[Footnote 91: Written in 1905. (Read at Institute of Naval
Architects.)]
The subject on which I have been invited to read a paper, and
which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for
anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be
expected to allot to it. To discuss it adequately, a volume of no
diminutive size would be necessary. It may, however, be possible
to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main
outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration
certain points which, over and above their historical interest,
may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day.
In taking account of the conditions of the Trafalgar epoch we have
to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters. These
are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted
to meet it by the British. The former of these was described in
the House of Commons by William Pitt at the beginning of the
war in words which may be used without change at the present
time. On 16th May 1803 the war, which had been interrupted by the
unstable Peace of Amiens, was definitely resumed. The struggle
was now to be a war not so much between the United Kingdom and the
French nation as between the United Kingdom and the great Napoleon,
wielding more than the resources of France alone. Speaking a week
after the declaration of war, Pitt said that any expectation of
success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition
that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of
the country by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of
descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired
and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and
protracted war. More briefly stated, the hostile plan was to
invade the United Kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel
us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the East, from
which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived. The plan
was comprehensive, but not easily concealed. What we had to do
was to prevent the invasion of the United Kingdom and defend our
trade and our outlying territories. As not one of the hostile
objects could be attained except by making a maritime expedition
of some kind, that is to say, by an expedition which had to cross
more or less extensive areas of water, it necessarily followed
that our most effective method of defence was the keeping open
of our sea communications. It became necessary for us to make
such arrangements that the maritime paths by which a hostile
expedition could approach our home-coasts, or hostile cruisers
molest our sea-borne trade, or hostile squadrons move to the
attack of our trans-marine dependencies--that all these paths
should be so defended by our navy that either the enemy would
not venture to traverse them or, if he did, that he could be
driven off.
Short as it is, the time at my disposal permits me to give a
few details. It was fully recognised that defence of the United
Kingdom against invasion could not be secured by naval means
alone. As in the times of Queen Elizabeth, so in those of George
III, no seaman of reputation contended that a sufficient land
force could be dispensed with. Our ablest seamen always held
that small hostile expeditions could be prepared in secret and
might be able to slip through the most complete lines of naval
defence that we could hope to maintain. It was not discovered
or alleged till the twentieth century that the crew of a dinghy
could not land in this country in the face of the navy. Therefore
an essential feature of our defensive strategy was the provision
of land forces in such numbers that an invader would have no
chance of succeeding except he came in strength so great that
his preparations could not be concealed and his expedition could
not cross the water unseen.
As our mercantile marine was to be found in nearly every sea,
though in greater accumulation in some areas than in others, its
defence against the assaults of an enemy could only be ensured
by the virtual ubiquity of our cruising force. This, of course,
involved the necessity of employing a large number of cruisers,
and of arranging the distribution of them in accordance with the
relative amount and value of the traffic to be protected from
molestation in different parts of the ocean. It may be mentioned
here that the term 'cruiser,' at the time with which we are dealing,
was not limited to frigates and smaller classes of vessels. It
included also ships of the line, it being the old belief of the
British Navy, justified by the experience of many campaigns and
consecrated by the approval of our greatest admirals, that the
value of a ship of war was directly proportionate to her capacity
for cruising and keeping the sea.
If the ocean paths used by our merchant ships--the trade routes
or sea communications of the United Kingdom with friendly or
neutral markets and areas of production--could be kept open by
our navy, that is, made so secure that our trade could traverse
them with so little risk of molestation that it could continue to
be carried on, it resulted as a matter of course that no sustained
attack could be made on our outlying territory. Where this was
possible it was where we had failed to keep open the route or line
of communications, in which case the particular trade following
it was, at least temporarily, destroyed, and the territory to
which the route led was either cut off or seized. Naturally,
when this was perceived, efforts were made to re-open and keep
open the endangered or interrupted communication line.
Napoleon, notwithstanding his supereminent genius, made some
extraordinary mistakes about warfare on the sea. The explanation
of this has been given by a highly distinguished French admiral.
The Great Emperor, he says, was wanting in exact appreciation
of the difficulties of naval operations. He never understood
that the naval officer--alone of all men in the world--must be
master of two distinct professions. The naval officer must be
as completely a seaman as an officer in any mercantile marine;
and, in addition to this, he must be as accomplished in the use
of the material of war entrusted to his charge as the members of
any aimed force in the world. The Emperor's plan for the invasion
of the United Kingdom was conceived on a grand scale. A great
army, eventually 130,000 strong, was collected on the coast of
north-eastern France, with its headquarters at Boulogne. The
numerical strength of this army is worth attention. By far the
larger part of it was to have made the first descent on our
territory; the remainder was to be a reserve to follow as quickly
as possible. It has been doubted if Napoleon really meant to
invade this country, the suggestion being that his collection
of an army on the shores of the Straits of Dover and the English
Channel was merely a 'blind' to cover another intended movement.
The overwhelming weight of authoritative opinion is in favour
of the view that the project of invasion was real. It is highly
significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary.
It could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval
obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the
expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to
be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected.
The numerical strength in troops which Napoleon thought necessary
compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that
concealment became quite impossible. Consequently an important
part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened
locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of
precision.
Notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of
naval warfare, the Great Emperor had grasped one of its leading
principles. Before the Peace of Amiens, indeed before his campaign
in Egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in Italy, he had seen
that the invasion of the United Kingdom was impracticable without
first obtaining the command of the sea. His strategic plan,
therefore, included arrangements to secure this. The details of
the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered;
but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment
of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied
in Nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. The gunboats,
transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of
many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern France and the
Netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition.
Fleets of line-of-battle ships were essential parts of it, and
on their effective action the success of the scheme was largely
made to depend. This feature remained unaltered in principle when,
less than twelve months before Trafalgar, Spain took part in the
war as Napoleon's ally, and brought him a great reinforcement
of ships and important assistance in money.
We should not fail to notice that, before he considered himself
strong enough to undertake the invasion of the United Kingdom,
Napoleon found it necessary to have at his disposal the resources
of other countries besides France, notwithstanding that by herself
France had a population more than 60 per cent. greater than that
of England. By the alliance with Spain he had added largely to
the resources on which he could draw. Moreover, his strategic
position was geographically much improved. With the exception
of that of Portugal, the coast of western continental Europe,
from the Texel to Leghorn, and somewhat later to Taranto also,
was united in hostility to us. This complicated the strategic
problem which the British Navy had to solve, as it increased the
number of points to be watched; and it facilitated the junction
of Napoleon's Mediterranean naval forces with those assembled in
his Atlantic ports by supplying him with allied ports of refuge
and refit on Spanish territory--such as Cartagena or Cadiz--between
Toulon and the Bay of Biscay. Napoleon, therefore, enforced upon
us by the most convincing of all arguments the necessity of
maintaining the British Navy at the 'two-power standard' at least.
The lesson had been taught us long before by Philip II, who did
not venture on an attempt at invading this country till he was
master of the resources of the whole Iberian peninsula as well
as of those of the Spanish dominions in Italy, in the Burgundian
heritage, and in the distant regions across the Atlantic Ocean.
At several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was
now the master, Napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and
win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough
to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across
the water which separated the starting points of his expedition
from the United Kingdom. Command of the sea to be won by a powerful
naval combination was thus an essential element in Napoleon's
strategy at the time of Trafalgar. It was not in deciding what
was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred:
it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he
went wrong. The British strategy adopted in opposition to that
of Napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of
the command of the sea. Formulated and carried into effect by
seamen, it differed in some important features from his. We may
leave out of sight for the moment the special arrangements made
in the English Channel to oppose the movements of Napoleon's
flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft.
The British strategy at the time of Trafalgar, as far as it was
concerned with opposition to Napoleon's sea-going fleets, may be
succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which
the enemy's forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable
strength. Though some of our admirals, notably Nelson himself,
objected to the application of the term 'blockade' to their plans,
the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they
should come out they would find outside their port a British
force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them
thoroughly and destroy them. Beating them and thus having done
with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what
was desired by our admirals. This necessitated a close watch on
the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let
the history of Cornwallis's command off Brest and of Nelson's
off Toulon suffice to tell us.
The junction of two or more of Napoleon's fleets would have ensured
over almost any single British fleet a numerical superiority that
would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost
certain. To meet this condition the British strategy contemplated
the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another,
which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment
be effected. By this step we should preserve, if not a numerical
superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force
as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment,
even if undefeated, a certainty. The strategic problem before our
navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem.
The enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards Brest
or towards Toulon. In the latter case, a superior force might
fall upon our Mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in
the Atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from
the Atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. Against
the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of Napoleon
to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off
Toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was
to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval
control of the English Channel.
After the addition of the Spanish Navy to his own, Napoleon to
some extent modified his strategic arrangements. The essential
feature of the scheme remained unaltered. It was to effect the
junction of the different parts of his naval force and thereupon
to dominate the situation, by evading the several British fleets
or detachments which were watching his. Before Spain joined him
in the war his intention was that his escaping fleets should
go out into the Atlantic, behind the backs, as it were, of the
British ships, and then make for the English Channel. When he
had the aid of Spain the point of junction was to be in the West
Indies.
The remarkable thing about this was the evident belief that the
command of the sea might be won without fighting for it; won,
too, from the British Navy which was ready, and indeed wished,
to fight. We now see that Napoleon's naval strategy at the time
of Trafalgar, whilst it aimed at gaining command of the sea, was
based on what has been called evasion. The fundamental principle
of the British naval strategy of that time was quite different.
So far from thinking that the contest could be settled without
one or more battles, the British admirals, though nominally
blockading his ports, gave the enemy every facility for coming out
in order that they might be able to bring him to action. Napoleon,
on the contrary, declared that a battle would be useless, and
distinctly ordered his officers not to fight one. Could it be
that, when pitted against admirals whose accurate conception of
the conditions of naval warfare had been over and over again tested
during the hostilities ended by the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon still
trusted to the efficacy of methods which had proved so successful
when he was outmanoeuvring and intimidating the generals who
opposed him in North Italy? We can only explain his attitude
in the campaign of Trafalgar by attributing to him an expectation
that the British seamen of his day, tried as they had been in
the fire of many years of war, would succumb to his methods as
readily as the military formalists of central Europe.
Napoleon had at his disposal between seventy and eighty French,
Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line, of which some sixty-seven
were available at the beginning of the Trafalgar campaign. In
January 1805, besides other ships of the class in distant waters
or specially employed, we--on our side--had eighty ships of the
line in commission. A knowledge of this will enable us to form
some idea of the chances of success that would have attended
Napoleon's concentration if it had been effected. To protect the
passage of his invading expedition across the English Channel
he did not depend only on concentrating his more distant fleets.
In the Texel there were, besides smaller vessels, nine sail of
the line. Thus the Emperor did what we may be sure any future
intending invader will not fail to do, viz. he provided his
expedition with a respectable naval escort. The British naval
officers of the day, who knew what war was, made arrangements to
deal with this escort. Lord Keith, who commanded in the Downs,
had under him six sail of the line in addition to many frigates
and sloops; and there were five more line-of-battle ships ready
at Spithead if required.
There had been a demand in the country that the defence of our
shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to
gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats.
This was resisted by the naval officers. Nelson had already said,
'Our first defence is close to the enemy's ports,' thus agreeing
with a long line of eminent British seamen in their view of our
strategy. Lord St. Vincent said that 'Our great reliance is on the
vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in
the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets,
and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.'
These are memorable words, which we should do well to ponder
in these days. The Government of the day insisted on having the
coastal boats; but St. Vincent succeeded in postponing the
preparation of them till the cruising ships had been manned.
His plan of defence has been described by his biographer as 'a
triple line of barricade; 50-gun ships, frigates, sloops of war,
and gun-vessels upon the coast of the enemy; in the Downs opposite
France another squadron, but of powerful ships of the line,
continually disposable, to support the former or attack any force
of the enemy which, it might be imagined possible, might slip
through the squadron hanging over the coast; and a force on the
beach on all the shores of the English ports, to render assurance
doubly sure.' This last item was the one that St. Vincent had
been compelled to adopt, and he was careful that it should be in
addition to those measures of defence in the efficacy of which
he and his brother seamen believed. Concerning it his biographer
makes the following remark: 'It is to be noted that Lord St.
Vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats
by gunboats,' &c. He objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or
long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful
to have the sea-going ships manned. Speaking of this coastal
defence scheme, he said: 'It would be a good bone for the officers
to pick, but a very dear one for the country.'
The defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy
of the time. An important part was played by our fleets and groups
of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes
direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral
vessels carrying commodities to or from British ports. The strategy
of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long
belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted
number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity
of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by
the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size. This
can be seen in the lists of successive years. In January 1803
the number of cruising frigates in commission was 107, and of
sloops and smaller vessels 139, the total being 246. In 1804 the
numbers were: Frigates, 108; sloops, &c., 181; with a total of
289. In 1805 the figures had grown to 129 frigates, 416 sloops,
&c., the total being 545. Most of these were employed in defending
commerce. We all know how completely Napoleon's project of invading
the United Kingdom was frustrated. It is less well known that
the measures for defending our sea-borne trade, indicated by the
figures just given, were triumphantly successful. Our mercantile
marine increased during the war, a sure proof that it had been
effectually defended. Consequently we may accept it as established
beyond the possibility of refutation that that branch of our naval
strategy at the time of Trafalgar which was concerned with the
defence of our trade was rightly conceived and properly carried
into effect.
As has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade,
being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of
communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any
rate, of our transmarine territories. Napoleon held pertinaciously
to the belief that British prosperity was chiefly due to our
position in India. We owe it to Captain Mahan that we now know
that the eminent American Fulton--a name of interest to the members
of this Institution--told Pitt of the belief held abroad that
'the fountains of British wealth are in India and China.' In the
great scheme of naval concentration which the Emperor devised,
seizure of British Colonies in the West Indies had a definite
place. We kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force
capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the
neighbouring lines of communication. In 1803 we had four ships
of the line in the West Indian area. In 1804 we had six of the
same class; and in 1805, while the line-of-battle ships were
reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine
to twenty-five. Whether our Government divined Napoleon's designs
on India or not, it took measures to protect our interests there.
In January 1804 we had on the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies
stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller
two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one ships of
war in all. This would have been sufficient to repel a raiding
attack made in some strength. By the beginning of 1805 our East
Indies force had been increased; and in the year 1805 itself we
raised it to a strength of forty-one ships in all, of which nine
were of the line and seventeen were frigates. Had, therefore, any
of the hostile ships managed to get to the East Indies from the
Atlantic or the Mediterranean ports, in which they were being
watched by our navy, their chances of succeeding in their object
would have been small indeed.
When we enter the domain of tactics strictly so-called, that is
to say, when we discuss the proceedings of naval forces--whether
single ships, squadrons, or fleets--in hostile contact with one
another, we find the time of Trafalgar full of instructive episodes.
Even with the most recent experience of naval warfare vividly
present to our minds, we can still regard Nelson as the greatest
of tacticians. Naval tactics may be roughly divided into two great
classes or sections, viz. the tactics of groups of ships, that
is to say, fleet actions; and the tactics of what the historian
James calls 'single ship actions,' that is to say, fights between
two individual ships. In the former the achievements of Nelson
stand out with incomparable brilliancy. It would be impossible
to describe his method fully in such a paper as this. We may,
however, say that Nelson was an innovator, and that his tactical
principles and methods have been generally misunderstood down
to this very day. If ever there was an admiral who was opposed
to an unthinking, headlong rush at an enemy, it was he. Yet this
is the character that he still bears in the conception of many.
He was, in truth, an industrious and patient student of tactics,
having studied them, in what in these days we should call a
scientific spirit, at an early period, when there was but little
reason to expect that he would ever be in a position to put to a
practical test the knowledge that he had acquired and the ideas
that he had formed. He saw that the old battle formation in single
line-ahead was insufficient if you wanted--as he himself always
did--to gain an overwhelming victory. He also saw that, though
an improvement on the old formation, Lord Howe's method of the
single line-abreast was still a good deal short of tactical
perfection. Therefore, he devised what he called, with pardonable
elation, the 'Nelson touch,' the attack in successive lines so
directed as to overwhelm one part of the enemy's fleet, whilst
the other part was prevented from coming to the assistance of the
first, and was in its turn overwhelmed or broken up. His object
was to bring a larger number of his own ships against a smaller
number of the enemy's. He would by this method destroy the part
attacked, suffering in the process so little damage himself that
with his whole force he would be able to deal effectively with the
hostile remnant if it ventured to try conclusions with him. It
is of the utmost importance that we should thoroughly understand
Nelson's fundamental tactical principle, viz. the bringing of
a larger number of ships to fight against a smaller number of
the enemy's. There is not, I believe, in the whole of the records
of Nelson's opinions and actions a single expression tending to
show that tactical efficiency was considered by him to be due
to superiority in size of individual ships of the same class
or--as far as _matériel_ was concerned--to anything but superior
numbers, of course at the critical point. He did not require,
and did not have, more ships in his own fleet than the whole of
those in the fleet of the enemy. What he wanted was to bring to
the point of impact, when the fight began, a larger number of
ships than were to be found in that part of the enemy's line.
I believe that I am right in saying that, from the date of Salamis
downwards, history records no decisive naval victory in which the
victorious fleet has not succeeded in concentrating against a
relatively weak point in its enemy's formation a greater number
of its own ships. I know of nothing to show that this has not been
the rule throughout the ages of which detailed history furnishes
us with any memorial--no matter what the class of ship, what the
type of weapon, what the mode of propulsion. The rule certainly
prevailed in the battle of the 10th August 1904 off Port Arthur,
though it was not so overwhelmingly decisive as some others. We
may not even yet know enough of the sea fight in the Straits
of Tsushima to be able to describe it in detail; but we do know
that at least some of the Russian ships were defeated or destroyed
by a combination of Japanese ships against them.
Looking back at the tactics of the Trafalgar epoch, we may see
that the history of them confirms the experience of earlier wars,
viz. that victory does not necessarily fall to the side which
has the biggest ships. It is a well-known fact of naval history
that generally the French ships were larger and the Spanish much
larger than the British ships of corresponding classes. This
superiority in size certainly did not carry with it victory in
action. On the other hand, British ships were generally bigger
than the Dutch ships with which they fought; and it is of great
significance that at Camperdown the victory was due, not to
superiority in the size of individual ships, but, as shown by
the different lists of killed and wounded, to the act of bringing
a larger number against a smaller. All that we have been able to
learn of the occurrences in the battle of the japan Sea supports
instead of being opposed to this conclusion; and it may be said
that there is nothing tending to upset it in the previous history
of the present war in the Far East.
I do not know how far I am justified in expatiating on this point;
but, as it may help to bring the strategy and tactics of the
Trafalgar epoch into practical relation with the stately science of
which in our day this Institution is, as it were, the mother-shrine
and metropolitical temple, I may be allowed to dwell upon it a
little longer. The object aimed at by those who favour great size
of individual ships is not, of course, magnitude alone. It is to
turn out a ship which shall be more powerful than an individual
antagonist. All recent development of man-of-war construction has
taken the form of producing, or at any rate trying to produce,
a more powerful ship than those of earlier date, or belonging to
a rival navy. I know the issues that such statements are likely
to raise; and I ask you, as naval architects, to bear with me
patiently when I say what I am going to say. It is this: If you
devise for the ship so produced the tactical system for which
she is specially adapted you must, in order to be logical, base
your system on her power of defeating her particular antagonist.
Consequently, you must abandon the principle of concentration of
superior numbers against your enemy; and, what is more, must be
prepared to maintain that such concentration on his part against
yourself would be ineffectual. This will compel a reversion to
tactical methods which made a fleet action a series of duels
between pairs of combatants, and--a thing to be pondered on
seriously--never enabled anyone to win a decisive victory on the
sea. The position will not be made more logical if you demand both
superior size and also superior numbers, because if you adopt
the tactical system appropriate to one of the things demanded,
you will rule out the other. You cannot employ at the same time
two different and opposed tactical systems.
It is not necessary to the line of argument above indicated to
ignore the merits of the battleship class. Like their predecessors,
the ships of the line, it is really battleships which in a naval
war dominate the situation. We saw that it was so at the time
of Trafalgar, and we see that it has been so in the war between
Russia and Japan, at all events throughout the 1904 campaign.
The experience of naval war, down to the close of that in which
Trafalgar was the most impressive event, led to the virtual
abandonment of ships of the line[92] above and below a certain
class. The 64-gun ships and smaller two-deckers had greatly
diminished in number, and repetitions of them grew more and more
rare. It was the same with the three-deckers, which, as the late
Admiral Colomb pointed out, continued to be built, though in
reduced numbers, not so much for their tactical efficiency as
for the convenient manner in which they met the demands for the
accommodation required in flag-ships. The tactical condition
which the naval architects of the Trafalgar period had to meet
was the employment of an increased number of two-deckers of the
medium classes.
[Footnote 92: Experience of war, as regards increase in the number
of medium-sized men-of-war of the different classes, tended to the
same result in both the French Revolutionary war (1793 to 1801)
and the Napoleonic war which began in 1803. Taking both contests
down to the end of the Trafalgar year, the following table will
show how great was the development of the line-of-battle-ship
class below the three-decker and above the 64-gun ship. It will
also show that there was no development of, but a relative decline
in, the three-deckers and the 64's, the small additions, where
there were any, being generally due to captures from the enemy.
The two-deckers not 'fit to lie in a line' were at the end of the
Trafalgar year about half what they were when the first period
of the 'Great War' began. When we come to the frigate classes we
find the same result. In the earlier war 11 frigates of 44 and
40 guns were introduced into our navy. It is worth notice that
this number was not increased, and by the end of the Trafalgar
year had, on the contrary, declined to 10. The smallest frigates,
of 28 guns, were 27 in 1793, and 13 at the end of the Trafalgar
year. On the other hand, the increase in the medium frigate classes
(38, 36, and 32 guns) was very large. From 1793 to the end of the
Trafalgar year the 38-gun frigates increased from 8 to 50, and
the 36-gun frigates from 16 to 54.
-------------------------------------------------------------
| | | Napoleonic War to |
| | French | the end of the |
| | Revolutionary War | Trafalgar year |
| Classes of Ships |-------------------|-------------------|
| |Commence-|Commence-|Commence-|Commence-|
| | ment of | ment of | ment of | ment of |
| | 1793 | 1801 | 1803 | 1806 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| 3-deckers | 31 | 32 | 29 | 29 |
| 2-deckers of 74 | 76 | 111 | 105 | 123 |
| guns, and above | | | | |
| 64 and 60 gun ships | 46 | 47 | 38 | 38 |
| 2-deckers not 'fit | 43 | 31 | 21 | 22 |
| to lie in a line' | | | | |
| Frigates 44 guns | 0 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| " 40 " | 0 | 5 | 5 | 4 |
| " 38 " | 8 | 32 | 32 | 50 |
| " 36 " | 16 | 49 | 49 | 54 |
| " 32 " | 48 | 41 | 38 | 56 |
| " 28 " | 27 | 11 | 11 | 13 |
-------------------------------------------------------------
The liking for three-deckers, professed by some officers of Nelson's
time, seems to have been due to a belief, not in the merit of their
size as such, but in the value of the increased number of medium
guns carried on a 'middle' deck. There is, I believe, nothing to
show that the two-deckers _Gibraltar_ (2185 tons) and _Coesar_
(2003) were considered more formidable than the three-deckers
_Balfleur_ (1947), _Glory_ (1944), or _Queen_ (1876). All these
ships were in the same fleet, and fought in the same battle.]
A fleet of ships of the line as long as it could keep the sea,
that is, until it had to retreat into port before a stronger
fleet, controlled a certain area of water. Within that area smaller
men-of-war as well as friendly merchant ships were secure from
attack. As the fleet moved about, so the area moved with it.
Skilful disposition and manoeuvring added largely to the extent
of sea within which the maritime interests that the fleet was
meant to protect would be safe. It seems reasonable to expect that
it will be the same with modern fleets of suitable battleships.
The tactics of 'single ship actions' at the time of Trafalgar
were based upon pure seamanship backed up by good gunnery. The
better a captain handled his ship the more likely he was to beat
his antagonist. Superior speed, where it existed, was used to
'gain the weather gage,' not in order to get a suitable range
for the faster ship's guns, but to compel her enemy to fight.
Superior speed was also used to run away, capacity to do which
was not then, and ought not to be now, reckoned a merit in a ship
expressly constructed for fighting, not fleeing. It is sometimes
claimed in these days that superior speed will enable a modern
ship to keep at a distance from her opponent which will be the
best range for her own guns. It has not been explained why a range
which best suits her guns should not be equally favourable for the
guns of her opponent; unless, indeed, the latter is assumed to be
weakly armed, in which case the distance at which the faster ship
might engage her would be a matter of comparative indifference.
There is nothing in the tactics of the time of Trafalgar to make
it appear that--when a fight had once begun--superior speed,
of course within moderate limits, conferred any considerable
tactical advantage in 'single ship actions,' and still less in
general or fleet actions. Taking up a position ahead or astern of
a hostile ship so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated
by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state
of the ship to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather
late in an action.
A remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly
apparent in the era of Trafalgar. I have already alluded to the
tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle ships
to those of the medium classes. The same thing may be noticed
in the case of the frigates.[93] Those of 44, 40, and 28 guns
relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number
of the 38-gun, 36-gun, and 32-gun frigates increased. The officers
who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress
on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the
sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now
call the 'battleship' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.'
In the earlier time there were ships which were intermediate
between the ship of the line and the frigate. These were the
two-deckers of 56, 54, 50, 44, and even 40 guns. They had long
been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never
counted in the frigate classes. They seemed to have held a
nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them
in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured
cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit
for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending
or other cruiser service. The two-deckers just mentioned were
looked upon by the date of Trafalgar as forming an unnecessary
class of fighting ships. Some were employed, chiefly because they
existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true
battleships on one side and true frigates on the other.[94]
[Footnote 93: See footnote 92.]
[Footnote 94: See footnote 92.]
In conclusion, I would venture to say that the strategical and
tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had
been mastered by our navy by the time of the Trafalgar campaign.
The effect of those lessons showed itself in our ship-building
policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history
of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means
to belligerent ends.