[Footnote 95: Written in 1902. (Read at the Hong-Kong United Service
Institution.)]
A problem which is not an attractive one, but which has to be
solved, is to arrange the proper method of supplying a fleet
and maintaining its communications. In time of peace as well as
in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles
of various kinds used on board ship, viz. naval stores, ordnance
stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, &c.
If we know the quantity of each description of stores that a
ship can carry, and if we estimate the progressive consumption,
we can compute, approximately but accurately enough for practical
purposes, the time at which replenishment would be necessary and
to what amount it should be made up. As a general rule ships
stow about three months' stores and provisions. The amount of
coal and engineers' stores, measured in time, depends on the
proceedings of the ship, and can only be calculated if we know
during what portion of any given period she will be under way.
Of course, this can be only roughly estimated. In peace time we
know nearly exactly what the expenditure of ammunition within a
given length of time--say, a quarter of a year--will be. For war
conditions we can only form an estimate based upon assumptions.
The consumption of provisions depends upon the numbers of officers
and men, and in war or peace would be much the same. The greater
activity to be expected in war would lead to more wear and tear,
and consequently to a larger expenditure of naval stores. In
peaceful times the quarterly expenditure of ammunition does not
vary materially. In case we were at war, a single action might
cause us to expend in a few hours as much as half a dozen quarterly
peace allowances. There is a certain average number of days that
a ship of a particular class is under way in a year, and the
difference between that number and 365 is, of course, the measure
of the length of time she is at anchor or in harbour. Expenditure
of coal and of some important articles of engineers' stores depends
on the relation between the time that she is stationary and the
time she is under way. It should be particularly noted that the
distinction is not between time at anchor and time at sea, but
between time at anchor and 'time under way.' If a ship leaves
her anchorage to run an engine-trial after refit, or to fire
at a target, or to adjust compasses, or to go into dock--she
burns more coal than if she remained stationary. These occasions
of movement may be counted in with the days in which the ship
is at sea, and the total taken as the number of days under way.
It may be assumed that altogether these will amount to six or
seven a month. In time of war the period under way would probably
be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting
under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable,
so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be
greatly increased.
The point to be made here is that--independently of strategic
conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the
supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is principally
that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except
provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must
be forwarded in larger quantities or at shorter intervals than in
peace time. If, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system
of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications
being left out of consideration for the present--will merely
have to be expanded in time of war. In other words, practice in
the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards
preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions.
That a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during
hostilities will not be doubted.
The general principles which I propose to indicate are applicable
to any station. We may allow for a squadron composed of--
4 battleships,
4 large cruisers,
4 second-class cruisers,
13 smaller vessels of various kinds, and
3 destroyers,
being away from the principal base-port of the station for several
months of the year. The number of officers and men would be, in
round numbers, about 10,000.
In estimating the amounts of stores of different kinds required
by men-of-war, it is necessary--in order to allow for proper
means of conveyance--to convert tons of dead-weight into tons
by measurement, as the two are not always exactly equivalent. In
the following enumeration only estimated amounts are stated, and
the figures are to be considered as approximate and not precise.
It is likely that in each item an expert maybe able to discover
some variation from the rigorously exact; but the general result
will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, especially
as experience will suggest corrections.
A thousand men require about 3.1 tons of victualling stores,
packages included, daily, We may make this figure up to 3.5 tons
to allow for 'medical comforts' and canteen stores, Consequently
10,000 men require about 35 tons a day, and about 6300 tons for
six months. The assumed squadron, judging from experience, would
require in peace time about 600 tons of engineers' stores, about
400 tons of naval stores, and--if the ships started with only their
exact allowance on board and then carried out a full quarterly
practice twice--the quantity of ordnance stores and ammunition
required would be about 1140 tons, to meet the ordinary peace
rate of expenditure, We thus get for a full six months' supply
the following figures:--
Victualling stores 6,300 tons.
Engineers' stores 600 "
Naval stores 400 "
Ordnance stores and ammunition 1,140 "
-----
Total 8,440 "
Some allowance must be made for the needs of the 'auxiliaries,'[96]
the vessels that bring supplies and in other ways attend on the
fighting ships. This may be put at 7 per cent. The tonnage required
would accordingly amount in all to about 9000.
[Footnote 96: The 7 per cent. mentioned in the text would probably
cover nearly all the demands--except coal--of auxiliaries, which
would not require much or any ammunition. Coal is provided for
separately.]
The squadron would burn in harbour or when stationary about 110
tons of coal a day, and when under way about 1050 tons a day. For
140 harbour-days the consumption would be about 15,400 tons; and
for 43 days under way about 45,150: so that for coal requirements
we should have the following:--
Harbour consumption 15,400 tons.
Under-way consumption 45,150 "
------
Total for fighting ships 60,550 "
7 per cent. for auxiliaries (say) 4,250 "
------
Grand total 64,800 "
Some time ago (in 1902) a representation was made from the China
station that, engine-room oil being expended whenever coal is
expended, there must be some proportion between the quantities
of each. It was, therefore, suggested that every collier should
bring to the squadron which she was supplying a proportionate
quantity of oil. This has been approved, and it has been ordered
that the proportions will be 75 gallons of oil to every 100 tons
of coal.[97] It was also suggested that the oil should be carried
in casks of two sizes, for the convenience of both large and
small ships.
[Footnote 97: I was informed (on the 10th December 1902), some
time after the above was written, that the colliers supplying
the United States Navy are going to carry 100 gallons of oil
for every 100 tons of coal.]
There is another commodity, which ships have never been able to
do without, and which they need now in higher proportion than
ever. That commodity is fresh water. The squadron constituted
as assumed would require an average of about 160 tons of fresh
water a day, and nearly 30,000 tons in six months. Of this the
ships, without adding very inconveniently to their coal consumption,
might themselves distil about one-half; but the remaining 15,000
tons would have to be brought to them; and another thousand tons
would probably be wanted by the auxiliaries, making the full
six months' demand up to 16,000 tons.
The tonnage requirements of the squadron and its 'auxiliaries'
for a full six months' period would be about 74,000, without
fresh water. As, however, the ships would have started with full
store-rooms, holds, and bunkers, and might be expected to return
to the principal base-port of the station at the end of the period,
stores for four-and-a-half months', and coal to meet twenty weeks',
consumption would be sufficient. These would be about 6750 tons
of stores and ammunition and 46,000 tons of coal.[98]
[Footnote 98: To avoid complicating the question, the water or
distilling vessel, the hospital ship, and the repair vessel have
not been considered specially. Their coal and stores have been
allowed for.]
The stores, &c., would have to be replenished twice and--as it would
not be prudent to let the ships run right out of them--replenishment
should take place at the end of the second and at the end of the
fourth months. Two vessels carrying stores and ammunition, if
capable of transporting a cargo of nearly 1700 tons apiece, would
bring all that was wanted at each replenishment. To diminish risk
of losing all of one description of supplies, if carried by itself
in a separate vessel, it has been considered desirable that each
supply-carrier, when employed, is to contain some ammunition,
some stores, and some provisions. There are great advantages
in having supply-carriers, including, of course, colliers, of
moderate size. Many officers must have had experience of the
inconvenience and delay due to the employment of a single very
large vessel which could only coal one man-of-war at a time.
Several vessels, each carrying a moderate amount of cargo, would
permit much more rapid replenishment of the ships of a squadron.
The inconvenience that would be caused by the loss or breakdown
of a supply-carrier would be reduced by employing several vessels
of moderate cargo-capacity instead of only one or two of great
capacity.
Each battleship and large cruiser of the assumed squadron may be
expected to burn about 1000 tons of coal in five weeks, so that
the quantity to be used in that time by all those ships would
be 8000 tons. The remaining ships, scattered between different
places as most of them would probably be, would require about
3500 tons. Therefore, every five weeks or so 11,500 tons of coal
would be required. Four replenishments would be necessary in the
whole period, making a total of 46,000 tons. Each replenishment
could be conveyed in five colliers with 2300 tons apiece.
Moderate dimensions in store- and coal-carriers would prove
convenient, not only because it would facilitate taking in stores
and coaling, if all the squadron were assembled at one place,
but also if part were at one place and part at another. Division
into several vessels, instead of concentration in a few, would
give great flexibility to the system of supply. A single very
capacious cargo-carrier might have to go first to one place and
supply the ships there, and then go to supply the remaining ships
lying at another anchorage. This would cause loss of time. The
same amount of cargo distributed amongst two or more vessels
would permit the ships at two or more places to be supplied
simultaneously.
You may have noticed that I have been dealing with the question
as though stores and coal were to be transported direct to the
men-of-war wherever they might be and put straight on board them
from the carrying-vessels. There is, as you all know, another
method, which may be described as that of 'secondary bases.'
Speaking generally, each of our naval stations has a principal
base at which considerable or even extensive repairs of the ships
can be effected and at which stores are accumulated. Visits to
it for the sake of repair being necessary, the occasion may be
taken advantage of to replenish supplies, so that the maintenance
of a stock at the place makes for convenience, provided that
the stock is not too large. The so-called 'secondary base' is
a place at which it is intended to keep in store coal and other
articles in the hope that when war is in progress the supply of
our ships may be facilitated. It is a supply, and not a repairing
base.
A comparison of the 'direct' system and 'secondary base' system
may be interesting. A navy being maintained for use in war, it
follows, as a matter of course, that the value of any part of
its equipment or organisation depends on its efficiency for war
purposes. The question to be answered is--Which of the two systems
promises to help us most during hostilities? This does not exclude
a regard for convenience and economy in time of peace, provided
that care is taken not to push economy too far and not to make
ordinary peace-time convenience impede arrangements essential
to the proper conduct of a naval campaign.
It is universally admitted that a secondary base at which stocks
of stores are kept should be properly defended. This necessitates
the provision of fortifications and a garrison. Nearly every
article of naval stores of all classes has to be brought to our
bases by sea, just as much as if it were brought direct to our
ships. Consequently the communications of the base have to be
defended. They would continue to need defending even if our ships
ceased to draw supplies from it, because the communications of
the garrison must be kept open. We know what happened twice over
at Minorca when the latter was not done.
The object of accumulating stores at a secondary base is to
facilitate the supply of fighting ships, it being rather confidently
assumed that the ships can go to it to replenish without being
obliged to absent themselves for long from the positions in which
they could best counteract the efforts of the enemy. When war is
going on it is not within the power of either side to arrange
its movements exactly as it pleases. Movements must, at all events
very often, conform to those of the enemy. It is not a bad rule
when going to war to give your enemy credit for a certain amount
of good sense. Our enemy's good sense is likely to lead him to
do exactly what we wish him not to do, and not to do that which
we wish him to do. We should, of course, like him to operate so
that our ships will not be employed at an inconvenient distance
from our base of supplies. If we have created permanent bases in
time of peace the enemy will know their whereabouts as well as
we do ourselves, and, unless he is a greater fool than it is safe
to think he is, he will try to make us derive as little benefit
from them as possible. He is likely to extend his operations to
localities at a distance from the places to which, if we have
the secondary base system of supply, he knows for certain that our
ships must resort. We shall have to do one of two things--either
let him carry on his operations undisturbed, or conform to his
movements. To this is due the common, if not invariable, experience
of naval warfare, that the fleet which assumes the offensive
has to establish what are sometimes called 'flying bases,' to
which it can resort at will. This explains why Nelson rarely
used Gibraltar as a base; why we occupied Balaclava in 1854; and
why the Americans used Guantanamo Bay in 1898. The flying base is
not fortified or garrisoned in advance. It is merely a convenient
anchorage, in a good position as regards the circumstances of
the war; and it can be abandoned for another, and resumed, if
desirable, as the conditions of the moment dictate.
It is often argued that maintenance of stocks of stores at a
secondary base gives a fleet a free hand and at least relieves
it from the obligation of defending the line of communications.
We ought to examine both contentions. It is not easy to discover
where the freedom comes in if you must always proceed to a certain
place for supplies, whether convenient or not. It may be, and
very likely will be, of the utmost importance in war for a ship
to remain on a particular station. If her coal is running short
and can only be replenished by going to a base, go to the base she
must, however unfortunate the consequences. It has been mentioned
already that nearly every item on our store list has to be brought
to a base by sea. Let us ascertain to what extent the accumulation
of a stock at a place removes the necessity of defending the
communication line. Coal is so much the greater item that
consideration of it will cover that of all the rest.
The squadron, as assumed, requires about 11,500 tons of coal
every five weeks in peace time. Some is commonly obtained from
contractors at foreign ports; but to avoid complicating the subject
we may leave contract issues out of consideration. If you keep
a stock of 10,000 tons at your permanent secondary base, you
will have enough to last your ships about four-and-a-half weeks.
Consequently you must have a stream of colliers running to the
place so as to arrive at intervals of not more than about thirty
days. Calculations founded on the experience of manoeuvres show
that in war time ships would require nearly three times the quantity
used in peace. It follows that, if you trebled your stock of
coal at the base and made it 30,000 tons, you would in war still
require colliers carrying that amount to arrive about every four
weeks. Picture the line of communications with the necessary
colliers on it, and see to what extent you are released from
the necessity of defending it. The bulk of other stores being
much less than that of coal, you could, no doubt, maintain a
sufficient stock of them to last through the probable duration
of the war; but, as you must keep your communications open to
ensure the arrival of your coal, it would be as easy for the
other stores to reach you as it would be for the coal itself.
Why oblige yourself to use articles kept long in store when much
fresher ones could be obtained? Therefore the maintenance of
store depots at a secondary base no more releases you from the
necessity of guarding your communications than it permits freedom
of movement to your ships.
The secondary base in time of war is conditioned as follows. If
the enemy's sphere of activity is distant from the base which
you have equipped with store-houses and fortifications, the place
cannot be of any use to you. It can, and probably will, be a
cause of additional anxiety to you, because the communications
of its garrison must still be kept open. If it is used, freedom
of movement for the ships must be given up, because they cannot
go so far from it as to be obliged to consume a considerable
fraction of their coal in reaching it and returning to their
station. The line along which your colliers proceed to it must
be effectively guarded.
Contrast this with the system of direct supply to the ships-of-war.
You choose for your flying base a position which will be as near
to the enemy's sphere of action as you choose to make it. You
can change its position in accordance with circumstances. If you
cease to use the position first chosen you need trouble yourself
no more about its special communications. You leave nothing at it
which will make it worth the enemy's while to try a dash at it.
The power of changing the flying base from one place to another
gives almost perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships.
Moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position
selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed
base.
The defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on
the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route,
viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant.
Within the last few years a good deal has been written about
the employment of cruisers. The favourite idea seems to be that
peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to
take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. The history
of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. We need not forget
Nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number
attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of
vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually
unaltered. At the beginning of 1805, the year of Trafalgar, we
had--besides other classes--232 frigates and sloops in commission;
at the beginning of 1806 we had 264. It is doubtful if forty of
these were attached to fleets.
It is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels
of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep
up with the fighting ships when at sea. This, perhaps, is due
to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on
the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. In
practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very
short time--from its supplies. Its movements depend on those of
its supply-train. The corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet
or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. As long as
these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered,
and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. All
that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right
place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying
that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies
and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called
communications'--the phrase being Mahan's.
The efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely
on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. Why do
we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace
so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails
before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? There are
two reasons. One is, because we have used the permanent base
method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find
it difficult to form a conception of any other. The other reason
is that the direct supply method is thought to be too costly.
The first reason need not detain us. It is not worthy of even
a few minutes' consideration. The second reason deserves full
investigation.
We ought to be always alive to the necessity of economy. The only
limit to economy of money in any plan of naval organisation is
that we should not carry it so far that it will be likely to impair
efficiency. Those who are familiar with the correspondence of the
great sea-officers of former days will have noticed how careful
they were to prevent anything like extravagant expenditure. This
inclination towards a proper parsimony of naval funds became
traditional in our service. The tradition has, perhaps, been
rather weakened in these days of abundant wealth; but we should
do our best not to let it die out. Extravagance is a serious foe
to efficient organisation, because where it prevails there is
a temptation to try imperfectly thought-out experiments, in the
belief that, if they fail, there will still be plenty of money
to permit others to be tried. This, of course, encourages slovenly
want of system, which is destructive of good organisation.
We may assume, for the purposes of our investigation, that our
permanently equipped secondary base contains a stock of 10,000 tons
of coal. Any proportionate quantity, however, may be substituted
for this, as the general argument will remain unaffected. As
already intimated, coal is so much greater in bulk and aggregate
cost than any other class of stores that, if we arrange for its
supply, the provision of the rest is a comparatively small matter.
The squadron which we have had in view requires an estimated
amount of 46,000 tons of coal in six months' period specified,
and a further quantity of 4600 tons may be expected to suffice
for the ships employed in the neighbouring waters during the
remainder of the year. This latter amount would have to be brought
in smaller cargoes, say, five of 920 tons each. Allowing for
the colliers required during the six months whilst the whole
squadron has to be supplied an average cargo of 2300 tons, we
should want twenty arrivals with an aggregate of 46,000 tons,
and later on five arrivals of smaller colliers with an aggregate
of 4600 tons to complete the year.
The freight or cost of conveyance to the place need not be considered
here, as it would be the same in either system. If we keep a stock
of supplies at a place we must incur expenditure to provide for
the storage of the articles. There would be what may be called
the capital charges for sites, buildings, residences, jetties,
tram lines, &c., for which £20,000 would probably not be enough,
but we may put it at that so as to avoid the appearance of
exaggeration. A further charge would be due to the provision of
tugs or steam launches, and perhaps lighters. This would hardly
be less than £15,000. Interest on money sunk, cost of repairs,
and maintenance, would not be excessive if they amounted to £3500
a year. There must be some allowance for the coal used by the
tugs and steam launches. It is doubtful if £500 a year would
cover this; but we may put it at that. Salaries and wages of
staff, including persons employed in tugs and steam launches,
would reach quite £2500 a year. It is to be noted that the items
which these charges are assumed to cover cannot be dispensed
with. If depots are established at all, they must be so arranged
that the stores deposited in them can be securely kept and can
be utilised with proper expedition. The total of the charges
just enumerated is £6500 a year.
There are other charges that cannot be escaped. For example,
landing a ton of coal at Wei-hai-wei, putting it into the depot,
and taking it off again to the man-of-war requiring it, costs $1
20 cents, or at average official rate of exchange two shillings.
At Hong-Kong the cost is about 2s. 5d. a ton. The charge at 2s.
per ton on 50,600 tons would be £5060. I am assured by every
engineer officer to whom I have spoken on the subject that the
deterioration in coal due to the four different handlings which
it has to undergo if landed in lighters and taken off again to
ships from the coal-store cannot be put at less than 10 per cent.
Note that this is over and above such deterioration as would be
due to passing coal direct from the hold of a collier alongside
into a ship's bunkers. If anyone doubts this deterioration it would
be well for him to examine reports on coal and steam trials. He
will be unusually fortunate if he finds so small a deterioration as
10 per cent. The lowest that I can remember having seen reported
is 20 per cent.; reports of 30 and even 40 per cent. are quite
common. Some of it is for deterioration due to climate and length
of time in store. This, of course, is one of the inevitable
conditions of the secondary base system, the object of which is
to keep in stock a quantity of the article needed. Putting the
purchase price of the coal as low as 15s. a ton, a deterioration
due to repeated handling only of 10 per cent. on 50,600 tons
would amount to £3795.
There is nearly always some loss of coal due to moving it. I
say 'nearly always' because it seems that there are occasions
on which coal being moved increases in bulk. It occurs when
competitive coaling is being carried on in a fleet and ships
try to beat records. A collier in these circumstances gives out
more coal than she took in. We shall probably be right if we
regard the increase in this case as what the German philosophers
call 'subjective,' that is, rather existent in the mind than in
the external region of objective, palpable fact. It may be taken
as hardly disputable that there will be less loss the shorter
the distance and the fewer the times the coal is moved. Without
counting it we see that the annual expenses enumerated are--
Establishment charges £6,500
Landing and re-shipping 5,060
Deterioration 3,795
-------
£15,355
This £15,355 is to be compared with the cost of the direct supply
system. The quantity of coal required would, as said above, have
to be carried in twenty colliers--counting each trip as that of
a separate vessel--with, on the average, 2300 tons apiece, and
five smaller ones. It would take fully four days to unload 2300
tons at the secondary base, and even more if the labour supply
was uncertain or the labourers not well practised. Demurrage
for a vessel carrying the cargo mentioned, judging from actual
experience, would be about £32 a day; and probably about £16 a
day for the smaller vessels. If we admit an average delay, per
collier, of eighteen days, that is, fourteen days more than the
time necessary for removing the cargo into store, so as to allow
for colliers arriving when the ships to be coaled are absent, we
should get--
20 X 14 X 32 £8,960
5 X 14 X 16 1,120
-------
£10,080
as the cost of transferring the coal from the holds to the
men-of-war's bunkers on the direct supply system. An average
of eighteen days is probably much too long to allow for each
collier's stay till cleared: because, on some occasions, ships
requiring coal may be counted on as sure to be present. Even
as it is, the £10,080 is a smaller sum than the £11,560 which
the secondary base system costs over and above the amount due to
increased deterioration of coal. If a comparison were instituted
as regards other kinds of stores, the particular figures might
be different, but the general result would be the same.
The first thing that we have got to do is to rid our minds of
the belief that because we see a supply-carrier lying at anchor
for some days without being cleared, more money is being spent
than is spent on the maintenance of a shore depot. There may be
circumstances in which a secondary base is a necessity, but they
must be rare and exceptional. We saw that the establishment of one
does not help us in the matter of defending our communications.
We now see that, so far from being more economical than the
alternative method, the secondary base method is more costly. It
might have been demonstrated that it is really much more costly
than the figures given make it out to be, because ships obliged
to go to a base must expend coal in doing so, and coal costs
money. It is not surprising that consideration of the secondary
base system should evoke a recollection of the expression applied
by Dryden to the militia of his day:
In peace a charge; in war a weak defence.
I have to say that I did not prepare this paper simply for the
pleasure of reading it, or in order to bring before you mere
sets of figures and estimates of expense. My object has been
to arouse in some of the officers who hear me a determination
to devote a portion of their leisure to the consideration of
those great problems which must be solved by us if we are to
wage war successfully. Many proofs reach me of the ability and
zeal with which details of material are investigated by officers
in these days. The details referred to are not unimportant in
themselves; but the importance of several of them if put together
would be incomparably less than that of the great question to
which I have tried to direct your attention.
The supply of a fleet is of high importance in both peace time
and time of war. Even in peace it sometimes causes an admiral to
pass a sleepless night. The arrangements which it necessitates
are often intricate, and success in completing them occasionally
seems far off. The work involved in devising suitable plans is
too much like drudgery to be welcome to those who undertake it.
All the same it has to be done: and surely no one will care to
deny that the fleet which has practised in quiet years the system
that must be followed in war will start with a great advantage on
its side when it is at last confronted with the stern realities
of naval warfare.