CHAPTER IV

THE BOOMERANG CONVENTION[7]

Missouri could not escape the dreaded, impending conflict. She carried

the elements of it within her own bosom. Union and disunion forces

angrily faced each other throughout all her borders. They jostled each

other in the streets, marts and society of St. Louis. But amid these

strong cross-currents of opinion, she remained securely anchored to the

Union. She was, to be sure, somewhat battered and broken, but was

surprisingly kept from the disaster of disunionism, that overtook most

of her sister slave States. It is my object in this chapter to show that

this great State, probably contrary to the expectation of a majority of

her inhabitants, was early in 1861, through the very machinery devised

to take her out of the Union, kept from that destructive folly.

When a Southern State contemplated seceding from the Union, first of

all, through an act of its legislature, it provided for the creation of

a sovereign Convention. The delegates to this Convention were duly

elected by the people. At the appointed time they assembled, organized

for business, and took up the question of secession, which they had been

chosen to examine and decide. If they passed an ordinance of secession,

it was believed that by such action the relations of the State to the

Union were utterly and irrevocably severed, unless the convention

determined of its own motion, or was required by the legislative act

that called it into being, to submit the ordinance to the people to be

ratified or rejected by their suffrages. For example, in Texas and

Virginia the secession ordinances were ratified by popular vote.

In Missouri the secession Governor, re-enforced by a secession

legislature, early in 1861, began to devise measures to take the State

out of the Union. He followed in the wake of the Cotton States. The

legislature, in full sympathy with him, passed an act which provided for

the calling of a State Convention. In a “Whereas,” which precedes the

sections of this act, it announced in fair words its “opinion,” that

“The condition of public affairs demands that a Convention of the people

be called to take such action as the interest and welfare of the State

may require.” Then the act specifies the time and the conditions of the

election of the members of the contemplated Convention, and specifically

designates the subject that the Convention was expected to consider,

viz.: “The then existing relations between the government of the United

States, the people and governments of the different States, and the

government and people of the State of Missouri, and to adopt such

measures for vindicating the sovereignty of the State, and the

protection of its institutions as shall appear to them to be demanded.”

But this act contained one section of vital importance. It provided that

any act of the Convention, changing or dissolving the political

relations of Missouri “to the government of the United States,” should

not be deemed valid until ratified by a majority of the qualified voters

of the State. However, when this act became a law, neither the Governor

nor the legislature seemed to have the slightest doubt that the people

of the State would ratify by a decided majority an ordinance of

secession; happily, no occasion ever arose for testing that question.

Nor was the confidence entertained by the Governor and the legislature

unfounded. They had every reason to believe that the same voters who had

elected them, when appealed to, would elect a Convention that would

favor their project of secession, and that an ordinance of secession

submitted to them would be triumphantly ratified. But

“The best laid schemes o’ mice and men

Gang aft agley.”

Still, to the secessionists at that time all things betokened certain

success. Their skies looked bright. If there were a threatening cloud as

big as a man’s hand they did not see it.

But too great confidence often leads men to overlook weaknesses in their

most hopeful projects. Those who devised the legislative act providing

for a convention, neglected to put into it any provision for limiting

its continuance or life. It was made a sovereign body, and also the sole

judge as to the time when it should adjourn _sine die_. So, as we shall

see, the Governor and the legislature “builded better than they knew.”

To them the Convention proved to be a boomerang, but to the State a

priceless blessing.

This act was approved by the Governor on the 21st of January. The

election of the members of the Convention took place on the 18th of

February, and the Convention met, according to the provision of the act

by which it was created, at Jefferson City, the capital of the State, on

February 28th, 1861.

But if this Convention was to keep the State from secession as some

began to hope it might, it was unmistakably clear that it should not

continue its deliberations at the capital of the State. Jefferson City

was then a small, and to sojourners in it, a somewhat desolate place.

Since the legislature was in session the Convention could not meet in

its halls, which, for such a body, were the only suitable places of

meeting in the city. Instead of that, the delegates were compelled to

occupy for their deliberations a small, repulsive court-house. No desks

were there provided for them. Moreover, the hotel accommodations were

meagre and unattractive, and, most of all, the libraries and

reading-rooms of the capital were about equivalent to nothing. The

tallow candles and oil lamps which at night gave just enough light in

the houses and on the muddy streets to make darkness visible, were far

more luminous than the intellectual lights of that then cheerless place;

and the light of the legislature then in session was darkness. There was

at that time hardly any considerable town in Missouri more

intellectually stagnant than its capital. Should the Convention carry on

its deliberations there, its members would have few if any facilities

for the investigation of vastly important questions that were certain to

arise, while all the currents of influence that would flow in upon them,

would urge them on to declare for secession. To all this the Union men

of St. Louis, together with a few scattered here and there throughout

the State, were keenly alive. Dr. Linton, a distinguished physician of

our city, and a member of the Convention, said, “When I got to Jefferson

City and heard nothing but the ‘Marseillaise’ and ‘Dixie’ in place of

‘The Star-Spangled Banner,’ I felt uneasy enough, and when I heard

Governor Jackson speak I felt badly.... I recollect, with my colleague,

Mr. Broadhead, hearing ‘Dixie’ played on the streets, and that we

stepped up to the leader of the band and asked him to play ‘The

Star-Spangled Banner;’ he said, being a foreigner, ‘Me ’fraid to play

that.’ We assured him that there was no danger, and he played one stanza

of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner,’ but immediately went off into ‘Dixie,’

and of course we went off in disgust.”

The Union men of St. Louis not only saw the danger arising from the

continuance of the Convention in Jefferson City, but they determined if

possible to avert it. Having in secret seriously considered the whole

matter, they cautiously and wisely laid their plan to bring the

Convention to their own city. Since many men in the State were deeply

prejudiced against St. Louis, regarding it as the stronghold of

Free-soilism, it was necessary carefully to conceal the movement that

was being made. If any delegate from St. Louis had openly moved that the

Convention should adjourn to our city, the motion would undoubtedly have

been promptly and decisively voted down. But the delegates from St.

Louis, instead of making an open move, quietly and unobserved found some

delegates from the country to whom they deemed it safe to make their

suggestions, and without any knowledge of it on the part of the

Convention these men were won to their ideas. When, therefore, the

Convention, on the second day of its session, was perfecting its

organization, Mr. Hall of Randolph County,—a strong pro-slavery district

near the centre of the State,—moved that when the Convention adjourned,

it should adjourn to meet “in the Mercantile Library Hall of St. Louis,

on Monday morning next, at 10 o’clock.” The motion met with strong

opposition, but after some discussion it became evident that there was

probably a majority in its favor. Still, the Convention, wishing to act

prudently in a matter of such vital importance, inquired if it were

certainly known that they could occupy the hall mentioned in the motion

of the gentleman from Randolph County? This brought to his feet Judge

Samuel M. Breckinridge, a delegate from St. Louis, who said that at the

request of some members from the country, he had already telegraphed to

St. Louis, and had received an answer that the Convention could occupy

without expense either of the two halls belonging to the Mercantile

Library Association. The undivulged fact was that the Union men of St.

Louis, days before, had arranged to offer to the Convention, without

cost, either of these halls, if by any means that body could be induced

to occupy it. At last, to remove any objection that might arise from

pecuniary considerations, the citizens of our city telegraphed that the

railroad fare of all the members of the Convention had also been

provided for; so, at the close of the second day’s session at Jefferson

City, on March 1st, the Convention, by a decided majority, adjourned to

meet on the following Monday, March 4th, at 10 A. M. in the Mercantile

Library Hall of St. Louis; and by that move the doubt that Missouri

would secede from the Union was greatly strengthened.

On Monday morning, when the Convention met for the first time in its new

quarters, its members found themselves in a beautiful hall, such as some

of them had never before seen. Each member was provided with a desk, and

pages were at hand to do his bidding, all at the expense of the loyal

men of the city. The free use of the Mercantile Library and Reading

Room, with its papers and periodicals from every part of the Union, and

also of the Law Library of the city, was also tendered them. Then, by a

secret prearrangement, in companies of from six to twelve, the members

of the Convention were daily invited by Union men to dine with them;

and, so long as the Convention continued its sessions, in the most

conservative and kindly way, at the tables and in the parlors of the

best and most intelligent men and women of the city, the whole question

of secession in all its phases was thoroughly discussed. By such a

procedure, without arousing antagonism, deep-rooted prejudice began

gradually to give way, and new light, unobserved, penetrated the minds

of the members of this sovereign Convention, and, as one by one the days

passed, the hope of the disloyal that Missouri would secede was

constantly on the wane.

Let us now notice the composition of this sovereign body, in whose hands

was providentially placed the political destiny, not only of Missouri,

but perchance also of the entire Republic. It had ninety-nine members.

Of these, fifty-two were lawyers, seven of whom were judges. These men

by their training were capable of clearly and firmly grasping the

fundamental principles of law and government. Happily more than half of

the Convention was of this class. Twenty-six were farmers, who from

habit of thought were decidedly conservative. Eleven were merchants, who

intuitively discerned the conditions that must be maintained in order to

secure and promote the commercial prosperity of their State. Three were

physicians, one of whom, Dr. Linton, was an exceptionally clear-headed

and brilliant man. There were also one lumber dealer, one bank

commissioner, one civil engineer, one blacksmith, one tanner, one

leather dealer and one circuit clerk. Each of these, by his pursuit, was

fitted to appreciate what was necessary to secure the highest material

interests of the State. The Convention as a whole was in ability quite

above the average, and unmistakably superior both in intellectual and

moral force to the legislature which had called it into being.

Considering the vastly important question which the Convention was

called upon to decide, it is also a matter of great interest to note the

ages of its members. One man, like an elderly maiden, was coy, and

refused to give his age; of the remaining ninety-eight, six were between

twenty-four and thirty; twenty-one were between thirty and forty;

forty-one were between forty and fifty; twenty-four were between fifty

and sixty; and six were between sixty and seventy. Most of these men,

then, were in the maturity and vigor of manhood. Two-thirds of the

Convention, lacking one, were between forty and sixty, old enough to

have gotten rid of crudities of thinking, and the impulsiveness and

rashness of young blood, and yet young enough to be free from the

enfeebling touch of age.

And since they were to deal with the question of secession, the

underlying cause of which was slavery, we should not fail to consider

their nativity, and the influences that surrounded them in early life,

when the deepest and most lasting impressions are made upon men. Thirty

of the ninety-nine delegates to this Convention were born in Kentucky;

twenty-three in Virginia; thirteen in Missouri; nine in Tennessee; three

in North Carolina; three in New York; three in New Hampshire; two in

Maryland; two in Pennsylvania; two in Illinois; one in Alabama; one in

the District of Columbia; one in Ohio; one in New Jersey; one in Maine;

one in Prussia; one in Bremen; one in Austria; and one in Ireland.

Eighty-two were born in the South, including the one from the District

of Columbia, while there were only thirteen born in the North and four

in Europe. When we observe that more than four-fifths of the Convention

had been born and brought up in slave States, we might rationally

conclude from this surface view that Missouri would soon follow her

seven erring sisters, like them secede from the Union, and link her

destiny to the Southern Confederacy.

Beyond question the Convention was almost unanimously pro-slavery. Some

of those born and educated in the North had become sweeping and positive

in their advocacy of slavery. There were none in the Convention who did

not denounce the Abolitionists, and very many of its members condemned

with equal severity the Republican party. All of them, with possibly a

very few exceptions, desired to protect and preserve the system of human

bondage that had unhappily fastened itself upon the nation. But right

here where there was so high a degree of unanimity, strange to say, the

Convention divided. The vexed question with them was, “What will

preserve slavery?” Some of them were in favor of going out of the Union

to preserve it; others with at least equal emphasis and force urged that

in order to preserve it Missouri must remain in the Union. These

delegates pointed to the geographical position of their State; on three

sides of her were free States. If she should secede, she would be

confronted on the east, north and west by a foreign nation and by

hostile territory, which would be an asylum for fugitive slaves. One

speaker declared: “It will make a Canada of every Northern State, and

the North will be a borne from which no slave traveller will return.”

Such men vehemently urged that secession would be the inevitable

destruction of slavery in Missouri. If the State should secede, it would

not be long before she would present to the world the anomaly of a slave

State without a slave. To be sure, the Cotton States withdrew from the

Union in order to preserve slavery; but even if the citizens of Missouri

believed that they had the constitutional right to secede, they could

not follow the example of the Gulf States, for if they did, they would

blot out forever the very institution that they were so earnestly

striving to save. So many in Missouri, and not a few in this Convention,

reasoned.

While, however, the Convention was divided on the question of the

secession of the State, and, during its earlier sessions, how evenly

divided none could tell, nearly all, if not all, of its members were

professed Unionists. The people had elected them as Unionists. It was

loudly proclaimed that Unionism had triumphed at the polls by from forty

to sixty thousand majority. Nearly every man that spoke during the

deliberations of the Convention with great vigor asserted that he was in

favor of maintaining the Union. The Hon. Hamilton R. Gamble, chairman of

the Committee on Federal Relations, in explaining to the Convention the

report of that committee, said: “As far as my acquaintance with the

gentlemen of this Convention extends, I know of no gentlemen who avow,

or insinuate, or in any manner admit, that they entertain any unfriendly

feeling to the Union. You may speak to any member of the Convention you

please in reference to his position about the Union, and he will

proclaim that he is in favor of the Union. How, then, in the

introduction of this question before this body, shall I undertake to

speak in favor of the Union, when there is a unanimity, an entire

unanimity, among all the members upon the very view which I would

endeavor to take and enforce?”

Any one unacquainted with the hair-splitting political doctrines of that

day might have been deceived by this emphatic and universal profession

of Unionism by the members of this sovereign Convention. Calhoun also

frequently made the strongest declarations of his warm attachment to the

Union. But neither he nor they had in mind the actual government formed

by the people of the States under the Constitution, in contradistinction

to the confederation that preceded it, but simply a compact of sovereign

States, which having been voluntarily entered into could by any State be

lawfully terminated at will. Many in this Convention were conscious or

unconscious disciples of Calhoun, and in their speeches advocated his

political heresies. Their effusive professions of devotion to the Union

deceived no one who was at all conversant with our political history.

The Hon. Mr. Gamble, whose words I have quoted in reference to their

“entire unanimity” for the Union, understood them perfectly, and he

expatiated on their professions of devotion to the Union in order to

induce them, if possible, to act in accordance with them, and to vote to

keep Missouri in that Union for which they expressed such fervent love.

On the surface there was unity; beneath the surface, contrariety. Some

of the Convention meant by the Union a centralized, sovereign government

under the Constitution, while others meant a loose compact of sovereign

States.

And if both parties when they spoke of the Union had meant the same

thing, which manifestly they did not, the phrase, “Union man,” would

still have been ambiguous. In the debates of the delegates it came out

clearly that there were two kinds of Union men in the Convention,

conditional and unconditional. Mr. Sheeley of Independence said: “I

admire this Union, and while perhaps I will stick in it as long as any

man in the Convention, who is not an unconditional Union man,” thus

openly announcing himself a conditional Union man. Mr. Vanbuskirk of

Holt County, in an able speech, declared that on the part of some of the

Convention, “the whole matter is brought to this point, that it is Union

upon condition; that is, Union with the ‘buts’ and ‘ifs,’ or ‘under

existing circumstances.’” Of course that kind of Unionism was a mockery.

Only about six months before, the rabid secessionist, Yancey of Alabama,

had proclaimed himself to be a pre-eminent Union man, but declared that

if Abraham Lincoln should be elected to the Presidency, he would favor

immediate secession. That was being a Calhoun Unionist, a Unionist

according to a construction of the Constitution that was utterly at

variance with John Marshall’s interpretation of it. In 1861, in

Missouri, whenever a man said, “I am a Union man in the Constitution,”

we knew for a certainty that his Unionism was conditional, and that he

should probably be classed with the secessionists.

Let us notice the conditions on which the loyalty of these “but” and

“if” Unionists was based. First, they felt themselves to be under no

obligation to sustain the Union unless the Federal government should

guarantee to them their rights. They meant by this, their rights in

slave property. The people of the Northern States must not obstruct by

legislation, or in any other way, the faithful execution of the Fugitive

Slave Law; in fact must aid the Southern slaveholder in recapturing his

fleeing property.

In the second place, they demanded a compromise by which slavery south

of 36° 30′ should be protected in the territories. In demanding no more

than this, many of them thought that they were making very generous

concessions to the North, since they believed that, under the

Constitution, the Southern slaveholder had the undoubted right to go

into any territory of the United States with his human chattels, and

there be protected in both person and slave property.

In the third place, they announced that they would not sustain the

Union, if the general government should attempt to coerce the seceded

States. They declared that they would neither aid their seven erring

sisters in making an attack on the Federal government, nor the Federal

government in coercing the States that had left the Union. This view was

urged by Mr. Howell on the floor of the Convention in a resolution, a

part of which was, “We earnestly remonstrate and protest against any and

all coercive measures, or attempts at coercion of said States into

submission to the general government, whether clothed with the name or

pretext of executing the laws of the Union, or otherwise. And we declare

that in such contingency Missouri will not view the same with

indifference.” This resolution intimated, and it came out clearly in the

ensuing debate, that if the United States should attempt to compel by

force the collection of the national customs in the South, such an act

on the part of the general government would be regarded as coercion.

This is sufficient to reveal the true character of the conditional

Unionists. They affirmed emphatically, “we are in favor of keeping

Missouri in the Union, if the Northern States will guarantee the

execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, protect slavery in the territories

south of 36° 30′, and the general government will not even in the

execution of the Federal laws south of Mason and Dixon’s line use any

force whatever; but if these conditions are not fulfilled, we are in

favor of going out of the Union, and uniting our fortunes with the

Southern Confederacy;” and when the Convention adjourned to St. Louis,

the Unionism of a decided majority of its members was unquestionably of

that conditional type.

Since we have so fully set forth the composition and views of the

Convention, it will be unnecessary to reproduce in detail its

organization and proceedings. The Hon. Sterling Price, afterwards a

Confederate general, was chosen president, and presided over the

deliberations of the Convention with ability and impartiality. The

delegates to the Convention took an oath to sustain the Constitution of

the United States and that of the State of Missouri. A strong Committee

on Federal Relations was appointed, of which Hon. Hamilton R. Gamble, an

unconditional Union man of whom we have already spoken, was chairman.

During the first sittings of the Convention, numerous resolutions in

reference to the attitude that Missouri ought to maintain toward the

Union were introduced and referred to the Committee on Federal

Relations; and while that committee was deliberating, the members of the

Convention occupied the time in making speeches on the general subject

of secession. As each one seemed anxious to declare himself, there was

much speaking. Both extreme and conservative views were freely aired,

and each day evidently added new strength to the position that it would

be unwise for Missouri to sever her relations with the Union.

There was one unique incident that profoundly stirred the whole

Convention. The Convention of the State of Georgia, that passed an

ordinance of secession, sent the Hon. Luther J. Glenn as a commissioner

to present it to the Convention of Missouri and to urge its delegates to

enact a similar ordinance and to join the Southern Confederacy. He

appeared at Jefferson City, during the proceedings of the second day of

the Convention, and his communication from Georgia to the Convention was

read by the Chair.[8] This communication was promptly laid on the table,

but the incident greatly disturbed all genuine Union men, especially

since the commissioner with his secession message had been received with

open arms by the Governor, and in the evening both houses of the

disloyal legislature in joint session had listened to an address from

him with the most manifest marks of sympathy.[9]

At the first day’s session in St. Louis this communication of the

Georgia commissioner was called up, and a motion was made that he be

invited to address the Convention. Thereupon there was hot debate. Hon.

Sample Orr, referring to Mr. Glenn, said: “He is here to-day and called

an ambassador by some, by others a commissioner. If he is an ambassador,

he has missed the right city. He should have gone to Washington. If he

is here as a commissioner from a sister State, then the oath we have

taken forbids that we should have an alliance with any other State in

the Confederacy.” He meant by Confederacy, the United States. Mr. Smith,

a delegate from St. Louis, said: “We did not come here to receive

ambassadors from foreign States.” But finally the Convention deemed it

best on the whole to listen to the gentleman from Georgia, who then

proceeded to tell the very old story of the atrocious conduct of the

Northern abolitionists, and of the equally reprehensible acts of the

Chicago Convention, that nominated Abraham Lincoln for the Presidency;

of the deplorable condition of his State, on account of the protective

tariff, that built up the North and pulled down the South, and that, on

account of these things, which a long-suffering people could no longer

endure, his State had peaceably seceded, and he was commissioned by

Georgia to urge Missouri to follow her example.[10]

Georgia’s Ordinance of Secession and the address of her commissioner

were referred to a special committee, of which the Hon. John B.

Henderson, the author of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of

the United States,[11] was chairman. On the eighteenth day of the

sittings of the Convention, Mr. Henderson, slaveholder though he was,

presented a comprehensive report recommending the rejection of the

prayer from Georgia to secede, presented by Mr. Glenn, and urging the

weightiest and most conclusive reasons against the disruption of the

Union. This report was stronger meat than the Convention was then able

to digest, so after a short, sharp debate it was laid on the table[12]

and was never afterwards taken up. It did not need to be. It had done

its work. The author of it had seized his opportunity to deal a

staggering blow against the secession of Missouri, and the effect of it

could not be neutralized. So what at first was a menace was transmuted

into a blessing.

The Georgia commissioner made a vow that he would never buy a new hat

until Missouri seceded from the Union. In 1900 he was still living. The

silk hat that covered his obfuscated brain when he represented seceded

Georgia before the Convention in St. Louis had been fixed over three

times. He was still proud of it and of the cause that he represented in

1861. Whether he now lives, we do not know. He has died, or will die, in

the faith. He was made of stern stuff. If he has, or when he shall have,

departed to the land where silk hats are not needed, and from which no

one ever secedes, every one who admires pure grit will heartily breathe

the prayer, _Requiescat in pace_.

We return now from this peculiar and important transaction, unexpectedly

thrust upon the attention of the Convention from without, to notice

that, by the time it had fairly begun its work in St. Louis, the

secession legislature which had created it, repented of what it had

unwittingly wisely done, and began to agitate the question whether it

had the power to repeal the ordinance that called the Convention into

being, and thus permanently dissolve it. They saw of course that the

Convention was not of their way of thinking. They refused to vote the

necessary means for the publication of its proceedings. Mr. Foster of

the Convention said in debate, “Although the legislature of Missouri

called this body into existence, yet, sir, its complexion so very

materially differs from the complexion of the legislative body, that, if

they had the power, in my judgment, they would crush us out of existence

to-day.” To the Union men of St. Louis and the State this growing

antagonism of the two law-making bodies was a cheering symptom. The

legislature, however, soon learned from its legal advisers that it could

not efface the wisdom into which it had blindly blundered; that the

chicken which it had so fondly hatched and fostered into maturity could

not be put back into the shell again; that, in short, there was no

political power in Missouri superior to the sovereign Convention which

it had evoked into being, and which was now calmly and wisely

deliberating in the great commercial city of the State.

All parties were finally convinced that though the legislature had

created the Convention, it could not destroy it. So the work of this

sovereign body moved on undisturbed. On the eighth day of its sittings

the Committee on Federal Relations reported through its chairman. In

their report the Committee, with but partial success, detailed the

political events which led to the secession of the Cotton States, and

had raised the question of secession in the remaining slave States. But

they presented with cumulative force many cogent reasons why Missouri

should not follow her erring sisters in seceding from the Union, and

finally crystallized their recommendations on the whole subject of

secession in seven resolutions, the first and chief of which was, “That

at present there is no adequate cause to impel Missouri to dissolve her

connection with the Federal Union.” This resolution seems to us now tame

and timid. But a more sweeping and positive resolution could not have

been carried through the Convention. Its very weakness was its strength.

Its apparent obeisance to the doctrine of secession made it acceptable

to many conditional Union men. When the loyal men of St. Louis heard it,

they were lifted up with hope.

However the Committee was not unanimous. On the next day some

conditional Union men on the Committee presented a minority report. Then

numerous amendments were offered, and for eight days longer the debate

went on, more earnest and vigorous than ever, but each day it was

evident that the more positive secession sentiment was slowly vanishing,

so that when on the sixteenth day of the Convention, the vote was taken

on the resolution quoted above, while nine members of the Convention

were absent, all present but one voted for it. George Y. Bast, a farmer

from Rhineland, Montgomery County, has the unenviable distinction of

being the minority of one that voted for the secession of Missouri. The

other resolutions of the Committee, with varying majorities, were also

adopted.

On the 22d of March the Convention adjourned to meet on the third Monday

in December following; but it also appointed a committee of seven, one

from each congressional district, to whom the power was delegated to

call the Convention together before the third Monday in December, if, in

their judgment, the public exigencies demanded it.

The reasons urged by the Convention against the secession of Missouri as

we gather them from its reported proceedings, briefly stated, were

these:

First: the geographical position of Missouri. She was so far north that

her climate was better adapted to the white man than to the black.

Moreover, she was shut in on three sides by free States, into which, if

she seceded from the Union, her slaves would flee and from which they

could not be brought back.

Second: she had other, and far greater interests than her slaves. They

numbered only one hundred and twelve thousand, while she had within her

borders more than one million, one hundred thousand white men. During

the then preceding decade her slaves had increased twenty-five per cent;

while her white population had increased one hundred per cent. The

taxable value of her slaves was only forty-five million dollars, while

that of her other property was three hundred and fifteen million

dollars. Most of her slaves were engaged in raising tobacco and hemp,

while her white population, which, through immigration, was rapidly

increasing, was developing her mining, manufacturing, and commercial

interests. The members of her sovereign Convention, from whose brains

the cobwebs had at last been swept, and whose vision had become clear,

saw that the immigration of free white men to Missouri would nearly, if

not wholly, cease, if the State by secession should be placed under the

political domination of the Confederacy, whose corner-stone had been

declared by its brilliant Vice-President to be African slavery.

Third: timid men were everywhere crying out for compromise. And most of

the members of the Convention still hugged the delusion that the

political antagonisms, which were then shaking the nation to its

foundations, and had already severed seven States from the Union, might

be overcome by compromise. To inaugurate measures by which such

compromise might be effected some advocated a convention of the border

slave States; others of the border slave and border free States; and

still others of all the States, and, so long as they cherished hope of

such a peaceful adjustment of difficulties, they thought it inexpedient

for Missouri to secede.

Fourth: most of the Convention believed that the seven States which had

already seceded had been carried out of the Union by ambitious

politicians; that the people had not been permitted fairly and fully to

discuss the question of secession, and freely to cast their ballots for

or against it. During the deliberations of the Convention extreme

Southern politicians, like Yancey of Alabama, were roundly and bitterly

denounced. Moreover, the State pride of the Missourians had been deeply

stung by the seceded States. Those States, they affirmed, had rudely

snapped the tie which bound them to the Union, without any consultation

with the border slave States, and then after they were out of the Union

and had gone so far as to set up a Southern Confederacy, they

complacently turned around and invited the States whose counsels they

had ignored to join them. Missouri felt that she should have been

consulted before secession was enacted, and some strong pro-slavery

members of the Convention declared in unmistakable terms that they were

utterly opposed to following the cotton lords of the South Atlantic and

Gulf States. Thus the precipitancy of the hot-headed Southern

politicians became no inconsiderable element of the force which kept

Missouri in the Union.

But there is reason for grave doubt if even all these considerations

combined would have led to this result, if the Convention had continued

its deliberations at Jefferson City. It was well known that the object

of the Governor and the legislature in creating the Convention was to

secure the secession of the State. Had it continued its sittings at the

State capital, the influences by which it would have been surrounded

would probably have incited its members to enact an ordinance of

secession. But the adjournment to St. Louis at once awakened a

reasonable hope of a better outcome. The delegates were now surrounded

by an entirely different atmosphere. They met in that city the highest

intelligence and the staunchest loyalty in the State. They were mightily

impressed with the fact that scores of men there who had formerly been

slaveholders in the South were unflinchingly loyal to the old flag.

Gradually they came to see that secession antagonized all the

commercial, educational, and moral interests of the State; that it was,

in short, a suicidal policy. As they deliberated day by day, even those

who had been the warmest advocates of such a policy began to waver.

Every day their vision grew clearer and truer. Even the president of the

Convention, who so soon afterwards became a commander of Confederate

troops, for the nonce, seemed to be a genuine Union man, and when the

vote was taken on the question of secession, as we have already noted,

only one man could be found in the entire Convention, who had the

hardihood to vote against the resolution, that it was not just then

expedient for Missouri to secede from the Union.

The victory was won. It was a momentous victory. Who won it? A little

band of intrepid Union men, men of whom, with perhaps two exceptions,

the nation at large knew little or nothing. They had come together in

St. Louis from every part of the Republic and from foreign countries.

That city was their adopted home. They had largely laid aside the

prejudices that they brought with them from their former places of

abode. Their contact with each other had made them larger, grander men.

Upon them unexpectedly a day of darkness had fallen. Dangers thickened

around them, but the very perils which beset them united their hearts in

unswerving, burning loyalty to the Union. At last the only hope of

keeping their State in the Union was the sovereign Convention called

into being for the very purpose of taking it out of the Union. So,

before God, they firmly resolved to use as well as they could the

unpropitious instrument made ready to their hand. They could not

directly control the deliberations and votes of the Convention.

Forbidding as the prospect seemed to be, there was hope, however, if

this sovereign body could be induced to carry on its deliberations in

their adopted city. They must invite the Convention to do this. Not

openly; such publicity would utterly defeat their purpose. They must

work in secret. Fortunately some of their own number were members of the

Convention. They were good men and wise and true. They did their

delicate work with skill. The Convention, apparently self-moved, came to

St. Louis. It deliberated there. Missouri stayed in the Union.

What was the significance of this outcome to the nation at large? It had

a mighty influence in keeping Kentucky, West Virginia, Delaware and

Maryland in the Union. It cheered and strengthened our wise,

conservative, patriotic President, whose manifold perplexities and vast

responsibilities pressed upon him like the superincumbent weight of a

mountain. It put into the Union army more than one hundred and nine

thousand men, of whom more than eight thousand were colored,[13] besides

the Home Guards in every considerable town of the State. It is probable,

however, that part of this number, even if the State had seceded, would

have found its place in the Union ranks; but the doctrine of State

rights was so dominant that probably at least seventy-five thousand of

that number would have followed the State and helped fight the battles

of the Southern Confederacy. It is quite possible that this great

military force added to the Federal army really decided the conflict in

favor of the Union; and that when some future historian impartially

surveys the whole field, he may be constrained to affirm that a band of

patriotic men, most of them unknown to fame, in a border city, on the

western bank of the Mississippi River, confronted with apparently

insurmountable obstacles, by prudent, decisive action, not only saved

their State from the madness of secession, but the whole Union from

irretrievable disruption.

[Illustration:

THE ARSENAL, ST. LOUIS, IN 1866.

[_Page 63_

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The story of a border city during the Civil War · 第 4 / 21 章