[Footnote 59: Written in 1898. (_The_Times_.)]
The regret, often expressed, that the crews of British merchant
ships now include a large proportion of foreigners, is founded
chiefly on the apprehension that a well-tested and hitherto secure
recruiting ground for the navy is likely to be closed. It has
been stated repeatedly, and the statement has been generally
accepted without question, that in former days, when a great
expansion of our fleet was forced on us by the near approach
of danger, we relied upon the ample resources of our merchant
service to complete the manning of our ships of war, even in
a short time, and that the demands of the navy upon the former
were always satisfied. It is assumed that compliance with those
demands was as a rule not voluntary, but was enforced by the
press-gang. The resources, it is said, existed and were within
reach, and the method employed in drawing upon them was a detail
of comparatively minor importance; our merchant ships were manned
by native-born British seamen, of whom tens of thousands were
always at hand, so that if volunteers were not forthcoming the
number wanted could be 'pressed' into the Royal service. It is
lamented that at the present day the condition of affairs is
different, that the presence in it of a large number of foreigners
forbids us to regard with any confidence the merchant service as an
adequate naval recruiting ground in the event of war, even though
we are ready to substitute for the system of 'impressment'--which
is now considered both undesirable and impossible--rewards likely
to attract volunteers. The importance of the subject need not
be dwelt upon. The necessity to a maritime state of a powerful
navy, including abundant resources for manning it, is now no
more disputed than the law of gravitation. If the proportion of
foreigners in our merchant service is too high it is certainly
deplorable; and if, being already too high, that proportion is
rising, an early remedy is urgently needed. I do not propose
to speak here of that matter, which is grave enough to require
separate treatment.
My object is to present the results of an inquiry into the history
of the relations between the navy and the merchant service, from
which will appear to what extent the latter helped in bringing the
former up to a war footing, how far its assistance was affected
by the presence in it of any foreign element, and in what way
impressment ensured or expedited the rendering of the assistance.
The inquiry has necessarily been largely statistical; consequently
the results will often be given in a statistical form. This has the
great advantage of removing the conclusions arrived at from the
domain of mere opinion into that of admitted fact. The statistics
used are those which have not been, and are not likely to be,
questioned. It is desirable that this should be understood, because
official figures have not always commanded universal assent. Lord
Brougham, speaking in the House of Lords in 1849 of tables issued
by the Board of Trade, said that a lively impression prevailed
'that they could prove anything and everything'; and in connection
with them he adopted some unnamed person's remark, 'Give me half
an hour and the run of the multiplication table and I'll engage
to payoff the National Debt.' In this inquiry there has been no
occasion to use figures relating to the time of Lord Brougham's
observations. We will take the last three great maritime wars
in which our country has been engaged. These were: the war of
American Independence, the war with Revolutionary France to the
Peace of Amiens, and the war with Napoleon. The period covered
by these three contests roughly corresponds to the last quarter
of the eighteenth and the first fifteen years of the nineteenth
century. In each of the three wars there was a sudden and large
addition to the number of seamen in the navy; and in each there
were considerable annual increases as the struggle continued. It
must be understood that we shall deal with the case of seamen only;
the figures, which also were large, relating to the marines not
being included in our survey because it has never been contended
that their corps looked to the merchant service for any appreciable
proportion of its recruits. In taking note of the increase of
seamen voted for any year it will be necessary to make allowance
also for the 'waste' of the previous year. The waste, even in the
latter part of the last century, was large. Commander Robinson,
in his valuable work, 'The British Fleet,' gives details showing
that the waste during the Seven Years' war was so great as to be
truly shocking. In 1895 Lord Brassey (_Naval_Annual_) allowed
for the _personnel_ of the navy, even in these days of peace
and advanced sanitary science, a yearly waste of 5 per cent., a
percentage which is, I expect, rather lower than that officially
accepted. We may take it as certain that, during the three serious
wars above named, the annual waste was never less than 6 per
cent. This is, perhaps, to put it too low; but it is better to
understate the case than to appear to exaggerate it. The recruiting
demand, therefore, for a year of increased armament will be the
sum of the increase in men _plus_ the waste on the previous year's
numbers.
The capacity of the British merchant service to supply what was
demanded would, of course, be all the greater the smaller the
number of foreigners it contained in its ranks. This is not only
generally admitted at the present day; it is also frequently
pointed out when it is asserted that the conditions now are less
favourable than they were owing to a recent influx of foreign
seamen. The fact, however, is that there were foreigners on board
British merchant ships, and, it would seem, in considerable numbers,
long before even the war of American Independence. By 13 George
II, c. 3, foreigners, not exceeding three-fourths of the crew,
were permitted in British vessels, 'and in two years to be
naturalised.' By 13 George II, c. 17, exemption from impressment
was granted to 'every person, being a foreigner, who shall serve in
any merchant ship, or other trading vessel or privateer belonging
to a subject of the Crown of Great Britain.' The Acts quoted
were passed about the time of the 'Jenkins' Ear War' and the
war of the Austrian Succession; but the fact that foreigners
were allowed to form the majority of a British vessel's crew is
worthy of notice. The effect and, probably, the object of this
legislation were not so much to permit foreign seamen to enter
our merchant service as to permit the number of those already
there to be increased. It was in 1759 that Lord, then Commander,
Duncan reported that the crew of the hired merchant ship _Royal_
_Exchange_ consisted 'to a large extent of boys and foreigners,
many of whom could not speak English.' In 1770 by 11 George III,
c. 3, merchant ships were allowed to have three-fourths of their
crews foreigners till the 1st February 1772. Acts permitting
the same proportion of foreign seamen and extending the time
were passed in 1776, 1778, 1779, 1780, 1781, and 1782. A similar
Act was passed in 1792. It was in contemplation to reduce the
foreign proportion, after the war, to one-fourth. In 1794 it
was enacted (34 George III, c. 68), 'for the encouragement of
British seamen,' that after the expiration of six months from the
conclusion of the war, vessels in the foreign, as distinguished
from the coasting, trade were to have their commanders and
three-fourths of their crews British subjects. From the wording
of the Act it seems to have been taken for granted that the
proportion of three-fourths _bona_fide_ British-born seamen was
not likely to be generally exceeded. It will have been observed
that in all the legislation mentioned, from the time of George
II downwards, it was assumed as a matter of course that there
were foreign seamen on board our merchant vessels. The United
States citizens in the British Navy, about whom there was so
much discussion on the eve of the war of 1812, came principally
from our own merchant service, and not direct from the American.
It is remarkable that, until a recent date, the presence of
foreigners in British vessels, even in time of peace, was not
loudly or generally complained of. Mr. W. S. Lindsay, writing in
1876, stated that the throwing open the coasting trade in 1855
had 'neither increased on the average the number of foreigners we
had hitherto been allowed to employ in our ships, nor deteriorated
the number and quality of British seamen.' I have brought forward
enough evidence to show that, as far as the merchant service
was the proper recruiting ground for the British Navy, it was
not one which was devoid of a considerable foreign element.
We may, nevertheless, feel certain that that element never amounted
to, and indeed never nearly approached, three-fourths of the
whole number of men employed in our 'foreign-going' vessels. For
this, between 50,000 and 60,000 men would have been required,
at least in the last of the three wars above mentioned. If all
the foreign mercantile marines at the present day, when nearly
all have been so largely increased, were to combine, they could
not furnish the number required after their own wants had been
satisfied. During the period under review some of the leading
commercial nations were at war with us; so that few, if any,
seamen could have come to us from them. Our custom-house statistics
indicate an increase in the shipping trade of the neutral nations
sufficient to have rendered it impossible for them to spare us
any much larger number of seamen. Therefore, it is extremely
difficult to resist the conclusion that during the wars the
composition of our merchant service remained nearly what it was
during peace. It contained a far from insignificant proportion
of foreigners; and that proportion was augmented, though by no
means enormously, whilst war was going on. This leads us to the
further conclusion that, if our merchant service supplied the
navy with many men, it could recover only a small part of the
number from foreign countries. In fact, any that it could give
it had to replace from our own population almost exclusively.
The question now to be considered is, What was the capacity of
the merchant service for supplying the demands of the navy? In
the year 1770 the number of seamen voted for the navy was 11,713.
Owing to a fear of a difficulty with Spain about the Falkland
Islands, the number for the following year was suddenly raised
to 31,927. Consequently, the increase was 20,214, which, added
to the 'waste' on the previous year, made the whole naval demand
about 21,000. We have not got statistics of the seamen of the
whole British Empire for this period, but we have figures which
will enable us to compute the number with sufficient accuracy
for the purpose in hand. In England and Wales there were some
59,000 seamen, and those of the rest of the empire amounted to
about 21,000. Large as the 'waste' was in the Royal Navy, it
was, and still is, much larger in the merchant service. We may
safely put it at 8 per cent. at least. Therefore, simply to keep
up its numbers--80,000--the merchant service would have had to
engage fully 6400 fresh hands. In view of these figures, it is
difficult to believe that it could have furnished the navy with
21,000 men, or, indeed, with any number approximating thereto.
It could not possibly have done so without restricting its
operations, if only for a time. So far were its operations from
shrinking that they were positively extended. The English tonnage
'cleared outwards' from our ports was for the years mentioned
as follows: 1770, 703,495; 1771, 773,390; 1772 818,108.
Owing to the generally slow rate of sailing when on voyages and
to the great length of time taken in unloading and reloading
abroad--both being often effected 'in the stream' and with the
ship's own boats--the figures for clearances outward much more
nearly represented the amount of our 'foreign-going' tonnage
a century ago than similar figures would now in these days of
rapid movement. After 1771 the navy was reduced and kept at a
relatively low standard till 1775. In that year the state of
affairs in America rendered an increase of our naval forces
necessary. In 1778 we were at war with France; in 1779 with Spain
as well; and in December 1780 we had the Dutch for enemies in
addition. In September 1783 we were again at peace. The way in
which we had to increase the navy will be seen in the following
table:--
-------------------------------------------------------
| | | | | Total |
| | Seamen | | | additional |
| | voted for | | | number |
| Year. | the navy | Increase. | 'Waste.' | required. |
|-------------------------------------------------------|
| 1774 | 15,646 | -- | -- | -- |
| 1775 | 18,000 | 2,354 | 936 | 3,290 |
| 1776 | 21,335 | 3,335 | 1,080 | 4,415 |
| 1777 | 34,871 | 13,536 | 1,278 | 14,184 |
| 1778 | 48,171 | 13,300 | 2,088 | 15,388 |
| 1779 | 52,611 | 4,440 | 2,886 | 7,326 |
| 1780 | 66,221 | 13,610 | 3,156 | 16,766 |
| 1781 | 69,683 | 3,462 | 3,972 | 7,434 |
| 1782 | 78,695 | 9,012 | 4,176 | 13,188 |
| 1783 | 84,709 | 6,014 | 4,722 | 10,736 |
-------------------------------------------------------
It cannot be believed that the merchant service, with its then
dimensions, could have possibly satisfied these great and repeated
demands, besides making up its own 'waste,' unless its size were
much reduced. After 1777, indeed, there was a considerable fall
in the figures of English tonnage 'outwards.' I give these figures
down to the first year of peace.
1777 736,234 tons 'outwards.'
1778 657,238 " "
1779 590,911 " "
1780 619,462 " "
1781 547,953 " "
1782 552,851 " "
1783 795,669 " "
1784 846,355 " "
At first sight it would seem as if there had, indeed, been a
shrinkage. We find, however, on further examination that in reality
there had been none. 'During the [American] war the ship-yards in
every port of Britain were full of employment; and consequently
new ship-yards were set up in places where ships had never been
built before.' Even the diminution in the statistics of outward
clearances indicated no diminution in the number of merchant
ships or their crews. The missing tonnage was merely employed
elsewhere. 'At this time there were about 1000 vessels of private
property employed by the Government as transports and in other
branches of the public service.' Of course there had been some
diminution due to the transfer of what had been British-American
shipping to a new independent flag. This would not have set free
any men to join the navy.
When we come to the Revolutionary war we find ourselves confronted
with similar conditions. The case of this war has often been
quoted as proving that in former days the navy had to rely
practically exclusively on the merchant service when expansion
was necessary. In giving evidence before a Parliamentary committee
about fifty years ago, Admiral Sir T. Byam Martin, referring
to the great increase of the fleet in 1793, said, 'It was the
merchant service that enabled us to man some sixty ships of the
line and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels.' He
added that we had been able to bring promptly together 'about
35,000 or 40,000 men of the mercantile marine.' The requirements
of the navy amounted, as stated by the admiral, to about 40,000
men; to be exact, 39,045. The number of seamen in the British
Empire in 1793 was 118,952. In the next year the number showed
no diminution; in fact it increased, though but slightly, to
119,629. How our merchant service could have satisfied the
above-mentioned immense demand on it in addition to making good
its waste and then have even increased is a thing that baffles
comprehension. No such example of elasticity is presented by
any other institution. Admiral Byam Martin spoke so positively,
and, indeed, with such justly admitted authority, that we should
have to give up the problem as insoluble were it not for other
passages in the admiral's own evidence. It may be mentioned that
all the witnesses did not hold his views. Sir James Stirling, an
officer of nearly if not quite equal authority, differed from
him. In continuation of his evidence Sir T. Byam Martin stated
that afterwards the merchant service could give only a small
and occasional supply, as ships arrived from foreign ports or as
apprentices grew out of their time. Now, during the remaining years
of this war and throughout the Napoleonic war, great as were the
demands of the navy, they only in one year, that of the rupture
of the Peace of Amiens, equalled the demand at the beginning of
the Revolutionary war. From the beginning of hostilities till
the final close of the conflict in 1815 the number of merchant
seamen fell only once--viz. in 1795, the fall being 3200. In 1795,
however, the demand for men for the navy was less than half that
of 1794. The utmost, therefore, that Sir T. Byam Martin desired
to establish was that, on a single occasion in an unusually
protracted continuance of war, the strength of our merchant service
enabled it to reinforce the navy up to the latter's requirements;
but its doing so prevented it from giving much help afterwards.
All the same, men in large numbers had to be found for the navy
yearly for a long time. This will appear from the tables which
follow:--