilst strong emotion proved his sincerity, “affairs have come to that
state that I thank my God I am an old man, and have a chance of dying
before I see the disgrace and ruin of my country.”[39] Had Malcolm
remained a little longer at Bushire, he would have seen all these
dreams of French assistance pass away from the imaginations of the
Persian Court, and might, under the force of altered circumstances,
have carried everything before him.
When Sir Harford Jones reached the Persian capital, General Gardanne
had withdrawn; and there was little difficulty in arranging
preliminaries of a treaty satisfactory alike to the Courts of Teheran
and St. James’s. The work was not done in a very seemly manner; but
it was not less serviceable when done, for the manner of its doing.
Perhaps there is not another such chapter as this in the entire history
of English diplomacy. Jones had left Bombay under the impression that
he was acting in accordance with the wishes of Lord Minto; but he had
not been long in Persia before he found that the Indian Government
were bent upon suspending his operations, and, failing in this, were
resolute to thwart him at every turn. They dishonoured his bills and
ignored his proceedings. A totally opposite course of policy had been
determined upon in the Council-Chamber of Calcutta. The proceedings
of Brigadier Malcolm at Bushire had not been viewed with unmixed
approbation by Lord Minto and his council; but he was the employé of
the Indian Government; they had confidence in the general soundness of
his views; and they felt that in the maintenance of their dignity it
was expedient to support him. In no very conciliatory mood of mind had
that eager, energetic officer returned to Calcutta. Chewing the cud of
bitter fancies as he sailed up the Bay of Bengal, he prepared a plan
for the intimidation of Persia, and was prepared with all the details
of it when, on the 22nd of August, he disembarked at Calcutta. There
was no unwillingness in the Council-Chamber to endorse his schemes. It
was agreed that an armament should be fitted out to take possession of
Karrack, an island in the Persian Gulf, or, in the delicate language
of diplomacy, “to form an establishment” there, as “a central position
equally well adapted so obstruct the designs of France against India,
as to assist the King of Persia (in the event of a renewal of the
alliance) against his European enemies.”
These measures were described as “entirely defensive, and intended even
to be amicable.” The command of the force was of course conferred on
Brigadier Malcolm. “I am vested,” he wrote to his friends at Madras,
“with supreme military and political authority and control in the
Gulf, to which, however threatening appearances may be, I proceed
with that species of hope which fills the mind of a man who sees a
great and unexpected opportunity afforded him of proving the extent of
his devotion to the country.”[40] It was to be a very pretty little
army, with a compact little staff, all the details of which, even to
the allowances of its members, were soon drawn up and recorded. An
engineer officer was called in and consulted about the plan of a fort,
with a house for the commandant, quarters for the officers, barracks
for the men, a magazine to contain five hundred barrels of gunpowder,
and everything else complete. The activity of the Brigadier himself
at this time was truly surprising. He drew up elaborate papers of
instructions to himself, to be adopted by the Governor-General. One
of these, covering twenty-six sheets of foolscap, so bewildered Lord
Minto in his pleasant country retreat at Barrackpore, that he could
come to no other conclusion about it than that the greater part had
better be omitted. Every conceivable contingency that could arise out
of the movements of France or Russia, or dispensations of Providence in
Persia, was contemplated and discussed, and instructions were sought or
suggested; but a new series of contingencies occurred to the Brigadier
after he had embarked, and a new shower of _ifs_ was poured forth from
the Sand-heads still further to perplex the government. Lord Minto
had by this time fully made up his mind that the French were coming;
wrote of it, not as a possible event, but as a question merely of
time; and contemplated the probability of contending in Turkey for the
sovereignty of Hindostan.[41] But the French had too much work to do
in Europe to trouble themselves about operations in the remote Asiatic
world.
At the beginning of October, Malcolm started for Bombay, from which
Presidency the details of his army were to be drawn. But before the
vessel on which he had embarked had steered into the black water, he
was recalled, in consequence of the receipt of intelligence of Sir
Harford Jones’s intended departure for Bushire. This was, doubtless,
very perplexing; but Malcolm did not despair. “I am this instant,” he
wrote, on the 5th of October, “recalled to Calcutta in consequence
of advices from Sir Harford, stating his intention of leaving Bombay
on the 11th of September. As it appears possible that he may not be
ready to sail before the 13th, he will, I think, receive a letter from
this government of the 22nd, desiring him to stay; and if that has the
effect of stopping him, the letter of the Supreme Government, dated
the 29th, will probably put an end to the mission.”[42] Vain hope! Sir
Harford Jones was at that time not many days’ sail from Bushire; and
before Malcolm finally quitted Calcutta, had started fairly on his race
to Teheran.
The Supreme Government now more urgently than before addressed
instructions to the nominee of the British Cabinet, ordering him to
retire from Persia. The Council were all agreed upon the subject.
Mr. Lumsden and Mr. Colebrooke, who were Members of Council at the
time, expressed themselves even more strongly on the subject than the
Governor-General. All were certain that Sir Harford Jones must either
fail signally, or disgrace and embarrass the government by a delusive
success. He might be repulsed at Bushire—or baffled at Shiraz—or drawn
into a treaty favourable to the French. In any case, it was assumed
that he was sure to bring discredit on the British Government and the
East India Company. Without asserting that the conduct of the Persian
Court had been such as to call for a declaration of war from the rulers
of British India, it was contended, and not, perhaps, without some
show of reason, that any advances made at such a time would compromise
its dignity, and that the attitude to be assumed should be rather one
of reserve than of solicitation. Both parties were in an embarrassing
position. Whilst Lord Minto was writing letters to Sir Harford Jones,
telling him that if he did not immediately close his mission, all his
proceedings would be publicly repudiated,[43] Sir Harford Jones, as
representative of the sovereign, was repudiating the proceedings of the
Supreme Government of India, and offering to answer with his fortune
and his life for any hostile proceedings on the part of the British,
not provoked by the Persians themselves. The government did its best to
disgrace Sir Harford Jones by dishonouring his bills and ignoring his
proceedings; and Sir Harford Jones lowered the character of the Indian
Government by declaring that it had no authority to revoke his measures
or to nullify his engagements with the Persian Court.
In the mean while, Brigadier Malcolm had sailed down the Bay of Bengal,
and reached Bombay by the first day of December. His instructions
had preceded him; a select force of some two thousand men was ready
to receive his orders; and by the 18th of January the expedition was
prepared, at all points, to take ship for the Gulf, to pounce upon
Karrack, and to strike a great panic into the rebellious heart of
the Persian nation. “But,” says Malcolm, in one of his voluminous
narratives, “the accounts I heard of the great change caused in
the affairs of Europe by the general insurrection of Spain, and
the consequent improbability of Buonaparte making an early attack
upon India, combined with the advance of Sir Harford Jones into
Persia, led me to suspend the sailing of the expedition. My conduct
on that occasion was honoured by approbation, and the expedition
countermanded.” But though the military expedition was countermanded,
the Mission was not. Malcolm, confident that the proceedings of such
a man as Jones, for whom he entertained the profoundest possible
contempt, could be attended only with disastrous failure, determined
to proceed to Persia, in spite of the civilian’s accounts of his
favourable reception. “I have private accounts from Bushire,” he
wrote on Christmas-eve, “which state that Sir Harford Jones is, or
pretends to be, completely confident of a success which every child
with him sees is unattainable through the means he uses. His friends
now believe he will go on in spite of any orders he may receive from
the Governor-General. _I mean to go on too_ (there is, indeed, nothing
in these despatches that can stop me for a moment), so we shall have
a _fine mess_ (as the sailors say) in the Gulf.”[44] Such, indeed,
was the feeling between the two diplomatists, and so little was it
disguised, that the Shah, perceiving plainly the true state of the
case, abused Malcolm before Jones, and Jones before Malcolm, as the
best means, in his opinion, of ingratiating himself with them both.
In March, 1809, the preliminary treaty was interchanged, on the part
of their respective sovereigns, by Sir Harford Jones and Meerza
Sheffee. No treaty before or since was ever interchanged under such
extraordinary and unbecoming circumstances. Meerze Sheffee, the prime
minister of Persia, was an old and infirm man. His age and rank among
his own people had given him a sort of license to speak with an amount
of freedom such as is not tolerated among Europeans in social, much
less in diplomatic converse. There was an intentional indefiniteness
in one of the articles of the treaty, which was to be referred to the
British Government for specific adjustment, and Meerza Sheffee, not
understanding or approving of this, blurted out that the British envoy
designed to “cheat” him. The figure used in the Persian language is
gross and offensive, and the word I have employed but faintly expresses
the force of the insult. Jones had not patience to bear it. He started
up, seized the counterpart treaty lying signed on the carpet before
him, gave it to Mr. Morier, and then turning to the astonished Wuzeer,
told him that he was a stupid old blockhead to dare to use such words
to the representative of the King of England, and that nothing but
respect for the Persian monarch restrained him from knocking out the
old man’s brains against the wall. “Suiting the action to the word, I
then,” says Jones, in his own narrative of his mission, “pushed him
with a slight degree of violence against the wall which was behind him,
kicked over the candles on the floor, left the room in darkness, and
rode home without any one of the Persians daring to impede my passage.”
It is not surprising that, after such a scene as this, the Persians
should have shaken their heads, and said, “By Allah! this Feringhee is
either drunk or mad.”
But, in spite of this and other untoward occurrences, the preliminary
treaty was duly interchanged. It bears date the 12th of March, 1809.
By this treaty, the Shah of Persia, declaring all other engagements
void, covenanting “not to permit any European force whatever to pass
through Persia, either towards India, or towards the ports of that
country.” He further undertook, in the event of the British dominions
in India being attacked or invaded by the Afghans or any other power,
“to afford a force for the protection of the said dominions.” On the
part of the British Government, it was stipulated that, in case any
European force had invaded, or should invade, the territories of the
King of Persia, his Britannic Majesty should afford to the Shah a
force, or, in lieu of it, a subsidy, with warlike ammunition, “such as
guns, muskets, &c., and officers, to the amount that might be to the
advantage of both parties, for the expulsion of the force so invading.”
The general provisions of the treaty were included in this, but the
anticipated arrival of Brigadier Malcolm with a military expedition in
the Persian Gulf rendered it necessary that certain specific articles
should be inserted with especial reference to this movement. It was
provided that the force should on no account possess itself of Karrack
or any other places in the Persian Gulf; but that, unless required by
the Governor-General for the defence of India, it should be held at
the disposal of the Persian shah, the Shah undertaking to receive it
in a friendly manner, and to direct his governors to supply it with
provisions “at the fair prices of the day.” This preliminary treaty
was conveyed by Mr. Morier, accompanied by a Persian ambassador, to
England, where it was duly ratified and exchanged; and Sir Harford
Jones was confirmed in the post of Resident Minister at the Court of
Teheran.
The success of Sir Harford Jones embarrassed the British-Indian
Government even more than did the apprehension of his failure. Lord
Minto and his councillors were sorely perplexed. It was desirable,
as they all acknowledged, that the engagements entered into by the
representative of the Court of England should be completed; but it was
not desirable that the Indian Government should be degraded in the eyes
of the Persian Court. Between their anxiety to accept the thing done
and to disgrace the doer, they were thrown into a state of ludicrous
embarrassment.[45] The resolution, however, at which they arrived was,
under all the circumstances of the case, as reasonable as could be
expected. It was determined to accept Sir Harford Jones’s treaty, and
to leave the dignity of the British-Indian Government to be vindicated
on a future occasion. Perhaps it would have been even better quietly
to have lived down the slight; for it cost a large sum of money to
satisfy the British-Indian Government that it had re-established its
name at the Court of the Persian, and confounded the malignity of
Jones.[46]
This is a curious chapter of diplomatic history. It is one, too,
which has evoked from the partisans of both parties an extraordinary
amount of bitterness. It hardly comes within the proper compass of
this history to narrate the incidents of the ambassadorial war, still
less to comment upon them. But it may be briefly remarked that all
parties were wrong. Mistakes were unquestionably committed by Malcolm,
by Jones, and by the Indian Government. There was an old feud between
the two former, which certainly did not tend to smooth down the
difficulties which had arisen; and the Government of India was not
very patient of the home-born interference with what it conceived to
be its rightful diplomatic prerogative. Jones, though receiving his
credentials from the Crown, was placed in subordination to the local
government, and ought to have obeyed its mandates. That he would have
done so, had he received instructions to withdraw before he had fairly
entered upon his work, it is only just to assume; but having once made
his appearance in Persia as the representative of his sovereign, he
thought that he could not abandon his mission under orders from the
Indian Government without lowering the dignity of the Crown.
He did not commence his expedition to Persia until some time after
Malcolm had retired; and when he went at last, it was under urgent
solicitations from the Governor-General to proceed there without delay.
He cannot, therefore, be charged with indelicacy or precipitancy. He
went only when the coast was clear. That he succeeded better than
Malcolm must be attributed mainly to the “chapter of accidents,” for
he was a man of vastly inferior parts. Malcolm says that it was owing
to his measures that Jones was enabled to advance—that the rumour of
his military preparations overawed the Persian Court—and that all the
rest was done by bribery. That there was at that time little hope
of any mission succeeding without bribery, no man knew better than
Malcolm.[47] But Malcolm could not bribe his way to Teheran in the
spring, because the French were then dominant at Court. Had he waited
till the autumn, the road would have been lubricated for him. One
thing at least is certain. Nothing could have been more fortunate
than the miscarriage of Malcolm’s military expedition. It would have
embarrassed our future proceedings, and entailed a large waste of
public money. As to the question of prerogative, it would be little use
to discuss it. It has been settled long ago. The Crown ministers have
taken into their own hands the appointment of our Persian ambassadors,
and the conduct of all subsequent negotiations with the Persian Court.
Henceforth we shall have to regard the relations subsisting between
Persia and Great Britain as affairs beyond the control of the East
India Company and their representatives, and to look upon the ministers
of the Crown as responsible for all that we have to contemplate in that
quarter of the world.[48]
NOTE TO NEW EDITION (1856).—The arguments with which Malcolm supported
the proposal for the occupation of the island of Karrack, may be
advantageously given in this place, as they are set forth in his own
words in his “Life and Correspondence”:—
_First._ That in the event of an attempt to invade India being made
by an European State, it was impossible to place any dependence on
the efforts of the King of Persia or the Pacha of Baghdad, unless
we possessed the immediate power of punishing their hostility and
treachery.
_Secondly._ That the States of Persia, Eastern Turkey, and Arabia
were, from their actual condition, to be considered less in the
light of regular Governments than as countries full of combustible
materials, which any nation whose interests it promoted, might throw
into a flame.
_Thirdly._ That though the French and Russians might, no doubt, in
their advance, easily conquer those States, in the event of their
opposing their progress, it was their obvious policy to avoid any
contest with the inhabitants of the country through which they passed,
as such must, in its progress, inevitably diminish the resources of
those countries, and thereby increase the difficulty of supporting
their armies—which difficulty formed the chief, if not the sole,
obstacle to their advance.
_Fourthly._ That though it was not to be conceived that the King of
Persia or Pacha of Baghdad would willingly allow any European army to
pass through his country, but there was every ground to expect that
the fear of a greater evil was likely not only to make these rulers
observe a neutrality, but to dispose them to aid the execution of a
plan which they could not resist, and make them desire to indemnify
themselves for submission to a power they dreaded by agreeing to share
in the plunder of weaker States—a line of policy to which it was too
obvious they would be united, and to which their fear, weakness, and
avarice made it probable that they would accede.
_Fifthly._ That under a contemplation of such occurrences, it appeared
of ultimate importance that the English Government should instantly
possess itself of means to throw those States that favoured the
approach of its enemies, into complete confusion and destruction, in
order that it might, by diminishing their resources, increase the
principal natural obstacle that opposed the advance of an European
army, and this system, when that Government had once established a
firm footing and a position situated on the confines of Persia and
Turkey, it could easily pursue, with a very moderate force, and
without any great risk or expenditure.
_Sixthly._ That with an established footing in the Gulf of Persia,
which must soon become the emporium of our commerce, the seat of
our political negotiations, and a dépôt for our military stores,
we should be able to establish a local influence and strength that
would not only exclude other European nations from that quarter, but
enable us to carry on negotiations and military operations with honour
and security to any extent we desired; whereas, without it, we must
continue at the mercy of the fluctuating policy of unsteady, impotent,
and faithless Courts, adopting expensive and useless measures of
defence at every uncertain alarm, and being ultimately obliged either
to abandon the scene altogether, or, when danger actually came, to
incur the most desperate hazard of complete failure by sending a
military expedition which must trust for its subsistence and safety,
to States who were known, not only from the individual character of
their rulers, but from their actual condition and character, to be
undeserving of a moment’s confidence.
_Seventhly._ That there was great danger in any delay, as the plan
recommended could only be expected to be beneficial if adopted when
there was a time to mature it and to organise all our means of defence
before the enemy were too far advanced; otherwise that momentary
irritation which must be excited by its adoption, would only add to
the many other advantages which our want of foresight and attention to
our interests in that quarter had already given to our enemies.