[The following article was read as an address, in compliance
with the request of its Council, at the annual meeting of the
Navy Records Society in July 1905. It was, and indeed is still,
my opinion, as stated to the meeting in some prefatory remarks,
that the address would have come better from a professed historian,
several members of the Society being well known as entitled to that
designation. The Council, however, considered that, as Nelson's
tactical principles and achievements should be dealt with, it would
be better for the address to be delivered by a naval officer--one,
moreover, who had personal experience of the manoeuvres of fleets
under sail. Space would not suffice for treating of Nelson's
merits as a strategist, though they are as great as those which
he possessed as a tactician.]
Centenary commemorations are common enough; but the commemoration
of Nelson has a characteristic which distinguishes it from most,
if not from all, others. In these days we forget soon. What place
is still kept in our memories by even the most illustrious of
those who have but recently left us? It is not only that we do
not remember their wishes and injunctions; their existence has
almost faded from our recollection. It is not difficult to persuade
people to commemorate a departed worthy; but in most cases industry
has to take the place of enthusiasm, and moribund or extinct
remembrances have to be galvanised by assiduity into a semblance
of life. In the case of Nelson the conditions are very different.
He may have been misunderstood; even by his professional descendants
his acts and doctrines may have been misinterpreted; but he has
never been forgotten.
The time has now come when we can specially do honour to Nelson's
memory without wounding the feelings of other nations. There is no
need to exult over or even to expatiate on the defeats of others.
In recalling the past it is more dignified as regards ourselves,
and more considerate of the honour of our great admiral, to think
of the valour and self-devotion rather than the misfortunes of
those against whom he fought. We can do full justice to Nelson's
memory without reopening old wounds.
The first thing to be noted concerning him is that he is the
only man who has ever lived who by universal consent is without
a peer. This is said in full view of the new constellation rising
above the Eastern horizon; for that constellation, brilliant
as it is, has not yet reached the meridian. In every walk of
life, except that which Nelson chose as his own, you will find
several competitors for the first place, each one of whom will
have many supporters. Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal, Cæsar,
Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon have been severally
put forward for the palm of generalship. To those who would acclaim
Richelieu as the first of statesmen, others would oppose Chatham,
or William Pitt, or Cavour, or Bismarck, or Marquis Ito. Who was
the first of sculptors? who the first of painters? who the first
of poets? In every case there is a great difference of opinion.
Ask, however, who was the first of admirals, and the unanimous
reply will still be--'Nelson,' tried as he was by many years of
high command in war. It is not only amongst his fellow-countrymen
that his preeminence is acknowledged. Foreigners admit it as
readily as we proclaim it ourselves.
We may consider what it was that gave Nelson this unique position
among men. The early conditions of his naval career were certainly
not favourable to him. It is true that he was promoted when young;
but so were many other officers. Nelson was made a commander only
a few months after the outbreak of war between Great Britain
and France, and was made a post-captain within a few days of the
declaration of war by Spain. An officer holding a rank qualifying
him for command at the outset of a great war might well have looked
forward confidently to exceptional opportunities of distinguishing
himself. Even in our own days, when some trifling campaign is
about to be carried on, the officers who are employed where they
can take no part in it vehemently lament their ill-fortune. How
much more disheartening must it have been to be excluded from
active participation in a great and long-continued conflict! This
was Nelson's case. As far as his hopes of gaining distinction
were concerned, fate seemed to persecute him pertinaciously. He
was a captain of more than four years' seniority when the treaty
of Versailles put an end to the war of American Independence. Yet,
with the exception of the brief Nicaragua expedition--which by
the side of the important occurrences of grand naval campaigns
must have seemed insignificant--his services during all those
years of hostilities were uneventful, and even humdrum. He seemed
to miss every important operation; and when the war ended--we may
almost say--he had never seen a ship fire a broadside in anger.
There then came what promised to be, and in fact turned out to
be, a long period of peace. With no distinguished war service
to point to, and with the prospect before him of only uneventful
employment, or no employment afloat at all, Nelson might well
have been disheartened to the verge of despondency. That he was
not disheartened, but, instead thereof, made a name for himself
in such unfavourable circumstances, must be accepted as one of
the most convincing proofs of his rare force of character. To
have attracted the notice, and to have secured the confidence,
of so great a sea-officer as Lord Hood constituted a distinction
which could have been won only by merit so considerable that
it could not long remain unrecognised. The war of American
Independence had still seven months to run when Lord Hood pointed
to Nelson as an officer to be consulted on 'questions relative
to naval tactics,' Professor Laughton tells us that at that time
Nelson had never served with a fleet. Lord Hood was one of the
last men in the world to go out of his way to pay to a youthful
subordinate an empty compliment, and we may confidently base our
estimate of an officer's merits on Lord Hood's belief in them.
He, no doubt, gave a Wide signification to the term 'tactics,' and
used it as embracing all that is included in the phrase 'conduct
of war.' He must have found out, from conversations with, and from
the remarks of, the young captain, whom he treated as intimately as
if he was his son, that the latter was already, what he continued
to be till the end, viz. a student of naval warfare. This point
deserves particular attention. The officers of the navy of the
present day, period of peace though it be, can imitate Nelson
at least in this. He had to wait a long time before he could
translate into brilliant action the result of his tactical studies.
Fourteen years after Lord Hood spoke of him as above related, by
a 'spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority
by signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick
perceptions,' Nelson entirely defeated the movement of the enemy's
fleet, contributed to the winning of a great victory, and, as
Captain Mahan tells us, 'emerged from merely personal distinction
to national renown.' The justification of dwelling on this is
to be found in the necessity, even at this day, of preventing
the repetition of mistakes concerning Nelson's qualities and
disposition. His recent biographers, Captain Mahan and Professor
Laughton, feel constrained to tell us over and over again that
Nelson's predominant characteristic was not mere 'headlong valour
and instinct for fighting'; that he was not the man 'to run needless
and useless risks' in battle. 'The breadth and acuteness of Nelson's
intellect,' says Mahan, 'have been too much overlooked in the
admiration excited by his unusually grand moral endowments of
resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility!'
In forming a true conception of what Nelson was, the publications
of the Navy Records Society will help us greatly. There is something
very remarkable in the way in which Mr. Gutteridge's volume[82]
not only confirms Captain Mahan's refutation of the aspersions
on Nelson's honour and humanity, but also establishes Professor
Laughton's conclusions, reached many years ago, that it was the
orders given to him, and not his amour, which detained him at
Naples at a well-known epoch. The last volume issued by the Society,
that of Mr. Julian Corbett,[83] is, I venture to affirm, the
most useful to naval officers that has yet appeared among the
Society's publications. It will provide them with an admirable
historical introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly
help them in ascertaining the importance of Nelson's achievements
as a tactician. For my own part, I may say with gratitude that
but for Mr. Corbett's valuable work I could not have completed
this appreciation.
[Footnote 82: _Nelson_and_the_Neapolitan_Jacobins_.]
[Footnote 83: _Fighting_Instructions_, 1530-1816.]
The most renowned of Nelson's achievements was that performed
in his final battle and victory. Strange as it may seem, that
celebrated performance has been the subject of much controversy,
and, brilliant as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been
freely, and indeed unfavourably, criticised. There is still much
difference of opinion as to the preliminary movements, and as
to the exact method by which Nelson's attack was made. It has
been often asserted that the method really followed was not that
which Nelson had expressly declared his intention of adopting.
The question raised concerning this is a difficult one, and,
until the appearance of Mr. Julian Corbett's recent work and
the interesting volume on Trafalgar lately published by Mr. H.
Newbolt, had not been fully discussed. The late Vice-Admiral
P. H. Colomb contributed to the _United_Service_Magazine_ of
September 1899 a very striking article on the subject of Nelson's
tactics in his last battle, and those who propose to study the
case should certainly peruse what he wrote.
The criticism of Nelson's procedure at Trafalgar in its strongest
form may be summarised as follows. It is affirmed that he drew
up and communicated to the officers under his orders a certain
plan of attack; that just before the battle he changed his plan
without warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily;
that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and, because of
all this, that the British loss was much heavier and much less
evenly distributed among the ships of the fleet than it need have
been. The most formidable arraignment of the mode of Nelson's
last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper published
by Sir Charles Ekins in his book on 'Naval Battles,' and vouched
for by him as the work of an eye-witness--almost certainly, as
Mr. Julian Corbett holds, an officer on board the _Conqueror_ in
the battle. It is a remarkable document. Being critical rather
than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of Clerk
of Eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the
investigation of tactical questions ever published in the English
tongue. On it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable
views expressed concerning the British tactics at Trafalgar. As
it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism
of Nelson's action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we
criticise it in its turn.
Notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually
took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean
tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have
an academic tinge. In fact, they are very much of the kind that a
clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities
inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class
of students. Between a professor of tactics, however clever, and
a commanding genius like Nelson the difference is great indeed.
The writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more
general opinion of his day. He has certainly suggested opinions
to later generations of naval officers. The captains who shared
in Nelson's last great victory did not agree among themselves as
to the mode in which the attack was introduced. It was believed
by some of them, and, thanks largely to the _Conqueror_ officer's
paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas Nelson had
announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast
or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead. Following
up the path of investigation to which, in his article above
mentioned, Admiral Colomb had already pointed, we can, I think,
arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was
adhered to.
Before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be
convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that
Nelson exposed his fleet at Trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting
it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _Conqueror's_
officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in
detail'; and that 'the brunt of the action would have been more
equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually
chosen been adopted. Now, Trafalgar was a battle in which an
inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior
fleet of thirty-three. The victory was so decisive that more than
half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed
on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell
an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the
rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port
near at hand. To gain such a victory over a superior force of
seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very
hard fighting was necessary. The only actions of the Napoleonic
period that can be compared with it are those of Camperdown, the
Nile, and Copenhagen. The proportionate loss at Trafalgar was the
least in all the four battles.[84] The allegation that, had Nelson
followed a different method at Trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action
would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily. In
nearly all sea-fights, whether Nelsonic in character or not,
half of the loss of the victors has fallen on considerably less
than half the fleet. That this has been the rule, whatever tactical
method may have been adopted, will appear from the following
statement. In Rodney's victory (12th April 1782) half the loss
fell upon nine ships out of thirty-six, or one-fourth; at 'The
First of June' it fell upon five ships out of twenty-five, or
one-fifth; at St. Vincent it fell upon three ships out of fifteen,
also one-fifth; at Trafalgar half the loss fell on five ships
out of twenty-seven, or very little less than an exact fifth.
It has, therefore, been conclusively shown that, faulty or not
faulty, long-announced or hastily adopted, the plan on which
the battle of Trafalgar was fought did not occasion excessive
loss to the victors or confine the loss, such as it was, to an
unduly small portion of their fleet. As bearing on this question
of the relative severity of the British loss at Trafalgar, it
may be remarked that in that battle there were several British
ships which had been in other great sea-fights. Their losses
in these latter were in nearly every case heavier than their
Trafalgar losses.[85] Authoritative and undisputed figures show
how baseless are the suggestions that Nelson's tactical procedure
at Trafalgar caused his fleet to suffer needlessly heavy loss.
[Footnote 84:
Camperdown 825 loss out of 8,221: 10 per cent.
The Nile 896 " " 7,401: 12.1 "
Copenhagen 941 " " 6,892: 13.75 "
_Trafalgar_ 1,690 " " 17,256: 9.73 " ]
[Footnote 85:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
| | | | | | Trafalgar |
| Ship | Action |Killed|Wounded|Total|--------------------|
| | | | | |Killed|Wounded|Total|
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|_Ajax_ | Rodney's | 9 | 10 | 19 | 2 | 9 | 11 |
| |(Ap. 12, 1782)| | | | | | |
|_Agamemnon_ | " | 15 | 22 | 37 | 2 | 8 | 10 |
|_Conqueror_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 3 | 9 | 12 |
|_Defence_ | 1st June | 17 | 36 | 53 | 7 | 29 | 36 |
|_Bellerophon_| The Nile | 49 | 148 | 197 | 27 | 123 | 150 |
|_Swiftsure_ | " | 7 | 22 | 29 | 9 | 8 | 17 |
|_Defiance_ | Copenhagen | 24 | 21 | 45 | 17 | 53 | 70 |
|_Polyphemus_ | " | 6 | 25 | 31 | 2 | 4 | 6 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[In only one case was the Trafalgar total loss greater than the
total loss of the same ship in an earlier fight; and in this
case (the _Defiance_) the number of killed at Trafalgar was only
about two-thirds of the number killed in the other action.]
It is now necessary to investigate the statement that Nelson,
hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the
battle. This investigation is much more difficult than that into
the losses of the British fleet, because, whilst the latter can
be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon
conjecture. How desirable it is to make the investigation of
the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the
curious fact that the very completeness of Nelson's success at
Trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study
of tactics in the British Navy for more than three-quarters of
a century. His action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate,
so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel
in our service that Nelson's method consisted merely in rushing
at his enemy as soon as he saw him. Against this conception his
biographers, one after another, have protested in vain.
At the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to
mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered.
One of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself
are not the same operations. Another is, that, in the order of
sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind'
or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other,
but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. Also, it
may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast
may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing
into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the
same operation. Again, adherence to a plan which presupposes
the enemy's fleet to be in a particular formation after he is
found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate
tactician. This remark is introduced here with full knowledge
of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that
Nelson did change his plan without warning. No admission of the
kind is intended. 'In all cases of anticipated battle,' says Mahan,
'Nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of
his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.'
The same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that
'No man was ever better served than Nelson by the inspiration
of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.'
The plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of 9th October
1805 indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the British
fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main
divisions and an 'advance squadron,' would move against an enemy
assumed to be in single line-ahead. The 'advance squadron,' it
should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions,
but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either.
The name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships
composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, 'feeling
for' the enemy. On 19th October six ships were ordered 'to go
ahead during the night'; and, besides the frigates, two more
ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between
the six and the commander-in-chief's flag-ship. Thus eight ships
in effect composed an 'advance squadron,' and did not join either
of the main divisions at first.
When it was expected that the British fleet would comprise forty
sail-of-the-line and the enemy's fleet forty-six, each British
main division was to be made up of sixteen ships; and eight
two-deckers added to either division would increase the strength
of the latter to twenty-four ships. It is interesting to note that,
omitting the _Africa_, which ship came up late, each British main
division on the morning of 21st October 1805 had nine ships--a
number which, by the addition of the eight already mentioned
as distinct from the divisions, could have been increased to
seventeen, thus, except for a fraction, exactly maintaining the
original proportion as regards the hostile fleet, which was now
found to be composed of thirty-three ships.
During the night of 20th-21st October the Franco-Spanish fleet,
which had been sailing in three divisions and a 'squadron of
observation,' formed line and stood to the southward, heading a
little to the eastward of south. The 'squadron of observation'
was parallel to the main body and to windward (in this case to
the westward) of it, with the leading ships rather more advanced.
The British main divisions steered WSW. till 1 A.M. After that
they steered SW. till 4 A.M. There are great difficulties about
the time, as the notation of it[86] differed considerably in
different ships; but the above hours are taken from the _Victory's_
log. At 4 A.M. the British fleet, or rather its main divisions,
wore and stood N. by E. As the wind was about NW. by W., the
ships were close-hauled, and the leader of the 'lee-line,' i.e.
Collingwood's flag-ship, was when in station two points abaft
the _Victory's_ beam as soon as the 'order of sailing' in two
columns--which was to be the order of battle--had been formed.
[Footnote 86: Except the chronometers, which were instruments of
navigation so precious as always to be kept under lock and key,
there were no clocks in the navy till some years after I joined
it. Time on board ship was kept by half-hour sand-glasses.]
About 6 A.M. the enemy's fleet was sighted from the _Victory_,
and observed to bear from her E. by S. and be distant from her
ten or twelve miles. The distance is corroborated by observed
bearings from Collingwood's flag-ship.[87] Viewed from the British
ships, placed as they were relatively to it, the enemy's fleet
must have appeared as a long single line-ahead, perhaps not very
exactly formed. As soon as the hostile force was clearly made out,
the British divisions bore up and stood to the eastward, steering
by the _Victory's_ compass ENE. The position and formation of
the British main divisions were by this made exactly those in
which they are shown in the diagram usually attached to the
celebrated memorandum of 9th October 1805. The enemy must have
appeared to the British, who were ten or twelve miles to windward
of him, and on his beam, as if he were formed in line-ahead. He
therefore was also in the position and formation assigned to
him in that diagram.
[Footnote 87: It would necessitate the use of some technicalities
to explain it fully; but it may be said that the bearings of
the extremes of the enemy's line observed from his flag-ship
prove that Collingwood was in the station that he ought to have
occupied when the British fleet was in the Order of Sailing and
close to the wind.]
At a time which, because of the variety in the notations of it,
it is difficult to fix exactly, but somewhere between 7 and 8
A.M., the enemy's ships wore together and endeavoured to form
a line to the northward, which, owing to the direction of the
wind, must have been about N. by E. and S. by W., or NNE. and
SSW. The operation--not merely of wearing, but of both wearing
and reforming the line, such as it was--took more than an hour
to complete. The wind was light; there was a westerly swell;
the ships were under easy sail; consequently there must have
been a good deal of leeway, and the hostile or 'combined' fleet
headed in the direction of Cadiz, towards which, we are expressly
told by a high French authority--Chevalier--it advanced.
Nelson had to direct the course of his fleet so that its divisions,
when about to make the actual attack, would be just opposite the
points to which the respective hostile ships had advanced in
the meantime. In a light wind varying in force a direct course
to those points could not be settled once for all; but that first
chosen was very nearly right, and an alteration of a point, viz.
to E. by N., was for a considerable time all that was necessary.
Collingwood later made a signal to his division to alter course
one point to port, which brought them back to the earlier course,
which by the _Victory's_ compass had been ENE. The eight ships
of what has been referred to as the 'advance squadron' were
distributed between the two main British divisions, six being
assigned to Collingwood's and two to Nelson's. They did not all
join their divisions at the same time, some--probably owing to
the distance at which they had been employed from the rest of
the fleet and the feebleness of the breeze--not till several
hours after the combined fleet had been sighted.
Collingwood preserved in his division a line-of-bearing apparently
until the very moment when the individual ships pushed on to make
the actual attack. The enemy's fleet is usually represented as
forming a curve. It would probably be more correct to call it a
very obtuse re-entering angle. This must have been largely due to
Gravina's 'squadron of observation' keeping away in succession,
to get into the wake of the rest of the line, which was forming
towards the north. About the centre of the combined fleet there
was a gap of a mile. Ahead and astern of this the ships were not
all in each other's wake. Many were to leeward of their stations,
thus giving the enemy's formation the appearance of a double line,
or rather of a string of groups of ships. It is important to
remember this, because no possible mode of attack--the enemy's
fleet being formed as it was--could have prevented some British
ships from being 'doubled on' when they cut into the enemy's
force. On 'The First of June,' notwithstanding that the advance
to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several British
ships were 'doubled on,' and even 'trebled on,' as will be seen
in the experiences on that day of the _Brunswick_, _Marlborough_,
_Royal_Sovereign_, and _Queen_Charlotte_ herself.
Owing to the shape of the hostile 'line' at Trafalgar and the
formation in which he kept his division, Collingwood brought his
ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her
attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum. By
the terms of that document Nelson had specifically assigned to his
own division the work of seeing that the movements of Collingwood's
division should be interrupted as little as possible. It would,
of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position
of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the
memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after Collingwood was
getting near his objective point. In execution, therefore, of
the service allotted to his division, Nelson made a feint at
the enemy's van. This necessitated an alteration of course to
port, so that his ships came into a 'line-of-bearing' so very
oblique that it may well have been loosely called a 'line-ahead.'
Sir Charles Ekins says that the two British lines '_afterwards_
fell into line-ahead, the ships in the wake of each other,' and
that this was in obedience to signal. Collingwood's line certainly
did not fall into line-ahead. At the most it was a rather oblique
line-of-bearing almost parallel to that part of the enemy's fleet
which he was about to attack. In Nelson's line there was more than
one alteration of course, as the _Victory's_ log expressly states
that she kept standing for the enemy's van, which we learn from
the French accounts was moving about N. by E. or NNE. In the light
wind prevailing the alterations of course must have rendered it,
towards the end of the forenoon, impossible to keep exact station,
even if the _Victory_ were to shorten sail, which we know she
did not. As Admiral Colomb pointed out, 'Several later signals
are recorded which were proper to make in lines-of-bearing, but
not in lines-ahead.' It is difficult to import into this fact
any other meaning but that of intention to preserve, however
obliquely, the line-of-bearing which undoubtedly had been formed
by the act of bearing-up as soon as the enemy's fleet had been
distinguished.
When Collingwood had moved near enough to the enemy to let his
ships deliver their attacks, it became unnecessary for Nelson's
division to provide against the other's being interrupted.
Accordingly, he headed for the point at which he meant to cut into
the enemy's fleet. Now came the moment, as regards his division,
for doing what Collingwood's had already begun to do, viz. engage
in a 'pell-mell battle,'[88] which surely may be interpreted
as meaning a battle in which rigorous station-keeping was no
longer expected, and in which 'no captain could do very wrong
if he placed his ship alongside that of the enemy.'
[Footnote 88: Nelson's own expression.]
In several diagrams of the battle as supposed to have been fought
the two British divisions just before the moment of impact are
represented as converging towards each other. The Spanish diagram,
lately reproduced by Mr. Newbolt, shows this, as well as the English
diagrams. We may take it, therefore, that there was towards the
end of the forenoon a convergence of the two columns, and that
this was due to Nelson's return from his feint at the hostile van
to the line from which he intended to let go his ships to deliver
the actual attack. Collingwood's small alteration of course of
one point to port slightly, but only slightly, accentuated this
convergence.
Enough has been said here of Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar. To
discuss them fully would lead me too far for this occasion.
I can only express the hope that in the navy the subject will
receive fuller consideration hereafter. Nelson's last victory
was gained, be it remembered, in one afternoon, over a fleet more
than 20 per cent. his superior in numbers, and was so decisive
that more than half of the hostile ships were taken. This was the
crowning effort of seven years spent in virtually independent
command in time of war--seven years, too, illustrated by more
than one great victory.
The more closely we look into Nelson's tactical achievements,
the more effective and brilliant do they appear. It is the same
with his character and disposition. The more exact researches
and investigations of recent times have removed from his name
the obloquy which it pleased some to cast upon it. We can see
now that his 'childlike, delighted vanity'--to use the phrase
of his greatest biographer--was but a thin incrustation on noble
qualities. As in the material world valueless earthy substances
surround a vein of precious metal, so through Nelson's moral
nature there ran an opulent lode of character, unimpaired in
its priceless worth by adjacent frailties which, in the majority
of mankind, are present without any precious stuff beneath them.
It is with minds prepared to see this that we should commemorate
our great admiral.
Veneration of Nelson's memory cannot be confined to particular
objects or be limited by locality. His tomb is wider than the
space covered by dome or column, and his real monument is more
durable than any material construction. It is the unwritten and
spiritual memorial of him, firmly fixed in the hearts of his
fellow-countrymen.
X