[Footnote 50: Written in 1899. (_Encyclopoedia_Britannica_.)]
This phrase, a technical term of naval warfare, indicates a definite
strategical condition. The term has been substituted occasionally,
but less frequently of late years, for the much older 'Dominion
of the sea' or 'Sovereignty of the sea,' a legal term expressing
a claim, if not a right. It has also been sometimes treated as
though it were identical with the rhetorical expression 'Empire
of the sea.' Mahan, instead of it, uses the term 'Control of
the sea,' which has the merit of precision, and is not likely
to be misunderstood or mixed up with a form of words meaning
something different. The expression 'Command of the sea,' however,
in its proper and strategic sense, is so firmly fixed in the
language that it would be a hopeless task to try to expel it;
and as, no doubt, writers will continue to use it, it must be
explained and illustrated. Not only does it differ in meaning
from 'Dominion or Sovereignty of the sea,' it is not even truly
derived therefrom, as can be briefly shown. 'It has become an
uncontested principle of modern international law that the sea,
as a general rule, cannot be subjected to appropriation.'[51]
This, however, is quite modern. We ourselves did not admit the
principle till 1805; the Russians did not admit it till 1824;
and the Americans, and then only tacitly, not till 1894. Most
European nations at some time or other have claimed and have
exercised rights over some part of the sea, though far outside
the now well-recognised 'three miles' limit.' Venice claimed
the Adriatic, and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating
its northern waters. Genoa and France each claimed portions of
the western Mediterranean. Denmark and Sweden claimed to share
the Baltic between them. Spain claimed dominion over the Pacific
and the Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal over the Indian Ocean and
all the Atlantic south of Morocco.[52] The claim which has made
the greatest noise in the world is that once maintained by the
kings of England to the seas surrounding the British Isles. Like
other institutions, the English sovereignty of the sea was, and
was admitted to be, beneficent for a long period. Then came the
time when it ought to have been abandoned as obsolete; but it was
not, and so it led to war. The general conviction of the maritime
nations was that the Lord of the Sea would provide for the police
of the waters over which he exercised dominion. In rude ages when
men, like the ancients, readily 'turned themselves to piracy,'
this was of immense importance to trade; and, far from the right
of dominion being disputed by foreigners, it was insisted upon by
them and declared to carry with it certain duties. In 1299, not
only English merchants, but also 'the maritime people of Genoa,
Catalonia, Spain, Germany, Zealand, Holland, Frisia, Denmark,
Norway, and several other places of the empire' declared that the
kings of England had from time immemorial been in 'peaceable
possession of the sovereign lordship of the sea of England,'
and had done what was 'needful for the maintenance of peace,
right, and equity between people of all sorts, whether subjects
of another kingdom or not, who pass through those seas.'[53] The
English sovereignty was not exercised as giving authority to
exact toll. All that was demanded in return for keeping the sea
safe for peaceful traffic was a salute, enforced no doubt as a
formal admission of the right which permitted the (on the whole,
at any rate) effective police of the waters to be maintained.
The Dutch in the seventeenth century objected to the demand for
this salute. It was insisted upon. War ensued; but in the end
the Dutch acknowledged by solemn treaties their obligation to
render the salute. The time for exacting it, however, was really
past. S. R. Gardiner[54] maintains that though the 'question of
the flag' was the occasion, it was not the cause of the war.
There was not much, if any, piracy in the English Channel which
the King of England was specially called upon to suppress, and
if there had been the merchant vessels of the age were generally
able to defend themselves, while if they were not their governments
possessed force enough to give them the necessary protection.
We gave up our claim to exact the salute in 1805.
[Footnote 51: W. E. Hall, _Treatise_on_International_Law_,
4th ed. 1895, p. 146.]
[Footnote 52: Hall, pp. 48, 49.]
[Footnote 53: J. K. Laughton, 'Sovereignty of the Sea,' _Fortnightly_
_Review_, August 1866.]
[Footnote 54: _The_First_Dutch_War_ (Navy Records Society), 1899.]
The necessity of the foregoing short account of the 'Sovereignty
or Dominion of the Seas' will be apparent as soon as we come
to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series
of struggles, for the command of the sea. Gaining this was the
result of our wars with the Dutch in the seventeenth century.
At the time of the first Dutch war, 1652-54, and probably of
the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen,
believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our
part to retain, and on that of the Dutch to put an end to, the
English sovereignty or dominion. The obstinacy of the Dutch in
objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the English
flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most Englishmen, and
probably of most Dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which
other reasons may have rendered inevitable. The remarkable thing
about the Dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the
possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea. We came
out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the
greatest, naval power. It is this which prompted Vice-Admiral P.
H. Colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such
as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior
purpose,' &c. An explanation that would make all these terms
intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. It
will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts
to gain which, as Colomb tells us, the Anglo-Dutch wars were
the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the
nation whose power on the sea is paramount. It exists and may
be visible in time of peace. The command which, as said above,
expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in
time of war. It can easily be seen that the former is essential to
an empire like the British, the parts of which are bound together
by maritime communications. Inability to keep these communications
open can have only one result, viz. the loss of the parts with
which communication cannot be maintained. Experience of war as
well as reason will have made it evident that inability to keep
open sea-communications cannot be limited to any single line,
because the inability must be due either to incapacity in the
direction of hostilities or insufficiency of force. If we have
not force enough to keep open all the communications of our widely
extended empire, or if--having force enough--we are too foolish
to employ it properly, we do not hold the command of the sea,
and the empire must fall if seriously attacked.
The strategic command of the sea in a particular war or campaign
has equal concern for all maritime belligerents. Before seeing
what it is, it will be well to learn on high authority what it is
not. Mahan says that command, or, to use his own term, 'control
of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single
ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross
more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents
upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded
harbours. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions
are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however
great the inequality of naval strength.'[55] The Anglo-French
command of the sea in 1854-56, complete as it was, did not enable
the allies to intercept the Russian ships in the North-Western
Pacific, nor did that held by the Federals in the American civil
war put an early stop to the cruises of the Confederate vessels.
What the term really does imply is the power possessed from the
first, or gained during hostilities, by one belligerent of carrying
out considerable over-sea expeditions at will. In the Russian
war just mentioned the allies had such overwhelmingly superior
sea-power that the Russians abandoned to them without a struggle
the command of the sea; and the more recent landing in South
Africa, more than six thousand miles away, of a large British army
without even a threat of interruption on the voyage is another
instance of unchallenged command. In wars between great powers
and also between secondary powers, if nearly equally matched,
this absence of challenge is rare. The rule is that the command
of the sea has to be won after hostilities begin. To win it the
enemy's naval force must be neutralised. It must be driven into
his ports and there blockaded or 'masked,' and thus rendered
virtually innocuous; or it must be defeated and destroyed. The
latter is the preferable, because the more effective, plan. As
was perceptible in the Spanish-American war of 1898, as long
as one belligerent's fleet is intact or at large, the other is
reluctant to carry out any considerable expedition over-sea. In
fact, the command of the sea has not been secured whilst the
enemy continues to have a 'fleet in being.'[56]
[Footnote 55: _Influence_of_Sea-power_on_History_, 1890, p. 4.]
[Footnote 56: See _ante_, Sea-Power, p. 50.]
In 1782 a greatly superior Franco-Spanish fleet was covering
the siege of Gibraltar. Had this fleet succeeded in preventing
the revictualling of the fortress the garrison would have been
starved into surrender. A British fleet under Lord Howe, though
much weaker in numbers, had not been defeated and was still at
large. Howe, in spite of the odds against him, managed to get his
supply-ships in to the anchorage and to fight a partial action, in
which he did the allies as much damage as he received. There has
never been a display of higher tactical skill than this operation
of Howe's, though, it may be said, he owes his fame much more
to his less meritorious performance on the first of June. The
revictualling of Gibraltar surpassed even Suffren's feat of the
capture of Trincomalee in the same year. In 1798 the French,
assuming that a temporary superiority in the Mediterranean had
given them a free hand on the water, sent a great expedition to
Egypt. Though the army which was carried succeeded in landing
there, the covering fleet was destroyed by Nelson at the Nile,
and the army itself was eventually forced to surrender. The French
had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor
operations, you cannot separate the command of the Mediterranean
or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general.
Local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty
raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel;
but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring
considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything
likely to have an important influence on the course of the war.
If Great Britain has not naval force enough to retain command
of the Mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough
to retain command of the English Channel. It can be easily shown
why it should be so. In war danger comes less from conditions of
locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. Taking up a weak
position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of
his power, but it does not constitute it.[57] A maritime enemy's
power to hurt resides in his fleet. If that can be neutralised
his power disappears. It is in the highest degree improbable
that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into
fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in
which the enemy may try to do us mischief. The most promising
plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when
he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat
him. The proper station of the British fleet in war should,
accordingly, be the nearest possible point to the enemy's force.
This was the fundamental principle of Nelson's strategy, and it
is as valid now as ever it was. If we succeed in getting into
close proximity to the hostile fleet with an adequate force of
our own, our foe cannot obtain command of the sea, or of any
part of it, whether that part be the Mediterranean or the English
Channel, at any rate until he has defeated us. If he is strong
enough to defeat our fleet he obtains the command of the sea
in general; and it is for him to decide whether he shall show
the effectiveness of that command in the Mediterranean or in
the Channel.
[Footnote 57: In his _History_of_Scotland_ (1873). J. H. M. Burton,
speaking of the Orkney and Shetland isles in the Viking times,
says (vol. i. p. 320): 'Those who occupied them were protected,
not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete
command over the North Sea held by the fleets that found shelter
in the fiords and firths.']
In the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular
area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or
at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements.
When the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought
not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a
small hostile expedition may slip across, say the Channel, throw
shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home
again unmolested. Its action would have no sort of influence on
the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless. It
would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were
repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated
system of 'cross-raiding,' discarded centuries ago, not at all
for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war
could be more effectually waged in other ways. The nation in
command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal
submission of an already defeated enemy, as Russia did when at
war with Sweden in 1719; but in such a case the other side cannot
retaliate. Temporary command of local waters will also permit of
operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks;
but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the
time available. If the duration of the temporary command is
insufficient the operation must fail. It must fail even if the
earlier steps have been taken successfully. Temporary command
of the Baltic in war might enable a German force to occupy an
Aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into
permanent command, Germany could make no use of the acquisition,
which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former
possessors. The command of the English Channel, which Napoleon
wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only
temporary. It is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened
in Egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite
independently of the proceedings of Villeneuve, he hesitated to
risk a second battle of the Nile and the loss of a second army.
It may have been this which justified his later statement that he
did not really mean to invade England. In any case, the English
practice of fixing the station of their fleet wherever that of
the enemy's was, would have seriously shortened the duration
of his command of the Channel, even if it had allowed it to be
won at all. Moreover, attempts to carry out a great operation
of war against time as well as against the efforts of the enemy
to prevent it are in the highest degree perilous.
In war the British Navy has three prominent duties to discharge. It
has to protect our maritime trade, to keep open the communications
between the different parts of the empire, and to prevent invasion.
If we command the sea these duties will be discharged effectually.
As long as we command the sea the career of hostile cruisers
sent to prey on our commerce will be precarious, because command
of the sea carries with it the necessity of possessing an ample
cruiser force. As long as the condition mentioned is satisfied
our ocean communications will be kept open, because an inferior
enemy, who cannot obtain the command required, will be too much
occupied in seeing to his own safety to be able to interfere
seriously with that of any part of our empire. This being so,
it is evident that the greater operation of invasion cannot be
attempted, much less carried to a successful termination, by the
side which cannot make head against the opposing fleet. Command of
the sea is the indispensable preliminary condition of a successful
military expedition sent across the water. It enables the nation
which possesses it to attack its foes where it pleases and where
they seem to be most vulnerable. At the same time it gives to its
possessor security against serious counter-attacks, and affords
to his maritime commerce the most efficient protection that can
be devised. It is, in fact, the main object of naval warfare.